ML23100A144
| ML23100A144 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/2023 |
| From: | John Marshall, Sturzebecher K Reactor Decommissioning Branch |
| To: | Fleming J Holtec |
| Sturzebecher K | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23100A142 | List: |
| References | |
| eConcurrence 20230410-50011, EPID L-2022-LLE-0010 | |
| Download: ML23100A144 (14) | |
Text
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Docket Nos.50-003, 50-247, and 50-286
Holtec Decommissioning International, LLC,
Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC, and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3
Exemption
I. Background
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 1 (IP1) permanently ceased generation on
October 31, 1974, and all fuel was removed from the IP1 reactor vessel by January 1976. In
1996, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC, the Commission) issued an order
approving the safe-storage condition of IP1. In 2003, the NRC issued Amendment No. 52 to
IP1s provisional operating license, which changed the expiration date of the provisional license
to be consistent with that of the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit No. 2 (IP2) facility license
at that time. Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section
50.82(a)(2), the IP1 license no longer authorizes operation of the reactor or emplacement or
retention of fuel into the reactor vessel. There is no IP1 spent fuel in wet storage at the Indian
Point Energy Center (IPEC) site; IP1 spent fuel is stored onsite in dry cask storage at the
independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI).
By letter dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System Accession No. ML17044A004), Entergy Nuclear Indian Point 2, LLC, and Entergy
Nuclear Indian Point 3, LLC (the IPEC licensees at that time, collectively, Entergy) certified to
the NRC that they planned to permanently cease power operations at IP2 and Indian Point
Nuclear Generating Unit No. 3 (IP3) by April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. By
letters dated May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (ML20133J902 and ML21131A157), Entergy
certified to the NRC that power operations permanently ceased at IP2 and IP3 on April 30,
1 2020, and April 30, 2021, respectively. In the same letters, Entergy certified to the NRC that the
fuel was permanently removed from the IP2 and IP3 reactor vessels and placed in the IP2 and
IP3 spent fuel pools (SFPs) as of May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021, respectively.
Based on the docketing of these certifications for permanent cessation of operations and
permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessels, as specified in 10 CFR 50.82(a)(2), the
10 CFR Part 50 renewed facility licenses for IP2 and IP3 (Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64,
respectively) no longer authorize operation of the reactors or emplacement or retention of fuel in
the reactor vessels. The facility is still authorized to possess and store irradiated (i.e., spent)
nuclear fuel. At the time of the exemption request described below, spent fuel was stored onsite
at the IP2 and IP3 facilities in the SFPs and in a dry cask ISFSI.
II. Request/Action
By letter dated March 18, 2022 (ML22077A132), Holtec Decommissioning International,
LLC (HDI), one of the licensees of IPEC and an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Holtec
International (Holtec), requested an exemption on behalf of Holtec Indian Point 2, LLC (a
licensee of IP1 and IP2, referred to as Holtec IP2) and Holtec Indian Point 3, LLC (a licensee of
IP3, and referred to as Holtec IP3), from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) concerning
onsite liability insurance. HDI, Holtec IP2, and Holtec IP3 are hereafter collectively referred to as
the licensee. The exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would permit the licensee to reduce the
required level of onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million for IPEC.
The regulation at 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) requires licensees to have and maintain onsite
property damage insurance to stabilize and decontaminate the reactor(s) and reactor site in the
event of an accident. The onsite insurance coverage must be either $1.06 billion or whatever
amount of insurance is generally available from private sources (whichever is less).
The licensee states that the risk of an incident at a permanently shutdown and defueled
reactor is much less than the risk from an operating power reactor. In addition, since reactor
operation is no longer authorized at IPEC, there are no events that would require the
2 stabilization of reactor conditions after an accident. Similarly, the risk of an accident that would
result in significant onsite contamination at IPEC is also much lower than the risk of such an
event at operating reactors. Therefore, the licensee requested an exemption from
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to reduce its onsite property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to
$50 million, commensurate with the reduced risk of an incident at the permanently shutdown
and defueled IPEC site.
III. Discussion
Under 10 CFR 50.12, Specific exemptions, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the requirements of
10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk
to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) any
of the special circumstances listed in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2) are present.
