ML17309A872

Provides Info from Util in NRC Ltr Dtd 961009 Re Adequacy & Availability of Design Basis Info

ML17309A872
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	02/12/1997
From:	PLUNKETT T F FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-97-28, NUDOCS 9702180197
Download: ML17309A872 (150)

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CATEGORYj.REGULATINFORMATIONDISTRIBUTIONSTEM(RIDE)lACCESSIONNBR'702180197DOC.DATE:97/02/12NOTARIZED:YESDOCKET0*FACIL:50-335St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPoweraLightCo.0500033550-,389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPowersLightCo.05000389.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATIONPLUNKETT,T.F.FloridaPower6LightCo.RECIP.NAME,RECIPIENTAFFILIATIONDocumentControlBranch(DocumentControlDesk)

SUBJECT:

.ProvidesinfofromutilinNRCltrdtd961009readequacy6availabilityofdesignbasisinfo.DISTRIBUTIONCODE:A074DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTRIENCLlSIZE:I0t'ITLE:Responsesto50.54(f)Req.forDesignBasisInfoNOTES:RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEPD2-3INTERNALFILECENTERS,KEXTERNAL:NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL11113311RECIPIENTIDCODE/NAMEWIENS,L.NRR/DRPM/PGEBCOPIESLTTRENCL1111NOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMOWFNSD-5(EXT.415-2083)TOELIMINATEYOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTIONLISTSFORDOCUMENTSYOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:LTTR8ENCL' FloridaPoworBcLightCompany,P.O.Box14000,JunoBoach,FL33408-0420L-97-2810CFR50.410CFR50.54(f)February12,1997U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionAttn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C,20555RE't.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389RequestforInformationPursuantto10CFR50.54(f)RegardingAdequacyandThepurposeofthisletteristoprovidetheinformationrequestedfromFloridaPower&LightCompany(FPL)inNRCletter(J.M.TaylortoJ.L.Broadhead)datedOctober9,1996.YourletterrequestedinformationthatwouldprovidetheNRCwith"addedconfidence"andreasonableassurancethatourplantsarebeingoperatedandmaintainedwithintheirdesignbasesandthatanydeviationsidentifiedarereconciledinatimelymanner.FPL'sresponsewasrequestedwithin120daysofreceivingyourletter(i.e.,byFebruary13,1997).Theengineeringdesign,configurationcontrol,andcorrectiveactionprocessesarediscussedintheenclosure.Theseareactiveprocessesthatareundercontinuouschangeandimprovementbasedonoperatingexperience,thecorrectiveactionprogram,andchangingregulatoryguidanceorinterpretations.Theenclosedinformationformsthebasisforourconclusionthatplantdesignbasesrequirementshavebeenandwillcontinuetobetranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures;thatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththeplantdesignbases;andthatFPLhasanadequateprocessfortheidentificationandcorrectionofidentifieddeviations.TheoveralleffectivenessofourcurrentprocessesandprogramsprovidesreasonableassurancethattheconfigurationofSt.LuciePlantUnits1and2isconsistentwiththeplantdesignbases.$8004h'rr702iSOi'rr7970212PDRADOCK05000335PPDRanFPLGroupcompany

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Page2TheEnclosurecontainsnewregulatorycommitmentswhicharelocatedintheresponsetoNRCrequest[fj.Insummary,FPLplanstocompletetheNEIInitiative(96-05)reportbyApril15,1997,resolvethe1996FSARconsistencyreviewfindingswithinatwoyearperiod,andcompletetheplantannunciatorsummaryreviewinDecember1998.Additionally,therecentNRCA/EInspectionfindingswillbeaddressedfollowingissuanceofthefinalinspectionreport,andthecorrectiveactionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiativeasappropriate,TheenclosedinformationisprovidedpursuanttotherequirementsofSection182aoftheAtomicEnergyActof1954,asamended,and10CFR50.54(f).TherequiredoathoraffirmationaffidavitexecutedbymyEngineeringVicePresident,isattached.Pleasecontactusshouldyouhaveanyquestionsontheenclosedinformation.Verytrulyours,T.F.PlunkettPresidentNuclearDivisionTFP/GRMEnclosurecc:Director,OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation,USNRCRegionalAdministrator,RegionII,USNRCSeniorResidentInspector,USNRC,St.LuciePlant St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28Page3STATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFPALMBEACHR.S.Kundalkarbeingfirstdulysworn,deposesandsays:ThatheisVicePresident,Engineering,NuclearDivision,ofFloridaPowerSLightCompany,theLicenseeherein;Thathehasexecutedthisdocument;thathehasreadthecontentsoftheattachedEnclosure,andinrelianceontheprocessesdiscussedintheEnclosureandindependentoversightofitsaccuracy,herebyaffirmsthatthestatementsmadeinthisdocumentaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge,informationandbelief;andthatheisauthorizedtoexecutethedocumentonbehalfofsaidLicensee.R.S.KundalkarSTATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFSworntoandsubscribedbeforemesidsj+dayofWr/',19~+byR.S.Kundalkar,whoispersonallyknowntome.arneofNotaryublic-StateofFloriROBERTAS.ECONOMYes:.:sjMYQQQssfONgCC993929EXPtQESJune1,199TeoNDE0THRvTMYFhN$$unAHcf,luc,Print,typeorstampCommissionedNameofNotaryPublic

'fl4r4 St.LucioUnitsIand2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePageIResponsetoNRC10CFR50.54(fjInformationRequestAdequacyandAvailabilityofDesignBasesInformation

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage2TableofContents1.0troduction....................In~~~~~~~~~32.0ResponsePreparation.............~~~~33.0SummatyofConclusions..........~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~44.0HistoricalBackground.~~~~~~~~~~45.0LA1stofActloils~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~7NRCRequest[a]"Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50.".........................8NRCRequest[b]"Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures."............~~29NRCRequest[c]"Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases."..43NRCRequest[d]"Processesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrenceandreportingtoNRC.".....................65NRCRequest[e]"Theoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplant(s)isconsistentwiththed1ttesignbases.............................................76NRCRequest[f]"Supplementalrequestforinformationondesignreview/basisprograms."~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~85AppendixA;PartialListofAcronyms.......................................88AppendixB~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~89TableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindings....,...............................89TableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviews.........................93 0

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage31.0IntroductionByletterdatedOctober9,1996,theNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)requestedinformationtoprovideaddedconfidenceandassurancethatFloridaPower&LightCompany's(FPL)nuclearunits,St.LucieUnits1and2andTurkeyPointUnits3and4,areoperatedandmaintainedwithintheirdesignbasesandthatanydeviationsarereconciledinatimelymanner.ThepurposeofthisenclosureistoprovidethespecificinformationrequestedbytheNRCforSt.LucieUnits1and2.AlthoughtheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesaresimilarfortheSt.LucieandTurkeyPointunits,theirlicensinganddesignbasesaredifferentandcertainactivitiesassociatedwithmaintainingthedesignbasesareplantspecific.Therefore,therequestedinformationfortheTurkeyPointunitsisprovidedinseparatecorrespondence.2.0ResponsePreparationTheinformationprovidedinthefollowingenclosureisorganizedconsistentwiththefive(5)Requests[a]through[e]oftheNRC'sOctober9thletter,withSt.LuciefutureactionsprovidedinRequest[f].Additionally,apartiallistofacronymsusedinthisenclosurealongwiththeirdefinitionsisprovidedasAppendixAandthedetailsofselectedFPLQualityAssurance(QA)auditsasAppendixB.WheretheinformationprovidedtotheRequests[a]throughfe]isthesame,theinformationprovidedintheinitiallocationislaterreferenced,incontext,fortheotherapplicablequestions.Referencesmadetoplantprograms,proceduresorinspections,areeithercontainedinFPLdocketedcorrespondenceorretainedonsite.Thisenclosurewasdevelopedbyamulti-disciplinedteamrepresentingtheSt.LucieEngineering,Licensing,QualityAssurance,ConfigurationManagement,Training,andCorrectiveActionDepartments.AninterfacebetweenSt.LucieandTurkeyPointwasestablishedtoaidinpreparingtheresponsesforcommonareas.PlantandFPLstaffmanagementprovidedguidanceandsupportedthedevelopmentoftheresponsebyparticipatinginteammeetingsandbyreviewingtheresponseoutlineanddrafts.ThemajorityoftasksinvolvedthereviewofhistoricaldocumentsthatdescribeprocessesandresultsofFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)reviewsandDesignBasisDocument(DBD)development.QualityAssuranceauditsoftheseactivities,aswellastheprocessesforcontrollingconfigurationanddesigncontrol,werealsoreviewed.Theprocessusedinthedevelopmentofthisresponsewassimilartopreparinganengineeringdesignproduct,inthat,therewereresponsepreparers,independentverifiers,andapprovalsbyknowledgeableplantandstaffpersonnel.ThisprocesshelpedtoensurethatthenecessaryinformationwasprovidedtotheRequests,andthattheinformationsubmittediscomplete.Duetotheevolutionarynatureofeachoftheprocessesdiscussedinthisresponse,descriptionsofprocessesareasnapshotintime.EachoftheprocessesissubjecttocontrolledchangeconsistentwithFPLprocedures.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L97-28EnclosurePage43.0SummaryofConclusionsFPLunderstandstheimportanceoftheplantdesignbasesandiscommittedtomaintainingtheplantconsistentwiththedesignbases.FPLhasconcludedwithreasonableassurancethatitsprocessesensurethattheas-builtplantisanaccuratereflectionoftheplant'sdesignbasesandtherefore,thatplantchangesdonoterodeorcompromisethesafetymarginsassociatedwithrisk-significantsystems.Whereperformed,in-depthverticalslicereviewsofdesignbasesdocumentationandtheiruseinplantmodifications,procedures,andoperations,supporttheoverallconclusionthatFPLprocessesareeffectiveinmaintainingtheSt.Luciedesignbases.FPLhasreviewedtheresultsofSt.Lucieaudits,inspections,self-assessmentsandverticalslicereviews,currentengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,plantconfigurationandperformancedocumentation,andproblemidentification/correctiveactionprograms.Basedonthesereviews,FPLconcludeswithreasonableassurancethattheSt.Lucieunitsareoperatedandmaintainedwithinthedesignbasesandthatanydeviationsarereconciledinatimelymanner.Further,itisconcludedwithreasonableassurance,thatthedesignbasesforSt.Lucieareaccurate,thatthedesignbasesandas-builtplantconfigurationandprocedureshavebeenmaintainedconsistentwiththelicensethroughreasonablyeffectiveprocesses,andthattheplantcorrectiveactionprogramsadequatelyidentifyandcorrectdeficienciesinatimelymanner.FPLhasendeavoredtokeeppacewiththelatestthinkingoftheindustryandtheNRCondesignbasesandconfigurationmanagementprograms.Bydoingso,FPLhasbeenabletoenhanceitsprogramsandprocessesovertime,improvingthedesignbasesinformationandfurtherensuringplantoperationandconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.ThenecessaryconfirmationofthishasbeenprovidedbythemanyinternalandexternalassessmentsthatcontinuallyoccuratSt.Lucie.Whiletheseassessmentshaveconfirmedanoveralldesignbasesprogramadequacy,theyhavealsogeneratedcorrectiveactionstoremoveidentifiedweaknesses.Thesetypesofassessmentsprovideforacontinualstrengtheningoftheoveralldesignbasesandplantoperation.OnerecentexampleofsuchanassessmentisthecomprehensiveNRCArchitect/Engineer(A/E)Inspection.ThisinspectionconcludedthattherewerenomajorweaknessesintheSt.Luciedesignbasesinformationfortwomajorplantsystems.Nevertheless,someimprovementactionshavebeenidentifiedfromtheinspection.Similarly,theSt.Luciemanagementinitiatedself-assessment,conductedinthefirsthalfof1996,foundageneraladequacyinthedesignbasesarea,butidentifiedweaknesseswhichmustbecorrectedtoenableSt.Lucietoregainitsformerexcellentperformance.4.0HistoricalBackgroundTheoriginalSt.LucieUnit1FSARwassubmittedtotheNRConMarch5,1973.TheoriginalSt.LucieUnit2FSARwassubmittedtotheNRConMarch24,1980.RevisionstotheFSARsweresubmittedthroughoutthelicensingprocessuntiltheoriginalNRCSafetyEvaluationReportswereissued.ThedesignofSt.LucieUnit2includedenhancementsfrompreviousindustryeventssuchastheaccidentatThreeMileIslandUnit2andthefireatBrownsFerry.These St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage5enhancementswereaddedtoSt.LucieUnit1asplantmodificationsperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50.59,"Changes,TestsandExperiments,"and10CFR50.90,"ApplicationforAmendmentofLicenseorConstructionPermit."Similarly,FPLsubmittedtheTopicalQualityAssuranceReport(TQAR).PeriodicupdatestotheFSARsandtheTQARareperformedinaccordancewiththeCodeofFederalRegulations.DuringthedesignandconstructionphasesofSt.Lucie,FPLperformedprojectmanagementfunctions.TheA/E(EBASCO)andNSSSsupplier(CombustionEngineering)performedtheengineeringandmodificationcontrolfunctions,includingoriginaldesignandanysubsequentmodificationsinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.FollowingtheimplementationofplantupgradesatTurkeyPointinresponsetoNUREG0737,areviewoftheengineeringdesignandconfigurationmanagementprocessesatTurkeyPointindicatedthattheA/Eandplantinterfacewasnotasrobustasduringtheconstructionphase.InresponsetotheactivitiesatTurkeyPoint,St.LucieimplementedtheCommitmenttoExcellenceProgram(CEP).TheCEPdidnotincludeaformaldesignbasesreconstitutionprogram,sincethevintageoftheSt.LuciePlantallowedthecaptureofmostofitsdesignbasesinformationwithintheoriginalplantdocumentation.However,theCEPdidleadtoimprovementstotheoperationoftheSt.Lucieunits.Beginningin1989,FPLbegantoassumetheA/EdesignfunctionsforbothSt.LucieandTurkeyPoint.St.LuciedesignengineersobtainedtrainingfromEBASCOandworkedhand-in-handwiththeA/Edesignengineersinthepreparationofdesignchangedocuments.Bylate1990,FPLEngineeringwasperformingdesign,productionengineering,anddesignmodificationfunctions.Theconfigurationanddesigncontrolmanagementprocesseswererevisedtoreflectthein-houseprocess.FPLhasconcludedthatthischangewasasignificantsteptowardbetterunderstandingandcontrollingtheplant'sdesignbases.In1991,aconfigurationmanagementmanualwasissuedwhichdelineateddesignandconfigurationcontrolresponsibilitiesaswellastheprocessrequirementsforplantdesign,interfaces,reviewsandapprovals.EngineeringandAdministrativeQualityInstructionsweredevelopedtoimplementdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessrequirements.Inthe1990timeframe,St.LucieparticipatedintheCombustionEngineeringOwnersGroupprojectthatresultedinthedevelopmentoftheSt.LucieDesignBasisReferenceSystem(DBRS).DuringthedevelopmentoftheDBRS,itwasconcludedthataprogramwasneededtodevelopsummaryleveldocumentswhichwouldconsolidateinformationcontainedinreferencedesignbasessources(i.e.,calculations,analyses,etc.),therebymakingitmoreaccessibletorespondtoplantoperationalneeds.Inthe1991timeframe,inresponsetotheaboveneed,theSt.LucieDesignBasisProgramwasinitiatedonanumberofsignificantplantsystemstodevelopthesummaryleveldocuments,referredtoasDesignBasisDocuments(DBD).TheSt.Luciedesignbasisprogramdidnotinvolvereconstitutingthedesignbases,however,specificreconstitutioneffortshavebeenperformedsuchastheLOCAcontainmentre-analysisandelectricaldistributionsystembasescalculations.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage6Inadditiontotheabovechronologyofefforts,St.Luciehasbeeninvolvedinvariousactivitieswhichhavehelpedtoimproveand/orvalidatetheplant'sdesignbasesanditsdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses.Theseactivitiesinclude:InresponsetoNRCBulletin79-14,"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-RelatedPipingSystems,"FPLperfor'medwalkdownsofdesignatedSeismicCategoryIsafety-relatedpipingsystemsandrevieweddocumentationoftheas-builtconfiguration.In1981,St.LucieUnit1providedanalysestojustifyanincreasedthermalpowerrating.InresponsetoNRCGenericLetter87-02,"VerificationofSeismicAdequacyofMechanicalandElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactors,"(USIA-46),FPLperformedanevaluationfortheseismicadequacyofselectedequipmentusingFPLengineersandaSeismicReviewTeamconsistingofengineeringexpertsintheareaofseismicadequacy.In1988,theFPLQualityAssuranceDepartmentconductedaverticalsliceauditontheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWatersystemdesign.In1991,theFPLQualityAssuranceDepartmentconductedaverticalsliceauditontheSt.LucieUnit1andUnit2feedwaterandmainsteamsystems.InFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconductedanelectricaldistributionsystemfunctionalinspection.In1991,FPLperformedatechnicalassessmentofthecontainmentpenetrationboundariesforSt.LucieUnits1and2.InSeptemberandOctober1991,theNRCconductedaservicewateroperationalperformanceinspection.InApril1993,FPLupdatedthecontainmentLossofCoolantAccidentanalysis.In1996,FPLperformedaFinalSafetyAnalysisReportreviewforproceduralconsistency.FromNovember1996throughJanuary1997,theNRCconductedanArchitect/EngineerinspectionwhichinvolvedtwomajorsystemsatSt.Lucie;Unit1auxiliaryfeedwaterandUnit2componentcoolingwater.In1997,St.LuciewillbeperformingaUnit1steamgeneratorreplacement.Inthecourseofpreparingforthisactivity,plantwalkdownshavebeenconductedandFSAR,designanalysis,andotherapplicabledesignbasesdocumentshavebeenreviewed.Theabovedescribedchronologyandactivities,coupledwiththeimproveddesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,providereasonableassurancethattheSt.Luciedesignbasesare St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage7adequateandthattheplantisconfiguredandoperatedinaccordancewithitsdesign.Inaddition,actionsareinprogressorwillbeinitiatedwhichwillfurtherimprovethedesignbasesdocumentationandtheprocesseswhichcontroldesignandconfigurationofSt.Lucie.5.0ListofActionsSt.Luciehasseveralplannedandon-goingactionswhichwillprovideadditionalassurancethattheunitsareoperatedandmaintainedwithinthedesignbases.TheseactionsarediscussedfurtherinresponsestoRequest[fJandarelistedbelow:5.1TheNEIInitiative(96-05)reportwillbeissuedtoNEIbyApril15,1997.5.2The1996FSARconsistencyreviewfindingswillberesolvedwithinatwoyearperiod.5.3TheplantannunciatorsummaryreviewiscurrentlyscheduledforcompletioninDecember1998.5.4TherecentNRCA/EInspectionfindingswillbeaddressedfollowingissuanceofthefinalinspectionreport,andthecorrectiveactionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiativeasappropriate.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage8[a]"Descriptionofengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesses,includingthosethatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50."Thefollowingoutlineprovidestheorganizationoftheresponsetorequest[a].1.0ConfigurationManagementOverview2.0DetailedDescriptionsofEngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcesses2.1EngineeringDesignControlProcesses2.2ConfigurationControlProcesses3.0Implementationof10CFR50.593.13.23.33.4UnreviewedSafetyQuestionDeterminationProcess10CFR50.59ScreeningandEvaluationProcess10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationNon-10CFR50.59Activities4.0EngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcessTraining4.14,24.34.4EngineeringSupportPersonnel(ESP)TrainingandQualificationShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)TrainingProgramNuclearPlantSupervisor(NPS)TrainingProgramFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)TrainingProgram5.010CFR50.71(e)ImplementationProcess5.1FSARUpdates5,2DesignBasisDocumentUpdates6.010CFR50,AppendixBImplementationProcessSt.Lucierecognizesthatmaintainingcurrentandaccessibledesigndocumentationisimportanttoensurethat,(1)theplantphysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicsaremaintainedandareconsistentwiththedesignbasesasrequiredbyNRCregulation,(2)systems,structures,andcomponentscanperformtheirintendedfunctions,and(3)theplantisoperatedinamannerconsistentwiththedesignbases.ThisisaccomplishedthroughtheSt.LucieConfigurationManagement(CM)processes,whichencompassengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrol.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-2SEnclosurePage91.0ConfigurationManagementOverviewConfigurationManagement(CM)iscomprisedofprocessesthatareusedtocontroltheplantdesignbasis,design,designchanges,physicalconfiguration,operations,maintenance,testing,procurement,installation,traininganddocumentation.TheCMprogramgoalsaretoensurethat,throughoutthelifeoftheplantthefollowingoccur:1.Designbasesareidentified,documentedandmaintained.2,Approveddesigndocumentsaccuratelyreflectandimplementthedesignbases.3.Plantphysicalstructures,systems,components,(SSCs),andprocesscontrolcomputersoftwareconformtotheapproveddesignrequirements.4.Plantphysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicsareaccuratelyreflectedinplantdocuments.5.Plantconditionsconformtotherequirementsincludedinthedesignbases,proceduresandotherapproveddocumentswhichareusedtocontroltheoperationoftheplant.6.Changestothedesignorphysicalplantareoptimizedthroughanintegratedreviewprocesswithestablishedapprovalcriteriatomakenecessarychangestothedesignorplant.7.Changestothedesignareapproved,planned,budgetedandscheduledforallphasesofthechangefromdesignthroughimplementation,requiredtestinganddocumentupdate.8.Consistencyismaintainedbetweendesignbases,designdocuments,hardware,software,andplantprocedures.ActivitieswhichaffecttheCMgoalslistedabovearecontrolledbyengineeringdesignandplantconfigurationcontrolprocesses.Theseprocessesensurethattheplantdesign,as-builtcondition,andoperationremaininconformancewiththeoriginalplantdesignbasesandsubsequentlicensingcommitmentsandrequirements.2.0DetailedDescriptionsofEngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcesses2.1EngineeringDesignControlProcesses2.1.1GeneralDescriptionTheprocesseswherebythedesignanddesignbasesaremaintainedandcontrolledincludesallplantdepartments.TheengineeringdesigncontrolprocessesarecontrolledunderFPLEngineeringQualityInstructions(ENGQl).ENGQIsaredesignedinahierarchicalfashionwithreferencetointerfacinginstructions.TheoverallgoverningENGQIfortheengineeringdesigncontrolprocessesisENGQI1.0,"DesignControl."Thisinstructionleadstheengineer/designer/usertoothergoverninginstructionsformaintainingandcontrollingtheplantlicense,designbases,as-builtdesigndocumentation,andoperations,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage10Determinationoftheappropriateprocessvehicletoinitiateadesignchangerequirestheunderstandingofthescopeoftheproposedchange.ThedesignchangeprocessisdividedintoPlantChange/Modifications(PC/M)andNon-PlantChange/Modifications(Non-PC/M).ThePC/Mprocessisfurthersubdividedintomajorandminorchanges.MajordesignchangestotheplantarecontrolledunderENGQI1.1,"EngineeringPackages,"andareimplementedusingthecompletePC/MEngineeringPackage(EP)processtoperformmodificationswhichconstituteachangetothefacility(physicaland/ordocumentation),requiringa10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.EPsusuallycontaindetailedimplementationandtestinginformationforcomplexorinvolveddesignchanges.MinordesignchangestotheplantarecontrolledunderENGQI1.2,"MinorEngineeringPackage",andareimplementedusingtheprocesstoperformminormodificationswhichconstituteachangetothefacility(physicaland/ordocumentation)butwhichdonotrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.MinorEngineeringPackages(MEP)include10CFR50.59screeningtodocumentthata10CFR50.59safetyevaluationisnotrequired.TheNon-PC/MprocessincludesDrawingChangeRequests(DCR),ItemEquivalencyEvaluations(IEE),ConditionReportdispositions,andMaintenanceSpecifications.ThisprocessalsoincludesTemporarySystemAlterations(TSA),designdocumentupdates,minorrepairs,andmaintenanceactivities.2.1.2PlantChange/Modification(PC/M)ProcessForPC/Ms,theengineeringdesignchangecontrolprocessincludes:DesignChangeInitiationDesignChangePackagePreparationDesignImplementationDocumentationUpdates2.1.2.1DesignChangeInitiationAchangetotheplantdesignmaybecomenecessaryforanumberofreasons,suchasneworchangingregulatoryrequirements,equipmentreliabilityproblems,obsoleteequipment,oroperationalimprovements.AplantmodificationisusuallyproposedbyusingtheRequestforEngineeringAssistance(REA)process.TheREAprocess,AP0005745,"RequestforEngineeringAssistance,"canbeinitiatedbyanymemberoftheplantstaffrequiringassistancefromEngineeringtoresolveplantproblems,conductengineeringstudies,reconcilediscrepancies,andupdatedesigndocumentation.Thisprocessprovidesananticipatedscope,purpose,budget,costandbenefit,design/safetysignificance,andrelativepriorityforthecandidateproject.Italsoidentifiesthesponsoringorganizationfortheproposedmodification.REAsareprocessedusingoneoftwopaths:Real-yVI'yIII,,y St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L97-28EnclosurePage11TimeSupportTeam(RTST)reviewforeasilyimplementedprojects,andPlantReviewBoard(PRB)managementreviewgroupforlargerorconstruction-intensiveprojects.FollowingtheissuanceofanREA,Engineeringperformsascope,scheduleandcostestimateforaproposedproject,includingtheevaluationofdesignoptions.Ifvariousoptionsarepossible,plantinputissolicitedsothatissuesofcost,simplicity,maintainability,usability,etc.,maybefactoredintotheevaluationforthepreferredoption.ThisinitialinformationisusedbytheRTSTorPRBreviewgroupsbeforetheydecidetorecommendfinalapprovalforEngineeringtoprepareadesignpackageandfortheimplementortocompleteprocurementandimplementationactivities.Thereviewgroupsarecomposedofplantmanagementortheirdesigneeswhoreviewandapproveprojects,authorizingtheuseofEngineeringresourcesbothforestimatinganddesigningactivities.Thereviewincludesconsiderationofthenumberofdesignchangesplannedforoutageandnon-outageworkperiod,sothatworkscopecanbescheduledandmanagedproperly.Ifapproved,theREAisforwardedtoEngineeringfordesignchangepackagepreparation.2.1.2.2DesignChangePackagePreparationThedesignengineerspreparedesignchangesinaccordancewiththelicense,designbasis,designstandards,andconfigurationmanagementrequirementsgovernedbyENGQI1.0,"DesignControl,"andENGQI1.1,"EngineeringPackages,"andENGQI1.2,'MnorEngineeringPackage."TheseproceduresareapprovedundertheQA10CFR50AppendixBprogram.Personnelwhopreparedesignchangesareappropriatelytrainedandexperienced.Thebasicstepsinthedesignchangeprocessinclude:a.Thedesignengineer(s)conductsresearchandinterfaceswiththedesignchangesponsor(s)toobtainafullunderstandingofthedesignchangejustification,scope,licensing/designimpact,interdisciplinedesignrequirements,affectedengineering/operationsdocumentation,etc.ApplicableOperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)(lessonslearnedfromotherutilities)isfactoredintodesignsordesignmodifications.EngineersstaycurrentwithFPLandnuclearindustryoperatingexperiencerelatedtoengineeringactivities.NRCBulletins,InformationNotices,otherregulatoryrequirements,internalFPLcorrespondencerelatedtonucleardesignexperience,experiencereportsreceivedfrommanufacturersandotherindustrysourcesarecirculatedappropriately.Inthedevelopmentofadesigndocument,thefollowingcomputerizedinformationretrievalservicesarecurrentlyavailableandmaybeusedtoobtaindatarelatedtodesignorsafetyanalysisinput:OEFprogram(FPL),NuclearPlantReliabilityDataSystem(INPO),TechnicalLibraryDatabase(INPO),NuclearNetwork(INPO),LERDatabase(INPO),andtheNRCIndex(INPO).b.Thedesignengineer(s)identifiesandassemblesthedesigninputthatmustbeconsideredinpreparingthedesignordesignchange.Designinputisdefinedasthesetofcriteria,parameters,basesorotherinformationuponwhichdetailedfinaldesignis

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage12based.Designchangesarebaseduponexistingdesignbasesdocumentation.Designinputsareidentifiedfromthefollowingsources:~FSAR/I'echnicalSpecifications~RegulatoryRequirements~LicensingCommitments~BasesDocuments(calculations,diagrams,drawings,designspecifications,analyses,studies,vendordocuments,DBDs,etc.)ApplicableCodesandStandardsRequirements~Equipment/ComponentSpecifications~EngineeringDocuments~RequestsforEngineeringAssistanceChangeRequestNotices~ConditionReportsThedesignorganizationperformsdesignintegrationactivitiestoensurethatallnewdesigns/designchangesareconsistentwiththebaseplantdesign,andthatconsiderationisgiventorelateddesignanddesignchangesinprogress.ThedesignintegrationactivitiesincludeareviewofinformationsourcessuchasTSAlogs,andabandonedequipmentlogs.Toaidthedesignintegration,electronicinformationsourceswhicharepartofthePassPortdatabase(FPL'scomputerizedmanagementinformationsystem)arealsoavailable.TheseincludethePC/MIndex,CalculationIndex,EngineeringEvaluationIndex,andTotalEquipmentDataBase.Thisreviewprovidesassurancethatnoothermodificationswhichareinprogresscanaffectthemodificationpackagewhichisbeingprepared.Alimitisimposedbymanagementonthenumberofmodificationsthatareprocessedatthesametimeinordertominimizeintegrationdifficulties.c.Thedesignengineer(s)performsthedetaileddesignchangeandprepares10CFR50.59screeningand/orsafetyevaluations.ThePC/Mdefinesthescopeofthemodificationandactivitiesassociatedwiththechange.ThesafetyevaluationorscreeningisamajorpartofthePC/Mandisrequiredtodemonstratethattheprovisionsof10CFR50.59aremetwhenperformingadesignmodification.Therequirementsof10CFR50.59areasubsetoftheoverallsafetyevaluationobjectives.Thesafetyevaluationaddressestheoverallsafetyaspectsofthemodificationincludingdescriptionandpurposeofthechange,analysisofeffectsonsafety,failuremodesandeffectsanalysis,effectsonTechnicalSpecifications,UnreviewedSafetyQuestion(USQ)determination,andplantrestrictions.Thedetaileddesigneffortincludeswalkdownsofaffectedsystemsandcomponentstoverifytheirfieldconfigurationandtheirconsistencywithplantdesigndrawings.Designchangepackagesundergointerdisciplinaryreviews,i.e.,conceptual,detailed,andfinal,involvingEngineeringandplantpersonnel.Aconceptualreviewmeeting S

