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MONTHYEARML23242A2142023-08-31031 August 2023 Request for Extension of Comment Period Associated with Draft Nuregs: Revision 1 of Subsequent License Renewal Guidance Documents, and Supplement 1 to Associated Technical Basis Document, Docket Id NRC-2023-0096 ML22055A5622022-02-23023 February 2022 NEI Draft FAQ 22-01 - ANS to Erfer PI ML21270A1312021-09-24024 September 2021 NEI 17-06 NEI Response to NRC Comments ML21244A2672021-08-0909 August 2021 EPFAQ 2021-001 Clarification of Section 4.3 of NUREG-7002, Criteria for Development of Evacuation Time Estimate Studies, Regarding Acceptable Error And/Or Confidence Interval ML21089A0622021-03-26026 March 2021 NEI Responses to Initial NRC Comments on Draft NEI 20-07 Draft B - for Discussion with NRC_032621 ML21003A0082021-01-12012 January 2021 NEI Feedback on POV Inspections Dec 8 2020 (1) ML20191A2312021-01-0404 January 2021 Responses to Public Comments to DG-1287 for Regulatory Guide 1.177, Revision 2, an Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications ML21006A3092020-12-21021 December 2020 NEI Feedback on Draft IMC-0335 12/21/2020 ML20339A4842020-11-23023 November 2020 Summary of Remaining October 2020 NRC Comments on NEI 20-09 ML20168A3912020-06-16016 June 2020 EPFAQ on EPG-SAG R4 - BWROG Update to Question 2019-04-02 ML20162A0692020-06-10010 June 2020 EPFAQ 2019-04 Supplement to Question 2019-04-02 ML20080J3492020-01-28028 January 2020 EPFAQ 2020-02 Clarification of Emergency Preparedness Communication Equipment Relative to Extended Loss of All Power Communication Equipment ML20017A0892020-01-17017 January 2020 NEI Description - Best Practice for Issue Escalation_012220 ML20008E4442020-01-0606 January 2020 EPFAQ 2020-01 Relief from Annual Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Update When Performing a Census Baseline ETE Study ML19196A3022019-07-19019 July 2019 Disposition Table for NEI and EPRI Comments Draft Safety Evaluations for EPRI Depletion TRs 3002010613 and 3002010614 ML19196A2762019-01-31031 January 2019 Attachment 3: Proposed Changes for EPRI Utilization Report & NEI 12-16, Revision 3 ML19196A2752019-01-31031 January 2019 Attachment 2: Comments on Draft SER, Revision 2 ML19196A2742019-01-31031 January 2019 Attachment 1: Evaluation of Depletion Reactivity Decrement Bias and Uncertainty Values Using Linear Versus Quadratic Weighted Least Squares Regression Models ML19149A4722019-01-0909 January 2019 EPFAQ 2019-01 CU1 and CA1 IC Clarification Public Comment ML18338A0642018-12-11011 December 2018 Session 2 Biographies for M. Billone, R. Montgomery, and B. Hanson ML18338A3972018-12-0404 December 2018 Completed EPFAQ 2018-03 Single Containment Fire Detector Alarm ML18338A3082018-12-0404 December 2018 Completed EPFAQ 2018-02 BWR Unisolable Leak ML18338A2902018-12-0404 December 2018 Completed EPFAQ 2018-01 RCS Barrier Loss Clarification ML18178A5862018-06-27027 June 2018 Draft NEI 18-03, Rev. F ML18157A1422018-05-31031 May 2018 EPFAQ 2018-04 Hazardous Events Effects on Safety Systems Clarification ML18081A2882018-03-22022 March 2018 EPFAQ 2018-001 RCS Barrier Loss Clarification ML18081A3022018-03-22022 March 2018 EPFAQ 2018-002 BWR Unisolable Leak Question ML18081A3092018-03-22022 March 2018 EPFAQ 2018-003 Containment Detector ML18068A4062018-03-12012 March 2018 NEI Examples- Use of COL License Conditions to Address Significant Errors in a Referenced Design Certification ML18068A6092018-03-0505 March 2018 Resolutions to 11/30/17 NRC Comments on NEI 12-04, Revision 1A ML18030A7712018-01-23023 January 2018 Ensuring the Future of Us Nuclear Energy: Creating a Streamlined and Predictable Licensing Pathway to Deployment ML18016A1252018-01-11011 January 2018 White Paper Addressing the Impact of CCF and Application of Qualitative R1 ML18176A1782017-12-31031 December 2017 Draft NEI 96-07, Appendix D Rev 0e ML17312A7952017-11-0808 November 2017 NEI 96-07 Appendix D Section 4.3.6 Revised ML17249A1002017-09-30030 September 2017 NEI Response to NRC Comment Set 1 ML17268A1062017-09-19019 September 2017 NEI 96-07, App Edits from September 19-21, 2017 Meeting ML17241A0282017-08-29029 August 2017 NEI 16-16, Draft 2, Staff Comments (Jul 13, 2017) and NEI Discussion Points (Aug 10, 2017) ML17195A2992017-07-14014 July 2017 EPFAQ 2016-002 Clarification of Equipment Damage (Completed) ML17209A0212017-07-14014 July 2017 07-14-17 Anchor Darling Valve Industry Resolution Plan Attachment ML17214A6992017-07-0505 July 2017 Attachment 1: Method of Evaluation Guidance Extract - Clean Copy (7/05/2017, E-Mail from K. Cummings/Nei to R. Wharton/Nmss/Dsfm 72.48 and Method of Evaluation) ML17214A7002017-07-0505 July 2017 Attachment 2: Method of Evaluation Guidance Extract - Track Changes (7/05/2017, E-Mail from K. Cummings/Nei to R. Wharton/Nmss/Dsfm 72.48 and Method of Evaluation) ML17171A4102017-06-20020 June 2017 Attachment - Industry Comments on EPFAQ 2017-001 ML17271A2002017-05-16016 May 2017 NEI 96-07, Appendix D with Hsi Edits from Sep 19-21, 2017 Meeting ML17097A4912017-04-0707 April 2017 Attachment 4 - NUREG-2191 and NUREG-2192 (February 2017 Draft) Electrical Comments ML17097A4882017-04-0707 April 2017 Attachment 1 - NUREG-2191 and NUREG-2192 (February 2017 Draft) Summary List of Significant Industry Comments ML17097A4892017-04-0707 April 2017 Attachment 2 - NUREG-2191 and NUREG-2192 (February 2017 Draft) Mechanical Comments ML17097A4902017-04-0707 April 2017 Attachment 3 - NUREG-2191 and NUREG-2192 (February 2017 Draft) Structural Comments ML17096A3882017-04-0606 April 2017 Proposed EPFAQ 2016-002 ML17095A5952017-04-0505 April 2017 NEI Proposed Edits to Draft EPFAQ 2016-002 (April 4, 2017 Public Meeting) ML17108A6162017-03-29029 March 2017 NEI 96-07 Appendix D Draft Revision 0b - Proposed Revisions - March 29 2017 2023-08-31