The financial protection limits of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were established after the Three
Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 accident out of concern that licensees may be unable to
financially cover onsite cleanup costs in the event of a major nuclear accident. The specified
$1.06 billion coverage amount requirement was developed based on an analysis of an accident
at a nuclear reactor operating at power, resulting in a large fission product release and requiring
significant resource expenditures to stabilize the reactor and ultimately decontaminate and
cleanup the site.
These cost estimates were developed based on the spectrum of postulated accidents for
an operating nuclear reactor. Those costs were derived from the consequences of a release of
radioactive material from the reactor. Although the risk of an accident at an operating reactor is
very low, the consequences onsite and offsite can be significant. In an operating plant, the high
temperature and pressure of the reactor coolant system (RCS), as well as the inventory of
relatively short-lived radionuclides, contribute to both the risk and consequences of an accident.
With the permanent cessation of reactor operations at IPEC and the permanent removal of the
3 fuel from the reactor vessels, such accidents are no longer possible. As a result, the reactor
vessels, RCS, and supporting systems no longer operate and have no function related to the
storage of the irradiated fuel. Therefore, postulated accidents involving failure or malfunction of
the reactors, RCS, or supporting systems are no longer applicable.
During reactor decommissioning, the largest radiological risks are associated with the
storage of spent fuel onsite. In the exemption request dated March 18, 2022, the licensee
discussed both design-basis and beyond design-basis events involving irradiated fuel stored in
the SFPs. The licensee determined that there are no possible design-basis events at IPEC that
could result in an offsite radiological release exceeding the limits established by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agencys (EPA) early phase Protective Action Guides (PAGs) of
1 roentgen equivalent man (rem) at the exclusion area boundary, as a way to demonstrate that
any possible radiological releases would be minimal and would not require precautionary
protective actions (e.g., sheltering in place or evacuation). The NRC staff evaluated the
radiological consequences associated with various decommissioning activities and the design
basis accidents at IPEC, in consideration of the permanently shutdown and defueled condition.
The possible design-basis accident scenarios at IPEC have greatly reduced radiological
consequences. Based on its review, the NRC staff concluded that no reasonably conceivable
design-basis accident exists that could cause an offsite release greater than the EPA PAGs.
The only incident that has the potential to lead to a significant radiological release at a
decommissioning reactor is a zirconium fire in the SFP. The zirconium fire scenario is a
postulated, but highly unlikely, beyond design-basis accident scenario that involves loss of
water inventory from the SFP resulting in a significant heat up of the spent fuel, and culminating
in substantial zirconium cladding oxidation and fuel damage. The probability of a zirconium fire
scenario is related to the decay heat of the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP. Therefore, the risks
from a zirconium fire scenario continue to decrease as a function of the time since IPEC has
been permanently shut down.
4 The Commission has previously authorized a lesser amount of onsite financial
protection, based on this analysis of the zirconium fire risk. In SECY-96-256, Changes to
Financial Protection Requirements for Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Reactors,
10 CFR 50.54(w) and 10 CFR 140.11, dated December 17, 1996 (ML15062A483), the NRC
staff recommended changes to the power reactor financial protection regulations that would
allow licensees to lower onsite insurance levels to $50 million upon demonstration that the fuel
stored in the SFP can be air-cooled. In its Staff Requirements Memorandum to SECY-96-256,
dated January 28, 1997 (ML15062A454), the Commission supported the NRC staffs
recommendation that, among other things, would allow permanently shutdown power reactor
licensees to reduce commercial onsite property damage insurance coverage to $50 million
when the licensee was able to demonstrate the technical criterion that the spent fuel could be
air-cooled if the SFP was drained of water.
The NRC staff has used this technical criterion to grant similar exemptions to other
decommissioning reactors (e.g., Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station, published in the Federal
Register (FR) on January 19, 1999 (64 FR 2920); Zion Nuclear Power Station, published in the
FR on December 28, 1999 (64 FR 72700); Kewaunee Power Station, published in the FR on
March 24, 2015 (80 FR 15638); Crystal River Unit 3 Nuclear Generation Plant, published in the
FR on May 6, 2015 (80 FR 26100); Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, published in the
FR on December 28, 2018 (83 FR 67365); Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, published in the FR
on January 14, 2020 (85 FR 2153); Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1, published in the
FR on March 26, 2021 (86 FR 16241); and the Duane Arnold Energy Center, published in the
FR on May 18, 2021 (86 FR 26946)). These prior exemptions were based on these licensees
demonstrating that the SFP could be air-cooled, consistent with the technical criterion discussed
above.
