05000266/FIN-2010002-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Communications, Incomplete ALARA Job Planning and Ineffective Implementation of Radiological Work Controls |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for inadequate ALARA job planning and ineffective implementation of radiological work controls. This issue adversely impacted the licensees ability to minimize dose for the containment sump fibrous insulation removal project during the Unit 2 refueling outage (U2R30). Specifically, radiological controls were not effectively implemented to reduce ambient radiation levels and minimize in-field work hours for craft personnel. This resulted in an actual dose outcome that was not consistent with the planned, intended dose for work associated with the fibrous insulation removal project. Corrective actions were implemented to address the organizational communication deficiencies that led to the incomplete ALARA job planning and ineffective implementation of radiological work controls for the project. The finding was more than minor because it impacted the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone objective for ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation in the attribute of program and process for ALARA planning, in that, incomplete ALARA job planning and radiological work control deficiencies contributed to an actual increase in worker doses in excess of 5 person-rem and exceeded the licensees initial intended dose estimates by more than 50 percent. The finding did not involve: an overexposure; a substantial potential for an overexposure; or an impaired ability to assess dose. While the finding involved ALARA planning and controls, the 3-year rolling average dose for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant was less than the significance determination process threshold of 135-person-rem for pressurized water reactors at the time the performance deficiency occurred. Therefore, the inspectors determined that this is a finding of very low safety significance. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance in decision-making, in that, the licensee did not communicate decisions and the basis for decisions to personnel who have a need to know the information in order to perform work safely in a timely manner (H.1(c)). |
| Site: | Point Beach  |
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| Report | IR 05000266/2010002 Section 2PS2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71122.02 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur J Bozga J Gilliam J Jandovitz M Kunowski M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno P Cardona Morales R Edwards R Ruiz R Winter S Burton T Bilik |
| CCA | H.10, Bases for Decisions |
| INPO aspect | CO.2 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2010Q1
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