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage13maybeheldforlargermorecomplexdesignchangestosolicitsuggestions/inputpriortocommencementofadetaileddesign.Whentheproposeddesignissubstantiallycomplete,adraftdesignchangepackageisissuedforImplementationReview(IR)sothatinputcanbesolicitedfromtheappropriatedepartmentsorgroupssuchasOperations,Maintenance,SystemandComponentEngineers,HealthPhysics,ConfigurationManagement,etc.Theearlyandfinalreviewprocessesensurethatthedesignchangeisunderstoodandmeetsthedesignbasis,designandoperationsrequirements.Theyalsoensurethattheimpactofthedesignchangeisreflectedintheappropriateplantdesigndocumentsandprocedures,andthatthefinalproductwillbeacceptableuponturnovertotheplant.Afterincorporatinginterdepartmentalcomments,thedesignchangepackageisfinalizedbyEngineering.d.Thedesignengineer(s)andotheraffectedsiteorganizationsidentifyandassemblethedocumentationaffectedbythedesignordesignchangeforinclusioninthePC/Mpackage.Documentationisupdatedandmaintainedtoreflectthe"as-built"statusoftheplant.Responsibilityforupdatingeachtypeofdocumentationisassignedtotheappropriatedepartment,functionalgroup,ororganization.ThePC/Maffecteddesigndocumentsaretrackedtoaidindesignintegration.Thetypesofdocumentsthatmaybeaffectedinclude:~FSARLicensingDocuments~DesignBasesDocuments~EngineeringDrawings~DesignSpecifications~EquipmentSpecifications~SystemSpecifications~Calculations~Analyses~VendorDrawings~VendorInstructionManuals~Databases~IndicesThefinaldesignchangepackageisapprovedandissuedbyEngineeringmanagementandisprocessedbytheplantforimplementationanddocumentcontrol.2.1.2.3DesignImplementationThedesignchangepackageisthensubmittedtoConfigurationManagement.Theapproveddesignchangepackageisroutedtoaffectedplantdepartmentsforreviewandpreparationforimplementation.Theappropriatedepartmentidentifiestrainingrequirementsandanyadditionalfunctionaltestsrequiredtobeperformedfollowingthemodification.Theimplementingdepartmentsprepareworkdocuments,i.e.,PlantWorkOrders(PWO),whichprovideinstructions

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage14forimplementingthedesignchange.Eachaffecteddepartmentidentifiesrevisionstoprograms,processes,anddocumentsrequiredasaresultofthedesignchange.TheserevisionsaremadeinaccordancewithplantproceduresensuringthatplantSSCsareinstalledandoperatedinaccordancewithestablisheddesignrequirementsandplantdocumentation.CMsubmitsthePC/MpackagetotheFacilityReviewGroup(FRG),amulti-disciplinegroup,forreviewandrecommendationtothePlantGeneralManager(PGM)forapproval.UponapprovalbythePGM,thedesignchangemaybeimplemented.TheCompanyNuclearReviewBoard(CNRB)alsoprovidesanindependentreviewofthedesignmodificationstoverifythatthechangedidnotconstituteaUSQ.BoththeFRGandtheCNRBreviewsareTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsforSt.Lucie.2.1.2.3.1ChangestoPC/MAfteraPC/Mhasbeenissuedforimplementationandpriortofinalclosure,ifaminortechnicalchangeoradocumentationchangetothePC/Misrequired,itisevaluatedfordispositionviatheChangeRequestNotification(CRN)process.TheengineeringdesignorganizationreviewsandresolvesCRNs.SpecialgenericupdatestoP/CMsareissuedperiodically.ThesePC/Msareusedtomakeequivalentreplacements,changedrawings,orexecuteminorconfigurationchangesboundedbythescopeoftheoriginalPC/M.ThesechangesareprocessedasCRNstothePC/M.IfthechangetothePC/Maffectsthesafetyevaluation,designcriteriaororiginalPC/Mintent,thenthePC/MisrevisedandtherevisionstothePC/MreceivethesamereviewastheoriginalPC/M.2.1.2.3.2PC/MClosureTheConfigurationManagement(CM)departmentistheplantorganizationspecificallytaskedtosuperviseprocessesaffectingconfigurationmanagementandtoensurethattheplantdesignandconfigurationaremaintainedaccurately.TheimplementingdepartmentprovidestheimplementingdocumentstoCMasaturnoverpackage.FormalverificationofcompletionbyCMentailsverifyingthecompletenessofopenitemsfromtheimplementingdepartment,satisfactorycompletionofPC/Mrequirementsincludingimplementationinstructions,testsandinspections,andcompliancetogoverningprocedures.2.1.2.4DocumentationUpdatesDrawingsrequiredbyOperationsforthesafeoperationoftheplantaredefinedbySt.LucieandEngineeringproceduresasPlantOperationalDrawings(POD).AspartofthePC/Mclosureprocess,thesedrawingsandappropriateplantoperatingproceduresareupdatedandplacedintheControlRoompriortotheOperationsDepartmentacceptingthemodification.Theremainingdocumentationisupdatedinaccordancewithapprovedprocedures,

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage152.1.3Non-PC/MProcessNon-PC/Mprocessesallowadministrativedocumentupdate,equivalentreplacements,andminor,non-nuclearsafety-relateddesignchanges.Thenon-PC/Mprocesses,includingdocumentupdatesandequivalentitemreplacementsareintendedforchangesthatareoutsideofthescopeof10CFR50.59,butascreeningisconductedasappropriatetoensurethechangedoesnotrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluationorTechnicalSpecificationchange.Thenon-PC/Mprocesscontrolstemporarysystemalterations,equivalentreplacements,minorscopechanges,drawingchangerequests,anddesigndocumentupdates.TheseactivitiesarecontrolledunderEngineeringandPlantprocedures.TheTemporarySystemAlterations(TSA)process,AP0010124,"ControlandUseofTemporarySystemAlterations,"maintainsplantanddesignconfigurationcontrolfornonpermanentchangestoplantSSCs,whileensuringtheapplicabletechnicalandadministrativereviewsandapprovalsareobtained.TheTSAprocessensuresthatpersonnelareawareoftemporaryplantconfigurationandthatTSAsmadetoplantequipmentdonotunacceptablydegradetheoriginaldesignintent.Tomaintainplantconfigurationcontrol,theaffecteddrawingsarestampedintheworkcontrolcenterandcontrolroomandidentifiedasaffectedbyTSA.TheItemEquivalencyEvaluation(IEE)processisusedtoperformequivalentitemreplacementsrequiringimplementationthatarewithintheboundsofamaintenanceactivity.AnIEEisrequiredifareplacementitemisnotalike-for-like(identical)replacementfortheoriginalitem.IEEsdetermineanddocumenttheacceptabilityofnon-identicalreplacementitemsbyevaluatingform,fitandfunction.Implementationofthereplacementitemmustfallintothemaintenancearena(nomodificationsorconstruction).Ifnot,theappropriatedesignchangevehicleisrequiredtoreplaceoraugmenttheIEEs.TheDrawingChangeRequest(DCR)processisusedtoperformadministrativechangestodesigndocumentsforwhichthereisanapprovedbasis(nophysicalchangeordesignchange).TypicalusesofDCRsareadministrativechangestocontrolleddocuments,orchangesincontrolleddocumentssubstantiatedbyIEEs.TheNon-NuclearSafety(NNS)modificationprocessisusedtoperformminorNNSchangesinsupportofmaintenanceactivitieswhichhaveatechnicalrelationshiporinterfacewiththeplant,anddonotaffectPODsorplantoperatingprocedures.Facilitiessuchasthewatertreatmentplantorcomponentssuchasairconditionersfortheservicebuildingmaybemodifiedbythisprocess.TypicallytheConditionReportprocessinitiatestheseminormodifications.Certainengineeringspecificationsreferredtoas"Re-use,"providegenericguidance,instructionsanddetailswhichcanbeusedforroutinerepetitivemaintenanceactivities.Theseengineeringspecificationsaresupportedby10CFR50.59safetyevaluations,ifrequired.Eachspecificationidentifiesthescopeofactivitiesitaddresses.Theappropriatespecificationscanbeinvokedwithinplantdocumentse.g.,PWOs,forroutinemaintenanceactivities,IfplantMaintenancedetermines 1~

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage16duringtheimplementationofaPWOthatthemaintenanceactivitymaynotbecoveredbytheengineeringspecificationandachangeisrequired,anengineeringreviewisprovided.Engineeringreviewsthemaintenanceactivityandeitherapprovesordisapprovesthechangerequested.Ifthedesignchangeprocessisentered,e.g.,anREAmaybeissued.2.1.4TypesofEvaluationsWhendesignchangesaredesired/requiredthesafetyevaluationprocessisutilizedtodemonstratethatsafetyismaintainedinthemodificationprocess.TherearedifferenttypesofevaluationsperformedbyEngineeringandotherqualifiedpersonnelfordifferentaspectsofplantsupport.Theseincludegeneralevaluations(studies,feasibilityassessments),operabilityassessment,nonconformanceassessmentandresolution,conditionassessmentandresolution,proposedlicenseamendments(10CFR50.90),probabilisticsafetyassessment,etc.2.1.4.1Stand-AloneSafetyEvaluationsStand-alonesafetyevaluations(SASE)areusedformeeting10CFR50.59requirementsinwhichnohardwarechangeisinvolved,thusanEPmaynotberequired.TheSASEsincludeaconcisedescriptionoftheproposedchange,whythechangeisnecessary,theeffectonplantoperationandsafety,anychangesindesignoroperatingpracticesorphilosophy,anyrestrictionsonplantoperations,whetheraUSQexistsorTechnicalSpecificationchangeisinvolved.TheevaluationalsodescribesthelicensingrequirementsincludingtheinformationnormallycontainedinthedesignsectionofanEPandtheactionsrequiredincludingshort-termandlong-termactionsbytheplantand/orengineeringdepartments.Theaffecteddocumentsareidentifiedandtheappropriatechangepackageisattachedtotheevaluation,includingalistofapplicabledocumentsusedinpreparationoftheevaluation.TheseevaluationsaresubmittedtotheFRGforreviewandrecommendationforapprovalbythePGM.AnyactionitemslistedintheevaluationaretrackedusingthePlantManagementActionItem(PMAI)process.2.22.2.1ConfigurationControlProcessesGeneralDescriptionTheconfigurationcontrolprocessesintegrateallplantactivities.TheseprocessesaccomplishtheCMprocessobjectivesdescribedinSection1.0abovebydefininganddocumentingtherequirementsformaintainingtheplant'sconfiguration(design,physicalplant,andprocedures)consistentwiththeplantdesignbases.ThegoverningproceduresfortheseprocessesareEngineeringandPlantQIsandotherapplicableplantproceduressomeofwhicharelistedbelow:ENGQI1.0DesignControlENGQI1.1EngineeringPackages(EPs)ENGQI1.2MinorEngineeringPackage(MEP) l ENGQI1.3ENGQI1.4ENGQI2.0ENGQI2.1ENGQI2.4ENGQI2.5ENGQI3.0ENGQI3.1ENGQI3.2ENGQI3.3ENGQI3.4ENGQI3.5ENGQI3.6ENGQI4.2ENGQI6.7QI3-PR/PSL-1QI6-PR/PSL-1ADM-08.04AP0006129QI PSL-1AP0010148OP0010122ADM-17.10ADM-17.03AP0006130ADM-0010432ADM-78.01St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage17DrawingChangeRequests(DCRs)ChangeRequestNotices(CRNs)EngineeringEvaluations10CFR50.59Screening/EvaluationNonConformanceReports(NCRs)ConditionReportsQualityAssuranceRecordsControlledDocumentDistributionDrawingControlVendorTechnicalManualControlFSARUpdatingDesignBasisDocument(DBD)UpdatingTotalEquipmentDataBase(TEDB)ProcurementEngineeringControlFSARReviewsDesignControlDocumentControlRootCauseEvaluationPMAICorrectiveActionTrackingSystemPreparation,Revision,Review/ApprovalofProceduresTemporaryChangestoProceduresInPlantEquipmentClearanceOrdersProcessingSafetyEvaluationsOperatingExperienceFeedbackConditionReportsControlOfPlantWorkOrdersPostMaintenanceTesting2.2.2IntegrationofConfigurationControlProcessesConfigurationcontrolprocessesestablishtheauthoritiesandresponsibilitiesforintegratingplantactivitieswhichcouldaffecttheplantconfiguration.Theyensurethattheintegrityofthedesignbasesismaintainedbyrequiringchangesthatmayimpactthedesignbasestobereviewedbytheproperorganization.Thesechangesincludephysicalchangestotheplantthatmayoriginatethroughthemodificationprocess,ordailyoperationalandmaintenancetasks,Thedesignbases,inturn,mustbeaccuratelyreflectedintheengineering,licensing,operating,maintenance,testing,training,andqualityassurancedocumentsfortheplantwithconsistencymaintainedamongthesedocuments.Design,Physical,andOperationalPlantConfigurationChangeProcessesThedesignchangePC/MpackagepreparationactivitiesareperformedbyEngineeringandmustaccountforaffecteddesignandadministrativedocuments.Designintegrationreviewsareperformedtoensurethat"open"plantchangesinprogressdonotconflictorcompetewiththe

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St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage18newdesignchange.Relationaldatabasestotrackchangedocumentsandotherdesignintegrationtoolsareavailabletofacilitatethisdesignintegrationreview.Walkdownsareperformedtovalidatethedesignchangepackagesagainstfieldconditions.As-buildingofaffecteddocumentsisautomaticallytriggeredbytherelationaldocumentcontroldatabasesuponcompletionofadesignchangepackage.PartofthedesignchangeactivityistheprocurementcontrolprocessthatprovidesamechanismtopurchaseinitialpartsandservicesforPC/Ms,andsubsequentstockreplacementparts.PlantworkiscontrolledanddocumentedwiththePlantWorkOrder(PWO)process.ThisprocessisamechanismtoprovidetheadministrativerequirementsandworkcontrolsforplantworkactivitiesonSafety-Related(SR),Quality-Related(QR),andNNSSSCs.ThePWOistheprimaryimplementingdocumentforPC/Ms.PWOsbecometheplant'shistoricalworkrecords.Whenworkiscomplete,theinformationprovidedinthePWOsisenteredintoFPL'sPassPortdatabaseforeasyretrieval.Changestotheplant'soperationalconfigurationthatarenotcontrolledbyprocedures,arecontroHedanddocumentedwiththeclearanceprocess,OP-0010122,"In-PlantEquipmentClearanceOrders."Thisprocesstrackstheremovalandrestorationofequipmentoutofservice.Theclearanceprocessprovidesadministrativecontrolsthatallowfortheisolationofcomponentsformaintenanceactivities,orforthesafetyofplantpersonnelandequipment.EachclearanceischeckedagainstTechnicalSpecificationrequirements,andrisksignificanceisreviewedpriortotheissuanceoftheclearance.Multiplereviewsandchecksareperformedtoensurethatthecomponentsareisolatedandrestoredcorrectlytooperable'status.Designchangesarerequiredtobereviewedbyinterfacingorganizationpersonnelknowledgeableinplantprocessesandconfiguration,andbysystemengineersknowledgeableabouttheaffectedSSCs,Operations,maintenanceandtestingpersonnelperforminterfacereviewsforFRG-affectedprocedures.AfinalreviewbytheFRGisperformedforsafetyimpacts.Duringimplementation,anynecessaryfieldchangesmustfirstbedocumentedandapprovedbyEngineering,viatheCRNprocess,beforetheyareimplemented.Post-modificationtestingrequirementsarepartofthedesignchangepackageandtestresultsbecomepartofthedesignchangepermanentrecords.Implementationdocumentssuchastemporaryprocedures,testresults,etc.,aresubmittedtoCMforreviewasanimplementationturnoverpackage(ITOP).Thispackageisthenusedtoprepareasystemacceptanceturnoversheet(SATS)todocumentturnoverofthemodifiedequipment/systemtoOperations.Thissystemacceptanceandturnoverprocesswhichisusedaspartofthefinaldesignchangeimplementation,requiresmandatoryapprovalfromallaffectedplantdepartments.Highpriorityaffecteddocuments(operatingprocedures,plantoperatingdrawings(POD),etc.)receivefirstpriorityforupdateuponnotificationofdesignchangeimplementationcompletion.ThesedocumentsmustbeupdatedandavailableaspartofthefinalSATS.Trainingisconductedondesignchangesandoperationsprocedurespriortofinalsystemacceptance,asappropriate.

NV~LP QeSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage192.2.2.2ProcedureChangeProcessThisprocessprovidesamechanismtomakeprocedurechangesinacontrolledmanner.Procedurechangesmaybeeitherpermanentortemporary.Newproceduresandchangestoexistingproceduresrequireasaminimum,a10CFR50.59screeningtodetermineifthenewprocedureorchangeisconsistentwiththeFSAR,TechnicalSpecificationsorwhetheraUSQexists.Ifa10CFR50.59safetyevaluationispreparedfornewproceduresorchangestoanexistingprocedure,thechangesarereviewedbytheFRG.ProceduresrequiredtobereviewedbyTechnicalSpecificationarereviewedbytheFRG.Newproceduresarevalidatedpriortouseandrevisedproceduresmaybevalidatedifthechangeisextensiveinnature.2.2.2.3DocumentControlProcesseThedocumentcontrolprocessgovernsthepreparation,issuance,andrevisionofdocumentssuchasinstructions,procedures,anddrawingswhichdescribeactivitiesaffectingquality.Documentcontrolprocessesensurethatdocumentsincludingchanges,arereviewed,'pprovedforreleasebyauthorizedpersonnel,anddistributedtotheresponsibleindividuals/organizationsforimplementationanduseasappropriate.Databasesorhardcopylogsthatidentifythemostrecentapprovedrevisionofdocumentsaremaintained.Controlsthatpreventtheinadvertentuseofobsoleteorsupersededdocumentsareprovided.Documentcontrolprocessresponsibilitiesincludeidentifying,storing,updating,andretrievingappropriatedocumentsthroughoutthelifeoftheplant.TheFSARandDBDupdatingprocessesaredescribedinsection5.1and5.2,respectivelywhichaddressestheimplementationprocessfor10CFR50.71(e)requirements.2.2.2.4QualityAssuranceRecordsRecordsaremaintainedtoprovidedocumentaryevidenceoftheperformanceofactivitiesaffectingqualityincludingdesignactivities,2.2.3DiscrepancyDocumentationandCommitmentTrackingProcesses2.2.3.1ConditionReport(CR)ProcessTheCRprocessallowspersonneltodocument,evaluate,analyzeandcorrectconditionsofconcern.CRsareinitiatedfornonconformancesandothereventsorconditionsthatmayappeartobeadversetothesafeandorderlyconductofplantoperations.TheCRprocessisnotintendedtoreplaceorduplicatethefunctionsofotherSt.Lucieprogramswhichprovideforidentification,dispositionandtrendingofadverseconditions,e.g.,PWOs,REAs.TheCRoriginatordeliverstheCRtotheNuclearPlantSupervisor(NPS).TheNPSreviewseachCRforoperabilityandreportabilityconcerns,logsitandforwardsittothePGM.ThePGMscreenseachCRandassignstheinvestigatinggroupresponsiblefortheinvestigation,analysisanddeterminationofcorrectiveactionsifrequired.TheConditionReportOversightGroup(CROG)reviewsdailytheCRsgeneratedinordertoverifyreportability,outagesignificance,andclassificationofcondition.

~I.Il St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage20ThedispositioningDepartmentHeaddeterminesiftherootcauseisadequatelyidentifiedandifthecorrectiveactionsareadequatetopreventrecurrence.ClosingaCRrequiresthatthePGMacceptssatisfactorilycompletedevaluations.Ifthecorrectiveactionscannotcompletedwithinthedesignatedtimeframe,theremainingopenitemsaretransferredtothePlantManagementActionItem(PMAI)orothertrackingsystem.2.2.3.2NonconformanceReport(NCR)ProcessTheNCRisconsideredasubsetoftheCRprocesswhichprovidesameansforcapturingpotentialorrealconcernswithrespecttotheplant,andallowsfortheircorrectionusingotherexistingandintegralplantprocesses,e.g.,thePC/Mprocess,PWO.NonconformanceshavehistoricallybeenaddressedusinganNCR.TheNCRprovidesamechanismfordocumentingtheidentificationofanonconformance,gettingappropriatereviews,andresolvingthenonconformanceortakingcorrectiveactions.Thisprocessisusedtocollectdataforfutureimprovements.EngineeringevaluatestheNCRandprovidesanappropriatedisposition(i.e.,correctiveaction,ifany)totheNCRforimplementation.2.2.3.3PlantManagementActionItem(PMAI)ProcessThePMAIprocessprovidesamethodforcontrollingandschedulingcorrectiveactionstomeetinternalcommitmentsandensuresfollow-upandclosureoflong-termcorrectiveactionsgeneratedbytheCRprocess.ThePMAIisatrackingsystemwhichfollowsthecorrectiveactionstocompletionandgivestheitemsvisibilitywithintheplantorganization.2.2.3.4CommitmentTrackingProcessAcommitmenttrackingprocessisinplacetoprovideamethodofidentifyingandtrackingcommitments.SourcesofcommitmentsincludeLicenseeEventReports,NoticeofViolationresponses,NRCrequirements,INPOorinternalauditfindings,andNRCsafetyevaluationreports.Themajorobjectiveoftheprocessistoassurecompletionofthecommitmentsinatimelymanner.3.0Implementationof10CFR50.59The10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprovidesassurancethatthedocumentedinformationusedbytheNRC,asabasisforlicensingthefacility,remainsvalidinlightoftheproposedchanges.FPLusesNSAC125asguidanceforsafetyevaluationsand10CFR50.59screenings.Whenproposeddesignchangesaredesiredorrequired,the10CFR50.59processdeterminesifthechangerequiresarevisiontoTechnicalSpecificationsorifthechangeconstitutesaUSQ.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage213.1UnreviewedSafetyQuestionDeterminationProcessChangestothefacility,proceduresdescribedintheFSAR,oratestoranexperimentnotdescribedintheFSARarescreenedfortheneedtodetermineifaUSQexists.Thissectiondiscussesthedefinitionsofachange,the10CFR50.59screeningprocess,andthepreparationofaformalsafetyevaluationinaccordancewith10CFR50.59.3.1.1ChangetotheFacilityChangestothefacilityincludeadditionsordeletionsofSSCsdescribedintheFSAR,modificationswhichaffectdesignfunctionormethodofperformingafunctionofanSSC,andtemporarymodifications.3.1.2ChangetotheProceduresFPLrevisesproceduresasdescribedintheFSARwithoutpriorNRCapprovalprovidedthechangedoesnotinvolveaTechnicalSpecificationchangeoraUSQ.Proceduresthatmayrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluationarethosethatareoutlined,summarizedorcompletelydescribedintheFSAR.3.1.3TestsandExperimentsTestsandexperimentsthatrequirea10CFR50.59safetyevaluationarethosethatarenotdiscussedintheFSAR,butarewithinthescopeoftheFSAR,i.e.,testsandexperimentswhichcoulddegradethemarginsofsafetyduringnormaloperations,anticipatedtransients,orthatcoulddegradetheadequacyofSSCstopreventaccidentsormitigateaccidentconditions.10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsarealsorequiredforchangestotestsorexperimentsthataredescribedintheFSAR.3.210CFR50.59ScreeningandEvaluationProcessSt.Luciefacilitychangesareevaluatedfor10CFR50.59applicability.Thisevaluationisreferredtoasa10CFR50.59screening.Formalsafetyevaluationsarepreparedforthosechangesthatfallwithinthescopeandintentofthe10CFR50.59rule.Theapplicableprocedurestothedesignchangeprocesscontainguidanceonscreeningcriteria.Thefollowingcriteriaareusedinscreeningactivitiesfor10CFR50.59applicability:1.DoesthechangerepresentachangetothefacilityasdescribedintheFSAR?2.DoesthechangerepresentachangetoproceduresasdescribedintheFSAR?3.IsthechangeassociatedwithatestorexperimentnotdescribedintheFSAR?

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage224.CouldthechangeaffectNuclearsafetyinawaynotpreviouslyevaluatedintheFSAR?5.DoesthechangerequireachangetotheTechnicalSpecifications?Apositiveresponsetoanyofquestions1-4requiresaformal10CFR50.59safetyevaluation.Apositiveresponsetoquestion5requiresalicenseamendmentinaccordancewith10CFR50.90priortochangeimplementation.Furthermore,adesignchangewhichrequiresachangetotheTechnicalSpecificationsrequiresNRCreviewandapprovalofalicenseamendmentpriortoimplementingthechange.3.3The10CFR50.59SafetyEvaluationForthepurposeofasafetyevaluationthe10CFR50.59criteriahavebeenexpandedintosevenquestionsforclarity:1.DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?2.DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?3.DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheprobabilityofoccurrenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?4.DoestheproposedactivityincreasetheconsequenceofamalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?5.DoestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibilityofanaccidentofadifferenttypethananypreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?6.DoestheproposedactivitycreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofmalfunctionofequipmentimportanttosafetythanpreviouslyevaluatedintheSAR?7.DoestheproposedactivityreducethemarginofsafetyasdefinedinthebasisforanyTechnicalSpecifications?Basedupontheanswerstothesequestions,adeterminationismadeifaUSQexistsoraTechnicalSpecificationchangeisrequired.Ifeitherexists,NRCreviewandapprovalofalicenseamendmentisobtainedpriortothechangebeingimplemented.Theprimaryparticipantsinthe10CFR50.59safetyevaluationpreparationareasfollows;~~~~~~~~~a.Preparer:Aproperlytrainedandqualifiedpreparerwhoisfamiliarwiththe50.59processdevelopsanunderstandingofthedesignbasisoftheplantandapplicable St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage23regulatoryrequirements.Thedesignchangeunderconsiderationtypicallyfallswithinthepreparer'sfieldofexpertise.b.Emmy:Aproperlytrainedandqualifiedreviewerthathasnotbeenparticipatinginthepreparationofthe50.59evaluationverifiestheacceptabilityofthesafetyevaluation.c.ZRQ:TheFRGiscomposedofdesigneesrepresentingthefunctionalareasoftheplantandprovidesamulti-disciplinereviewofthesafetyevaluationsinaccordancewith10CFR50.59guidelinesandconcurswiththedeterminationthataUSQdoesnotexistandnoTechnicalSpecificationchangeisrequired.Additionally,thefollowingafter-the-factreviewsareconducted:d.Q5RB:Anoffsitesafetyreviewboard,theCNRB,composedofofficers,managers,orspecialistindesign,operations,safetyanalysisorrelatedactivities,withextensivenuclearplantexpertiseisresponsibleforthereviewofevaluationspreparedaccordingto10CFR50.59guidelines.ThepurposeofthereviewistoconfirmthechangedoesnotconstituteaUSQandnoTechnicalSpecificationchangeisrequired,e.~:QualityAssuranceperformsperiodicauditsoforganizationsinvolvedinthe10CFR50.59evaluationprocess,Auditresultsaredocumentedandreviewedbymanagementhavingresponsibilityinthespecificareasaudited.Correctiveactionsaredocumentedandfollow-upauditsareperformed,ifrequired.The10CFR50.59safetyevaluationprocessisappliedtopotentialdesign,physicalplantandproceduralchangesthatmayimpacttheplantlicense,designbasesortheFSAR.However,therearechangestotheplantwhicharenotgovernedbythe10CFR50.59requirementsandaremanagedunderSt.Lucieprocedures.Thesearereferredtoasnon-10CFR50.59activitiesasdiscussedbelow.3.4Non-10CFR50.59ActivitiesPlantactivities,controlledundervariousadministrative,engineering,operationsandmaintenanceprocedures,whicharenotnormallyconsidereddesignactivities,butwhichcouldpossiblyaffectthedesignbasisarescreenedfor10CFR50.59applicability.Eachprocedurecontrollingtheseactivitiescontainsarequirementtoperforma10CFR50.59screening.Thesescreeningsareperformedbyqualifiedpersonneltrainedonthe10CFR50.59requirements.4.0EngineeringDesignandConfigurationControlProcessTrainingSt.Lucietrainingincludesindoctrination,technicalandcontinuationtrainingforengineeringandsupportinginterfacedepartmentpersonnel.Thistrainingprovidesinstructionandon-the-jobtrainingrequiredtoensurecompliancewithSt.Lucieprocedures/policiesregardingplant St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage24activities,includingdesign.FormaltrainingactivitiesaregovernedbytwoQualityInstructions:QI2-PR/PSL-2,"IndoctrinationandTrainingofSt.LuciePersonnel,"andQI1-PR/PSL-11,"SiteServicesOrganization."TrainingmaterialsaredevelopedfromandmaintainedconsistentwithcurrentlyissuedFPLandSt.Lucieplantdesigndocumentation,proceduresandpolicies.TheSt.LucieTrainingDepartmentisondistributionforupdatedplantdesignbasesdocuments,proceduresandFPLpolicynotices.Inaddition,theSt.LucieTrainingDepartmentisondistributionforrelevantNRCandindustrycorrespondenceregardingpowerplantrequirementsandactivities.Neworrevisedtrainingmaterialsaredevelopedwhicharecurrentwiththebestindustrypractices.Trainingassociatedwithdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesthatimplement10CFR50.59,10CFR50.71(e),andAppendixBto10CFRPart50arediscussedinthefollowingsections.4.1EngineeringSupportPersonnel(ESP)TrainingandQualificationInitialindoctrinationtrainingforengineeringsupportpersonnelincludesabasicreviewoftheplantQIsandproceduresassociatedwiththeconfigurationcontrolprocess,theplantmodificationprocess,theuseofa10CFR50.59safetyevaluationtomodifytheplantoridentifyanunreviewedsafetyquestion.EachofthereviewsispartoftheinitialindoctrinationtrainingsectionoftheINPOaccreditedESPTrainingProgramforallnewengineeringsupportpersonnel.TheESPQualificationGuidesprovideindividualqualificationrequirements.Thesequalificationrequirementsarebasedonanevaluationoftheindividual'seducation,previousexperienceandtechnicaltraining.Thetrainingrequiredforeachindividualisspecifiedbythedepartmentsupervisor.4.2ShiftTechnicalAdvisor(STA)TrainingProgramTheSTAisresponsibleforreviewingprocedurechangesforapplicabilitytotherequirementsof10CFR50.59.STAsaretrainedontherequirementsof10CFR50.59andtherequirementsoftheCRprocess.4.3NuclearPlantSupervisor(NPS)TrainingProgramTheNPSisresponsibleforreviewingCRsforsafetyissuesandoperabilityconcerns.TheNPStrainingprogramcontainsspecificlessonsonplantchangesinaccordancewith10CFR50.59andapplyingtheplant'sdesignbasistooperations.4.4FacilityReviewGroup(FRG)TrainingProgramTrainingon10CFR50.59requirementsispresentedaspartoftheFRGinitialandrequalificationtraining.ItisdesignedtointroduceFRGmembersandalternatestotheirresponsibilitiesasrelatedtoFRGreviewofprocedureanddesignchanges.