In its March 18, 2022, request, the licensee compared the IPEC fuel storage parameters
with those used in NRC generic evaluations of fuel cooling included in NUREG/CR-6451, A
5 Safety and Regulatory Assessment of Generic BWR [Boiling-Water Reactor] and PWR
[Pressurized-Water Reactor] Permanently Shutdown Nuclear Power Plants, dated August 1997
(ML082260098). The analysis described in NUREG/CR-6451 determined that natural air
circulation would adequately cool fuel in the representative PWR.
In SECY-00-0145, Integrated Rulemaking Plan for Nuclear Power Plant
Decommissioning, dated June 28, 2000, and SECY-01-0100, Policy Issues Related to
Safeguards, Insurance, and Emergency Preparedness Regulations at Decommissioning
Nuclear Power Plants Storing Fuel in Spent Fuel Pools, dated June 4, 2001 (ML003721626
and ML011450420, respectively), the NRC staff discussed additional information concerning
SFP zirconium fire risks at decommissioning reactors and associated implications for onsite
property damage insurance. Providing an analysis of when the spent fuel stored in the SFP is
capable of air-cooling is one measure that can be used to demonstrate that the probability of a
zirconium fire is exceedingly low.
In their letter dated March 18, 2022, HDI stated, and the NRC staff confirmed, that the
bounding analyses for the IP2 and IP3 SFPs for beyond design basis events demonstrate that
15 months after shutdown of IP3 a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is available before the fuel cladding
temperature of the hottest fuel assembly in either SFP reaches 900°C with a complete loss of
SFP water inventory. This analysis, Holtec Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculation Methodology
Topical Report, Revision 2, dated December 22, 2021 (ML21357A005 [non-public]), was
submitted by HDI in support of a request for exemptions from certain emergency planning
requirements, dated December 22, 2021 (ML21356B693). HDI provided further information in
, Indian Point Unit Nos. 2 and 3 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Up Calculations, to HDIs
supplemental letter dated February 1, 2022 (ML22032A117).
As stated in NUREG-1738, Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at
Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants, dated February 2001 (ML010430066), 900°C is an
acceptable temperature to use for assessing the onset of fission product release, where the
6 SFP is drained and air cooling is not possible; at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would be available from the time
spent fuel cooling is lost until the hottest fuel assembly reaches a temperature of 900°C. The
10-hour criterion, conservatively, does not consider the time to uncover the fuel and assumes
instantaneous loss of cooling to the fuel. The 10-hour time period is also not intended to
represent the time that it would take to repair all key safety systems or to repair a large SFP
breach. The 10-hour criterion is a conservative period of time in which pre-planned mitigation
measures to provide makeup water or spray to the SFP can be reliably implemented before the
onset of a zirconium cladding ignition. In addition, in the unlikely event that a release is
projected to occur, 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> would provide sufficient time for offsite agencies, if deemed
warranted, to take appropriate action to protect the health and safety of the public.
In the NRC staffs evaluation contained in SECY-22-0102, the NRC staff assessed the
HDI accident analyses associated with the radiological risks from a zirconium fire at a
permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC after 15 months of fuel decay. For the highly unlikely
beyond design-basis accident scenario where the SFP coolant inventory is lost in such a
manner that all methods of heat removal from the spent fuel are no longer available, the NRC
staff found that there will be a minimum of 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> from the initiation of the accident until the
cladding reaches a temperature where offsite radiological release might occur. The NRC staff
finds that 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> is sufficient time to support deployment of mitigation equipment, consistent
with plant conditions, to prevent the zirconium cladding from reaching a point of rapid oxidation.
As a result, the likelihood that such a scenario would progress to a zirconium fire is deemed not
credible.