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Emergency Preparedness Program Frequently Asked Question (EPFAQ)
EPFAQ Number: 2018-02 Originator: David Young Organization: NEI Relevant Guidance: This question concerns NEI 99-01, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactors, Revision 6.
Applicable Section(s): BWR EAL Fission Product Barrier Table Thresholds for LOSS or POTENTIAL LOSS of Barriers; RCS Barrier Loss #3.A Date Accepted for Review: 4/4/2018 Status: Under Review QUESTION OR COMMENT:
Background
The term UNISOLABLE is defined as:
An open or breached system line that cannot be isolated, remotely or locally.
BWR fission product barrier threshold RCS Loss #3.A states, UNISOLABLE break in ANY of the following: (site-specific systems with potential for high-energy line breaks)
The basis section for RCS Loss #3.A contains this statement, If it is determined that the ruptured line cannot be promptly isolated from the Control Room, the RCS barrier Loss threshold is met. The PWR EAL Fission Product Barrier Table in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6, contains the following RCS Barrier Loss threshold: An automatic or manual ECCS (SI) actuation is required by EITHER of the following:
Question How should a plant operator classify an RCS leak at a BWR facility that is isolated using a local control (i.e., outside the Control Room)?
PROPOSED SOLUTION:
The emergency classification level (ECL) declared for an off-normal event must be made in accordance with the licensees approved emergency classification scheme. The generic scheme development guidance used by licensees, and endorsed by the NRC, is structured to require emergency classifications commensurate with increased risk to the plant, plant workers and the public. With respect to the definition of UNISOLABLE, the provision for local isolation is included to preclude unwarranted emergency declarations, i.e., if operators can locally isolate an RCS leak, then the integrity of the RCS barrier will be maintained and there is no increased risk to the plant, plant workers or the public (although subsequent corrective actions may be required by plant Technical Specifications and procedures).
Emergency Preparedness Program Frequently Asked Question (EPFAQ)
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, section IV.C.2, a licensee shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate ECL. Following the detection of an RCS leak, a plant operator must assess, classify, and declare the emergency within 15 minutes of the initial leak indications. If operators, following procedures, can isolate the leak within 15 minutes of the first indication, then RCS barrier integrity will be maintained and no emergency declaration is required. If the leak cannot be isolated, from the Control Room or locally per the definition of UNISOLABLE, within 15 minutes of initial indications, then the RCS barrier must be considered lost and the appropriate ECL declared.
The sentence cited above from the basis section for RCS Loss threshold #3.A should be understood within the context of assessing the conditions associated with a large high-energy line break. The authors of NEI 99-01, Revision 6, wrote this statement with the assumption that a plant would not have the capability to locally isolate such a leak within 15 minutes, hence the wording from the Control Room; there was no intent to preclude consideration of a local capability should a plant design provide one. If a plant design has a local isolation capability, then the basis section should be revised to state that RCS barrier Loss threshold #3.A is met if prompt isolation cannot be accomplished from the Control Room or locally (in accordance with the definition of UNISOLABLE). Prompt should be understood to mean that the emergency must be declared as soon as the plant operator determines that the leak cannot be isolated and in all cases within 15 minutes of initial event indications.
A licensee may add clarifying wording reflecting this position to their site-specific emergency classification scheme procedure and/or technical basis document. Consistent with the guidance in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2003-18, Supplement 2, Use of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, Revision 4, dated January 2003, it is reasonable to conclude that this change would be considered as a difference.
NRC RESPONSE:
RECOMMENDED FUTURE ACTION(S):
INFORMATION ONLY, MAINTAIN EPFAQ UPDATE GUIDANCE DURING NEXT REVISION