Ngg~'+Ir St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage255.010CFR50.71(e)ImplementationProcessTheengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesdescribedintheresponsetothisrequest,detailtheactivitiesthatensuretheaccuracyofthechangeswhicharemadetotheFSAR.5.1FSARUpdatesTheSt.LucieUnit1andUnit2FSARswereoriginallysubmittedtotheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC),aspartoftheoperatinglicenseapplication,andaremaintainedandupdatedinaccordancewiththerequirementsof10CFR50.71(e)(3)(l).AmendmentsreflectFSARchangesuptoamaximumof6monthspriortothedateoffiling.SpecialFSARamendmentsmaybesubmittedtotheNRCmorefrequentlythantheminimumrequiredby10CFR50.71(e).ENGQI3.4,"FSARUpdating,"providestheinstructionsforupdatingtheFSARinaccordancewith10CFR50.71(e),FSARamendmentsconsiderthefollowingcategoriesofitemsimplemented,revised,oridentifiedsincethelastamendment:~Changesmadeinthefacility/proceduresasdescribedintheFSAR~Safetyanalysesperformedinsupportoflicenseamendments~Safetyevaluationsperformedper10CFR50.59~SafetyevaluationsperformedattherequestoftheNRC~NewormodifiedNRCrequirements~ChangesmadetodrawingscontainedintheFSAR~CommitmentsinFPL'orrespondencetotheNRC~CorrectionstotheFSAR~ChangestodesignbasesordesigncriteriaidentifiedintheFSAR~Changestoquality,procedural,test,inspection,orothercriteriacitedintheFSAR~AbandonedequipmentnotedintheFSAREngineeringdesignchangesareprocedurallyrequiredtoaddresstheimpactontheFSARaspartoftheengineeringdesignchangeprocess,andtoincludeproposedchangestotheFSARwiththeissuanceofeachdesignchangepackage,asapplicable.ThisprocessprovidesacomprehensivemechanismforcapturingchangestotheFSARandfortheirincorporationintothedesignbases.ChangestothefacilitymayaffecttheFSARdescriptionsandassociatedaccidentanalyses.Engineeringdesignoutputs,e.g.,EPs,stand-aloneSafetyEvaluations,whichimpacttheFSARincludeanFSARChangePackage(FCP)asanattachmenttothedocument.FCPsarereviewed,andifadequate,areincorporatedintothenextamendmentoftheFSARfollowingtheimplementationofthechange,Plantdesignchangesimplementedduringtheupdateperiodandall10CFR50.59safety~~~~~~~~~~evaluationsarereviewedforimpactontheFSAR.Whenachangeisproposed,theorganizationinitiatingthechangedetermineswhetherthechangewillresultintherevisionofanydocuments.

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St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage26Changestolicensingdocumentscanresultfromdesignchanges,as-foundconditions,evaluations,procedurerevisions,andNRCrequirements.FPLresponsestoNRCInformationrequests,IEBulletins/Circulars/InformationNotices,FPLcorrespondencetoandfromtheNRC,etc.mayaffecttheFSAR.IncomingandoutgoingNRCcorrespondenceisreviewedforimpactontheFSAR.IfitisdeterminedthatanFSARchangeisrequired,anFCPispreparedalongwithanynecessarysupportingevaluations.TheintentoftheNRCcorrespondencereviewistoidentifyanddocumentNRCrequirementsthatimpactthedesign,operation,ormaintenanceofthefacility,regardlessofthelevelofdetailassociatedwiththerequirement.CommitmentsinNRCcorrespondencetoimplementphysicalchangestothefacilityarenotincorporatedintothenextFSARrevision.Physicalchangesareonlyincorporatedafterimplementationandturnoverforuse.Stand-alonesafetyevaluationsthatrequireFSARchangeshaveanFCPattached.Engineeringreviewsstand-alonesafetyevaluationsforwardedbyotherdepartmentsand/orcontractorsforpotentialFSARimpact.FCPsaredevelopedasnecessary.TheFSARusercommentform,whichisproceduralized,permitstheFSARusertoidentifyactualorperceiveddiscrepanciesinthecontentoraccuracyoftheFSAR.FSARusercommentsconcerningthecontentoftheFSARareforwardedtoEngineeringforreviewandincorporationintotheFSAR.TheFSARusercommentisreviewedtodetermineifenoughinformationisprovided.InordertobeprocessedforinclusioninanFSARamendment,theusercommentmustmeetoneofthefollowingcriteria:I)Editorial,suchthatback-updocumentationisnotrequired.2)Providingsufficientbases,e.g.,safetyevaluation,PC/Mreference,orequivalencyjustificationtoshowthatthedesiredchangehasbeenevaluatedand/oranalyzed.Ifthecriteriastatedaboveisnotmet,thedeficienciesaredocumentedontheusercommentformandreturnedtotheoriginator.Iftheusercommentisadequate,itisforwardedtothecognizantdisciplineforreviewanddisposition.(Notethatusercomm'entsaretypicallyforwardedtoEngineeringaspartofaCR.)Ifavaliderrororconcernisidentified,thecommentprocesswillinitiatethoseactivitiesrequiredtocorrect/updatetheFSARpriortosubmittaltotheNRC.AcompletedFSARamendmentisreviewedforaccuracyandcompletenessbytheappropriateplantdepartmentspriortosubmittaltotheNRC.5.2DesignBasisDocumentUpdatesTheDesignBasisDocuments(DBD)forSt.Luciehavebeenissued.Somechangepackagestothisdocumenthavebeengeneratedbuthavenotbeenincorporatedintothedocument.PeriodicupdatesareplannedonascheduleconsistentwiththeFSARandwillfollowtheprocessforupdatinginaccordancewithENGQI3.5,"DesignBasisDocument(DBD)Updating."

I'V St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage27DBDupdatesconsiderthefollowingcategoriesofitemsimplemented,revised,oridentifiedsincethelastrevision;~ChangestodesignbasesordesigncriteriaidentifiedintheDBD~Changesmadeinthesystems/componentsdescribedintheDBD~Safetyevaluationsperformedper10CFR50.59~Safetyevaluationsperformedinsupportoflicenseamendments~SafetyevaluationsperformedattherequestoftheNRC~NewormodifiedNRCrequirements~CommitmentsinFPLcorrespondencetotheNRC~ChangesmadetofigurescontainedintheDBD~CorrectionstotheDBDChangestothefacilitymayaffecttheDBDdescriptions.ThesechangesmayresultfromdesignchangesissuedbyEngineering,Contractors,orotherSt.Luciedepartments.Engineeringdesignoutputs,e.g.,EPs,MEPs,DCRs,evaluations,whichimpacttheDBDincludeaDBDChangePackage(DCP)asanattachmenttothedocument.ThelevelofdetailandformatprovidedinDBDupdatesareconsistentwiththelevelofdetailandformatcontainedintheoriginalDBD.ThereviewofNRC/FPLcorrespondenceandstand-alonesafetyevaluationsforimpactontheDBDisthesameasthemethodusedtoreviewtheFSARupdatesdiscussedinSection5.1.DBDusercommentformsareproceduralizedandusedsimilartoFSARusercommentforms(seeSection5.1)toidentifyactualorperceiveddiscrepanciesincontentoraccuracyoftheDBD.PriortoissuingaDBDupdate,areviewoftherevisedDBDiscoordinatedwithapplicabledepartmentsandorganizations.6.010CFR50,AppendixBImplementationProcessTheFPLQualityAssurance(QA)ProgramisdescribedintheFPLTopicalQAReport(TQAR)andisstructuredtobeincompliancewiththerequirementsofAppendixBto10CFRPart50.TheTQARdelineatestheQAProgramrequirementsandsummarizestheFPLapproachtoactivitiesrelatedtomaterials,parts,components,systemsandservicesincludedintheQAProgram.TheTQARstatesthataQAProgrambeestablishedfordesign-relatedactivities.Morespecifically,theTQARprovidesthegeneralguidancethatthedesigncontrolprogrammustensurethatthedesignisdefined,controlledandverified,thatapplicabledesigninputsarespecifiedandcorrectlytranslatedintodesignoutputdocuments;thatdesigninterfacesareidentifiedandcontrolled;thatdesignadequacyisverifiedbypersonsotherthanthosewhodesignedtheitem;andthatdesignchanges,includingfieldchanges,aregovernedbycontrolmeasurescommensuratewiththoseappliedtotheoriginaldesign.ThegeneraldesignrequirementsdescribedintheTQARareimplementedthroughQIs.Foreachapplicablecriterionin10CFR50,AppendixB,thereisacorrespondingEngineeringandPlantQIorseriesofQIsthatcomplywiththecriterioninAppendixB.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage28ThedesignrecordsaredevelopedtoprovideevidencethatthedesignprocessanddesignverificationwereperformedinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSt.Lucie'sQAProgram.QIsaredevelopedasrequiredbyeachoftheimplementingdepartmentsthatdescribethemeasurestobeusedtoimplementthequalityassurancerequirements.QIsdescribeactionsandresponsibilitiestobeperformedwithinadepartmentororganizationandaddresstherequirementsoftheappropriateTQARrequirements.QAperformsperiodicauditsoftheconfigurationcontrolprocesses.TheFPLTQARrequiresthatauditsberegularlyscheduledforon-goingactivities,andthescopeofthoseauditsincludethepreparation,review,approvalandcontroloftheFSAR,designs,specifications,procurementdocuments,instructions,procedures,anddrawings.QIsrequireabiennialfunctionalareaauditofdesignandconfigurationcontroltobeperformedbytheQAorganization.Designcontrolisalsoauditedduringauditsofotherfunctionalareassuchasfireprotection,fuels,refuelingoperations,environmentalprotection,andprotectionandcontrol.Activityauditsofspecificdesignandconfigurationcontrolissuesmaybeperformedatanytime.Inaddition,reviewsofsafety-relatedandnonsafetyrelatedSSCshavebeenperformedaspartofauditsandtechnicalreviews.Also,St.Lucieproceduresrequirethatproceduresandinstructions(includingthoserelatedtodesignandconfigurationcontrol)bereviewedbyQAforcompliancewiththeTQAR,andotherapplicableindustrystandardsandrequirements.TQR18.0,"Audits,"requiresthatQAAuditFindingsbeissuedtotheresponsiblemanagementoftheauditedorganization,whoarerequiredtocorrectthedeficienciesidentifiedintheauditreportandtakeactionstopreventtheirrecurrence.ThestatusofcorrectiveactionsaretrackedbyQAuntilthecorrectiveactionshavebeenaccomplishedandverifiedbyQA.

St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePago29[b]"Rationaleforconcludingthatdesignbasesrequirementsaretranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures."Thefollowingoutlineprovidestheorganizationoftheresponsetorequest[b]:1.0Introduction2.0ProgramsAffectingDesignBasis2.1CommitmenttoExcellenceProgram2.1.1OperatingProcedureUpgradeProject2.1.2TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProject2.2DesignBasisProgram2.2.1DesignBasisDocumentDevelopment2.2.2DesignBasisDocumentUseandMaintenance3,0RecentDesign-RelatedProjects3.1PlantProcedureImprovementProgram3.2ContainmentPenetrationReview3.3InstrumentSetpointVerification4.0FunctionalReviewandVerificationofDesignBasisTranslationintoProcedures4.14.24.34.44.54.64.7FSARProceduralConsistencyReviewAnnunciatorSummaryReviewIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroupInserviceInspectionandTestingProgramsSurveillanceTestingNRCInspections4.6.1EmergencyOperatingProcedureTeamInspection4.6.2OperationalSafetyTeamInspection4.6.3MaintenanceTeamInspection4.6.4EquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationInspection4.6,5ConclusionfromNRCInspectionEffortsFPLAudits,Self-AssessmentsandFindings4.7.1AuditFindingsandStrengths4.7.21996PlantSelf-Assessment5.0Conclusion b'

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage301.0IntroductionFPLhasreviewedtheprocessesusedtolicense,design,operateandtesttheSt.LuciePlants.Thisreviewhasindicatedthattheprocesseswillmaintainthedesignbasisandassurethatoperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedurespreservethedesignbasis.ThisincludestherecentlycompletedFSARProceduralConsistencyReviewandtheself-assessmentperformedinpreparationfortherecentNRCA/EInspection.TherationaleforconcludingthattheSt.Luciedesignbasisrequirementsaretranslatedintoplantproceduresisbaseduponthefollowing:1.Thedesign,proceduresandplantmodificationshavebeenunderproceduralcontrolsinceinitialoperationtoassurethatchangestotheprocedures,thedesignortotheFSARareconsistent.TheSt.LucieprogramsandinitiativeswhichhaveaidedinassuringthisconsistencyweretheCommitmenttoExcellenceProgram,plantprocedureimprovementprogram,andthecontainmentpenetrationreview.2.Thestartuptestproceduresverifiedthattheplantoperatedasdesignedandmetthedesignbasesforplantoperation.p>>3.TheDesignBasisProgramhelpedtoensurethatthedesignbaseswascorrectlyincorporatedintotheplant'soperatingprocedures.4.Currentandpastplantprograms,suchastheplantprocedureimprovementprogramandtheinstrumentsetpointverification,confirmtheacceptabilityofplantprocedures.5.Self-assessments,FPLaudits,andNRCinspectionshaveevaluatedthroughsamplingprogramsthattheprocessesformaintainingproceduralconsistencywiththedesignbasesareacceptableandprovidereasonableassuranceoftheireffectiveness.Theoriginaldesignprocessproduceddesigndocumentssuchascalculations,drawings,specifications,evaluations,andanalysesnecessarytosupportinitialconstruction,testing,operationandlicensingoftheplant.Thedesigndocumentsproducedbythisprocesswereusedasthebasesforsystemstartupandacceptancetesting.Thedesignandconstructionprocessincludedvariousqualityassuranceaudits,qualitycontrolinspections,anddocumentationrequirementstoassureconsistencybetweenconstructionanddesign.TheFSARwascreatedduringtheplantdesignprocessandwassubmittedtotheNRCforreviewandapproval.TheFSARincludesdescriptionsoftheplant'sdesignandoperatingpracticesrequiredtoshowcompliancewithNRCregulations.NRCreviewoftheoriginalFSARresultedinadditionalamendmentspriortoplantoperation.TheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportdocumentsthisreviewandtheNRCstaff'sfindingsthattheplantdesignandoperatingpracticeswereacceptable,TechnicalSpecificationsweredeveloped(inconjunctionwiththeNRCreview)toidentifyfunctionalrequirements,controllingparameters,andsurveillanceandtestingrequirementsthataresignificanttothesafeoperationoftheplant.Themaintenanceprocedures

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePago31weredevelopedfromthevendortechnicalmanuals,andA/EandNSSSsupplierdocumentswhichcontainedthedesignbasesrequirementsforSSCs.Theselicensinganddesignreviewsconductedinconjunctionwiththeinitialstartuptestingoftheplant,confirmedthatthedesignbasesrequirementswereappropriatelytranslatedintoplantprocedurespriortoinitialoperation.TheinitialstartuptestprogramwasdevelopedbasedondesignbasisrequirementsidentifiedbytheNSSSsupplierandtheA/E.Thecompletionofthestartuptestingverifiedthattheplant'ssystemsoperatedasdesignedandthattheplantwasconfiguredinaccordancewiththedesignbasis.ThestartuptestreportwassubmittedtotheNRCpriortocommercialoperation.Thesetestproceduresprovidedabasisfortheoperatingandtestingprocedures.TheCommitmenttoExcellenceProgram(CEP)includedprojectstoupgradeoperatingproceduresandtoestablishbetterconsistencyinplantoperationsthro'ughtheuseofastandardformatforTechnicalSpecification.TheDesignBasisDocumentdevelopmentprogramconsolidatedinformationcontainedinreferencedesignbasessourcesandcomparedplantprocedurestodesignbasisrequirements.Theplantprocedureimprovementprogram,containmentpenetrationreview,andinstrumentsetpointverificationprojectareexamplesofeffortsthathelptoconfirmthatcurrentplantprocedurescorrectlyimplementtheplantdesignbases.Inaddition,thenumerousFPLplantreviews,self-assessmentsandaudits,andNRCinspections,haveallcontributedtoensuringthattheplantdesignbases,arecorrectlyreflectedintheplant'sprocedures.Theseprojects,programs,initiativesandprocessescollectivelysupporttherationaleforconcludingwithreasonableassurancethattheoperations,maintenanceandtestingproceduresatSt.Lucieareconsistentwiththeplant'sdesign,andthatdiscrepanciesbetweendesigndocuments,theFSARandtheplantareidentifiedandresolved.2.0ProgramsAffectingDesignBasisThefollowingprojectssupporttherationalethattheproceduresreflectthedesignbasis.2.1CommitmenttoExcellenceProgramTheSt.Lucie"CommitmenttoExcellenceProgram"wasmodeledaftertheTurkeyPoint"PerformanceEnhancementProgram(PEP)"andwasdevelopedtomeetfourspecificgoals:~Continuedsafeandreliableplantoperation.~Improvedplantandsitematerialcondition.~Increasedemphasisonqualityperformanceinsystems,controls,andpersonnel.~Continuedresponsivenesstoregulatoryrequirementsandcorporategoals.

I,1 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage32Variousimprovementelementswerebroughtunderonebroadprogramtoenhancecoordinationefforts,betterutilizeresources,andprovidethepropercontroltoensureaccomplishmentoftheprogramgoals.TheCEPprogramwasspecifictoSt.LuciePlantandincorporated,whereappropriate,theresultsandlessonslearnedfromthePEPimplementedatFPL'sTurkeyPointPlant.TwooftheCEPprojectsthatrelatetoprocedureimprovementsare:~CEPProject3-OperatingProcedureUpgradeProject~CEPProject9-TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProject2.1.1OperatingProcedureUpgradeProjectCEPProject3wastheSt.Lucieprojecttodevelopandimplementaprogramtoupgradeandmaintainplantoperatingprocedures.Theprogramincludedtheestablishmentofoperatingprocedureupgraderesources,revisionofemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOP),establishmentofconsistentprocedureformats,revisionandupgradeofplantoperatingprocedures,trainingofpersonnelonupgradedprocedures,andimplementationoftherevisedprocedures.TheplantemergencyoperatingprocedureswererevisedinaccordancewithCEN-152,thegenericEOPguidelinesforCombustionEngineeringplants,andNUREG0737commitments.Thereviewandupgradeoftheplantoperatingproceduresaddressedformat,technicalaccuracy,TechnicalSpecifications,sourceandreferencedocuments,acceptancecriteria,andapplicablehumanfactorscriteria.2.1.2TechnicalSpecificationImprovementProjectCEPProject9wastheSt.LucieprojecttodevelopandimplementaprogramfortrackingproposedTechnicalSpecificationchangesandtoprovideuniformitybetweenUnit1andUnit2TechnicalSpecifications.TheprojectconsistedofareviewandvalidationofthedifferencesbetweentheUnit1andtheUnit2TechnicalSpecificationsandthesubmittalofchangestotheNRC.2.22.2.1DesignBasisProgramDesignBasisDocumentDevelopmentTheDesignBasisPrograminvolvedthedevelopmentofasetofunit-specificsystem-leveldocuments,referredtoasdesignbasisdocuments(DBD),thatcontainaroadmaptothereferenceregulations,codes,standards,calculations,analyses,specifications,etc.,thatformthebasisforsystemdesign,testingandoperation.EachDBDwasreviewedagainstplantdrawingsinanefforttoensureconsistencywiththedesignbasesandtheplantconfigurationandoperatingprocedures.TheDBDsexplainsystemdesignandprovideadefinitionofthebasesforthedesign,componentdesignconstraints,anddesignfeatures.TheresultsoftheDesignBasisProgramsupporttheconclusionthattheoperating,testing,andmaintenanceproceduresareconsistentwiththeplant'sdesignbasis.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage332.2.2DesignBasisDocumentVseandMaintenanceTheDBDsprovideameansforfacilitatingthesearchandretrievalofdesignbasessourcedocuments,Inthisregard,theDBDsprovideareferenceforfutureprocedurerevisionsandthereforewillhelpmaintainconsistencybetweenthedesignbasesandplantprocedures.TheDBDsalsoprovideausefultoolfordesignengineeringtosupportplantmodificationsandoperabilityevaluations.MaintenanceoftheDBDsisimportanttoensuringdesignandconfigurationcontroloftheplant.TheDBDswereintendedtobeupdatedatapproximatelythesamefrequencyastheFSAR.AConditionReport(CR)wasissuedin1996againsttheDBDprogramconcerningtheuntimelyincorporationofDBDupdates.TheproposedcorrectiveactionstothisCRincludeshavingtheDBDupdatesincorporatedonascheduleconsistentwithupdatingtheFSAR.3.03.1RecentDesign-RelatedProjectsPlantProcedureImprovementProgramTheSt.LuciePlantProcedureImprovementProgramisfocusedonregulatoryperformanceimprovement.Thescopeoftheprojectistoidentifyandimproveoperationandmaintenanceactivitiesbyupgradedtaskinstructions.Includedintheupgradeprocessisreviewofthedesignbasisdocumentstoensureregulatorycommitmentcompliance.TheProcedureImprovementProgramincludesoperations,maintenance,andadministrativeprocedures.TheinitialstepincludedcentralizingprocedurewritersfromOperations,ElectricalMaintenance,InstrumentandControlMaintenance,MechanicalMaintenance,andAdministrativeDepartmentsunderaproceduredevelopmentsupervisor.Thisnewgroupprovidesasinglepointofcontactforproceduralissues.Thegoalofthisnewgroupistotakethecurrentsetofplantproceduresandidentifytasksforwhichproceduresdonotexist,andidentifyexistingproceduresthatneedtobeupgraded.Theseprocedureswillbeplacedintoastandardizedformatanduseindustry-provenlanguagetechniquestogivetheend-usertechnicallycorrect,firsttimeimplementableprocedures.Theimprovedprocessincludesthefollowingfundamentalattributes:~Definethescopeofatechnicalsubcommittee~Reviewproceduresforcriticalcharacteristicsandattributes~Includeindustrystandardmethodsforprocedurevalidation~Validatebyend-usertoensuretheprocedureissoundandimplementable~Establishasiteprocedurewriter'sguidewhichincorporatesINPOandindustryapprovedwritingstandardsAnotherfundamentalattributeoftheimprovedprocessistoreviewapplicabledesignbasesdocumentsthatgoverntheactivitiesandcontrolthetasksdescribedineachprocedure.These St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage34basesdocumentsinclude,butarenotlimitedto,St.LucieTechnicalSpecifications,FSAR,Off-siteDoseCalculationManual,NRCcorrespondence,ABB-CEbulletins,calculations,analyses,evaluations,specificationsandplantdrawings.3.2ContainmentPenetrationReviewIn1991,anevaluation,"TechnicalAssessmentofContainmentPenetrationBoundaries,"wasissuedforeachunit,toaddressplanteventsrelatedtothecontrolofcontainmentisolationboundaries.Theobjectivesoftheseevaluationswereto:1)performatechnicalassessmentofeachmechanicalcontainmentpenetrationtodeterminethosecomponentswhoseintegrityoroperationalpositionwerevitaltocontainmentintegrity;and2)providesketchesidentifyingcontainmentboundarycomponentstoassistplantpersonnelinvolvedinoperationsandmaintenanceactivities.Theevaluationsestablish,foreachindividualpenetration,thecontainmentpenetrationboundary~~includingcomponentsthatarevitaltocontainmentintegrity.Inpreparingtheevaluations,eachpenetrationconfigurationwasevaluatedto:1)confirmthattheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC),requiringadoublebarrierissatisfiedforeachlinepenetratingthecontainment;and2)identifythosecomponentsthatformthecontainmentpenetrationboundary,includingthosecomponentsthatcanbemanipulated(e.g.,valvesopened,capsremoved,orpipingblindflangesremoved)suchthatthedoublebarriercriterioncouldbeviolated.Ineachcase,appropriatedesignandconstructiondocumentationwasconsultedand,wherepossible,thesystemcomponentswerewalked-downtogenerateandconfirmthecontainmentpenetrationsketches.TheUnit1evaluationconcludedthattheisolationsystemmeetstheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria,inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetratingthecontainment.However,certaincontainmentpenetrationvalvingdidnotconformineverydetailtotherequirementsofGDC54throughGDC57,sincetheGDCwerepublishedaftertheConstructionPermitwasissued,andhence,werenotavailableasaguide.TheUnit2evaluationconcludedthattheisolationsystemmeetstherequirementsofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(exceptionstakentoGDCprovisionsarediscussedinSection6.2.4.3oftheStLucieUnit2UFSAR)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetratingthecontainment.

~IVP St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage353.3InstrumentSetpointVerificationBetween1991and1993,FPLperformedaninstrumentsetpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.Approximately250safety-relatedandimportant-to-safetyinstrumentloopswereevaluatedwithapproximately150loopsrequiringdocumentationorrecalculations.Plantoperatingandmaintenanceprocedureswerecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditionsanddesigndocumentstoverifyconsistency.TherewerenodesignbasisinconsistencesfoundwhichwereofamagnitudewhichrequiredNRCnotification.Thisprogramprovidesabasistoconcludethatthecurrentplantsetpointsarecorrectlytranslatedintoplantproceduresandthatthedesignbasisisavailable.TheoriginalSt.LucieinstrumentsetpointswerefurnishedbytheA/E,theNSSSdesigner,orotherequipmentvendors,andhavebeensupplementedthroughtheyearsbyengineeringpackages,whichweretypicallyproducedbytheA/E.Priortotheinstrumentsetpointverificationeffort,controlofinstrumentsetpointchangewasgovernedbyaseparateprocessthatinvolvedplantandengineeringprocedures.Inaddition,itwasanacceptedpracticeatthetimethatsomeofthesetpointscouldbechangedbytheplantbasedonA/Eorvendorinputwithlimiteddocumentation.Historically,thesetpointbaseshavebeenmaintainedinvariousdocumentsincludingdrawings,vendormanuals,andmaintenanceprocedures,andthecalibration/scalingvalues(typicallycalculatedbymaintenance)weremaintainedinthecalibrationprocedure.Thesetpointverificationeffort(inadditiontodocumentingorrecalculatinginstrumentsetpoints)changedtheoldprocessbyincorporatinginstrumentsetpointchangesintotheconfigurationmanagementprocess.Theprocesschangeconvertedthesetpointlistintoanengineeringdrawingandplacedinstrumentsetpointsunderengineeringcontrolintheconfigurationmanagementprocess.Plantprocedureswereupdatedasappropriatetoreflecttheinstrumentsetpointbasesdescribedinthedesigndrawings.4,0FunctionalReviewandVerificationofDesignBasisTranslationintoProceduresSinceinitialstartup,therehavebeennumerousQualityAssuranceandEngineeringaudits,self-assessments,NRCinspections,andthirdpartyreviewswhichhaveverifiedconsistencybetweentheplant,andtheoperations,maintenance,andtestingproceduresinuseatthetimeoftheinspection.Theseauditsandinspectionshelpprovidereasonableassurancethatthedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocesshasincorporateddesignbasischangesresultingfromplantmodificationsintoplantprocedures.TheengineeringdesignandconfigurationmanagementprocessesprovidethenecessarycontrolstoensurethattheSt.LuciePlantdesignbasesrequirementsareaccuratelytranslatedintoplantoperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures.Forexample,therehavebeenseveralmajorself-assessmentandimprovementprojectsperformedbyFPLwhichhaveservedtoimprovetheSt.Lucieconflgurationcontrolprocesses.TheeffectivenessoftheseinitiativeshavebeenconfirmedthroughformalNRCinspectionsandFPLauditsoftheengineeringprocesses,designbasisandprocedures.Someoftheseimprovementprojectsandinspectionresultsareprovidedinsupport tIt St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage36ofourrationaleforconcludingthattheSt.LuciePlantdesignbasesrequirementsareproperlytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestingprocedures:FSARProceduralConsistencyReviewAnnunciatorSummaryReviewIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroupInserviceInspectionTestingProgramSurveillanceTestingNRCInspectionsQAAudits,Self-AssessmentsandFindings4.1FSARProceduralConsistencyReviewOiDuring1995and1996,NRCinspectionsfoundthatplantoperatorswereusingprocedureswhichhadprocessstepsnotfoundintheFSARandthatthenormalprocessstepsfoundintheFSARwerenotbeingfollowed.NRCInspectionReport96-03documentedthatlicensedoperatorsweredilutingthereactorcoolantsystembydirectlyinjectingwaterintothechargingheaderwhiletheprocessstepsdescribedintheFSARweretoinjectthewaterintothevolumecontroltanktoallowmixing.Asaresultofthiseventandothersimilarinconsistencies,FPLinitiatedacomprehensiveFSARreviewtoimproveconsistencybetweenoperatingproceduresandtheFSARs.ThiseffortwascompletedinDecember1996.ThereviewoftheSt.LucieUnit1FSARidentified219plantproceduresashavingsomeFSARtie.ThereviewoftheSt.LucieUnit2FSARidentified236proceduresashavingsomeFSARtie.Therewerenoplantmodificationsrequiredasaresultofthesereviews.ThefinalconclusionoftheseFSARreviewsispendingthefinalresultsofsomeCRs,however,theseCRshavehadoperabilityreviewsandnoneareconsideredsafetysignificant.ThesmallnumberofFSARinconsistenciesrequiringaCRindicatesthattheredoesnotappeartobelargedifferencebetweentheFSARsandtheplantoperatingprocedures,4.2AnnunciatorSummaryReviewAplantannunciatorsummaryreviewiscurrentlyinprogress.Asannunciatorsprovideanearlyindication/announcementofpossibledegradingplantconditions,theyareanimportantaidtooperatorsinidentifyingappropriateproceduralactionstotakeinresponsetothesechangingconditions.Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciatorsforthecontrolrooms,wastemanagementpanels,emergencydieselgenerators,steamgeneratorblowdownbuilding,boricacidconcentrators,wasteconcentrators,watertreatmentplant,oxygenanalyzer,andtheliquidwastepanels,asappropriate.Thisprogramreviewsselectedlogicconfigurations,annunciatorsetpoints,proceduralreferences,andcorrespondingoperatoractionsfoundintheannunciatorsummaryprocedureforeachunitagainstthedesigndocuments.Thealarmsetpointisreviewedagainstthesetpointlistwhichisacontrolledengineeringdocument.Thisprojectisapproximately10%completewithover200annunciatorsetpoints,configurationsandproceduralresponsesreviewed t4 St.LucieUnitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage37andhasnotidentifiedanyinconsistencieswhichwouldbeconsideredsafetysignificant.Thisprogramcontinuestosupporttheconclusionthatthecurrentplantproceduresareconsistentwiththeplant'sdesignbasis.4.3IndependentSafetyEngineeringGroupFrom1983to1994,theIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG)performedtechnicalreviewsofplantsafetysystems.Concernswereforwardedtocognizantorganizationsalongwithrecommendationstoimprovesafetyandperformance.Systemwalkdownswithplantandmaintenancepersonnelwereusedtoidentifyinconsistenciesbetweentheoperating,testing,andmaintenanceproceduresandtheplant'sconfiguration.Proceduraladequacywasalsoverifiedaspartoftheeffortanddocumentedinreports.Thisprogramalsosupportstherationaletoconcludethattheoperating,maintenance,andtestproceduresareconsistentwiththeplant'sdesignbasis.4,4InserviceInspectionandTestingProgramsInserviceinspectionsandtestsareperformedinaccordancewithISIandISTprocedures.ThescheduleofinspectionsandtestsisincompliancewiththerequirementsoftheASMECode.Theproceduralstepstoperformasurveillancetestincludestherequirementstohaveplantoperatorsinthecontrolroomreviewandapproveperformanceofthetest.Theplantisplacedinanacceptableconfiguration(consistentwiththedesignbasis)forthetest,consideringthecurrentplantoperatingmodeandTechnicalSpecificationrequirements.Aftercompletionofthetest,thetestresultsarereviewedwiththecontrolroomoperatorstoassurecomponentsareoperablepriortotheirreturntoservice.CRsissuedforcomponentswhichdonotmeetacceptancecriteria,ensurethatarootcauseofthefailureisdeterminedandresolved.TheISTproceduresensurethatplantoperationremainswithinthedesignbasisconfigurationduringthetesting.4.5SurveillanceTestingTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancetestsandtheirschedulesareperformedinaccordancewithplantprocedures.CRsissuedfortestswhichdonotmeetacceptancecriteriaensuretherootcauseofafailureisdeterminedandresolved,Surveillancetestproceduresensurethatplantoperationremainswithinthedesignbasisconfigurationduringthetesting.InaccordancewiththerecommendationsofGenericLetter96-01,eachreactorprotectionandsafeguardssurveillancetestwillbereviewedagainstthedesignbasisforthesysteminvolvedtoassurethatdesignbasisrequirementshavebeentestedandthatthesurveillancetestcompletelyteststheentireactuationcircuitandlogicinvolved.TheresultsofthisreviewwillbeincorporatedintotheclosureofGenericLetter96-01,"TestingofSafety-RelatedLogicCircuits."