Based on the evaluation in SECY-96-256, as well as analysis done by HDI and verified
by the NRC staff, the NRC staff determined $50 million to be an adequate level of onsite
property damage insurance for a decommissioning reactor once the spent fuel in the SFP is no
longer susceptible to a zirconium fire. However, the NRC staff has postulated that there is still a
potential for other radiological incidents at a decommissioning reactor that could result in
7 significant onsite contamination besides a zirconium fire. In SECY-96-256, the NRC staff cited
the rupture of a large, contaminated liquid storage tank (~450,000 gallons) causing soil
contamination and potential groundwater contamination as the costliest postulated event to
decontaminate and remediate (other than an SFP zirconium fire). The postulated large liquid
radiological waste storage tank rupture event was determined to have a bounding onsite
cleanup cost of approximately $50 million. Therefore, the NRC staff determined that the
licensees proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million would be consistent with
the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost, as discussed in SECY-96-256, to account for
the postulated rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at the IPEC site, should such an
event occur.
The NRC staff has determined that the licensees proposed reduction in onsite property
damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent with SECY-96-256 and
subsequent insurance considerations resulting from additional zirconium fire risks as discussed
in SECY-00-0145 and SECY-01-0100, as well as NUREG/CR-6451 and NUREG-1738. In
addition, the NRC staff notes that similar exemptions have been granted to other permanently
shutdown and defueled power reactors, upon demonstration that the criterion of the zirconium
fire risks from the irradiated fuel stored in the SFP is of negligible concern. The NRC staff
concluded that 15 months after the permanent shutdown date of IP3 of April 30, 2021, sufficient
irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at IPEC to decrease the probability of an onsite
radiological release from a postulated zirconium fire accident to negligible levels. In addition, the
licensees proposal to reduce onsite insurance to a level of $50 million is consistent with the
maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery from the rupture of a large liquid radwaste
storage tank.
The NRC staff also notes that in accordance with letters submitted by HDI on February
15, 2023, and October 16, 2023 (ML23046A102 and ML23289A158), all the spent fuel from the
8 IP2 and IP3 SFPs has been transferred to dry storage within the ISFSI. As such, an initiating
event that would threaten SFP integrity is no longer applicable.
A. The Exemption is Authorized by Law
The requested exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) would allow the licensee to reduce
the minimum coverage limit for onsite property damage insurance. As stated above, 10 CFR
50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when the
exemptions are authorized by law.
As explained above, the NRC staff has determined that the licensees proposed
reduction in onsite property damage insurance coverage to a level of $50 million is consistent
with SECY-96-256. Moreover, the NRC staff concluded that 15 months after the permanent
cessation of power operations, sufficient irradiated fuel decay time will have elapsed at IPEC to
decrease the probability of an onsite and offsite radiological release from a postulated zirconium
fire accident to negligible levels. In addition, the licensees proposal to reduce onsite insurance
to a level of $50 million is consistent with the maximum estimated cleanup costs for the recovery
from the rupture of a large liquid radiological waste storage tank.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensees proposed exemption will not
result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commissions
regulations. Therefore, based on its review of the licensees exemption request as discussed
above, and consistent with SECY-96-256, the NRC staff concludes that the exemption is
authorized by law.
B. The Exemption Presents No Undue Risk to the Public Health and Safety
The onsite property damage insurance requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) were
established to provide financial assurance that following a significant nuclear incident, onsite
conditions could be stabilized and the site decontaminated. The requirements of
10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) and the existing level of onsite insurance coverage for IPEC are predicated
on the assumption that the reactor is operating. However, IPEC permanently ceased power
9 operations on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3,
respectively), and permanently defueled as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021
(For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively). The permanent cessation of operations and defueled
status of the facility results in a significant reduction in the number and severity of potential
accidents and, correspondingly, a significant reduction in the potential for and severity of onsite
property damage. The proposed reduction in the amount of onsite insurance coverage does not
impact the probability or consequences of potential accidents. The proposed level of insurance
coverage is commensurate with the reduced consequences of potential nuclear accidents at
IPEC. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that granting the requested exemption will not
present an undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
C. The Exemption Is Consistent with the Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemption would not eliminate any requirements associated with physical
protection of the site and would not adversely affect the licensees ability to physically secure
the site or protect special nuclear material. Physical security measures at IPEC are not affected
by the requested exemption. Therefore, the proposed exemption is consistent with the common
defense and security.
D. Special Circumstances
Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever
application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the regulation.