4 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage384.6NRCInspectionsSelectedNRCinspectionsandtheirresultsarediscussedinthefollowingsections.TheresultsoftheseinspectionswereusedtofurtherimprovethedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesandalsohelptoconfirmthattheSt.Luciedesignbasesrequirementshavebeenmaintainedandproperlytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestprocedures.TheseinspectionsalsoconfirmFPLfindingsthatdiscrepanciesfoundarenotsafetysignificant.4.6.1EmergencyOperatingProcedureTeamInspectionInApril1988,theNRCconductedanEmergencyOperatingProcedure(EOP)TeamInspectionatSt.Lucie.TheresultsofthisinspectionaredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport88-08datedAugust26,1988.ThisspecialannouncedinspectionwasconductedintheareaofEOPsandincludedtheimplementationofvendorGenericTechnicalGuidelines,validationandverification,andtrainingconductedontheEOPs.Nounsafeoperationalconditionswereidentified.Onedeviationfromalicenseecommitmentwasidentifiedinthereport.BasedontheNRCobservationsoftheEOPsinuse,thestaffconcludedthattheEOPswereadequateforusebytrainedoperators.ThestaffdidexpressconcernswithanumberofthefindingsmadeduringtheinspectionwhichrepresentimpedimentstotheeffectiveimplementationoftheEOPs.Specificareasofconcernidentifiedincludedtechnicaladequacyoftheprocedures(e,gvagueness,omissions,anddeviationsfromsuggestedproceduralsteps),humanfactors(e.g.,opticalresolutionoffigures,notenoughcopiesavailabletooperators,andplantlabelingdeficiencies),andtrainingweaknesses(e.g.,technicalbasispresentedinlessonplansoccasionallydisagreedwiththeEOPsandanoperatorwasobservedtofollowthegeneralguidanceratherthantheEOP).Furtherinspectorfollow-upwasperformedforthenoteddiscrepanciesduringNRCInspection90-32,whichdeterminedthattheadequacyofcorrectiveactionswassufficienttoclosethefindings.4.6.2OperationalSafetyTeamInspectionInAprilandMay1990,theNRCconductedanOperationalSafetyTeamInspection(OSTI)atSt.Lucie.TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport90-09.Thisspecialannouncedinspectionutilizedarisk-basedinspectionguideandevaluatedStLuciescurrentlevelofperformanceintheareaofplantoperations.TheinspectionincludedanevaluationoftheeffectivenessofvariousplantgroupsincludingOperations,Surveillance/InserviceTesting/Calibration,andAdministrativeControlsandEngineeringsupport.Plantmanagement'sawarenessof,involvementin,andsupportofsafeplantoperationswerealsoevaluated.Emphasiswasplacedoninterviewsofpersonnelatalllevels,observations,andsystem Nll1 St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage39walkdowns.Theinspectorsalsoreviewedplantdeviationreports,LicenseeEventReportsforthecurrentSALPperiod,andevaluatedtheeffectivenessoftheSt.Lucie'srootcauseidentification,short-termandprogrammaticcorrectiveactions,andrepetitivefailuretrendingandrelatedcorrectiveactions.Withintheareasinspected,severalstrengthswerenoted,however,someweaknessesandenforcementitemswerealsoidentified.Correctiveactionstoaddressenforcementitemshavebeencompleted.4.6.3MaintenanceTeamInspectionInOctoberandNovember1989,NRCconductedaMaintenanceTeamInspectionattheSt.LuciePlant.TheresultsoftheinspectionaredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport89-24datedJanuary23,1990..Thisspecialannouncedteaminspectionconsistedofanin-depthinspectionofthemaintenanceprogramanditsimplementation.Theoverallresultsdeterminedthemaintenanceprogramtobegoodwithgoodimplementation.Significantstrengthswereidentifiedinthereport,TheNRCrecognizedthatplantmanagementisinvolvedinthemaintenanceprogramandappearedtobeaggressiveinimprovingtheprogram.Commitmentofengineeringforanewmaintenancefacility,theexistingtrainingfacility,otherplannedprogramimprovements,andreceptivenesstoteamfindingsindicatedapositiveattitudetowardprogramimprovements.Generally,themaintenancestaffandsupervisionwereknowledgeableandqualified.Workobservedwasaccomplishedinanorganizedprofessionalmannerwithemphasisonfollowingprocedures.Inparticular,theI&CandElectricalgroupswerefoundtobestrong.TwoviolationswereidentifiedregardingcontrolofclassIEpanelcomponentsanddiscrepantmaintenancerecords.Correctiveactionstoaddressidentifiedenforcementitemshavebeencompleted.4.6.4EquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationInspectionInFebruaryandMarch1989,theNRCconductedaninspectionofthe10CFR50.49requirementsforenvironmentalqualification(EQ)ofelectricalequipmentatSt.LuciePlant,TheinspectionincludedareviewoftheFPLimplementationprogramtomeettherequirementsof10CFR50.49,walkdowninspectionsofEQequipmentinsidecontainment,reviewofEQmaintenanceactivities,reviewofEQdesignchangesandFPLactionsinresponsetoNRCinitiatives(NRCNotices86-71and88-89),andfollow-uponFPLactionsinresponsetolicenseconditions.TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport89-07datedApril6,1989.Noviolationsordeviationswereidentified.TheresultsofthisinspectionsupportedtheNRCspreviousassessmentinMarch1986,thatFPLhadimplementedanadequateprogramandthattheprogramcontinuestobeadequate.ThewalkdownsofEQequipmentresultedinnoopen

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage40orunresolveditems.EQdocumentationfileswereconsideredwellorganizedandcomplete,requiringminimaladditionalinformationtosupporttheanalysisprovidedinthefile.EQmaintenanceprogramproceduralcompliancewasgood,andthespecialmaintenancerequirementsdescribedintheEQdocumentpackageswereconfirmedtohavebeenincorporatedintotheproceduresforthosesampleitemsreviewed.TheinspectionteamnotedthatthetrackingmechanismusedbytheplanttoensureschedulingandcompletionofEQmaintenancetasksappearedtobefragmentedwithseparatelistsforcalibration,surveillance,preventivemaintenance(PM),andreplacement.Therewasnooverallprogramtoensurethatmaintenanceactivitieswerebeingaccomplished.ThiswasconsideredaweaknessinFPL'sEQmaintenanceprogram.FPLacknowledgedtheconcernandcommittedtoimplementaformalizedmaintenancetrackingsystemasoutlinedintheinspectionreportdetails.Theinspectionteamconsideredtheseactionstobeadequatetoresolveconcerns.ThisinspectionsupportsFPL'spositionthatSt.LucieequipmentundertheEQProgramwasperformancetestedandmaintainedinaccordancewiththeplantdesignbases.4.6.5ConclusionfromNRCInspectionEffortsTheseinspectionsevaluatedtheSt.Lucieprocessesforoperatingandmaintainingtheplantasdesigned.Plantconfiguration,SSCmaintenance,componenttestingandplantoperationwereevaluatedbytheseteamsandfoundtobeacceptable.Deficienciesnotedbytheinspectorswereenteredintothecorrectiveactionprogramforresolutionasnecessary.Follow-upinspectionsverifiedthecorrectiveactionprocess.Therefore,theseinspectionssupporttherationalethattheprocessesinplacewillassurethatdesignbasisinformationismaintainedinmaintenance,operatingandtestingprocedures4.7FPLAudits,Self-AssessmentsandFindingsTheeffectivenessofSt.Lucieinitiatives,projects,programs,andprocesseshavebeenauditedbyFPLQA.ProvidedbelowandinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1aredetailsofselectedQAaudits.Theoverallreviewoftheseauditssupportstheconclusion,withreasonableassurance,thatSt.Luciedesignbasesrequirementshavebeenmaintainedandproperlytranslatedintooperating,maintenance,andtestprocedures,andthatdiscrepanciesfoundarecorrectedinatimelymanner.4.7.1AuditFindingsandStrengthsSincetheinitialstartupoftheunits,numerousformalauditshavebeenperformedbytheQualityAssuranceorganizationinareasrelatedtothecontrolofdesignbases,design,configuration,testing,andplantproceduresatSt.Lucie.Designprogramauditstypicallyreviewedengineeringprocesses,implementingprocedures,andtheimplementationofdesignchangesandassociatedrecords(i.e.modificationpackages).QAauditsconsistentlyfoundthatQualityAssuranceProgramelements(includingdesignrequirements)wereadequatelyaddressedbyprocedures,andthattheimplementationofthoseprocedureswaseffective,Theprogramsandproceduresfor clhg' St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage41translatingdesignrequirementsintoproceduresandinstructionswereconsistentlydeterminedtobeadequate.AuditFindingswereresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprocess,andresultedinimprovementsofEngineering,OperationsandTestingprocessesandprocedures.OnetrendnotedbyQAwasrepeatedinstancesoflessthanadequatetranslationofdesignbasesintoproceduresanddrawings,In1996,QAAuditQSL-PCM-96-11identifiedthattherewereinsufficientprocedurerequirementstoensurethatproceduresaffectedbydesignchangesorsafetyevaluationrequirementswereidentifiedandupdatedpriortoimplementation.ThethreeFindingsissuedinAuditQSL-PCM-96-11resultedinimprovementstothemodificationpackageimplementationprocessestoincludeaProceduresWritingGroupreviewofthePC/Mpriortoimplementation.OtherrelevantexamplesofQAauditswhichpromptedplantandprocessimprovementsarehighlightedinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1,"QAAuditFindings,"andaresummarizedbelow.~QAS-JPN-91-8,"JunoNuclearEngineering-ProductionEngineeringGroup(PEG)forSt.Lucie."~QAS-JPN-92-3,"NuclearEngineering."~QAS-JPN-93-3,"NuclearEngineering-St.LucieDesignControl."~QAS-JPN-95-1,"NuclearEngineeringAudit."QSL-PM-96-18,"PerformanceMonitoringAudit."OtherQAauditsandself-assessmentslistedinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1resultedinfindingswhichdirectlyrelatedtothepropertranslationofdesignbasesrequirementsintooperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.ResolutionoffindingsfromthefollowingauditslistedinAppendixB,TableB4.7.1promotedsignificantimprovementintheSt.Luciedesignbasismaintenanceandprocedureconsistencyprocesses:~QSL-PM-96-06,"PerformanceMonitoringAudit."DiscrepanciesbetweentheFSARandSt.Lucieimplementingprocedureswereidentifiedandproceduresdidnotadequatelyaddressdesignrequirements.~QSL-PM-96-08,"PerformanceMonitoringAudit."AdiscrepancybetweentheFSARandSt.Lucieimplementingprocedureswasidentified.CorrectiveactionforthesefindingsalsocontributedtotheprocesschangetoaddtheProceduresWritingGrouptothePC/MprocessforreviewofaffectedproceduresbeforethePC/Misapprovedforimplementation.4.7.21996PlantSelf-AssessmentInOctober1996,St.Luciecompletedafiveandonehalfmonthself-assessmentofsiteperformanceduringthetwoyearperiodfromJanuary1994toMay1996.OnOctober18,1996,theSelf-AssessmentTeampublishedacomprehensivereportwhichdocumentedtheirevaluationoftheperformanceofoperations,engineering,maintenance,andplantsupportfunctionalareas,aswellasmanagementpoliciesandthecorrectiveactionprogram.Theevaluationofthe St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage42engineeringfunctionalareaincludedengineeringdesigncontrolandconfigurationmanagement.Theteamconcludedthattheoverallqualityofengineeringworkwassuperior.However,plantdrawings,proceduresandlicensingdocumentswerenotalwaysupdatedtoreflectchangestotheplant.Inaddition,guidanceforupdatingoperatingprocedures,as-builtdocuments,andtheFSAR,toreflectchangesduetoplantmodifications,wasunclear.Theissueswereaddressedinthesummerof1996withtheimplementationofnewguidelinesforimplementingplantmodifications.ThecompletehistoryofQAauditsandself-assessmentshasresultedincontinualprocessimprovementsindesignandconfigurationcontrol,andinplantproceduredevelopmentandcompliancewiththeplantdesignbases.5.0ConclusionThereisadequaterationaleforconcludingwithreasonableassurancethattheoperations,maintenance,andtestingproceduresatSt.Lucieareconsistentwiththedesignandthatdiscrepanciesbetweendesigndocuments,theFSAR,proceduresandtheplantarenotsignificantwithrespecttosafetybaseduponthefactsthat:~Theverificationatinitiallicensingoftheplant,FSARandthedesignareconsistent.~Theprocessesinplaceassurethatconsistencyismaintained.~Variousimprovementprojectsandprogramsthroughoutthehistoryoftheplantconfirmtheacceptabilityofplantprocedures.~Thevariousaudits,inspections,andself-assessmentshaveverifiedconsistencyofdesignwiththeplantanditstranslationintotheprocedures.~Processeshavebeenandareinplaceforidentification,evaluationandcorrectionofdiscrepanciesbetweenthedesignandtheplantprocedures.

St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage43Ic]"Rationaleforconcludingthatsystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases."Anoutlineoftheorganizationoftheresponsetothisrequestfollows:1.0Introduction2.0St.LucieProgramsandInitiatives2.1DesignBasisProgram2.2ContainmentPenetrationReview2.3LOCAContainmentRe-analyses2.4InstrumentSetpointVerification2.5Unit1SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)2.6SimulatorValidationProject2.7OperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)Program2.8SurveillanceTesting2.9MaintenanceRuleProgram2.10PlantProcedureImprovementProgram2.11AnnunciatorSummaryReview3.0Walkdowns,Inspections,AuditsandReviews3.1FPLPlantWalkdowns3.2FPLSeismicWalkdowns3.3FPLUnit1SteamGeneratorReplacementWalkdowns3.4NRCElectricalDistributionFunctionalInspection(EDSFI)3.5NRCServiceWaterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspection3.6NRCInspectionofPlantChangesandModifications3.7NRCIntegratedInspections3.8NRCEquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationProgramInspection3.9NRCInspectionoftheMotorOperatedValveProgram3.10NRCCheckValveInspection3.11NRCArchitect/EngineerTeamInspection3.12FPLAuditsandReviews4.0Conclusion St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage441.0IntroductionTherationaleforconcludingwithreasonableassurancethattheSt.LuciePlantsystem,structure,andcomponent(SSC)configurationisconsistentwiththedesignbasesisbasedonthefollowing:1.TheplantconfigurationwasverifiedtobeconsistentwithdesigninformationandtheFSARpriortoinitialoperation.2.Startuptestingverifiedplantperformanceconformedwiththedesignbasesforplantoperation.3.Plantchangeshavebeenunderproceduralcontroltoassureconsistencywiththedesignbasessinceinitialoperation.4.Processimprovementinitiativeshaveresultedinimprovedeffectivenessoftheprocessesusedtomaintaintheplantconfigurationandperformanceconsistentwiththedesignbases.5.Routineaudits,inspectionsandverticalslicereviewsconfirmthatplantperformanceandconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.St.LucieUnits1and2werelicensedin1976and1983,respectively.TheplantconfigurationwasverifiedtobeconsistentwithdesigninformationandtheFSARpriortoinitialoperation.Theoriginaldesignprocessproduceddesigndocumentssuchascalculations,drawings,specifications,evaluations,andanalysesnecessarytosupportinitialconstruction,testing,operation,andlicensingoftheplant.Thedesigndocumentsproducedbythisprocesswereusedasthebasesforsystemstartupandacceptancetesting.Thedesignandconstructionprocessincludedvariousqualityassuranceaudits,qualitycontrolinspections,anddocumentationrequirementstoassureconsistencybetweentheas-builtsystems,structures,andcomponents,andthedesign.TheFSARwasproducedaspartoftheplantdesignprocessandsubmittedtotheNRCforreviewandapproval.TheFSARincludessufficientdescriptionsoftheplant'sdesign,configurationandperformancerequirementstodocumentcompliancewithNRCregulations.NRCreviewoftheoriginalFSARresultedinamendmentspriortoplantoperation,TheNRCSafetyEvaluationReportdocumentsthisreviewandthestaff'sfindingsthattheplant'sdesign,configuration,andperformanceparameterswereacceptable.TechnicalSpecificationsweredeveloped(inconjunctionwiththeNRCreview)toidentifyconfigurationandfunctionalrequirements,controllingparameters,andsurveillanceandtestingrequirementsthataresignificanttothesafeoperationoftheplant.Theselicensing,design,andas-builtconfigurationreviews,conductedinconjunctionwiththeinitialstartuptestingoftheplant,confirmedthatthesystem,structure,andcomponentconfigurationandperformancewereconsistentwiththedesignbasespriortoinitialoperation.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage45Startuptestingverifiedplantperformanceconformedwiththedesignbasesforplantoperation.TheinitialstartuptestingprogramwasdevelopedbasedondesignbasisrequirementsidentifiedbytheNSSSsupplierandtheA/E.AbstractsforthestartuptestprocedureswereprovidedtotheNRCforreviewandacceptance,Thesuccessfulcompletionoftheinitialstartuptestprogramverifiedthattheplant'slicensedconfigurationandperformancewereincompliancewithitsdesignbases.AstartuptestreportwassubmittedtotheNRCpriortocommercialoperation.Thisreportformedthebasisforsubsequentplantoperationandinservicetesting.Sincestartup,plantchangeshavebeenunderproceduralcontroltoassureconsistencywiththedesignbases.AsdiscussedintheresponsetoRequest[a],theevolutionaryandcurrentengineeringdesignandconfigurationmanagementprocesseshaveprovidedthenecessarycontrolstoensurethattheSt.LucieSSCconfigurationandperformancehavebeenandremainconsistentwiththedesignbases.Inaddition,FPLhassufficientdocumentation(calculationsand/orpre-operational,startup,andsurveillancetestdata)toconcludethatthecurrentplantconfigurationisconsistentwithitsdesignbases.TheFPLengineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesweredevelopedandmaintainedtoensurethattheplantdesign,as-builtcondition,andoperationremaininconformancewiththeoriginalplantlicense,designbases,andsubsequentlicensingcommitments.Theseprocessesareusedtocontroltheplantdesignbasis,design,designchanges,physicalconfiguration,andoperations,maintenance,testing,installation,procurementandtrainingrequirementsanddocumentation.2.0St.LucieProgramsandInitiativesStLucieprogramsandinitiativessupporttherationalethatSSCconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases.Togethertheyhavehelpedidentifyprocessimprovements,correctprocedural/plantconfigurationinconsistencies,improvecontentandaccessibilityofdesignbasesinformation,andimproveplantperformance.Theseprogramsandinitiatives,whichsupporttherationalethatsystems,structuresandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththedesignbases,arediscussedinthefollowingsections,2.1DesignBasisProgramTheDesignBasisPrograminvolvedthedevelopmentofasetofunit-specificsystem-leveldocuments,referredtoasdesignbasisdocuments(DBD),thatcontainaroadmaptothereferenceregulations,codes,standards,calculations,analyses,specifications,etc.,thatformthebasisforsystemdesign,testingandoperation.EachDBDwasreviewedagainstplantdrawingsinanefforttoensureconsistencywiththedesignbases,andtheplantconfigurationandoperatingprocedures.TheDBDsexplainsystemdesignandprovideadefinitionofbasesforthedesign,componentdesignconstraints,anddesignfeatures.TheresultsoftheDesignBasisProgramsupporttheconclusionthatSSCconfigurationandperformanceareconsistentwiththeplant'sdesignbasis.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage462.2ContainmentPenetrationReviewIn1991,anevaluation,"TechnicalAssessmentofContainmentPenetrationBoundaries,"wasissuedforeachunittoaddressplanteventsrelatedtothecontrolofcontainmentisolationboundaries.Theobjectivesoftheseevaluationswereto:1)performatechnicalassessmentofeachmechanicalcontainmentpenetrationtodeterminethosecomponentswhoseintegrityoroperationalpositionwerevitaltocontainmentintegrity;and2)providesketchesidentifyingcontainmentboundarycomponentstoassistplantpersonnelinvolvedinoperationsandmaintenanceactivities.Theevaluationsdocumentedthecontainmentpenetrationboundary,includingcomponentsthatarevitaltocontainmentintegrity.Inpreparingtheevaluations,eachpenetrationconfigurationwasevaluatedto:1)confirmthattheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)requiringadoublebarrierissatisfiedforeachlinepenetratingthecontainment;and2)identifythosecomponentsthatformthecontainmentpenetrationboundary,includingthosecomponentsthatcanbemanipulated(e.g.,valvesopened,capsremoved,orpipingblindflangesremoved)suchthatthedoublebarriercriterioncouldbeviolated.Appropriatedesignandconstructiondocumentationwasconsultedand,wherepossible,thesystemcomponentswerewalked-downtogenerateandconfirmthecontainmentpenetrationsketches.TheUnit1evaluationconcludedthattheisolationsystemmeetstheintentofthe10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(GDC)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetratingthecontainment.However,certaincontainmentpenetrationvalvingdidnotconformindetailtotherequirementsofGDC54throughGDC57,sincetheGeneralDesignCriteriawerepublishedaftertheConstructionPermitwasissued,andhence,werenotavailableasaguide.TheUnit2evaluationconcludedthattheisolationsystemmeetstherequirementsofthe10CFR.50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria(exceptionstakentoGDCprovisionsarediscussedinSection6.2.4.3oftheStLucieUnit2UFSAR)inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetratingthecontainment.2.3LOCAContainmentRe-analysis~~~In1993,theLOCAcontainmentanalysesofrecordwereupdated.Priortotheupdate,thecontainmentsectionoftheFSARsincludedmuchoftheoriginaldesignbasissensitivitystudies.

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St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage47Plantchanges,(e.g.,poweruprate),hadbeenaddressed,however,thisinformationwastypicallyupdatedwiththemostlimitingcaseofrecord,andasaresult,portionsoftheFSARhadbecomeunclear.There-analysesandassociatedFSARupdates,incorporatedchangesintooneevaluationforeachunit.Itutilizedoperatingexperiencewherenecessarytosupportinputsincludingthefinalproductofpeakandtransientcontainmentpressureandtemperature,andinputfortheDesignBasisProgram.Theresultsofthere-analysesshowedcontainmentpressuretobewithinboththepeakcontainmentdesignpressureandtheTechnicalSpecificationintegratedleakratetestpressure.Thepeakcontainmenttemperaturewasalsowellwithinthepeakcontainmentvesseltemperaturelimit.Thelongtermtemperatureresponsewasalsoshowntobewithintheexistingequipmentenvironmentalqualification(EQ)envelopeforUnit2.AlthoughthelongtermtemperatureresponseforUnit1wasshowntoslightlyexceedtheexistingequipmentEQenvelopeforalimitedtimeinterval,whentheequipmenttestcurveswerereviewed,theyboundedthenewanalyses,andtheEQcurvewasrevised.Additionally,there-analysesevaluatedtheCCWtemperatureresponseusingatimedependentcontainmentheatload.TheCCWandICWloopswereconservativelymodeledwithoutcreditforthetimelagsassociatedwithlooptransittimesandpipingvolumes.Inthismanner,arealisticapproachtopeakCCWtemperaturecalculationswasconducted,therebyprovidinganaccuratebaselineofpredictedCCWtemperatureforanyfutureanalyses,andvaluableinputforplantoperation.2.4InstrumentSetpointVerificationBetween1991and1993,FPLperformedaninstrumentsetpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.Approximately250safety-relatedandimportant-to-safetyinstrumentloopswereevaluatedwithapproximately150loopsrequiringdocumentationorrecalculations.Plantoperatingandmaintenanceprocedureswerecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditionsanddesigndocumentstoverifyconsistency.TherewerenodesignbasisinconsistencesfoundwhichwereofamagnitudewhichrequiredNRCnotification.Thisprogramprovidesabasistoconcludethatthecurrentplantsetpointsarecorrectlytranslatedintoplantproceduresandthatthedesignbasisisavailable.TheoriginalSt.LucieinstrumentsetpointswerefurnishedbytheA/E,theNSSSdesigner,orotherequipmentvendors,andhavebeensupplementedthroughtheyearsbyengineeringpackages,whichweretypicallyproducedbytheA/E.Priortotheinstrumentsetpointverificationeffort,controlofinstrumentsetpointchangeswasgovernedbyaseparateprocessthatinvolvedplantandengineeringprocedures.Inaddition,itwasanacceptedpracticeatthetimethatsomeofthesetpointscouldbechangedbytheplantbasedonA/Eorvendorinputwithlimiteddocumentation.Historically,thesetpointbaseshavebeenmaintainedinvariousdocumentsincludingdrawings,vendormanuals,andmaintenanceprocedures,andthecalibration/scalingvalues(typicallycalculatedbymaintenance)weremaintainedinthecalibrationprocedure.