The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) is to provide reasonable assurance that
adequate funds will be available to stabilize reactor conditions and cover onsite cleanup costs
associated with site decontamination following an accident that results in the release of a
significant amount of radiological material. Since IPEC permanently ceased power operations
on October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021 (For IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively),
and permanently defueled as of January 1976, May 12, 2020, and May 11, 2021 (For IP1, IP2,
10 and IP3, respectively), it is no longer possible for the radiological consequences of design-basis
accidents or other credible events at IPEC to exceed the limits of the EPA PAGs at the
exclusion area boundary. The licensee has evaluated the consequences of highly unlikely,
beyond-design-basis conditions involving a loss of coolant from the SFP. The analyses show
that 15 months after the permanent cessation of power operations, the likelihood of such an
event leading to a large radiological release is negligible. The NRC staffs evaluation of the
licensees analyses confirms this conclusion.
The NRC staff also finds that the licensees proposed $50 million level of onsite
insurance is consistent with the bounding cleanup and decontamination cost as discussed in
SECY-96-256, to account for the hypothetical rupture of a large liquid radiological waste tank at
the IPEC site, should such an event occur. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the
application of the current requirements in 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) to maintain $1.06 billion in onsite
insurance coverage is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule for the
permanently shutdown and defueled IPEC reactors.
Under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii), special circumstances are present whenever compliance
would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those
incurred by others similarly situated.
The NRC staff concludes that if the licensee was required to continue to maintain an
onsite insurance level of $1.06 billion, the associated insurance premiums would be in excess of
those necessary and commensurate with the radiological contamination risks posed by the site.
In addition, such insurance levels would be significantly in excess of other decommissioning
reactor facilities that have been granted similar exemptions by the NRC.
The NRC staff finds that compliance with the existing rule would result in an undue
hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the
11 regulation was adopted and are significantly in excess of those incurred by others similarly
situated.
Therefore, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and
10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(iii) exist.
E. Environmental Considerations
The NRCs approval of an exemption from insurance or indemnity requirements belongs
to a category of actions that the Commission, by rule or regulation, has declared to be a
categorical exclusion after first finding that the category of actions does not individually or
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. Specifically, the exemption is
categorically excluded from the requirement to prepare an environmental assessment or
environmental impact statement in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25).
Under 10 CFR 51.22(c)(25), granting of an exemption from the requirements of any
regulation of Chapter I to 10 CFR, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is a categorical exclusion
provided that: (i) there is no significant hazards consideration; (ii) there is no significant change
in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite;
(iii) there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation
exposure; (iv) there is no significant construction impact; (v) there is no significant increase in
the potential for or consequences from radiological accidents; and (vi) the requirements from
which an exemption is sought involve surety, insurance, or indemnity requirements.
As the Director of the Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste
Programs in the NRCs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, I have determined
that approval of the exemption request involves no significant hazards consideration, as defined
in 10 CFR 50.92, Issuance of amendment, because reducing the licensees onsite property
damage insurance for IPEC does not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or
consequences of an accident previously evaluated; (2) create the possibility of a new or
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant
12 reduction in a margin of safety. The exempted financial protection regulation is unrelated to the
operation of IPEC or site activities. Accordingly, there is no significant change in the types or
significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite and no
significant increase in individual or cumulative public or occupational radiation exposure. The
exempted regulation is not associated with construction so there is no significant construction
impact. The exempted regulation does not concern the source term (i.e., potential amount of
radiation in an accident) or any activities conducted at the site. Therefore, there is no significant
increase in the potential for, or consequences of, a radiological accident. In addition, there
would be no significant impacts to biota, water resources, historic properties, cultural resources,
or socioeconomic conditions in the region resulting from issuance of the requested exemption.
The requirement for onsite property damage insurance involves surety, insurance, and
indemnity matters only.
Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) and 51.22(c)(25), Criterion for categorical
exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or
otherwise not requiring environmental review, no environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the approval of this exemption
request.
IV. Conclusions
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), the
exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety,
and is consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are
present as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants the licensee an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) for IPEC. IPEC permanently ceased power operations on
October 31, 1974, April 30, 2020, and April 30, 2021, for IP1, IP2, and IP3, respectively. The
exemption from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) permits IPEC to reduce the minimum required onsite
13 14property damage insurance from $1.06 billion to $50 million 15 months after permanent cessation of power operations, which was August 1, 2022. Because this period has already elapsed, the exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated:
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jane E. Marshall, Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards.November 14, 2023 Signed by Marshall, Jane on 11/14/23