,I St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage48Thesetpointverificationeffort(inadditiontodocumentingorrecalculatinginstrumentsetpoints)changedtheoldprocessbyincorporatinginstrumentsetpointchangesintotheconfigurationmanagementprocess.Theprocesschangeconvertedthesetpointlistintoanengineeringdrawingandplacedinstrumentsetpointsunderengineeringcontrolintheconfigurationmanagementprocess.Basesdocumentssuchascalculationswereupdatedasappropriatetoreflecttheinstrumentsetpointsdescribedinthedesigndrawings.2.52.5.1Unit1SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)EvaluationofAccidentAnalysisTheaccidentanalysespresentedinChapter15oftheSt.Lucie1FSARwereevaluatedtodeterminetheeffectsofuseofthereplacementsteamgenerators(RSG).TheobjectiveofeachevaluationwastodemonstratethattheSt.Lucie1plantresponsewiththeRSGswouldmeetallNRCapprovedFSARacceptancecriteria.ThespecifictransientsconsideredintheStand-AloneSafetyEvaluation(SASE)weregroupedaccordingtothecategoriesdescribedinNRCRegulatoryGuide1.70,withacrossreferencetotheSt,Lucie1FSAR.Thecategoriesare:e1.Increasesinheatremoval2.Decreasesinsecondaryheatremoval3.Decreasesinreactorcoolantsystemflow4.Reactivityandpowerdistributionanomalies.5.Increasesinreactorcoolantinventory6.Decreasesinreactorcoolantinventory7.RadioactivityreleasesfromsubsystemsTheFSARwasreviewedtodeterminetheeffectsofusingtheRSGs.ThesafetyevaluationoftheFSARChapter15accidentanalyses,themainsteamlinebreakandlossofcoolantaccidentanalysesforreactorbuildingpressureresponseinFSARChapter6,andtheoverpressureprotectionandnaturalcirculationanalysesinFSARChapter5arealsodiscussedinSASE.2.5.2EvaluationofReactorBuildingResponseTheRSGscanaffectthemassandenergyreleasesforprimaryandsecondarysystemruptures.Consequently,theeffectsofuseoftheRSGsontheSt.Lucie1reactorbuildingpressurecalculationsinChapter6oftheFSARwereassessed.2.5.3EvaluationofStructuralResponse~~~TheloadingsresultingfromaLOCA,MainSteamLineBreakandseismiceventswereevaluatedfortheRSGsandreactorcoolantsystem.Theobjectiveoftheseevaluationswastoverifythat r04I~A St.LucicUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage49theexistingcomponents,supports,andrestraintswereadequatetoaccommodatetheRSGsundernormalandaccidentloadingconditions.Theevaluationsaddressedallprimarycomponents.2.5.4EvaluationofOtherRCSInterfacesGenerally,theuseoftheRSGsdoesnotaffectthebalanceofthereactorcoolantsystemoritssupportinganalyses.However,certaininterfaceswithotherplantfeatureswereevaluatedwithrespecttouseoftheRSGs.Itemsconsideredinclude:1.EffectsofRSGhydraulicsoncorelift2.Nozzledams3.OverpressureprotectionanalysesinAppendix5AoftheFSAR4.Lowtemperatureoverpressureprotection(LTOP)analysesinAppendix5BoftheFSAR5.NaturalcirculationanalysesinAppendix5CoftheFSAR6.InternalmissileevaluationinSection3.5oftheFSAR7.Looseparts8.Feedwatercontrol2.5.5EvaluationofPlantDocumentation~~ComprehensivereviewsoftheSt.Lucie1TechnicalSpecifications,FSAR,plantemergencyandoff-normaloperatingprocedures,andtheexistingstressanalysiswereperformedtoidentifychangesthatmayberequiredduetouseoftheRSGs.Thetechnicalspecificationreviewincludedlimitingconditionsforoperation,surveillancerequirements,andbases.TheFSARreviewincludedapage-by-pagereviewoftheFSARtextandtables.2.5.6SGRPProjectSpecificDesignBasisDocumentsTheSGRPdevelopedspecificdesignbasisdocumentsfortheprojectspecialprocessesandotherprojectspecifictasks.RiggingandhandlingCuttingandbevelingSteamgeneratorreplacementweldingTemporarysupports/restraintsandstructuresBlowdownsysteminterfaceReplacementsteamgeneratorinsulationSteamgeneratormanwayplatformsRCSdecontaminationThesedocumentswereusedduringthedevelopmentofthevariousprojectengineeringpackages,TheapplicableSt.LucieDBDswillbeutilized,alongwithotherappropriatebasesdocuments,duringthe1997reconciliationphaseoftheSGRPdesigndocumentspriortoimplementation.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage502.5.7ConclusionTheevaluationoftheexistingplantdesignandlicensingbases,steamgeneratorphysicalinterfaces,thermal-hydraulicaspects,structuralsupports,safetyanalyses,technicalspecifications,andoff-normalandemergencyproceduresshowedtheRSGdesigntopreservetheexistingplantdesignandlicensingbases.Therefore,useoftheRSGsatSt.Lucie1meetsallrelevantcriteriaandguidance,theexistinglicensinganddesignbasesremainvalid,theTechnicalSpecificationsandtheirbasesremainvalid,andnounreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.2.6SimulatorValidationProjectSt.Luciehasareferenceplantsimulator.Itwasdevelopedasanoperatortrainingtoolandisbasedonextensivereviewsofthedesign,designbases,and,operationaldataandprocedures,toensureconsistencybetweentheactualplantandtheresponseofthesimulator.Ininstanceswhenthesimulatorpredictsanunexplainedplantresponse,thefeedbackprocessinthetrainingprogramsprovidesforresolutionofdifferences.Anotheruseofthesimulatoristovalidatethatproposeddesignchangestotheplantaresafeandeffective.Byfirstsimulatingmajorchanges,St.Luciehasbeenabletoidentifyandcorrectdesigndifferencespriortoimplementationintotheplant.Thesimulatorisalsousedtoimproveoperatorunderstandingoftheplantresponsetounexpectedevents,suchthatcorrectiveactionsareidentified,andcontributors,orresponsesthatmaybepreventative,arealsoidentified.TheTrainingDepartmentassiststheOperationsDepartmentinvalidationofproceduresbyusingdraftproceduresduringthesimulatorportionoflicensedoperatorcontinuingtraining.ThedraftproceduresareprovidedtotrainingbytheOperationsDepartmentandthefeedbackfromthecrewsareforwardedtotheproceduredevelopmentgroup.2.7OperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)ProgramIndustryeventsandreports'arereviewedandprocessedbasedonapplicabilitytoSt.LucieinaccordancewiththeOperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)Program.OperatingexperienceeventsandreportsarereviewedandscreenedforapplicabilitytoSt.LuciebytheOEFCoordinator.Operatingexperiencefeedbackwhichmeritanalysis,specificactions,oradocumentedplantrevieworresponse,areprocessedasConditionReports.TheConditionReportprocessensuresthoroughanalysisoftheeventandpreparationofareportsuchthatrelevantissuesareaddressedincludingupdatetotheplantdocumentationifrequired.Operationalexperiencefeedbackisusedtoimproveplantprocesses,andwhereprocessenhancementsimproveplantsafetyand/oroperation,proceduresarerevised.TheOEFprogramendeavorstominimizethepotentialforaninitiatorofaneventnotbeingrecognizedinthechangeprocessofaprocedure.

'IM St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-2SEnclosurePago512.8SurveillanceTestingSurveillancetestingisusedtoverifytheoperabilityofSSCsbyensuringtheirperformanceremainswithinthespecifieddesignbases,Theidentificationofdegradedequipmentpriortofailureincreasesequipmentavailabilityandassuresthatcomponentsrequiredtooperateduringanaccidentareoperable.SurveillancerequirementsareobtainedfromtheFSAR,TechnicalSpecifications,ASMEBoilerandPressureVesselCode,SectionXIPumpandValveprogram,andothercriteriaspecifiedasnecessary.Programsareinplacetoassurefailedormissedsurveillancesareappropriatelyevaluatedforreportabilityandnecessarycorrectiveactionsareimplemented.2.8.1TechnicalSpecificationSurveillanceTestingTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancetestingprovidesassurancethatSSCsoperatetoperformtheirintendedfunction.Surveillancetestingisaccomplishedandtrackedbyoperatingandadministrativeprocedures.Componentswhichfailthesurveillancetestsareenteredintotheconditionreportingprocessforrootcausedeterminationandresolution.Thisprocessidentifiesdegradedequipmentandallowstimelyrepairs.2.8.2InserviceTestingProgram~~~~~~Theinservicetestingisusedtoverifytheoperationalreadinessofpumpsandvalveswhichhaveaspecificaccidentmitigatingorsafeshutdownfunction.ThegeneralrequirementsofASMEParagraphsIWV-1100andIWP-1100forClass1,2and3pumpsandvalvesapplytoSt.Lucie.TheserequirementsestablishtheinputsusedintheFSARsafetyanalyses.ThefollowingdescribeSSCfunctions,andwerereviewedfortheInserviceTestingProgramscope:UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportTechnicalSpecificationsSystemdescriptionsforTrainingSpecialanalysesCommitmentcorrespondencePlantprocedures10CFR50,AppendixJleakratetestprogramTheASMEInserviceTestingProgramsforSt.LucieUnits1and2areforthesecond10-yearintervalandwillbeineffectthroughtheendofthesecond120-month(10-year)intervalunlessrevisedandreissuedforreasonsotherthantheroutineupdaterequiredatthestartofthethirdinterval,TheNRChasreviewedandapprovedthesetestprograms.TheASMEInserviceTestingProgramteststhespecificas-builtconfigurationvalues(i.e.,individualorintegratedcomponentcharacteristics/parametersforeachpumpandvalve)usedin St.LucioUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage52theFSARsafetyanalyses.Inthisway,thespecificsystemandcomponentcapabilitiesusedinthesafetyanalysesarebetterassuredunderallplantconditions.2.9MaintenanceRuleProgramTheSystemandComponentEngineersimplementthe10CFR50.65maintenanceruleprogram.Systemengineersmonitortheperformanceofsystemsandsystemcomponentsagainstsetcriteria.Maintenanceactivitiestocorrectdegradedequipmentaremonitored.Maintenancepreventablefunctionalfailures(MPFF),akeyindicator,aretrackedandtrendedandenteredintotheconditionreportingprocessforrootcauseevaluationandresolution.Systemengineersperformthefunctionfailureevaluationinaccordancewithadministrativeprocedures.Theprogramadministratorhastheresponsibilitytotrack,monitor,andidentifyrepetitiveMPFFsandtoreturnthesystem,structure,orcomponenttoitsprescribedacceptablelimits.2.10PlantProcedureImprovementProgramTheSt.LuciePlantProcedureImprovementProgramisfocusedonregulatoryperformanceimprovement.Thescopeoftheprojectistoidentifyandimproveoperationandmaintenanceactivitiesbyupgradedtaskinstructions,Includedintheupgradeprocessisreviewofthedesignbasisdocumentstoensureregulatorycommitmentcompliance.TheProcedureImprovementProgramincludesoperations,maintenance,andadministrativeprocedures.TheinitialstepincludedcentralizingprocedurewritersfromOperations,ElectricalMaintenance,InstrumentandControlMaintenance,MechanicalMaintenance,andAdministrativeDepartmentsunderaproceduredevelopmentsupervisor.Thisnewgroupprovidesasinglepointofcontactforproceduralissues.Thegoalofthisnewgroupwastoupgradeproceduresasnecessaryandtopreparenewproceduresfortaskswithoutprocedures.Thebasicformatforprocedureswillbestandardizedanduseindustry-provenlanguagetechniquestogivetheend-useratechnicallycorrect,firsttimeimplementableprocedure.Theimprovedprocessincludesthefollowingfundamentalattributes:~Definethescopeofatechnicalsubcommittee~Reviewproceduresforcriticalcharacteristicsandattributes~Includeindustrystandardmethodsforprocedurevalidation~Validatebyend-usertoensuretheprocedureissoundandimplementable~Establishasiteprocedurewriter'sguidewhichincorporatesINPOandindustryapprovedwritingstandardsAnotherfundamentalattributeoftheimprovedprocessistoreview,asappropriate,designbasisdocumentsthatgoverntheactivitiesandcontrolthetasksdescribedineachprocedure.Thesebasisdocumentsinclude,butarenotlimitedto,St.LucieTechnicalSpecifications,FSAR,Off-siteDoseCalculationManual,NRCcorrespondence,ABB-CEbulletins,calculations,analyses,evaluations,specificationsandplantdrawings.

I St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage532.11AnnunciatorSummaryReviewAplantannunciatorsummaryreviewiscurrentlyinprogress.Annunciatorsprovideanearlyindication/announcementofpossibledegradingplantconditions,andassuchtheyareanimportantaidtooperatorsinidentifyingappropriateproceduralactions.Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciatorsforthecontrolrooms,wastemanagementpanels,emergencydieselgenerators,steamgeneratorblowdownbuilding,boricacidconcentrators,wasteconcentrators,watertreatmentplant,oxygenanalyzer,andtheliquidwastepanels.Thisprogramwillincludereviewofselectedlogicconfigurations,annunciatorsetpoints,proceduralreferencesandcorrespondingoperatoractionsfoundintheannunciatorsummaryprocedureforeachunit,againstthedesigndocuments,asappropriate.Thisprojectisapproximately10%completewithover200annunciatorsetpoints,configurationsandproceduralresponsesreviewed,andhasnotidentifiedanyinconsistencieswhichwouldbeconsideredsafetysignificant.ThisprogramcontinuestosupporttheconclusionthattheSSCconfigurationandperformanceisconsistentwiththeplant'sdesignbasis.3.0Walkdowns,Inspections,AuditsandReviews3.1Therehavebeennumerousplantwalkdowns,NRCInspections,andFPLAuditsandVerticalSliceReviews,whichhaveverifiedconsistencybetweentheSSCsandthedesignbases.FPLPlantWalkdownsAsonemeansofensuringthattheplantconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases,plantwalkdownsareperformedaspartoftheSystemEngineerProgram.SystemEngineersarecognizantoftheirsystem'soperatingstatus,includingscheduledandunscheduledmaintenance,periodictestingandresults,systemarrangementandoperationalconfiguration,systemperformancemargins,andperformancetrending.3.1.1SystemEngineerWalkdownsAP0005750,"DutiesandResponsibilitiesoftheSystemEngineer,"isthegoverningdocumentwhichprovidesthebasisforthesystemengineerprogram.Thesystemengineeristhe"owner"oftheplantsystemandremainscognizantofthesystemsdesignbases,itsperformancecriteria,systemoperation,andmaintenancerequirements.Thesystemengineerreviewsproposedplantmodificationstothesystem.Materialconditionismonitoredbysystemwalkdowns.EngineersperformsystemwalkdownsinaccordancewithGuidelineSCEG-003,"GuidelinefortheConditionSurveyofStructuresandSupportsbyPlantPersonnel."Theresultsofthesewalkdownsareusedtodemonstratecompliancewiththemaintenancerule.ProceduralanddrawinginconsistenciesidentifiedbythesystemengineersareenteredintotheCRprocessforresolution.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage543.1.2QAWalkdownsQAsafetysystemwalkdownsprovideanothermeansofensuringthattheplantconfigurationisconsistentwiththedesignbases.SinceJanuary1996,walkdownsareconductedonaquarterlybasisaspartoftheQATechnicalReviewsandAssessments(TRA)groupfunctions.TheTRAgroupwasformedtoencompasstheformerISEGfunctions,whichfocusesonissuesaffectingnuclearsafetyandplantreliability.Priorto1996,QAperformedverticalsliceauditsofsafetysystems,whichalsoincludedsystemwalkdowns.AsnotedinAppendixB,TableC3.12thewalkdownshavehelpedverifyplantconfigurationtoplantdrawingsandprocedures.Duringsomeoftheseaudits,minorinconsistenciesbetweentheplantanddesigndocumentswereidentifiedandenteredintothecorrectiveactionprogramforresolution.3.2FPLSeismicWalkdowns3.2.1IEBulletin79-14IEBulletin79-14,"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-RelatedPipingSystems,"addressedanNRCconcernthattheseismicanalysisofsafetyrelatedpiping,coupledwithpressure,thermal,operatingweight,andotherapplicablesystemoperatingparameters,beverifiedinaccordancewithactualas-builtdrawingsforitsimpactonthestressanalysisofrecord.AtSt.LucieUnits1and2,theverificationprocessconsistedofaprogrambywhichtheas-builtconfigurationsofSeismicCategoryIsafety-relatedpipingsystemsweredocumented,evaluated,andmodifiedasnecessary,byateamofexperiencedengineersanddesignersundertheFPLQA/QCprogram.ThisprogramconsistedofwalkdownsofdesignatedSeismicCategoryIsafetyrelatedpipingsystemsanddocumentationoftheas-builtconfigurationincludingpipingsize,components,andgeometry;location,orientation,andtypeofvalves;locationandconfigurationofpipesupports;andfloorandwallpenetrationdetails.Thesedetailswerethenevaluatedbytheteamtoassessifdocumentrevisionsand/orplantmodificationswererequiredand,ifnecessary,acceptableundertheconstructioncodeofrecord.CommitmentsmadebyFPLwithregardstoNRCBulletin79-14,whichincludedwalkdowns,packagepreparation,evaluation,andmodifications,werecompletedforSt.LucieUnits1and2.3.2.2GenericLetter87-02GenericLetter87-02,"VerificationofSeismicAdequacyofMechanicalandElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactor,"(USIA-46),requiredareviewofSt.LucieUnit1equipmentrequiredtoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownoftheplantforaperiodofeighthours.FPLselectedsafety-relatedandnon-safety-relatedequipmentfortheirreview.ThisequipmentwasevaluatedforseismicadequacybyFPLengineersandaseismicreviewteamconsistingofengineeringexpertsintheareaofseismicadequacyofequipmentandequipmentperformanceduringearthquakes.ThefourbasicrequirementsfortheGL87-02/USIA-46reviewofSt.LucieUnit1,whichwere St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage55addressedinthewalkdownare;theequipmentseismiccapacitybeinggreaterthandemand,theconstructionadequacyoftheequipment,anchorageadequacyandnoseismicspatialinteraction.Thewalkdownsresultedintheidentificationofthreeequipmentitems,andtwootheritemswhichwereacceptablebutrequiredmaintenanceontheanchorage.Modificationsweremadetoallequipmentidentifiedwithdeficiencies,andareportwasissuedtotheNRCin1992.ByletterdatedFebruary9,1995,theNRCissuedaSafetyEvaluationReport(SER)addressingtheSt.LucieandTurkeyPointresponseto87-02withseveraloutstandingissues.AnauditwasperformedatTurkeyPointinDecemberof1995,andtheNRCissuedasupplementalSERonOctober22,1996,addressingoutstandingissuesfoundduringtheaudit.InthisSER,openitemsforSt.LucieUnit1wereclosed.3.3FPLUnit1SteamGeneratorReplacementWalkdownsA10CFR50.59safetyevaluationan~",tofdesignpackagestobeusedduringthe1997steamgeneratorreplacementoutagehavebveloped.Thesedocumentsarenowundergoingadesignreviewandverificationprocesspriortoimplementation.Plantwalkdownswereconductedinthecourseofdoingthisdesignwork,andtheplantFSAR,designanalysisandotherapplicablelicensingbasisdocumentswerereviewed.WalkdownswereconductedinsideandoutsidecontainmentintheareasaffectedbytheSGRP.Thespecificareasofinterestweretemporarystructureswhichinterfacewithpermanentplantstructuresandwhereinterferenceswillneedremovaltoaccommodatemovementofthenewsteamgenerators.Duringthewalkdowns,minorpipeandHVACsupportdiscrepanciesbetweenthedesigndrawingsandtheas-foundcondition,weredocumented,evaluatedanddispositioned.Inallcasesphysicalchangeswerenotnecessaryandtheappropriatedrawingsweremodified.AninputerrorintheFSARaccidentanalysiswasdocumented,evaluatedandcorrectedbythesourcefuelvendor,anddeterminednottoaffecttheconclusionoftheaccidentanalyses.3.4NRCElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspectionInFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconductedaspecialannouncedteaminspectionintheareasofdesignofelectricalsystemsandrelatedengineeringandmaintenanceactivities.ThisinspectionspecificallyfocusedontheElectricalDistributionSystem(EDS)as-builtconfigurationconformancetodesignbasesrequirementsanddesignoutputdocuments.Theinspectionincludedareviewofdesign,calibration,maintenance,andthe"as-built"configurationoftheelectricaldistributionsystemincludingmechanicalsystemsandequipmentassociatedwiththeEDS.3.4.1FPLPreparationfortheEDSFISt.LucieEngineersandPlantStaffexpendedover13,000man-hoursbetween1990andearly1991inpreparationfortheinspectionandconductedtwoselfaudits.KeyelectricaldesignandconfigurationaspectsofSt.LucieUnits1and2werereviewedandupdatedasrequired.Someoftheareaswere:

~~

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage56~Electricalsystemshortcircuitandvoltagedropanalyses~Batteryandbatterychargersizing~DCsystemminimumandmaximumvoltage~Breakercoordination~Fusesizing~Cablesizing~ProtectiveRelaysettings~EmergencyDieselSystem-Electricaldesign8caccidentloading~EmergencyDieselSystem-Mechanicaldesign,fuel8ccoolingsystem~As-installedconfigurationversusdesigndrawingsUponcompletionofthiseffort,severalcalculationswereupdatedorrevised.Inaddition,anumberofinconsistencieswereidentifiedintheFSARandplantconfigurationdrawings.Theseinconsistencieswerescheduledforcorrection.DuringtheFPLreview,nooperabilityproblemswereidentifiedwiththeSt.Lucieelectricaldistributionsystem.3.4.2NRCInspectionTheNRCconductedanannouncedteaminspectionduringthefirstquarterof1991.Duringthisextensivetechnicalaudit,thefollowingareaswerereviewedbytheteam:~TransmissionSystem-Theteamreviewedthecharacteristicsofthe240kVelectricaltransmissionsystem.Maximumandminimumrangeofvoltageandfrequencywasreviewed.~MediumVoltage(4.16KV)Class1EElectricalSystem-areviewofthe4.16kVandemergencydieseldesignwasconducted.Manyofthecalculationsandanalysesforequipmentloading,shortcircuit,andvoltageregulationwerereviewed.Alsoincludedwasareviewofthediesels'apabilitytostartandacceleratetheassignedsafetyloadswithintherequiredtimesequence.Theteamconcludedthemaximumcalculatedfaultcurrentlevelsandvoltageregulationforthesystemwasdemonstratedtobeacceptableinalldesignconditions.~Class1E480VACSystem-shortcircuitandvoltagedropcalculationswerereviewedforthe480Vacelectricalsystem.Shortcircuitratingswerefoundtobewithintheequipmentrating.Cableswereadequatelysizedandbreakercoordinationwasacceptable.~ClasslE120VACSystem-theClass1E120Vacdesignwasreviewed.Severalshortcircuitandvoltagedropcalculationswereperformedtodemonstratethatcablesizingwasacceptablefortheequipment.~Class1E125VDCSystem-revieweddesigndocumentation,calculations,andevaluationswhichdemonstratedsizingandloadingforthe125Vdcsystemand St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage57equipment.Thisdocumentationincludedshortcircuitandlowvoltagecalculations,MOVdesignstudies,highvoltageanalysis,andcoordinationstudies.Thedocumentationappropriatelyverifieddcequipmentwasadequatelysized.Minordocumentationerrorswereidentifiedbytheteam.FPLinvestigatedtheerrorsandagreedtocorrectthedocumentsintheforthcomingrevisions.~DCMotorOperatedValves-voltagedropcalculationsfordcmotoroperatedvalveswerefoundnottomeetpresentdayvendorrecommendations.Additionalinformationsuppliedbythevendorconfirmedthatacceptabletorquewasprovidedtooperatevalvesunderplantstatedconditions.Theteamconcludedthatnooperabilityconcernexistedinthisarea.~Maintenance,Testing,Calibration,andConfigurationcontrol-variouswalkdowninspectionswereconductedtoverifythe"asinstalled"configurationoftheelectricalsystemanddeterminecompliancewiththedesigndrawingsanddocuments,Completedcalibrationandsurveillanceprocedureswerealsoreviewedtoverifythatsystemfunctionsweretestedinaccordancewithdesignspecifications.Althoughtheteamidentifiedsomeminorissues,itwasdeterminedthatacomprehensiveprogramforthemaintenance,testingandcalibrationoftheelectricalequipmentwasinplaceatSt.Lucie.Overall,theteamdeterminedtheresultsofthewalkdowninspectionswereverysatisfactory.TheresultsofthisinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport91-03datedMay17,1991,andnoviolations,deviationsoroperabilityconcernswerenoted.TheNRCconcludedthattheElectricalDistributionSystem(EDS)atSt.Luciewascapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditions,andthatadequatecontrolsareinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.TheengineeringtechnicalsupportanddesigngroupssupportingtheEDSwerealsofoundtobeadequate.Theirperformancedemonstratedinvolvementinproblemidentificationandresolutionaswellasroutineactivitiesinmaintenance,testing,operations,andprocurement.PlantmodificationstotheEDSwereperformedinaccordancewiththeapproveddesigncontrolprocesses.Minordiscrepancieswerenotedintheareasofthestartuptransformer,thenon-safetycoolingfanintheemergencydieselgeneratorrooms,fusecontrolandrelaysettingdrawings,therelaysettingcalibrationprocedureandpreventivemaintenancetodetectfailedmoldedcasecircuitbreakers.ThesediscrepancieswereresolvedundertheSt.LucieCorrectiveActionProgram.TheresultsofthisinspectiondemonstratedthattheEDSatSt.LuciewillperformitsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditionsandthatFPLhadadequatecontrolsinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.

3.5St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage58NRCService%'aterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspectionInSeptemberandOctober1991,theNRCconductedaspecialannouncedpilotteaminspectionintheareaoftheservicewateroperationalperformance.Thisinspectionspecificallyfocusedontheservicewater(i.eintakecoolingwateratSt.Lucie)systemas-builtconfigurationanddemonstratedoperationalperformanceregardingtheapplicabledesignbasesrequirements.Theinspectionincludedamechanicaldesignreview;detailedsystemwalkdowns;reviewofsystemoperation,maintenance,andsurveillance;andassessmentofqualityassuranceandcorrectiveactionsrelatedtotheIntakeCoolingWater(ICW)system.TheteamalsoassessedFPL'simplementationofactionsrequiredbyGenericLetter89-13,"ServiceWaterSystemProblemsAffectingSafety-RelatedEquipment,"aswellassystemunavailabilitytogainadditionalinsightsforprobabilisticriskassessmentapplications.TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport91-201.TheNRCinspectionteamconcludedthattheServiceWaterSystemas-builtconfigurationwouldbecapableofperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionunderdesignbasesconditions.Discrepancieswerenotedintheareasoftestingthestandby"C"pump,ICWtemperaturecontrolvalvestroketimetesting,ISTofICWmanualvalves,FSARinconsistenciesandtrainingmaterialinconsistencies.Overall,thisNRCSWSOPIfoundnodiscrepanciesintheplantdesignbases,however,thereviewcontributedtoimprovementsintheSt.Lucieprocessesformaintainingitsplantconfiguration,performance,andtestingproceduresconsistentwithitsdesignbases.3.6NRCInspectionofPlantChangesandModificationsInNovember1993,theNRCconductedaroutineannouncedinspectionoftheareaofdesignchanges,plantmodifications,andengineeringandtechnicalsupportactivities.ThisinspectionspecificallyfocusedontheadequacyofthePlantChange/Modification(PC/M)processtoensurethatchangestotheplantdesignand/oras-builtconfigurationwereimplementedsuchthatthemodifiedconfigurationandsystem/componentperformancewereincompliancewiththeplantdesignbasesrequirements.TheresultsweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport93-25,datedDecember1,1993.Intheareasinspected,noviolationsordeviationswereidentified.FPLhaddemonstratedtheuseofanadequateprioritizationprocessforidentifyingandimplementingplantmodification.TheoverallqualityandtechnicalcontentofthePC/Mpackagesreviewedwereadequateandsufficientlydocumentedtoverifyclosure.The10CFR50.59safetyevaluationsprovidedsufficientdiscussionandjustificationtocomplywithregulatoryrequirements.FPLhadimplementedacontrolprocesswhichwouldreduceandmaintainthePC/Mbacklogtoanacceptablelevel.Thisinspectionsupportsthepositionthattheplantdesignand/oras-builtconfigurationandperformanceparametershavebeenmaintainedconsistentwiththedesignbasesandthatdesignchangecontrolprocessactivitiesareadequate.

3.7NRCIntegratedInspectionsSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage59During1996,theNRCperformedseveralintegratedinspectionsatSt.Lucie.InspectionReports96-01,96-04,96-06,96-08and96-09documentinspectionreviewsoftheFSAR,plantconfiguration,plantprocedures,plantpractices,andplantparametersforconsistency.ThegeneralconclusionsfromthesereportsaresimilartotheFPLfindingsconcerningtheFSAR.ThedesignbasesinformationiscorrectbutthereexistsminordeficienciesbetweentheFSARandtheplantdocumentation.ThenoteddeficiencieshavebeenenteredintotheplantcorrectiveactionprogramforresolutionbytheissuanceofConditionReports(CR).ThisinspectioneffortsupportsthepositionthattheSt.Luciedesignbasesandlicensedconfigurationandperformanceismaintainedconsistentinplantareasinspected.3.8NRCEquipmentEnvironmentalQualificationProgramInspectionInFebruaryandMarch1989,theNRCconductedaninspectionofthe10CFR50.49requirementsforenvironmentalqualification(EQ)ofelectricalequipmentatSt.LuciePlant.TheinspectionincludedareviewoftheFPLimplementationprogramtomeettherequirementsof10CFR50.49,walkdowninspectionsofEQequipmentinsidecontainment,reviewofEQmaintenanceactivities,reviewofEQdesignchangesandFPLactionsinresponsetoNRCinitiatives(NRCNotices86-71and88-89),andfollow-uponFPLactionsinresponsetolicenseconditions.TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport89-07datedApril6,1989.Noviolationsordeviationswereidentified.TheresultsofthisinspectionsupportedtheNRC'spreviousassessmentinMarch1986,thatFPLhadimplementedanadequateprogramandthattheprogramcontinuestobeadequate.ThewalkdownsofEQequipmentresultedinnoopenorunresolveditems.EQdocumentationfileswereconsideredwellorganizedandcomplete,requiringminimaladditionalinformationtosupporttheanalysisprovidedinthefile.EQm'aintenanceprogramproceduralcompliancewasgood,andthespecialmaintenancerequirementsdescribedintheEQdocumentpackageswereconfirmedtohavebeenincorporatedintotheproceduresforthosesampleitemsreviewed.TheinspectionteamnotedthatthetrackingmechanismusedbytheplanttoensureschedulingandcompletionofEQmaintenancetasksappearedtobefragmentedwithseparatelistsforcalibration,surveillance,preventivemaintenance,andreplacement,Therewasnooverallprogramtoensurethatmaintenanceactivitieswerebeingaccomplished.ThiswasconsideredaweaknessinFPL'sEQmaintenanceprogram.FPLacknowledgedtheconcernandcommittedtoimplementaformalizedmaintenancetrackingsystemasoutlinedintheinspectionreportdetails.ThisinspectionsupportstheFPL'spositionthatSt.LucieequipmentundertheEQProgramwasconfigured,qualified,performancetested,andmaintainedinaccordancewiththeplantdesignbases.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage603.9NRCInspectionoftheMotorOperatedValveProgramTheFPLMOVprograminvolvedadesignbasisreviewandplantconfigurationverificationbyengineeringandplantmaintenancetodetermineparameterscriticalforMOVoperationinresponsetoGL89-10,ThirdpartyreviewsbycontractorsandINPOprovidedguidanceonmethodologyfortestingandlessonslearnedfromotherutilityprograms.SomeoftheaspectsofthisprogramincludetheincorporationofMOVdata,setpoints,andparametersintoengineeringdrawings,performancetesting,andplantmodificationstoimprovetheoperation/reliabilityofMOVs.TheincorporationoftheMOVdataintotheengineeringprocessaddsprocesscontrolswhichmaintainsconsistencybetweentheMOVdesignbasisandtheplantconfiguration.InSeptember1991,theNRCconductedaspecialannouncedteaminspectiontoexaminetheprogramdevelopedinresponsetoNRCGenericLetter(GL)89-10,"Safety-RelatedMotorOperatedValveTestingAndSurveillance."TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport91-18datedNovember18,1991,andfoundthatthebasicprogramadequatelyaddressedmostoftherecommendations.However,NRCconcernsresultingfromtheinspectionincludedsomepotentialdeviationsfromtherecommendationsofthegenericletter,avendorrecommendationthatwasnotbeingmet,andprogrammaticdetailsthatwerenotsufficientlydefinedtoassessatthetimeoftheinspection.TwopotentialprogramdeviationswereresolvedwiththeNRCinsubsequentcorrespondence.TheNRCinspectionteamalsonotedthatthepersonnelinvolvedintheprogramwereknowledgeableoftheissuesinvolvedinthegenericletter.GoodrefreshertrainingwasbeingprovidedfortheupcomingOctober1991refuelingoutage.FPLrecognizedthatstandardindustryvalvefactorsarenotwhollyadequateforgatevalvesettingcalculations.Positivestepshadbeenundertakentoaddressindustryconcernsatthetimeregardingthecapabilitiesofthediagnostictestingequipmentpreviouslyused.Preventivemaintenanceproceduresprovideddefinitiveinformationregardingtheattributestobeassessed.3.10NRCCheckValveInspectionInJanuary1993,theNRCconductedaroutineannouncedinspectionintheareasoflicenseeprogramsassociatedwithsafetyrelatedcheckvalves.TheresultsoftheinspectionweredocumentedinNRCInspectionReport93-01,datedFebruary23,1993.ThereportconcludedthatFPLhadimplementedasatisfactorycheckvalveprogramtoensuretheoperabilityofcheckvalves.Theynotedthatknowledgeableandexperiencedpersonnelwereinvolvedintheprogramtoensureadequateactionsweretakentoaddresscheckvalveproblemswhenidentified,andthattherewasadequatemanagementattentiontothecheckvalveprogram.TheNRCfoundthatFPL'sinvolvementwiththeNuclearIndustryCheckValveUsersGroupwasapositiveinitiative,thatcheckvalvesintheISTprogramwereincludedinthecheckvalveprogram,thatcheckvalvesinsystemsbeyondthoseidentifiedinINPOSER86-03wereincludedinthecheckvalveprogram,andtheuseofacheckvalvedatabasetoidentifyindividualvalveparametersandsummarizevalve St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage61maintenancehistorywasastrength.Onenon-citedviolationandoneunresolveditemwereidentifiedinthereport.(Correctiveactionsassociatedwiththisinspectionhavebeencompleted.)ThisinspectionsupportstheFPLpositionthatSt.Lucieimplementedasatisfactorycheckvalveprogramtoensureoperabilityofcheckvalves.3.11NRCArchitect/EngineerTeamInspectionFromNovember4,1996toJanuary10,1997,theNRCconductedaspecialannouncedteaminspectionintheareaofsafetysystemoperationalperformancecapability.ThisparticularinspectionispartofanewNRCinspectioninitiative,calledanArchitect/Engineer(A/E)TeamInspection.TheNRCinspectionteamconsistedofanNRCteamleaderand5A/Einspectors(2mechanicalengineers,1instrumentationandcontrolsengineer,1electricalengineerand1fieldengineer).TheNRCteamutilizedtheguidanceofNRCInspectionProcedure93801,"SafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI),"duringtheinspectionwiththeemphasisonengineeringd'esign.Theprimaryobjectiveofthisinspectionwastoassesstheoperationalperformancecapabilityofselectedsafetysystemsthroughadetailedengineeringdesignreview.TwosafetysystemswereselectedforreviewbytheNRC:theUnit1auxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)system,andtheUnit2componentcoolingwater(CCW)system.Theinspectionfocusedonidentifyingthedesignbasisfunctionsoftheselectedsystemsthroughadetailedreviewoflicenseanddesignbasesdocumentation.Confirmationthattheselectedsystemscouldperformthesedesignbasisfunctionswasperformedthroughareviewofengineeringanalyses/calculations,operatingprocedures,maintenanceproceduresandsystem/componenttesting.Inpreparationfortheinspection,FPLconductedanextensiveself-assessmentoftheselectedsystemdesignbasesanddesign/configurationcontrolprocesses.Documentsreviewedduringthisself-assessmentincludedcalculations,originalequipmentspecificationsandpurchaseordercorrespondence,FSAR,NRCSERs,DBDs,TechnicalSpecifications,licenseamendments,as-builtdocumentation,accidentanalyses,vendortechnicalmanuals,PCMs,TSAs,plantoperatingprocedures,testingprocedures,andcorrectiveactionprogramfindings.Discrepanciesandinconsistenciesidentifiedthroughthisself-assessmentweredocumentedusingtheCRprocess.Noneofthediscrepanciesidentifiedthroughtheself-assessmentweredeterminedtoinvolveanissuethatcompromisedoperabilityoftheselectedsystemsoritscapabilitytoperformitsintendeddesignbasisfunctions.Duringtheconductoftheinspection,theNRCinspectionteamperformedextensiveanddetailedreviewsinthefollowinggeneralareas:~Engineeringdesignandconfigurationcontrol~Consistencyindesignbasisdocuments(FSAR,DBD,etc.)~Systemmodificationhistoryandassociated10CFR50.59safetyevaluations~Designinterfaceswithoperationsandmaintenance St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage62~Adequacyofoperatingprocedures~AdequacyofTechnicalSpecificationsurveillancetestingforoperabilitydeterminations~CorrectiveactionhistoryThepreliminaryNRCfindingsindicatedthattherewerenomajorprogramweaknessesorfailures,andthatthesystemsinspectedwerecapableofperformingtheirintendeddesignbasisfunctions.TheNRCinspectionfinalreportisscheduledtobeissuedinlateFebruary1997.3.12FPLQAAuditsandReviewsNumerousformalQAauditsandreviewshavebeenperformedbytheQualityAssuranceorganizationsincetheinitialstartupoftheunits,inareasrelatedtothecontrolofdesign,configuration,andtestirigoftheSt.LuciePlant.Designprogramauditstypicallyreviewedengineeringprocesses,implementingprocedures,andtheimplementationofdesignchangesandassociatedrecords(i.e.modificationpackages).QAauditsconsistentlyfoundthatQualityAssuranceProgramelements(includingdesignbasisrequirements)wereadequatelyaddressedbyprocedures,andthattheimplementationofthoseprocedureswaseffective.Additionally,verticalslicereviewsandsafetysystemwalkdownswereperformedonasamplingbasistoverifythattheexistingplantconfigurationmatchedthedesign.QAconsistentlyfoundthatplantsafetysystemswerebuiltasdesigned,withminorexceptions.Minordiscrepancieswereidentifiedandformallyresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram.ExamplesofQAauditsandself-assessmentswhichevaluatedwhethertheSt.Luciesystems,structures,componentconfigurationandperformancewereconsistentwiththedesignbasesarelistedinAppendixB,TableC3.12.AuditFindingshaveresultedinenhancementstoengineering,operations,andtestingprocessesandprocedures.~QSL-OPS-88-595,"VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem."(5findings-Nofindingsinvolveddiscrepanciesbetweenas-builtconditions,InserviceTesting(IST)systemperformanceandthesystemdesignbases).~QSL-OPS-88-672,"VerificationoftheUnit2ReactorCoolantSystemDesign,OperationandMaintenance,toAssureSystemOperability."(1finding-regardinginstrumentcalibration-noconfiguration,performance,designbasisdiscrepancies).~QSL-OPS-90-739,"VerificationoftheUnit1and2AuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemDesign,OperationandMaintenance,toAssureSystemOperability."(1finding-regardinganinstrumentrootisolationvalveposition-noconfiguration,performance,designbasisdiscrepancies).~QSL-OPS-91-821,"VerificationoftheUnit1ReactorProtectionSystemModifications,Testing,Maintenance,andProcurement,toAssureSystemOperability."(Nofindings).

St.LucioUtiitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage63~ISEG-PSL-A93-017,"ISEGAssessmentActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1RefuelingOutage."Performedtoensurethatthekeysafetyfunctionsforshutdownconditions(i.e.RCSinventory,decayheatremoval,poweravailability,reactivitycontrol,andcontainmentintegrity)werenotcompromisedbyoutagework.(Nofindingsregardingconfiguration,performance,designbasis).~ISEG-PSL-A93-019,"ISEGAssessmentActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1RefuelingOutage."Performedreviewsoftheimplementationofshutdownmarginverifications,andpressurizersafetyreliefvalvemodifications.(Nofindings).~ISEG-PSL-A93-020,"ISEGActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.Lucie-1RefuelingOutage."IndependentoversightoftheACandDCpoweravailabilityduringtheoutage,ensuringapplicablerequirementsweresatisfied.(Nofindingsregardingconfiguration,performance,designbasis).I~ITR95-002,"ReviewofLER335/94-006;ContainmentIntegrityOutsideofFSARAssumptionsUnderLimitedCircumstancesduetoDesignError."Evaluatedtherootcauseoftheeventwhichinvolvedadesignerrormadeduringthe1978additionoftheiodineremovalsystemforUnit1.(Nofindings).~ITR96-013,"SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):AuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem,Unit1."Verifiedthatplantdrawingsreflectas-builtconditions.(Nofindings).II~QR96-0006,"FourthQuarter1996ESFWalkdownoftheUnit2HighPressureInjectionSystem."Verifiedas-builtconditionsarereflectedinplantdrawingsandmetUFSARrequirements,Valvelineupswereperformedusingoperatingprocedures,andcomponentswereverifiedtomatchdesigndocumentation.(Nofindings).OtherQAauditsandassessmentslistedinAppendixB,Table3.12resultedinfindingswhichdirectlyrelatedtoSt.Luciesystem,structureandcomponentconfigurationandperformanceconsistencywiththedesignbases.ResolutionofthesefindingsfromthefollowingauditslistedinAppendixB,TableC3.12resultedinimprovementintheSt.Lucieconfigurationandperformanceconsistentwiththedesignbases:~QSL-OPS-88-624,"Unit1and2EmergencyDieselGeneratorsandSafety-RelatedSwitchgearSystems."(5findings-regardingdrawing/as-builtdiscrepancies,ISTdiscrepancies,anddesignbasiscomponentsizingdocumentation;discrepancieswereresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram).~QSL-OPS-91-800,Supplement1,"VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnit1and2FeedwaterandMainSteamSystems."(2findings-regardingdrawing/as-builtdiscrepanciesandprocedures/as-builtdiscrepancies;discrepancieswereresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram).

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage64~ITR96-015,"SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):SectionsofEmergencyCoreCoolingSubsystemsintheUnit1ReactorContainmentBuilding,andPressurizerCodeSafetyValveModifications."(3findings-regardingupdateofdesignbasisdocumentsfollowingdesignmodificationimplementation;discrepancieswereresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram).~QSL-PM-96-18,"September1996PSLQAPerformanceMonitoringAudit."Performance-basedobservationsintheareasofoperations,maintenance,services,andengineering.(6findings-regardingdrawing/as-builtdiscrepancies,procedures/as-builtdiscrepancies,updateofdesignbasisdocumentsfollowingdesignmodificationimplementation,and2findingsthatwereindicativeoflessthanadequateimplementationof10CFR50.59requirements;discrepancieswereresolvedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram).4.0ConclusionThereisadequaterationaleforconcludingwithreasonableassurancethatthesystems,structuresandcomponentsareconsistentwiththedesign,andthatdiscrepanciesbetweendesigndocuments,theFSAR,procedures,andtheplantarenotsignificantwithrespecttosafety.Thisconclusionisbaseduponfollowing:~Theverificationatinitiallicensingthattheplant,FSARandthedesignareconsistent.~Processesareinplacetoensurethemaintenanceofthatconsistency.~Recentprogramsandinitiativeshaveaidedinverifyingandenhancingthedesignbasesforconfigurationandperformancerequirementsonplantsystems.~Auditsandinspectionshaveverifiedconsistencybetweenthedesignbasisandtheplant.~Processeshavebeenandareinplaceforidentification,evaluationandcorrectionofdiscrepanciesbetweenthedesignbasisandtheplantsystems,structuresandcomponents.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage65[d]"Processesforidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactions,includingactionstodeterminetheextentofproblems,actiontopreventrecurrenceandreportingtoNRC."Thefollowingoutlineprovidestheorganizationoftheresponsetorequest[d]:1.0Introduction-Background2.0ProblemIdentificationProcesses2.12.22.32.42.52.6OperatorRoundsWalkdownsOperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)/GenericImplicationsManagementSelf-assessmentQualityAssurance(QA)AuditProgramsNuclearSafetySpeakout(SPEAKOUT)3.0CorrectiveActionPrograms3.1HistoricalDiscussion3.2QualityInstructions(Qi)3.3ConditionReporting(CR)System3.4EventResponseTeams3,5CommitmentandCorrectiveActionsTracking(CIRAC)Systems3.6ChangeRequestNotices(CRN)3.7NonconformanceReports(NCR)3.810CFRPart21/SignificantSafetyHazardEvaluations3.9OperabilityDetermination3.1010CFR50.72and50.73ReportabilityDetermination3.11CorrectiveActionProgramTraining4.0NRC/St.LucieInterfaces St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage661.0,.Introduction-BackgroundTheSiteVicePresidentandDirectorofNuclearAssuranceareresponsiblefortheoverallimplementationoftheprogramsdescribedinthisresponse.Operationspersonnelareresponsibleforoperatingtheplantinaccordancewiththedesignbases,TechnicalSpecificationsandtheapplicableregulations.Alongwithaquestioningattitudeexhibitedbyplantpersonnelandtheidentificationofissuesduringroutinework,St.Luciehasmanyprogramswhicharespecificallydesignedtoidentifyissuesneedingresolution.Exampleswhicharediscussedinthisresponseare,operatorrounds,programinaticandspecialwalkdowns,OperatingExperienceFeedback,managementself-assessments,theQAprogram,theConditionReportprocess,andNuclearSafetySPEAKOUT.Conditionsfoundmaybedocumentedbyanyemployee,permanentortemporary,onaConditionReport(CR).AfterreviewbytheNuclearPlantSupervisorandthePlantGeneralManager(PGM),theorganizationassignedresponsibilityforresolutionoftheconditionconductsananalysisanddevelopsappropriatecorrectiveactions.ThecorrectiveactionsidentifiedintheresolutiontoeachCRaretrackedbypersonnelresponsibleforcompletionoftheassignedactivities.TheCRprogramisadministeredbytheServicesorganization.RootcausesaretypicallydeterminedbypersonnelfromtheorganizationassignedresponsibilityforresolutionoftheCR.Thedepthofanalysisandresourcesdevotedtocorrectiveactioniscommensuratewiththesignificanceofthenotedcondition.TheNuclearPlantSupervisorandtheon-shiftoperationsstaffareauthorizedandrequiredtomaketimelyreportabilityandoperabilitydecisionsandfollowthroughtheapplicableprocedurestocompletion.Forthoseconditionswhichareofanaturewhichalloworrequiremoredetailedevaluation,theEngineeringstaffaidsinthedeterminationofoperabilityandtheLicensingstaffaidsinthedeterminationofreportability.2.02.1ProblemIdentificationProcessesOperatorRoundsOperatorroundsarerequiredbyplantprocedures.TheprocedureinsomecasesimplementstherequirementsofTechnicalSpecificationsandisalsoareflectionofmanagementexpectationsfortheoperatortokeepabreastoftheoperationoftheequipmentintheplant.Operatorroundsuseacomputerizeddataloggertoprovidetheoperatorwithdetailedplantinformation.Thisinformationisusefulindocumentingplantstatusandismoreuser-friendlythantheprevioushardcopylogs.Thecomputerprovidestheoperatorwiththerangeofnormalvaluesassociatedwithequipmentperformance.ItalsohasTechnicalSpecificationinformation,trendingcapabilities,anddoesnotallowtheoperatortoexittheprogramuntiltheroundshavebeen St.LucieUqits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage67completed.Theavailabilityoftheinformationinthecomputerizeddatasetsimplifiestheidentificationofanabnormalconditionandprovidesamoreefficientmeansforsupervisorreview.Plantproceduresprovidebroadscoperequirements,aswellasspecificdepartmentalinstructionsgoverningtheaspectsofeachwatchstation.Satisfactorycompletionofasetofroundsonaparticularwatchstationinaccordancewiththeseinstructions(underthesurveillanceofasupervisor)isarequirementforqualifyingonawatchstation.Theinstructionsareperiodicallyusedasamonitoringtoolbymanagementtoinsurethattheroundsareperformedinaccordancewiththeirexpectations.Theroundshelptotrendandrespondtodegradingconditionsinatimelymanner.Plantworkordersaregeneratedfordeficiencies,andconditionreportsaregeneratedforitemsoutsidetheworkorderprocess.2.2WalkdownsOperatingExperienceFeedback(OEF)/GenericImplicationsSystemengineersandcomponentengineersarerequiredtoperformwalkdownsoftheirsystemsonaregularbasis.Directionsforwalkdownsareprovidedbyprocedure.EngineeringDepartmentinstructionsareinplaceforwalkdownsofcomponentsandsystems.SeeSection4.0intheresponsetoquestion[c]formoredetailsonprogrammaticandspecialwalkdowns.Ifnonconformingconditionsarefound,theCRsystemisusedtodocumenttheconditionand~~provideavehicleforthecorrectionofthecondition.2.3IndustryeventsandreportsarereviewedandprocessedbasedonapplicabilitytoSt.Lucieinaccordancewithadministrativeprocedures.IndustryeventsandreportsarereviewedbytheOEFcoordinatorandprocessedbasedonpotentialgenericapplicabilitytoSt.LucieinaccordancewithAdministrativeProcedureADM-17.03,"OperatingExperienceFeedback."IndustryeventreportsscreenedbytheOEFCoordinatorinclude:NRCGenericLetters(GL)NRCInformationNotices(IN)NRCDailyEventReportsNRCPressReleases(PR)INPOSignificantOperatingExperienceReports(SOER)INFOSignificantEventReports(SER)INPOSignificantEventNotifications(SEN)INPOSignificantbyOthersReports(SO)INPOOperationsandMaintenanceReminders(0&MR)INPOOperatingExperienceReports(OE)Westinghouse,GeneralElectric,andCombustionEngineeringVendorandTechnicalReportsOperatingexperienceitemswhichmeritanalysis,specificactionsorathorough,documentedplant~~~~~~~revieworresponse,areprocessedasCRs.ImplementationoftheCRprocessensuresthatathoroughevaluationandanalysisoftheeventorreportismadeandthattheplant'sresponse(if St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage68applicable)adequatelyaddressestheconcerns.Ifanupdatetotheplant'sdesignbasesdocumentsistcquiredinresponsetotheoperatingevent,itwillbeidentifiedandimplementedthroughtheCRprocessusingtheappropriateengineeringprocesses.Whereenhancementsorchangesareidentifiedwhichwouldbenefittheplantormitigatetheconsequencesofanevent,procedure/processchangesaremadeasnecessary.OneoftheOEFprogramgoalsistoaidinthedevelopmentofplantprocedures,suchthatthepotentialfortheintroductionofastepwhichcouldinitiateaneventisminimizedduringprocedurechangeprocess.ViolationswhichhavebeencitedatotherlicenseesarereviewedonaperiodicbasisforapplicabilitytoSt.Lucie.ContractorsthathavecompileddocketedinformationoninternalaswellasgenericcommunicationsfromtheNRChavebeenretainedbyFPL.Thisbodyofinformationisavailableinanelectronicallysearchableformat,andaidsinthetimelyreviewofinformationpotentiallyapplicabletoSt.Lucie.RecentaccessviatheInternethasmademanyofthesedocumentsavailabletoFPLonthesamedayasreleasedtotheindustrybytheNRC.2.4ManagementSelf-assessmentSt.Luciedepartmentshaveaseriesofformalandinformalprogramswhichprovideforself-assessment.Theself-assessmentprocessesusedatSt.Lucieinclude:PostOutageAssessmentsPostTripReviewsOffHoursToursTrainingObservationsPlantManager'sWalkdownEventResponseTeamsConditionReportSystemTrendingQuarterlyTrendAnalysisEachoftheseprocessesprovidetheopportunitytoidentifyprocedure,designorconfigurationissuesinneedofresolution.BeginninginAugust1995,aseriesofsignificantproblemsandeventsindicatedthatSt.Lucieplantperformancehaddeclined.St.Lucieplantmanagementtooktheinitiativetoconductacriticalandcomprehensiveself-assessmentofSt.LucieOperations,Engineering,MaintenanceandPlantSupportfunctionalareas,aswellasmanagementpoliciesandthecorrectiveactionprogram.WithrespecttotheSt.Luciedesignbases,theassessmentdidnotidentifyanysafetysignificantissues,However,someopportunitiesforimprovementwereidentifiedinrelatedareassuchasconfigurationmanagement.Forexample,theaccountabilitiesforthemaintenanceoftheFSARwasnotclearlyestablished,someplantdrawings,proceduresandlicensingdocumentswerenotupdatedtoreQectmodifications,andtherewasinsufficienttrainingprovidedtoengineersassigned

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage69toidentifyandperformrequireddrawingupdates.Correctiveactionshavebeeninitiatedfortheweaknessesidentifiedbytheself-assessment.2.5QualityAssurance(QA)AuditProgramsTheQAorganizationatSt.LucieisanindependentorganizationreportingthroughanoffsiteDirectordirectlytothePresidentoftheNuclearDivision.QAhasaprogramofauditswhichisrequiredbyTechnicalSpecifications.AuditsarealsoconductedattherequestoftheCNRBandupperNuclearDivisionmanagement.ThefindingsandrecommendedcorrectiveactionsresultingfromtheauditprogramaredocumentedthroughthegenerationofaCRforeachitem,aswellasintheQAauditfiles.(Alsoseediscussionintheresponsetorequest[a],Section6.0,ontheTopicalQualityAssuranceReport(TQAR)Section18.0requirementsforaudits.)2.6NuclearSafetySpeakout(SPEAKOUT)TheSPEAKOUTprogramisaseparateconfidentialreportingprocessforidentificationofconcerns.Thisprogrammaybeusedbypersonnelwishingtoremainanonymousorusedasamethodoutsidethenormalchainofcommandreportingprocess.Thisprogramisdesignedtomaintainanonymitywhileseekingcausesandcorrectiveactionsfortheidentifiedissues.AdesignatedcommitteereviewssignificantSPEAKOUTissuesforthoroughnessofinvestigation,documentationandcorrectiveactions.Summaryreportsoneachissuearereturnedtotheidentifyingindividualfortheirinformation.3.03.1CorrectiveActionProgramsHistoricalDiscussionTheoverallmethodandprocessforaddressingcorrectiveaction,asrequiredbyCriterionXVIof10CFR50AppendixB,hashistoricallybeenacontrolledprocess,withengineeringsupportprovidedasnecessary.Issuesareraisedthroughsuccessivemanagementlevels,uptoandincludingthePresidentNuclearDivision.Thisprocessisprogressive,andtheindividualmaycontinueupthischainifsatisfactoryactionisnottakenatanylevelonanindividualconcern.ThisprocessissupplementedbytheNuclearSafetySPEAKOUTprogramwhichprovidesamechanismforanonymouslyidentifyingconcerns.Seesection2.6ofthisresponseforfurtherdetailsonSPEAKOUT.TheTQARforSt.Lucieisthetoptierdocument(approvedbytheNRC)whichdefinestheQAprogram.TheTQARiswrittensuchthatthenumberingandtopicofeachsectionmatchesthatof10CFR50,AppendixB.QualityInstructionsandplantadministrativeproceduresprovideimplementationlevelguidanceforTQARrequirements.Thishierarchyofqualityprocedureshasexistedsincethenuclearunitconstructiontimeframe.ThebasicrequirementsforcorrectiveactionprocessesaredescribedinthefollowingTopicalQualityReports(TQR):

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage70ThisTQRrequiresthatmeasuresbeestablishedtocontrolnonconformingitemstopreventthemfrombeinginstalledorused.Physicalcontrolssuchassegregationortaggingensurethatinadvertentuseofnonconformingitemsdoesnotoccur.Measuresarealsoprovidedfortheevaluationanddispositionoftheitems.Forexample,nonconformanceswhichaffectdesignintegrityorcreateadeviationfromdesignspecificationsrequireEngineeringreviewforidentificationofappropriatecorrectiveactions.Adocumentedtechnicalevaluationisrequiredwhenanitemisaccepted"as-is"orrepairedtoanacceptableevaluation.Theseevaluationsassurethatthefinalconditiondoesnotadverselyaffectsafety,operabilityormaintainabilityoftheitemorcomponent.ThisTQRrequiresthatmeasuresbeestablishedtoensurethatconditionsadversetoqualityarepromptlyidentified,trackedandcorrected.ThesemeasurescurrentlyexistintheformoftheConditionReportingsystemdescribedbelow.Iftheidentifiedconditionissignificant,aRootCauseAnalysisisperformed,theextentoftheconditionisdetermined(genericimplications),appropriateactionsaretakentopreventrecurrence,andresultsarereportedtoappropriatemanagementlevels.Conditionswhichmayaffectplantsystemoperabilityreceiveadocumentedoperabilityassessmentwithinspecifiedtimeframes.Requirementshavebeeninplacetoensurethatcorrectiveactionnotonlycorrectstheimmediateconditionbutalsopreventsadverseconditionsfromrecurring.ThisTQRrequirestheconductingofacomprehensivesystemofplannedandperiodicauditsofthequalityassuranceprogramtodeterminetheeffectivenessoftheprogram.AuditresultsarereviewedbythemanagementoftheauditedorganizationandsubsequentlybytheCompanyNuclearReviewBoard.3.2QualityInstructions(QI)QualityInstructionsareprocedureswrittentodelineateactionsandorganizationalresponsibilitieswhichaffectqualityintheoperationoftheSt.LuciePlant.QualityInstructionsprovideimplementationleveldetailfortheQualityAssuranceProgramrequirementsoutlinedintheTQR.SimilartotheTQR,thesetofQualityInstructionsalsofollowsthecriterionstructureof10CFR50AppendixB.QualityInstructionswithintheQI15andQI16serieshavehistoricallydefinedthemethodsforrequesting,implementing,documentingandreportingactionstocorrectidentifieddeficiencies.TheseproceduresprovidefordispositionbyEngineeringofnonconformancesaffectingdesignintegrityordeviationsfromdesignspecifications.Provisionshavebeenincludedtoaddressconcernsofanimmediatenature,totrackopenitemsuntilclosureandtoprovideforreportingofsignificantconditionstomanagement.

St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage713.3ConditionReporting(CR)SystemPriorto1994,St.Luciehadseveralproblemreportingandresolutionsystems.In1994,mostwereconsolidatedintoasinglesiteprocess.TheCRprocessiscontrolledbyanadministrativeprocedure(AP0006130,"ConditionReports").TheprocessisusedthroughouttheNuclearDivision,althougheachplanthasitsownimplementingprocedure.ThesystemisalsodesignedtohaveaverylowthresholdforusebyanyoneworkingintheNuclearDivision.Thisallowstrackingandtrendingoflowlevelaswellashighlevelissuestoaidplantmanagementtosetprioritiesonissuesastheyarise.TheCRprocessincludesrequirementsthateachCRbereviewedbytheNuclearPlantSupervisor(NPS)forthepurposeofmaintaininghisawarenessofplantconditionsandtheperformanceofaninitialoperabilityassessment.SubsequenttothisreviewbytheNPS,conditionreportsreceiveareviewbyaninterdisciplinarypanelofplantpersonnel.Inaddition,thispanelmakesrecommendationstothePlantGeneralManagerregardingthelevelofrootcauseanalysisrequiredandtheappropriatedepartmentforassignment.Subsequenttothisreview,thePlantGeneralManagerreviewsallConditionReports.TheCRprocessincludesthefollowingcorrectiveactionevaluations:1.CRsarescreenedforsafetysignificance,operabilityandreportabilityissues(10CFR50.72-NotificationRequirements;10CFR50.73-LERs,and10CFR21)andareprioritizedaccordingtotheirpotentialimpactoncontinuedsafeoperation.2,ForCRsofsafetysignificance,operability,andreportabilityevaluationsareinitiatedimmediatelyfollowinginitialscreeninginthecorrectiveactionprocess.3.Rootcauseanalysisandreviewforgenericimplicationsisperformedcommensuratewiththesignificanceofthecondition.4.Correctiveactionsaredeveloped,reviewedbymanagementoftheassigneddepartmentandimplemented.5.Correctiveactionimplementationisscheduledaccordingtotheprioritizationoftheissue(includingconsiderationofimpactondesignbasesdocumentation).6.ConditionReportsreceiveanindependentreviewforclosure.7.TrackingandtrendingofCRsisperformedonaperiodicbasisforthepurposeofidentifyingperformancetrendsandproblemareasrequiringmanagementattention.CorrectiveactionswhicharegeneratedbytheCRprocessaretrackedinaPlantManagerActionItem(PMAI)trackingsystem.Thisisaplantspecifictrackingsystemwhichfollowsthecorrectiveactionstocompletionandgivestheitemsvisibilitywithintheorganization.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage723.4EventResponseTeamsAnEventResponseTeam(ERT)programprovidesforafastactinggroupofknowledgeableplantpersonneltoinvestigatetherootcauseofplanteventssuchas,automaticreactortrips,unplannedunitshutdowns,andrecurringmaintenance/repairissues,SignificantequipmentproblemscanalsobethesubjectofinvestigationsbyanERT.TheERTprocessisdefinedwithinanERTGuidelinedocument.AnERTmayberequestedbyanymemberoftheNuclearManagementTeam.ThePGMorEngineeringManagerappointsanERTleaderandconcurswiththeselectionofteammembers.IncaseswhereanERTisformed,aCRisinitiated.TeammeetingsareheldasoftenasnecessaryuntiltheERTaccomplishesthefollowingtasks:~Determinationoftherootcauseoftheevent.~Determinationofshort-termcountermeasures.~Determinationofcountermeasurestopreventrecurrenceoftheevent.~Identificationofpossiblegenericproblemsthatmaycausesimilarevents,anddevelopmentofactionplanstoaddressthem.TheERTusestoolssuchaseventtimelines,drawings,causeandeffectdiagrams,failuremodesandeffectanalysis,possiblerootcauseevaluationmatrices,systemoperators,vendorapplicationexperts,systemengineers,andcomponentspecialiststoaidinthedeterminationofrootcause.Aformalplantprocedure,ADM-08.04,"RootCauseEvaluation,"isalsoinplacetoprovidedetailedguidanceindeterminationofzootcause.Thisprocedureprovidesforuseofthefollowingprovenrootcausetechniques:taskanalysis,changeanalysis,barrieranalysis,eventtimelineandcausalfactorcharting,causalfactorscategorylisting,causeandeffectanalysis,andfaulttreeanalysis;Aformalprocedure,OP0030119,"PostTripReview,"isinplacetoprovideasystematicmethodforensuringtheproperfunctioningofsafety-relatedandotherimportantequipmentduringareactortrip.TheposttripreviewisusedasinputtotheERTandprovidesmanagementwiththenecessaryinformationtodeterminewhentheplantcanbesafelyrestarted.EventResponseTeamrecommendationsandcountermeasuresaredocumentedandtrackedusingtheCRsystem.3.5CommitmentandCorrectiveActionsTracking(CTRAC)SystemsIn1985St.LuciebegantrackingcommitmentsmadetotheNRC.Thetrackinggoalistomeetthecompletiondateforallcommitments.CommitmenttoExcellenceProgram(CEP)Project6wasimplementedtoenhancetheeffectivenessoflicensingactivitiesandtoimprovethecoordinationandcontrolofNRC-relatedprojects.Thistrackingsystemprovidedaprocessforclosingeachcommitmentitem,suchasthosemadewithinanapplicationforalicenseamendment,anexemptionrequest,aresponsetoanoticeofviolation,acorrectiveactionwithinaLicensee St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage73EventReport,orothercommitmentmadetotheNRConthedocket.ThecommitmenttrackingsystemtodayismoredetailedbutessentiallythesameinfunctionasthatgeneratedaspartofProject6.NRCcommitmentsarenowtrackedusingthePMAITrackingSystem.Anadditionalfeatureofthesystemistomakeavailableasearchtoolwhichcanascertainifaparticularissueisinfactacommitmentandprovidealinktotheoriginatingdocument.Proceduresoftenhavecommitmentreferencesintheintroductorysectionsoftheprocedureandinmanycasesinthebodyoftheprocedurenexttothestepwhichimplementsthecommitment.3.6ChangeRequestNotices(CRN)Whenanengineeringdesignpackageisissued,thereisalwaysapotentialthatsomefieldconditionorminorchangemayberequiredafterthepackageisissued.TheEngineeringprocedurespermitadesignpackagetoeithergothroughaformalrevisionortohaveaCRNbeissuedtoresolvetheminorchange.TheCRNistheprimarymethodusedtomakeminorchangestoanissuedengineeringpackage,wheretherequestedchangedoesnotaffectthedesignorsafetyanalysisoftheengineeringpackage.ACRNmayalsobeinitiatedforadesignpackagebyanyindividualandprovidesamechanismforformallycorrectingminorpotentialproblemswithanissueddesign.3.7NonconformanceReports(NCR)TheNCRprocesswasadministeredbytheQualityControlDepartmentuntil1994,atwhichtime,itwasmadepartoftheConditionReport(CR)processwhichisnowadministeredbytheServicesDepartment.TheNCRprocessprovidesameansforcontrollingthedispositionofnonconformingitemsreportedduringreceiptinspectionorfieldinspectionofSSCswhereEngineeringisrequiredtoevaluateandresolvethenonconformance.TheNCRprocessalsoprovidesfortheconductofanoperabilityassessmentfornonconformancesidentifiedonin-serviceequipment.NonconformingitemsthatareacceptablebyvirtueofexistingdesigndocumentationdonotrequireEngineeringevaluationandarecorrectedbyaPlantWorkOrderorRelayWorkOrder.3.810CFRPart21/SignificantSafetyHazardEvaluationsOnemechanismforevaluatingdesignorequipmentproblemsisthroughthe10CFR21reportingprocess,Whenfirstinstitutedin1977,Part21wasusedextensivelytoaddressdesignandequipmentissuesidentifiedbothinternallyandbyexternalvendors.10CFR21evaluationshavealmostexclusivelybeenperformedbyengineeringpersonnelifthedesignorequipmentisfoundtohavebeenprovidedtoFPL.TheseevaluationsprovidedameansforFPLtoevaluateandaddressspecificissuesfromeitherexternalorinternalsourcesandtodocumentrequiredcorrectiveactionsandreportingtoNRC.Subsequentchangesinthisruleandthepromulgationof10CFR50.72and50.73aresuchthatevaluationsarenowprimarilyperformedwith"operability"criteriaasthefocusratherthanagainstsubstantialsafetyhazardscriteria.Operabilityisincorporated St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage74withintheconditionreportingprocessandismorerestrictivethan10CFR21.10CFR21evaluationsareperformedforequipmentreceivedbythewarehouse,butnotyetinstalledinthepowerplanttoevaluateifasubstantialsafetyhazardexists.Thereportingcriteriaof10CFR50.72and50.73andtheirusewillbediscussedinsection3.10.3.9OperabilityDeterminationTheinitialoperabilityreviewforallconditionsisconductedduringtheNuclearPlantSupervisor'sreviewoftheConditionReport.Ifamoredetailedreviewiswarranted,theCRisassignedtoEngineering.Recommendedguidance,considerations,andmethodologyforperformingassessmentsofoperabilityonnonconformingordegradedconditionsareproceduralizedinaNuclearEngineeringQI.TheQIisbasedontheinformationcontainedinNRCGenericLetter91-18,"InformationtoLicenseesRegardingTwoNRCInspectionManualSectionsonResolutionofDegradedandNonconformingConditionsandonOperability."ThefollowingaspectsofoperabilitydeterminationarediscussedintheQI:~Operabilityvs.fullqualification~Operabilityvs,singlefailure~Operabilityandtheuseofmanualactionvs.automaticaction~Operabilityandtheuseofprobabilisticsafetyassessment~Operabilityvs.environmentalqualification~TechnicalSpecificationoperabilityvs.ASMESectionXIoperativecriteria~Operabilityvs.pipingandpipesupportrequirements~Operabilityvs.flawevaluation~Operabilityvs.operationalleakage(GenericLetter90-05)~Operabilityvs.structuralrequirementsInaddition,adesign/operabilityreferenceguideisintheEngineeringQIstoprovideadditionalguidanceonoperabilityconsiderationsaswellasdesign,safety,quality,andregulatoryconsiderationswhichmayfacilitatedevelopmentofthoroughdesigninputs/analysesandoperabilityassessments.Theguidanceisintendedtobeachecklisttoensurethatapplicableconsiderationsarenotomittedduringadesignoroperabilityassessmentactivity.3.1010CFR50.72and50.73ReportabilityDeterminationConditionswhichmaybereportablearedocumentedonaConditionReport.EachCRisreviewedbytheNuclearPlantSupervisorfor10CFR50.72reportabilityinaccordancewithadministrativeprocedureAP0010721,"NRCRequiredNon-RoutineNotificationsandReports."ThesiteFacilityReviewGroup(FRG)reviewsspecificeventsforreportabilityandtheLicensingDepartmentpreparesallLicenseeEventReports(LER).

St.LucioUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage753.11CorrectiveActionProgramTrainingTrainingonidentificationofproblemsandimplementationofcorrectiveactionsincludesthefollowing:TheEngineeringSupportPersonnel(ESP)TrainingPlanincludesinitialtrainingontheCorrectiveActionProgram.ThistrainingispartoftheInitialIndoctrinationtrainingsectionoftheINPOaccreditedEngineeringSupportPersonnel(ESP)TrainingProgram.ThistrainingconsistsofabasicreviewoftheplantproceduresassociatedwiththecorrectiveactionsprogramincludingtheCRprocess.SpecifictraininginrootcauseanalyticaltechniqueshasbeenperiodicallyprovidedtoSt.Luciepersonnel.Thismaterialiscontainedinahandbookentitled"ProblemIdentificationandCorrection"(PIC).Thishandbookincludestopicssuchas,definingtheproblem,determiningrootcauseandthedevelopmentofappropriatecorrectiveactions.ThePICprocesstrainingisofferedtoappropriatemanagementandengineeringpersonnel.MethodsavailableforthereportingofproblemsatSt.LucieisasubjectoftheGeneralEmployeeTrainingProgrampresentedtoplantemployeesandcontractorsonanannualbasis.Additionally,theopportunitytoprovideinformationdirectlytotheNRCinaccordancewiththeprovisionsofForm3isasubjectofthistrauung."NotificationofPlantEvents"isalessonplanwhichincludesthereportingrequirementsof10CFR50.72.andisusedforthetrainingoflicensedoperators4.0NRC/St.LucieInterfacesFPLhasapolicythatrequiresopenandcandidcommunicationswithNRCpersonnel.FrequentcommunicationsaremadewiththeNRCresidentinspectorsandtheNRCprojectmanagerforSt.Lucie.AregulatoryliaisonofficeismaintainedinWashingtonD.C.toallowexpeditedface-to-facecommunicationswiththeNRCstaff,ifrequired,foranyissuewhichmayarise,

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage76[e]"Theoveralleffectivenessofyourcurrentprocessesandprogramsinconcludingthattheconfigurationofyourplant(s)isconsistentwiththedesignbases."Anoutlineoftheorganizationoftheresponsetothisrequestfollows:1.0Introduction2.0ProgramReviewsWhichLeadtoDesignBasesVerification2.12.22.32.42.52.62.72.82.9NRCBulletin79-14PipingWalkdownProgramTechnicalSpecificationImprovementsElectricalPowerSystemDesignBasesEnhancementsUpdatedLOCAContainmentAnalysisSt.LucieUnit1ThermalPowerUprateContainmentPenetrationBoundaryReviewSt.LucieUnit1-USIA-46SeismicAdequacyProgramSt.LucieUnit1SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)FSARProceduralConsistencyReview3.0FPLVerticalSliceAuditsandConclusions3.13.23.3VerticalSliceAuditoftheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem(ICW)VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnits1and2FeedwaterandMainSteamSystemsQualityAssuranceAuditConclusions4.0NRCVerticalSliceAudits4.1ElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFI)4.2ServiceWaterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspection(SWSOPI)4.31996-1997Architect/EngineerInspection5.0ConclusionsontheOverallEffectivenessoftheFPLProgramatSt.Lucie

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage771.0IntroductionFPL,withreasonableassurance,isconfidentthatthecurrentprocessesandprogramsareeffectiveinensuringthattheSt.Luciedesignandconfigurationareconsistentwiththedesignbases.Thisconclusionisbaseduponthefollowing:Theinitialplantverificationprocess,startuptesting,surveillancetesting,andcontrolofthemodificationprocessresultsinconsistencybetweenplantdesignandprocedures.Inaddition,previouslyperformeddesignbasesverificationeffortssuchasSSFI-typeinspections,theFSARproceduralconsistencyreview,andrelatedreviewsshowtheconsistencybetweentheplant,plantprocedures,andthedesignbases.2.Theplantdesignchangeprocessensuresthecompatibilityoftheplantphysicalandfunctionalcharacteristicswiththedesignbasesandplantdocumentation.Changesareevaluatedandreviewedtofullydeterminetheimpactofeachchangeonothersystemsanddocumentsandensureadherencetoestablishedrequirements.3.Theprocessesforidentifying,analyzing,andresolvingconditionsincludetheConditionReportprocess(whichincludesthereviewofpotentialdefectsandnoncompliancesandEngineeringreviewofselectedCRs),theNuclearSafetySPEAKOUTprogramandtheQAauditprogram.Forcaseswhereproblemswereandareidentified,appropriaterootcauseanalysesandcorrectiveactionswereandareimplemented.BaseduponinformationpresentedintheresponsestoNRCrequestsandtheitemspresentedabove,FPLconcludesthatitsdesigncontrolprocessesprovidereasonableassuranceandconfidencethattheplantisbeingoperatedandmaintainedwithinitsdesignbasesinamannerthatdoesnotadverselyimpactthehealthandsafetyofthepublic.Thedesigncontrolprocessintegratesplantchangesandmodificationsintotheplant'soperating,maintenance,andtestingproceduresandassuresthattheplant'sperformanceisconsistentwithitsdesignbases.FPLhasassessedtheaccessibilityandadequacyofitsdesignbasesdocumentation.TheresultsofthisassessmentformthebasisfortheFPLconclusionthatsufficientdesignbasesreconstitutionhasbeenaccomplishedtoprovideanadequatebaselinefortimelyoperabilitydeterminationsandplantdesignchanges.Thedesignbasesaresufficientlyunderstood,documented,andauditable.Operabilitydeterminationsand10CFR50.59evaluationsthatmayneedtobemadequicklyinresponsetoplantissuescanbesupported.TheSt.Lucierecordforcompleteandaccurateoperabilitydeterminationssupportsthisoverallconclusionregardingdesignbasesadequacy.InformationusedsolelytosupportdevelopmentofdesignmodificationpackagesneednotberetrievedasexpeditiouslybutisreadilyretrievableasevidencedbythepreparationforandresultsoftheSt.LucieNRCA/EInspection.

QeSt.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage78TheFPLmethodologyusedindesignbasesreconstitutiondecisionsconsidersthesafetysignificanceofanymissingorerroneousinformation.TheFSARproceduralconsistencyreview,theNRCA/EInspectionpreparationeffort,andtheNRCA/EInspectionresultsidentifieddiscrepanciesamongdesignbasesinformationresources,noneofwhichconstitutedasignificantsafetyconcern.TheNRC'sA/EInspectionperformedatSt.Luciefoundthatthedesignbaseschangesforthesystemsinspectedhadbeenadequatelyimplemented.Theseassessmentsandinspectionsdidnotidentifyprogrammaticfailurestoadequatelymaintaintheplant'sdesignbases.FPL'sconfidenceisbasedontheevaluationofanumberoffactorsandprog'ramsdiscussedinprevioussectionsofthisenclosure.DesignandconfigurationcontrolprogramsdescribedinNRCRequest[a]andtheresultsofevaluationsdescribedinresponsetoNRCRequests[b]and[c]supportourconclusionthatthedesignandconfigurationcontrolprocessesusedatSt,Lucieareinaccordancewithregulatoryexpectations.Theseprogramshavebeenimprovedovertimeasindustryandcompanyexpectationshavechanged.Theseprogramimprovementshaveculminatedineffectivedesigncontrolandconfigurationmanagementandhavecorrectlytranslateddesignbasesinformationintotheplantoperating,maintenanceandtestingprocedures.SpecificactivitieswhichvalidatetheoveralleffectivenessofmaintainingSt.Lucie'sdesignbasesinformationarediscussedbelow.2.0ProgramReviewsWhichLeadtoDesignBasesVerification2.'1NRCBulletin79-14PipingWalkdownProgramNRCBulletin79-14"SeismicAnalysisforAs-BuiltSafety-RelatedPipingSystems"addressestheconcernthattheseismicanalysesofsafety-relatedpiping,coupledwithpressure,thermal,operatingweight,andotherapplicablesystemoperatingparameters,beverifiedinaccordancewithactualas-builtdrawingsforitsimpactonthestressanalysisofrecord.AtSt.LucieUnits1and2,theverificationprocessconsistedofaformalprogrambywhichas-builtconfigurationsofSeismicCategoryIsafety-relatedpipingsystemsweredocumented,evaluated,andmodifiedasnecessaryundertheFPLQA/QCprogramasappropriate,byateamofexperiencedengineersanddesigners.ThisprogramconsistedofwalkdownsofdesignatedSeismicCategoryIsafety-relatedpipingsystemsanddocumentationoftheas-builtconfigurationincludingpipingsize,components,andgeometry;location,orientation,andtypeofvalves;locationandconfigurationofpipesupports;andfloorandwallpenetrationdetails.Thesedetailswerethenevaluatedbytheteamtoassessifdocumentrevisionsand/orplantmodificationswererequiredand,ifnecessary,acceptableundertheconstructioncodeofrecord.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosttrePage792.2TechnicalSpecificationImprovementsTheSt.Lucieunitswerelicensedtothestandardtechnicalspecificationformatsatthetimetheoperatinglicenseswereissued.Overtheyearstherehavebeen147amendmentstotheSt.LucieUnit1operatinglicenseand86amendmentstotheSt,LucieUnit2operatinglicense,themajorityofwhichwererevisionstotheunitstechnicalspecifications.St.LuciehasreviewedandimplementedmanyoftheTechnicalSpecificationlineitemimprovementsissuedasNRCGenericLetters(GL)andhasadoptedanumberoftheNUREG1432,"StandardTechnicalSpecifications,CombustionEngineeringPlants,"improvements.2.3ElectricalPowerSystemDesignBasesEnhancementsIn1991,FPLcompletedareviewoftheSt.LucieElectricalDistributionSystem(EDS).TheobjectiveofthisactivitywastoassesstheperformancecapabilityoftheEDSbyreviewingthedesignparametersastheyrelatetoonsiteandoffsiteemergencypowersourcesandassociatedsafety-relatedequipmentwhichisreliedonduringandfollowingdesignbasisevents.Additionally,keyparametersofplantconfigurationanddrawingswerereviewedforconsistencywiththedesign.Uponcompletionofthereview,severalcalculationswereupdatedorrevisedtoreflectcurrentdesignstandards.Inaddition,anumberofinconsistencieswereidentifiedintheFSARandplantconfigurationdrawings.Theseinconsistencieswerescheduledforcorrectionandclosedfollowingtheaudit.DuringthisreviewtherewerenosignificantoperabilityconcernsidentifiedintheSt.LucieElectricalDistributionSystem.2.4UpdatedLOCAContainmentAnalysisIn1993,theLOCAcontainmentanalysesofrecordwereupdated.Priortotheupdate,thecontainmentsectionoftheFSARsincludedmuchoftheoriginaldesignbasissensitivitystudies.Impactofpreviouschanges,suchasanincreaseintheratedpowerlevelfrom2560MWtto2700MWt,hadbeenaddressed.Typically,thisinformationwasupdatedwiththemostlimitingcaseofrecord.Analyses,however,hadbeenperformedusingacase-by-caseapproach,makingportionsoftheFSARunclearandoutdated.This1993updatetotheLOCAcontainmentanalysisincorporatesapplicableplantchangesintooneconciseevaluationutilizingoperatingexperiencewherenecessarytojustifytheinputs.2.5St.LucieUnit1ThermalPowerUprateIn1981,FPLprovidedanalysestojustifyanincreasedthermalpowerratingforUnit1from2560MWtto2700MWt.Thisresultedinnumerouschangestotheplant'sdesignbases.Thesechangesarediscussedintheproposedlicenseamendmentrequestwhichwasprovidedin

St.LucieUttitsland2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage80accordancewith10CFR50.90.Thisamendmentrequestincludedanengineeringevaluationtojustifytheproposedchanges.ThethermaluprateprojectevaluationswerereviewedbyFPLin1996aspartofpreparationsfortheNRCA/EInspection.FPLidentifiedthatthecondensatestoragetankrequirementsforauxiliaryfeedwaterhadnotbeenupdatedtocorrespondtotheapproximately5%increaseinthermalpower.Thedecayheatgeneratedbythereactorcoreisincreasedduetotheincreaseinthermalpower.AConditionReportwasgeneratedtoresolvethisinconsistency.ShouldtheanalysisconcludethatthecondensaterequirementsarenotboundedbythecurrentTechnicalSpecificationminimum,thenanamendmenttothetechnicalspecificationswillberequestedinaccordancewith10CFR50.90.Additionally,the1996FSARproceduralconsistencyreviewfoundseveralupdatinginconsistenciesresultingfromthethermalpoweruprate.ConditionReportswereissuedforresolutionoftheseinconsistencies.2.6ContainmentPenetrationBoundaryReviewTechnicalassessmentsofcontainmentpenetrationboundariesforUnits1and2werecompletedin1991.Theobjectivesoftheseevaluationsweretoperformatechnicalassessmentofeachmechanicalcontainmentpenetrationtodeterminethosecomponentswhoseintegrityorpositionwasvitaltocontainmentintegrity,andtoprovidesketchesidentifyingthecontainmentboundarycomponents.Theevaluationsshow,foreachindividualpenetration,thecontainmentpenetrationboundary,includingcomponentsthatarevitaltocontainmentintegrity.TheUnit1andUnit2evaluationsconcludedthatingeneralthecontainmentisolationsystemmettheintentof10CFR50AppendixA,GeneralDesignCriteria,inthatadoublebarrierisprovidedineachlinepenetratingthecontainment.2.7St.LucieUnit1-USIA-46SeismicAdequacyProgramNRCGenericLetter(GL)87-02,"VerificationofSeismicAdequacyofMechanicalandElectricalEquipmentinOperatingReactors,"(USIA-46)requiredareviewofSt.LucieUnit1equipmentrequiredtoachieveandmaintainhotshutdownoftheplantforaperiodofeighthours.FPLselectedsafetyandnon-safety-relatedequipmentfortheirreview.ThisequipmentwasevaluatedforseismicadequacybyFPLengineersandaseismicreviewteamconsistingofengineeringexpertsintheareaofseismicadequacyofequipmentandequipmentperformanceduringearthquakes.ThefourbasicrequirementsfortheGL87-02/USIA-46reviewofSt.LucieUnit1,whichwereverifiedthroughwalkdownsare:theequipmentseismiccapacitybeinggreaterthandemand,theconstructionadequacyoftheequipment,anchorageadequacy,andnoseismicspatialinteractions.

St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage812.8St.LucieUnit1-SteamGeneratorReplacementProject(SGRP)TheSGRPdevelopeda10CFR50.59evaluationandasetofdesignpackagesthatwillbeusedduringthe1997steamgeneratorreplacementoutage.Inthecourseofdoingthisdesignwork,plantwalkdownswereconductedandtheFSAR,designanalysesandotherapplicabledesignbasisdocumentswerereviewed,WalkdownswereconductedinsideandoutsidecontainmentintheareasaffectedbytheSGRP.ThesewalkdownsfoundminorpipeandHVACsupportdiscrepanciesbetweenthedesigndrawingsandtheas-foundcondition.Eachdiscrepantconditionwasdocumented,evaluatedanddispositioned.TheaccidentanalysespresentedinChapter15wereevaluatedtodeterminetheeffectsofusingthereplacementsteamgenerators(RSG).TheobjectiveofeachevaluationwastodemonstratethattheSt.LucieUnit1plantresponsewiththeRSGswouldmeetallNRC-approvedFSARacceptancecriteria.Theseevaluationsoftheexistingplantdesignandlicensingbases,steamgeneratorphysicalinterfaces,thermal-hydraulicaspects,structuralsupports,safetyanalyses,technicalspecifications,andoff-normalandemergencyproceduresshowedthattheRSGdesignpreservestheexistingplantdesignandlicensingbases.Therefore,useoftheRSGsatSt.Lucie1meetsallrelevantcriteriaandguidance,theexistinglicensinganddesignbasesremainvalid,theTechnicalSpecificationsandtheirbasesremainvalid,andnounreviewedsafetyquestionsexist.2.9FSARProceduralConsistencyReviewFPLdevotedabout8000man-hoursin1996tothereviewoftheFSARs.ThiseffortinvolvedacomprehensivereviewoftheFSARswiththeprimaryfocusbeingtheidentificationofproceduralprocessesincludedintheFSARandtheircomparisontothecurrentplantprocedurestoassureconsistency.Theconclusionofthiseffortisthattherewerenooperabilityissuesofsafetysignificance.ThefinalresultsofsomeConditionReports(CR)arestillpending,however,theresultstodatehavenotposedanyunresolvedsafetyconcerns.ThesmallnumberofCR-relatedinconsistenciesindicatethattheredoesnotappeartobemajordiscrepanciesbetweentheFSARsandtheoperatingprocedures.Therefore,thisprogramsupportstheoverallconclusionthatplantproceduresandthedesignbasisareconsistent.3.03.1FPLVerticalSliceAuditsandConclusionsVerticalSliceAuditoftheSt.LucieUnit2IntakeCoolingWaterSystem(ICW)In1988,theFPLQAdepartmentconductedaverticalsliceauditontheUnit2ICWsystemdesign,procurementofparts,andsystemoperationandmaintenance,toassuresystemoperability.TheICWsystemandcomponentswereinspectedtoevaluateconfigurationcontrol,andtodeterminewhethertheywerecapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionsrequiredbytheirdesignbases.Plantmodificationswerereviewedtodetermineifanyunreviewedsafetyquestionswere St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage82introduced.Systemwalkdownsverifiedas-builtconfiguration.Pre-operationaltestingandhydrostatictestingmettheobjectivesofthedesignbases.Theauditresultedinfivefindings,noneofwhichinvolveddiscrepanciesbetweenas-builtconditionsandthedesignbases.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandwereclosed.3.2VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnits1and2FeedwaterandMainSteamSystemsIn1991,theFPLQAdepartmentconductedaverticalsliceauditonthedesign,operation,andmaintenanceoftheUnit1andUnit2feedwaterandmainsteamsystems.Thedesignbases,asdescribedintheFSAR,werereviewedtoassurethatconfigurationcontrolwasmaintained.Safetyevaluationsforsystemmodificationswerereviewedtoensureunreviewedsafetyquestionsdidnotexist.Systemwalkdownsverifiedtheas-builtconfiguration,componentidentification,orientation,accessability,andgeneralplantconditions.Operatingprocedures,plantdrawings,maintenanceactivities,andpostmaintenancetestingwerealsoreviewed.Discrepanciesbetweenplantdrawingsandproceduresresultedintwofindings.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandwereclosed.3.3QualityAssuranceAuditConclusionsTheQAAuditProgram,alongwithothertechnicalreviewsandassessmentsperformedbytheQualityDepartmentorIndependentSafetyEngineeringGroup(ISEG),haveconsistentlyevaluatedtheimplementationofplantmodifications,comparedsystemas-builtconditionstoplantdesign,andevaluatedwhetherdrawingsandprocedureswereconsistentwiththeplants'esignbases,withoverallsatisfactoryresults.4.04.1NRCVerticalSliceAuditsElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspection(EDSFI)InFebruaryandMarch1991,theNRCconductedaspecialannouncedteaminspectionintheareasofdesignofelectricalsystemsandrelatedengineeringandmaintenanceactivities.ThisinspectionspecificallyfocusedontheElectricalDistributionSystem(EDS)as-builtconfiguration,conformancetodesignbasesrequirements,anddesignoutputdocuments.TheNRCconcludedthattheEDSatSt.Lucieasevaluatedwascapableofperformingitsintendedfunctionundernormalandaccidentconditions.ItwasalsoconcludedthatadequatecontrolsareinplacetomaintaintheEDSinanoperableconfiguration.4.2ServiceWaterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspectionInSeptemberandOctober1991,theNRCconductedateaminspectionintheareaoftheservicewateroperationalperformanceatSt.Lucie.Thisinspectionspecificallyfocusedontheservicewatersystem(i.e.,intakecoolingwatersystem)systemas-builtconfigurationandoperationalperformanceregardingtheapplicabledesignbasesrequirements.Theinspectionincludedamechanicaldesignreview,detailedsystemwalkdowns,andareviewofsystemoperation,

QoSt.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage83maintenance,andsurveillanceprocedures.ItalsoincludedanassessmentofqualityassuranceandcorrectiveactionsrelatedtotheintakecoolingwatergCW)system.TheNRCinspectionteamconcludedthattheICWas-builtconfigurationwouldbecapableofperformingitsintendedsafetyfunctionunderdesignbasesconditions.4.31996-1997Architect/EngineerInspectionFromNovember1996throughJanuary1997,theNRCconductedanArchitect/EngineerInspectionoftwosystemsatSt.Lucie;theUnit1AuxiliaryFeedwaterandtheUnit2ComponentCoolingWaterSystems.ThisinspectionwasperformedinaccordancewithNRCInspectionManualChapter93801,SafetySystemFunctionalInspection(SSFI)guidance.FPL'spreparationforthisinspectionidentified17concernsassociatedwithdesignbases,designorconfigurationcontrol,orplantconfiguration/performance.ConditionReportsweresubmittedfortheseitemswhichenteredtheconditionintothecorrectiveactionprogramforresolution.OneConditionReportidentifiedundervoltagetripdevicesondcmolded-casecircuit-breakerswhichhadnotbeentestedforoperation.ThefindingresultedinanNRCnotificationconcerningthe125Vdcswing-bustie-breakersbeinginaconditionwhichalonecouldhavepreventedfulfillmentofasafetysystem.TherewerenootheridentifieddesignbasesinconsistencieswhichrequiredNRCnotification.TheNRChasnotissuedtheinspectionreportatthetimeofthisresponse,however,atthepublicexitmeetingfortheNRCA/EInspectioneffort,theNRCnotedthattherewasnobreakdownormajorfailuresintheconfigurationcontrolprocessoroperationallysignificantconcernswiththedesignbasesfortheplant.TheFPLself-assessmentandtheNRCinspectionsupporttheconclusionthatthedesignbasesinformationisavailableandadequateandthatmajorprogramfailuresdonotexist.5.0ConclusionontheOverallEffectivenessoftheFPLProgramatSt.LucieTheevents,inspections,audits,andreviewprogramsdiscussedabove,providethebasistoconcludewithreasonableassurancethatthedesignbasesinformationisadequateandavailable.Thecorrectiveactionprogramassuresthatidentifiedproblemsorconcernsaretracked,evaluated,andcorrectiveactionsimplemented.Theprocessalsotrendsplanteventstoidentifyrepetitiveproblemswhichcouldindicateaprocess/programproblem.Thisallowscorrectiveactionstobeimplementedonarangeofissues.ThefocusofrecentFPLactivitieshasbeentoreducethenumberofchangesoccurringatitsnuclearunitssuchthattheimpactonthedesignbasesisreduced.Backlogsofdesignchangesandrequiredequipmentrepairs/replacementarebeingreduced,resultinginimprovedcontroloftheplant'sconfiguration.Baseduponinformationpresentedinthis'section,aswellasintheFPLresponsetorequests[a]through[d]ofthisenclosure,FPLhasconcludedthattheexistingcontrolprocessesprovide St.LucieUtuts1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage84reasonableassuranceandconfidencethattheplantisbeingoperatedandmaintainedwithinitsdesignbases,Thevalidityoftheseconfigurationcontrolprocessesareconfirmedbycontinuedsafeplantoperation,self-initiatedevaluations,andNRCassessmentsofplantperformance.Theevents,inspections,audits,andprogramsdiscussedaboveprovideadditionalbasistoconcludethatwithreasonableassurance,thedesignbasesinformationisadequateandavailable.Thecorrectiveactionprogramassuresthatproblemsorconcernswhichareidentifiedaretracked,evaluatedandcorrectiveactionsimplementedtoresolvetheproblemsorconcerns.

St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage85[f]"Supplementalrequestforinformationondesignreview/basisprograms."Thefollowingoutlineprovidestheorganizationfortheresponsetothisadditionalinformationrequest.1.01.0NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)96-05Initiative2.0FSARReviewsandSelf-Assessments3.0DesignBasisProgram4.0ListofActionsNuclearEnergyInstitute(NEI)96-05InitiativeInresponsetoNRCInformationNotice96-17,"ReactorOperationInconsistentwiththeUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport,"datedMarch18,1996,NEI96-05,"GuidelinesforAssessingProgramsforMaintainingtheLicensingBasis,"wasissued.St.LucieiscurrentlyproceedingwiththerevieweffortproposedbyNEI,whichwilladdressprogratnmaticandnon-programmaticFSARchangesandassesstheaccuracyoftwosafetyandtwonon-safety,risksignificantsystemsdescribedintheFSAR.2.0FSARReviewsandSelf-AssessmentsThefollowingSt.Lucieprogramsandinitiativesarecurrentlyinprogressorarecompleted.2.1FSARProceduralConsistencyReviewDuring1995and1996,NRCinspectionsfoundthatplantoperatorswereusingprocedureswhichhadprocessstepsnotfoundintheFSARandthatthenormalprocessstepsfoundintheFSARwerenotbeingfollowed.Asaresultofthiseventandotherexamplesofsimilarproceduralinconsistencies,FPLinitiatedanFSARreviewforproceduralconsistency.This1996effortinvolvedacomprehensivereviewoftheFSARs(~8000man-hours)withtheprimaryfocusbeingtheidentificationofproceduralprocessesintheFSARandacomparisonwiththeplantprocedurestoassureconsistency.Theconclusionreachedfromthiseffortisthattherewerenooperabilityissueswhichrepresentedasubstantialsafetyhazard.Thefinalresultsofsomeconditionreportsarestillpending,however,theyhavehadoperabilityreviewscompletedtoensurethattheydonotposeanyunresolvedsafetyconcerns.ThesmallnumberofCR-relatedinconsistenciesidentifiedindicatethattheredoesnotappeartobemajordiscrepanciesbetweentheFSARandtheplantoperatingprocedures.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage86InstrumentSetpointReviewBetween1991and1993,FPLperformedaninstrumentsetpointreviewfortheSt.LuciePlanttoverifyanddocumentcurrentsetpoints.Plantoperatingandmaintenanceprocedureswerecomparedtothecurrentfieldconditionsanddesigndocumentstoverifyconsistency.Thiseffortiscomplete.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprogramandwereclosed.2.3AnnunciatorReviewAplantannunciatorsummaryreviewiscurrentlyinprogress.Thisprogramwillreviewselectedannunciatorsforthefollowingalarmpanels:controlroom,wastemanagement,dieselgeneratorsAandB,steamgeneratorblowdownbuilding,boricacidconcentratorsAandB,wasteconcentrators,watertreatmentplant,theoxygenanalyzerandliquidwaste.Thisprojectisapproximately10%completewithover200annunciatorsreviewed.Discrepanciesfoundinthisreviewwillbeenteredintothecorrectiveactionprogrambymeansofaconditionreport.2.4NRCA/EInspectionFindingsFPLpreparedfortheNRCA/EInspectioneffortbyself-assessingthreesystems.TherewereseveralfindingsnotedwhichwereenteredintotheSt.Luciecorrectiveactionprogram.Atthetimeofthisresponse,thewritteninspectionreporthasnotbeenissued,buttheNRCresultswereprovidedatapublicexitmeetingonJanuary28,1997.TheNRCexitresultsindicatedthattherewerenomajorprogramweaknessesorfailures,however,itwasnotedthatfutureself-assessmentswouldbebeneficial.3.0DesignBasisProgramAdesignbasisprogramwascompletedatSt.Lucieonaselectednumberofsystems.Thisprogramdevelopedsummaryleveldocumentswhichconsolidatedinformationcontainedinreferencedesignbasessources(i,ecalculations,analyses,etc.),therebymakingitmoreaccessibleinrespondingtoplantoperationalneeds.Designbasisimprovementactivitieswillcontinuetobeperformedonanas-neededbasisthroughoutthelifeoftheplant.Suchimprovementactivitieshavebeenprimarilyperformedduringthedevelopmentofdesignmodificationpackagesandascorrectiveactionsfromvariousself-assessmentsandinspectionsthroughtheyears,andareexpectedtocontinue,althoughtoalesserextent,inthefuture.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage874.0ListsofActionsSt.Luciehasseveralplannedandon-goingactionswhichwillprovideadditionalassurancesthattheunitsareoperatedandmaintainedwithinthedesignbasis.Theseactionsare:4.1TheNEIInitiative(96-05)reportwillbeissuedtoNEIbyApril15,1997.4.2The1996FSARconsistencyreviewfindingswillberesolvedwithinatwoyearperiod.4.3TheplantannunciatorsummaryreviewiscurrentlyscheduledforcompletioninDecember1998.4.4TherecentNRCA/EInspectionfindingswillbeaddressedfollowingissuanceofthefinalinspectionreportandthecorrectiveactionswillbeprovidedbyaseparateletterorinitiativeasappropriate.

AppendixA:PartialListofAcronymsSt.LucieUjtitsIand2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage88A/EAFASAFWCMCNRBCRCRNCIRACDBDDBRSDCRDERDWAEDGEDSEDSFIENGQIEOPEPEQERTESPFCPFPLFRGFSARGLHPSIIAICWIEEININPOISIITOPJ/LLLERLPSILOCAMEPMOVMPFFMWtNCRNEINNSNon-PC/MNPSArchitect/EngineerAuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystemAuxiliaryFeedwatcrConfigurationManagementCompanyNuclearReviewBoardConditionReportChangeRequestNoticeCommitmcntTrackingDesignBasisDocumentDesignBasisReferenceSystemDrawingChangeRcqucstNRCDailyEventReportDeliveryWorkAuthorizationEmergencyDieselGeneratorElectricalDistributionSystemElectricalDistributionSystemFunctionalInspectionEngineeringQualityInstructionEmergencyOperatingProcedureEngineeringPackageEquipmentQualificationEventResponseTeamEngineeringSupportPersonnelFSARChangePackageFloridaPowerandLightCompanyFacilityReviewGroupUpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportNRCGenericLettersHighPressureSafetyInjectionInstrumentAirIntakeCoolingWaterItemEquivalencyEvaluationInHouseEventNRCInformationNoticesInstituteOfNuclearPowerOperationsInserviceInspectionImplementorTurnoverPackageJumperandLiftedLeadLicenseeEventReportsLowPressureSafetyInjectionLossofCollantAccidentMinorEngineeringPackageMotorpcratcdValveMaintenancePrcventablcFunctionalFailureMegaWatts-ThermalNon-ConformanceReportNuclearEnergyInstituteNon-NuclearSafetyNon-PlantChange/ModiTicationNuclearPlantSupervisorNRC08'cMROEOEFOSTIPC/MPCRPEGPEPPMPMAIPMTPODPRPRAPRBPSLPTNPWOQAQIRCSREARTSTSALPSARSASESATSSDNSENSERSITSOSOERSQADSSFISSCSSHSTARSWSOPITEDBTQARTSANuclearRegulatoryCommissionOperationsandMaintenanceReminderOperatingExperienceReportOperatingExperienceFeedbackOperationalSafetyTeamInspectionPlantChange/ModificationProcedureChangeRequestProductionEngineeringGroupPerformanceEnhancementProgramPreventativeMaintenancePlantManagerActionItemPost-MaintenanceTestingPlantOperatingDrawingsProcurementRequisitionProbabilisticRiskAssessmentPlantReviewBoardSt.LuciePlantUnitsIand2TurkeyPointUnits3and4PlantWorkOrderQua!ityAssuranceQualityInstructionReactorCoolantSystemRequestforEngineeringAssistanceRealTimeSupportTeamSystematicAssessmentOfLicenseePcifoflilailceSafetyAnalysisReportStandAloneSafetyEvaluationsSystemAcceptanceAlloverStatusSupplierDeviationNoticeSigniTicantEventNotificationSafetyEvaluationReportSafetyInjectionTankSignificantbyOthersReportSignificantOperatingExperienceReportSpecialQADocumentSafetySystemFunctionalInspectionSystem,StructureandComponentSignificantSafetyHazardSt.LucieActionReportsServiceWaterSystemOperationalPerformanceInspectionTotalEquipmcntDataBaseTopicalQualityAssuranceRcportTemporarySystemAlteration St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage89AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQAS-JPN-91-8,"JunoNuclearEngineering-ProductionEngineeringGroup(PEG)forSt.Lucie."SummatgTheauditteamfocusedontheSt.LucieProductionEngineeringGroup(PEG),andtheJunoNuclearEngineeringgroup.Auditorsreviewedmodiflicationpackages,associatedsafetyevaluations,designbasesdocuments,theenvironmentalqualificationprogram,andengineeringproceduresandqualityinstructions.ThreeauditFindingsidentifiedprograminaticandadministrativeareasforimprovement.Plantchangesandmodiflicationofoperatingplants.ControlofFPLoriginateddesign.IdcntiTicationofsafety-relatedstructures,systemsandcomponents.EnvironmentalqualificationofelectricalequipmentControlofcomputersoftwareEndmgr.¹1.SomeinternaldesigninterfaceswithnewJPNorganizationsarenotdocumented.¹2.SomedesignbasisinformationinthcTotalEquipmcntDataBasegK)B)isnotup-to~e.¹3.DeliveryWorkAuthorizations(DWAs)wereissuedforsafety-relatedservicestoasupplierwhowasnotontheapprovedsupplierlistforthelocationdesignatedontheDWA.QAS-JPN-92-3,"NuclearEngineering."Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandarcclosed.Summary;TheauditteamfocusedonASMESectionXI,safetyevaluations,designinputs,designbases,designanalyses,engineeringpackages,specialprocesses,engineeringprocedures,andtheJunoNuclearEngineeringQualityAssuranceProgram.ThreeauditFindingswereissued,butthedeficienciesdidnothaveasignificantimpactonsafetyorqualityrelatedactivities.ASMESectionXISafetyclassificationandsafetyevaluationsTechnicalspecificationsDesigninputs/designbasisDesignanalysisMinorengineeringpackagesEndings:¹1.ImplementingproccdurcsandassociatedtrainingdidnotalwaysmeetQAManualrequirementsfortheQARecords/DocumentControlCenters.¹2.Non<estructivetestingproceduresconflictedwiththeQualityInstruction.¹3.Receiptacknowledgmentsthatwerenotreceivedwithin30daysofdistributingQArecordswerenotalwaysfollowedup.Thcfindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage90AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQAS-JPN-93-3,"NuclearEngineering-PSLDesignControl."SualrrtargTheauditteamevaluated12engineeringpackagesandtheirassociatedcalculations,alongwithdocumentsandproceduresassociatedwiththePSLProbabilisticRiskAssessment(PRA).OneFindingwasissuedforfailingtoupdatedesigndocumentsfollowingchangestotheplant.EngineeringpackagesMnorengineeringpackagesDesignandsafetyanalysesCalculationsComputersoftwarecontrolPCsoftwarecontrolEndingr.¹LHardwarechangesweremadetovalvesintheplant,buttheTotalEquipmentDataBasegKK)wasnotupdatedtoreflectthosespecificchanges.QAS-JPN-95-1,"NuclearEngineeringAudit."Thefindingswercformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.BtttrrtrrargThisfunctionalareaauditevaluatedengineeringpackagesdevelopedforthePSLUnit2cycle9refuelingoutage,real-timesupportforcorrectiveactionrcqucstsinvolvingengineering,andlongtermenhancementprojectssuchasthePSL24monthfuelcycle.Allmajorengineeringprocessesandproccdurcsusedtoprovidedesignoutputwereevaluated.Therewerenoauditfindingsorconcernsidentifiedduringtheaudit.DesigncontrolEngineeringpackagesMinorengineeringpackagesCalculationsDesigninputverificationsEnvironmentalqualificationsEngineeringevaluations10CFR5059screening/evaluations10CFR21SSHevaluationandreportingOperabilitydeterminationssafetyclassificationsVendortechnicalmanualcontrolsFSARupdatingDesignbasisdocumentupdatingTEDBComputersoftwarecontrolEindirtgzNone St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage91AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQSL-PM-9M6,April/May1996PSLQAPerformanceMonitoringAudit.Snmmary;Thisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-basedobservationsintheareasofoperations,maintenance,servicesandengineering,andresultedin6Findings.Intheengineeringarea,discrepanciesbetweentheFSARandPSLimplementingprocedureswereidentified,andproceduresdidnotadequatelyaddressdesignrequirements.Endittgr.¹1.TheFSARwasnotupdatedtoreflectchangesinradwastestoragepractices.¹4.Noproceduralguidanceexistedwhichdescribedwhatconstitutedalossofstationair,andtherequiredcontingencyactionstoisolateanopenpenetrationisstationairwaslostduringcorealterations.QSL-PM-9648,May/June1996PSLQAPerfonnanceMonitoringAudit.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.Snmnnuz:Thisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-basedobservationsintheareasofoperations,maintenance,servicesandengineering,andresultedin3Findings.Intheengineeringarea,discrepanciesbetweenthcFSARandPSLimplementingprocedureswereidentified.Ending¹1.TheprocedureandmethodsusedtotransferresinfromtheblowdownbuildingdidnotmatchthesystemoperatingdescriptionintheFSAR.QSL-PCM-96-11,AuditofthePSLprogramforreviewandimplementationofplantchange/modificationpackages,andstand-aloneengineeringsafetyevaluations.'Ihefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.SttmmargTYisauditfocusedonStLucieUnit1Cycle14refuelingactivities.The"Reload"modificationpackagewasreviewed,andQAidentifiedthatprercquisitesforspentfuelpoolcoolingwerenotmetpriortofuelmovement.Additionalmodiflicationpackagestobeimplementedduringthercfuclingoutagewerereviewed,aswellasthemodificationpackageandsafetyevaluationreviewprocesses.QAfoundthatthepre-implementationreviewofdesignchangesandsafetyevaluationsbycognizantorganizationsispoorlydefined,anddonotprovideadequateassurancethattherequirementsoftheseengineeringdocumentswillbecapturedandsatisfiedpriortoimplementation,resultingin3significantFindings.Endingr.¹1.PlantproceduresandinstructionsdonotadequatelydefinetheprocessforthereviewofPC/Mpackagesbyapplicabledepartments,andtheresolutionofcomments,duringthePC/Mpreparationstage(beforeissuancetotheplant).¹2.PlantproceduresandinstructionsdonotadequatelydefinetheprocessforthereviewofPC/Mpackagesbyapplicabledepartments,theresolutionofcomments,ortheidentificationofplantproceduresimpactedbyPC/Mpackagesduringthefinalreviewstage(afterissuancetotheplant).¹3.Plantproceduresandinstructionsdonotadequatelyaddressthereviewofengineeringsafetyevaluationsforimpactonplantproceduresandinstructions.NoprocedureexistswhichspcciTieshowPSLreviewsandimplementsrequirementsstatedinsafetyevaluations.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage92AUDITAppendixBTableB4.7.1-QAAuditFindingsRESULTSQSL-PM-96-18,September~1996PSLQAPerformanceMonitoringAudit.Bmnmxr.Thisroutineauditfocusedonperfonnance-basedobservationsintheareasofoperations,maintenance,servicesandengineering,andresultedin6Findings.Intheengineeringarea,twoFindingswereindicativeoflessthanadequateimplementationof10CFR5059requirements.Ettditgr.¹3.Changestoplantsystemsweremadeusingtheminormaintenanceprocesswithoutadequatelyaddressingconfigurationcontrolrequirements,ortherequirementsof10CFR50.59,"Changes,TestsandExpcrimcnts."¹5.TheprocessforconvertingplantprocedurestoGuidelines,andforrevisingGuidelinesdonotmeet10CFR5059requirements.Thefinding¹3wasformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandisclosed.Finding¹5isstillbeingresolved.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage93AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQSL4PS-88-595,VerticalSexualSliceAuditoftheUnit2TheauditteamfocusedontheICWsystemdesign,procurementofparts,andsystemIntakeCoolingWaterSystem.operationandmaintenance,toassuresystemoperability.TheICWsystemandcomponentswereinspectedtoevaluateconfigurationcontrol,andtodeterminewhethertheywerecapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionsrequiredbytheirdesignbases.PlantmodiTicationswerereviewedtodetermineifanyunreviewedsafetyquestionswereintroduced.Systemwalkdownsverifiedas-builtconfiguration.Pre-operationaltestingandhydrostatictestingmetthcobjectivesofthedesignbases.Theauditresultedin5Findings,nonewhichinvolveddiscrepanciesbctwcenas-builtconditionsandthedesignbases.SystemdesignProcurementIn-serviceInspectionTesting¹1.¹2.¹3.¹4.¹5.Drawingsdidnotreflectas-builtconditions.ICWsystemprocedurescontaineddiscrepancies.Improperormissingcomponentidentificationtags.Externalcorrosionwasnotconsidered,andevidenceofdamageanddeteriorationwereidentifie.Nonconformingconditionswerenotalwaysdocumented.Thcfindingswereformallyaddressedbythccorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUttits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage94AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQS~PS-88424,Unit1and2EmergencyDieselGeneratorsandSafety-RelatedSwitchgearSystemsSmnmatr.ThisauditfocusedonEDGsystemdesign,procurementofparts,andsystemoperationandmaintenance,toassuresystemoperability.TheEDGsystemandcomponentswereinspectedtoevaluateconfigurationcontrol,andtodeterminewhethertheywerecapableofperformingthesafetyfunctionsrequiredbytheirdesignbases.Plantmodificationswerereviewedtodetermineifanyunreviewedsafetyquestionswereintroduced.SystemwalkdownsveriTiedas-builtconfiguration.Theauditresultedin5Findings,whichwereformallyaddressedthroughthecorrectiveactionprogram.DesignoperabilityConfigurationcontrolofdesignparametersPC/MsafetyevaluationsTestingforoperabilityCorrectivemaintenanceconfigurationchangesIndividualtimingrelaysandloadblocksLoadsequencerblockvoltagedropElectricalcablingStretchpowereffectsEindiomr.¹1.EDGfueloiltransferpumpsweretested,butnotincludedintheISTplan.¹2.EDGdrawingsdidnotreflcctas-builtconditions.¹3.EDGproceduresdescribingsystemsandcomponentswereinaccurate.¹4.Numerousitemswerefoundnottagged,ortaggedincorrectly.¹5.'Inherewasnodocumentationavailablethatdemonstratedthatthe16,450gallonstoragetanksfortheUnit1EDGsmetthedesignbasisrequirementofhavingsufficientfuelonhandtooperatebothEDGsintandemfor4days,oroneEDGfor8days.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage95AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSQSLPS-89472,VerificationoftheUnit2ReactorCoolantSystemDesign,OperationandMaintenance,toAssureSystemOperability.Summary:ThisauditfocusedonReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)componentsandprocedures,withparticularemphasisoninstrumentation,evaluating93RCSinstrumentsduringthcaudit.Safetyevaluationforsystemmodificationswerereviewed,andplantdrawingwerecomparedwithas-builtconditions.Systemwalkdownswereperformed,andoperating,maintenanceandtestprocedureswerereviewed.OneFindingwasissuedregardinginstrumentation.DesignoperabilityConfigurationcontrolofdesignparametersPC/MsafetyevaluationsReplacementpansOff-normalproceduresOperatingproceduresmaintenanceproceduresPlantdrawingsAnnunciatordrawingdetailsComponenttaggingZhtdtttgr.¹1.Onesafety-relatedinstrumentand8instrumentsusedtoverifycompliancewithtechnicalspecificationswercnotonaperiodiccalibrationschedule.QSLIPS-90-739,VerificationoftheUnit1and2AuxiliaryFeedwatcrSystemDesign,OperationandMaintenance,toAssureSystemOperability.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.BttmmargThisauditfocusedonthedesignbasesoftheAFWsystemasdescribedintheFSAR,andconfigurationcontrolofdesigninformation.Safetyevaluationsforsystemmodificationswereevaluated,andtheas-builtconfigurationoftheAFWActuationSystem(AFAS)wasinspected.WalkdownsoftheUnit1and2AFWsystemwereperformed,andOperatingproceduresandmaintenanceactivitieswercalsoevaluated.OneFindingdocumentedinadequateproceduresatUnit2.DesignoperabilityConfigurationcontrolofdesignparametersPC/MsafetyevaluationsReplacementpartsPlantdrawingsAnnunciatordrawingsComponenttaggingAFWline-upprocedureEntutgr.¹1.AFWoperatingprocedurepositiondescriptionforinstrumentrootisolationvalvesdidnotmatchthedrawingsandas-foundconditions.Thefindingswereformallyaddrcsscdbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.

St.LucieUpits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage96AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITQSL4PS-91-800,Supplement1,VerticalSliceAuditoftheUnit1and2FeedwaterandMainSteamSystems.RESULTSSuuuxxr.Thisauditfocusedonthedesign,operationandmaintenanceoftheUnit1and2feedwaterandmainsteamsystems.Thedesignbases,asdescribedintheFSAR,werereviewedtoassurethatconfigurationcontrolwasmaintained.Safetyevaluationsforsystemmodificationswerereviewedtoensureunrcviewedsafetyquestionsdidnotexist.Systemwalkdownsverifiedtheas-builtconfiguration,componentidentification,orientation,accessability,andgeneralplantconditions.Operatingprocedures,plantdrawings,maintenanceactivitiesandpostmaintenancetestingwerealsoreviewed.Discrepanciesbetweenplantdrawingsandproceduresresultedin2Findings.DesignoperabilityConfigurationcontrolofdesignparametersPC/MsafetyevaluationsMaintenanceTestingHadmu;¹1.Flowdiagramsdidnotreflectas-foundconditions.¹2.Plantproceduresdidnotaccuratelyreflectheplantconfiguration.QSLNPS-91-821,VerificationoftheUnit1ReactorProtectionSystemModiTications,Testing,Maintenance,andProcurement,toAssureSystemOperability.Thefindingswereformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandareclosed.SmltllargThisauditfocusedonmodiflicationstotheRPStoensurethatsystemmodificationsdidnotintroduceunreviewedsafetyquestions.RPSsetpointswereevaluatedtoensuretheywereadequatetomitigatepostulatedaccidents.RPSinstrumenttoleranceswereevaluated.Maintenanceandoperatingprocedureswerereviewed.RPSSetpointsPC/MsafetyevaluationsReplacementpartsFunctionaltestingInstrumentcalibrationsZbldillgS.None.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage97AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDlTRESULTSISEG-PSL-A93417,ISEGAssessmentActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1RefuelingOutage.StannaryISEGperformedanindependentriskassessmentofnuclearsafetyduringthe1993Unit1refuelingoutage.Reviewswereperformedtoensurethatthekeysafetyfunctionsforshutdownconditions(i.e.RCSinventory,decayheatremoval,poweravailability,reactivitycontrol,andcontainmentintegrity)werenotcompromisedbyoutagework.OneconcernwasidentifiedinvolvingthelackofverificationofthedesignbasesforthespentfuelpoolasstatedintheUFSAR,whichcouldbejeopardizedbyoutagework.Canuhmhns;Outageschedulingandrevieweffortsareperformedwithhighregardtonuclearsafety.¹1~Incorporatethespentfuelpooloperabilitycriteriaintoapplicableoutagemanagementprocedures.ISEG-PSIA93419,ISEGAssessmcntActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.LucieUnit1RefuelingOutage.BumnturgISEGperformedreviewsoftheimplementationofshutdownmarginverifications,andpressurizersafetyreliefvalvemodifications.Cnnuhtsinnr.Shutdownmarginverificationswereperformedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecifications.PressurizersafetyreliefvalvetailpipeloadingmodiTicationsresultedinzeroleakageofthereliefvalves.ISEG-PSL-A93420,ISEGActivitiesAssociatedWiththeSpring1993St.Lucic-1RefuelingOutage.NoneSummzgISEGprovidedindependentoversightoftheACandDCpoweravailabilityduringtheoutage,ensuringapplicablerequirementsweresatisfied.Theintegratedsafcguardstestwasobserved,andaplantmodificationsofthestationblackoutcrosstiebreakerswasevaluated.Canubtsinns;Powerwasadequatelymaintainedduringtherefuelingoutage.Fansforthepressurizerheaterbusshouldbeconsideredforroutinecleaningeachoutage.PrewperationaltestingoftheStationBlackoutplantmodificationsrevealedproblemsthatshouldhavebeendctectcdthroughthemodiTicationreviewprocessorthepost-modiTicationinspcctionhestprocess.¹LReviewtheadequacyofthcprocessforensuringthatmaincircuitbreakersarerackedoutandtaggedwheneverthe480-voltbussesarecross-tied.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage98AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSITR95402,ReviewofLER335/94406:ContainmentIntegrityOutsideofFSARAssumptionsUnderLimitedCircumstancesduetoDesignError.Sttmmarz:ThistcchnicalreviewevaluatedthecausalfactorsandcorrectiveactionsassociatedwithLER335/94406.'Iherootcauseoftheeventinvolvedadesignerrormadeduringthe1978additionoftheiodineremovalsystemforUnit1.Cezbtsianr.Causalfactorsforthelossofcontainmentsumpinventoryinexcessofthedesignbasiswereextensivelydeveloped.Genericimplicationswereadequatelyaddressed.Correctiveactionsboundedthcevent.None1TR96413,SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):AuxiliaryFeedwatcrSystem,Unit1.Summary;TheQAIndependentTechnicalReviewgrouppcrformcdwalkdownsoftheUnit1AFWsystemtoverifythatplantdrawingsreflecteas-builtconditions.Condmhms:listQuarter1996ESFsystem-Theas-installedconfigurationwasaccuratelyrcflcctedinplantdrawings.walkdowns]Generalcleanlinessandmaterialconditionsweresatisfactory.NoneITR96415,SafetySystemWalkdown(Partial):SectionsofEmergencyCoreCoolingSubsystemsintheUnit1ReactorContainmentBuilding,andPressurizerCodeSafetyValveModiTications.[3rdQuarter1996ESFsystemwalkdowns]Sumac.TheQAIndependentTechnicalReviewgroupperformedwalkdownsofportionsoftheUnit1highandlowpressuresafetyinjectionandcontainmentspraysystems,toverifythatplantdrawingsreflectedas-builtconditions.ThercplaccmentofthepressurizercodesafetyvalvesunderamodiTicationpackagewasalsoevaluated.Concernswereidentifieregardingtheplant'sevaluationofanNRCinformationnotice(IN),and3recommendationsweremadetoaddressadministrativeproblems.Cant:lusim:Theas-installedconfigurationwasaccuratelyrcflcctedinplantdrawings.Generalcleanlinessandmaterialconditionsweresatisfactory.OperatingproceduresproperlyimplementedthcrequirementsoftheUFSARforthesystemsevaluated.ThePSLengineeringevaluationofNRCIN96-31(regardingthepotentialforoperationinanunanalyzedconditionbyoperatingwithSafetyInjectionTanks(SIT)cross-tied)didnotcontainaquantitativeevaluationforthepeakcenterlinefuelcladdingtcmpcraturesresultingfromcross-tyingSafetyInjectionTanks(SITs).ConditionReportCR96-1726wasissuedtotrackthcresponse.¹l.¹2.¹3.Revisethepressurizerdesignbasisdocumentstoreflecttherecentplantmodification.Enhancetheminorengineeringpackagepreparationform.UpdatetheUFSARtoincludetheUnit1Cycle13largebreaklossofcoolantaccidentanalysisdata.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389L-97-28EnclosurePage99AppendixBTableC3.12-QAAuditsandVerticalSliceReviewsAUDITRESULTSPSLNuclearAssuranceQualityReportQR964006,"FourthQuarter1996ESFWalkdownoftheUnit2KghPressureInjectionSystem."SmnmargTheQAIndependentTechnicalReviewgroupperformedwalkdownsofportionsoftheUnit2highpressuresafetyinjectionsystems,toverifythatas-builtconditionswerereflectedinplantdrawingsandmetUFSARrequirements.Valvelineupswereperformedusingoperatingprocedures,andcomponentswereverifiedtomatchdesigndocumentation.Canclttsiatm:Theas-installedconfigurationwasaccuratelyreflectedinplantdrawings.Valveswereintheirrequiredpositions.Minoridentificationtagdiscrepancieswerenoted.41installedcomponentswereverifiedtomatchthePASSPORTdescriptions.ApotentiallackofseparationbetweenHPSIdischargeisolationvalveswasevaluatedandfoundtobesatisfactory.Ecsttltr.SatisfactoryQSL-PM-96-18,September1996PSLQAPerformanceMonitoringAudit.SttmmargThisroutineauditfocusedonperformance-basedobservationsintheareasofoperations,maintenance,servicesandengineering,andrcsultcdin6Findings.Intheengineeringarea,twoFindingswercindicativeoflessthanadequateimplementationof10CFR5059requirements.Ezimgr.N3.Changestoplantsystemsweremadeusingtheminormaintenanceprocesswithoutadequatelyaddressingconfigurationcontrolrequirements,ortherequirementsof10CFR5059,"Changes,TestsandExperiments."N5.TheprocessforconvertingplantprocedurestoGuidelines,andforrevisingGuidelinesdonotmeet10CFR5059requirements.FindingN3wasformallyaddressedbythecorrectiveactionprocessandisclosed.FindingN5iscurrentlyinthecorrectiveactionprocess.

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