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| #REDIRECT [[05000245/LER-1996-046-01, Forwards Supplemental LER 96-046-01 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960627.Supplement Changes Completion Date of Commitment B15820 from 961115 to 970301]]
| | {{Adams |
| | | number = ML20137Y047 |
| | | issue date = 04/17/1997 |
| | | title = Forwards Suppl LER 96-046-04,documenting Event Occurring at Facility on 960627.Provides Addl Reportable Condition Identified on 970318.W/util Commitments Listed |
| | | author name = Hinnenkamp P |
| | | author affiliation = NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE CO. |
| | | addressee name = |
| | | addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| | | docket = 05000245 |
| | | license number = |
| | | contact person = |
| | | document report number = B16389, NUDOCS 9704220301 |
| | | package number = ML20137Y051 |
| | | document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE |
| | | page count = 3 |
| | }} |
| | {{LER |
| | | Title = Forwards Suppl LER 96-046-04,documenting Event Occurring at Facility on 960627.Provides Addl Reportable Condition Identified on 970318.W/util Commitments Listed |
| | | Plant = |
| | | Reporting criterion = 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| | | Power level = |
| | | Mode = |
| | | Docket = 05000245 |
| | | LER year = 1996 |
| | | LER number = 46 |
| | | LER revision = 4 |
| | | Event date = |
| | | Report date = |
| | | ENS = |
| | | abstract = |
| | }} |
| | |
| | =text= |
| | {{#Wiki_filter:. |
| | - - - - -. - - ~ ~ - - - - |
| | ~ |
| | " " ' " - ~ ' |
| | "'g g gg Millstone offes |
| | * Rope Ferry Rd., Waterford, CT Utilities System v.o. w 128 |
| | } |
| | Waterford, CF 06385-0128 (203) 447 1791 s |
| | April 17,1997 l |
| | Docket No. 50-245 B16389 i |
| | Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) i i |
| | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j |
| | Attention: Document Control Desk i |
| | j Washington, DC 20555 f. |
| | 5 1. |
| | This letter forwards supplemental Licensee Event Repon (LER) 96-046-04, documenting an 4 |
| | event that occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 on June 27,1996. This LER is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i). |
| | j-This supplemental report provides an additional reportable condition that was identified on March 1: |
| | 18,1997. Accordingly, one additional commitment has been added as B16389-1 below. |
| | ) |
| | The following are Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's (NNECO's) commitments contained j |
| | within this letter. All other statements contained within this letter are for information only. |
| | I i |
| | 1 f |
| | B15820-1 NNECO commits to modify the procedure for performing the local leak rate test (LLRT) on the vacuum breaker to include testing of the shaft packing and stuffing box. LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A integrated leak rate testing (ILRT) prior to startup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | :- B15820-2 NNECO commits to modify the containment side bolting flange of valves 1-AC-9 & |
| | 1-AC-12 during refueling outage 15. LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A ILRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | B15820 3 NNECO commits that changes will be made to the procedure to perform the LLRT on the bolting flange between valves 1-HS-4 and 1-HS-5 during refueling outage 15. |
| | LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A ILRT prior to stanup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | i B16211-1 NNECO will complete by May 31,1997 (prior to performing the next ILRT), the program administrative control document, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," which will identify the specific roles and responsibilities of 22010 f* |
| | implementing and maintaining the program. This document will also list the primary containment isolation barriers with associated basis for each penetration. |
| | kh;I 9704220301 970417 1 PDR ADOCK 05000245 8 |
| | 5pppgsps |
| | |
| | U.S'. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16389\\Page 2 of 3 l |
| | B16211-2 NNECO will determine Appendix J Program stafling requirements and obtain program management approval by May 31,1997. |
| | B16211-3 NNECO will develop an Appendix J action plan which will identify the importance of conservative decision making regarding implementation of Appendix J requirements from all perspectives including design, operation and engineering. |
| | NNECO will incorporate this plan into an administrative procedure, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," by May 31,1997. |
| | B 16211-4 NNECO will determine Appendix J programmatic enhancement training requirements and include in administrative procedure, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," by May 31, 1997. NNECO will implement this training by September 30,1997. |
| | B16211-5 NNECO commits that the following corrective actions, identified by the Appendix J program review, will be completed prior to startup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | * The LLRT surveillance procedures, which require revision to provide a valid LLRT, will be revised prior to performance of the as-left LLRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | * Evaluate the need to modify Millstone Unit No.1 Technical Specifications to include air lock leakage acceptance criteria. |
| | * Revise ILRT procedure to include correct containment penetration valve lineup j |
| | for each containment penetration and include containment temperature survey in accordance with ANSI N45-4 -1972 prior to performance ofILRT for Refueling Outage 15. |
| | * Modify containment penetrations X-30f and X-34f to allow valid Type C test of isolation valves 1-RR-111 A/B and 1-RR-25A/B. |
| | * Modify surveillance procedures for the following penetrations to allow valid Type 1 |
| | C test: |
| | X-21l A Post Accident Sampling 1-PAS-24,1-PAS-25 X-14 RWCU 1-CU-2 A X-16A/B Core Spray 1-CS-5A/B X-42 Standby Liquid Control 1-SL-7 X-47 Reactor Recirculation 1-RR-37 Resise ILRT procedure to provide LLRT for containment air pressure and e |
| | verification flow connections on containment penetrations prior to performance ofILRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16. |
| | |
| | ..__...__.____._____........__.__.m l |
| | U.S: Nuclear. Regulatory Commission |
| | . B16389\\Page 3 of 3 I |
| | . Revise Main Steam Isolation Valve LLRT procedure to correct leakage to accident pressure of 43 psig. |
| | * Modify containment penetration X-35E by installing an' additional containment |
| | :- l l |
| | isolation valve and associated test connections. Revise LLRT procedure to test |
| | ] |
| | l the new containment isolation valve and implement testing. |
| | j Modify penetrations X-25 and X-202D to allow valid Type C test. |
| | i B 16389-l' NNECO commits that the LLRT procedure will be revised to perform Type B l |
| | testing of each flanged connection at penetrations X-35 A, B, C, D and E prior to the j |
| | next required LLRT during the current outage. |
| | i 4 |
| | Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY l |
| | l-P. D.Tiinnenkamp M |
| | Director, Unit Operations Attachment: LER 96-046-04 cc: Dr. W. D. Travers, Director, Special Projects i |
| | H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator 1 |
| | S. Dembek, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No.1 T. A. Eastick, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No.1 1 |
| | j.- |
| | l i |
| | 1 i |
| | .. ~ _. |
| | }} |
| | |
| | {{LER-Nav}} |
LER-1996-046, Forwards Suppl LER 96-046-04,documenting Event Occurring at Facility on 960627.Provides Addl Reportable Condition Identified on 970318.W/util Commitments Listed |
| Event date: |
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| Report date: |
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| Reporting criterion: |
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
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| 2451996046R04 - NRC Website |
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text
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- - - - -. - - ~ ~ - - - -
~
" " ' " - ~ '
"'g g gg Millstone offes
- Rope Ferry Rd., Waterford, CT Utilities System v.o. w 128
}
Waterford, CF 06385-0128 (203) 447 1791 s
April 17,1997 l
Docket No. 50-245 B16389 i
Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) i i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
Attention: Document Control Desk i
j Washington, DC 20555 f.
5 1.
This letter forwards supplemental Licensee Event Repon (LER) 96-046-04, documenting an 4
event that occurred at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1 on June 27,1996. This LER is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).
j-This supplemental report provides an additional reportable condition that was identified on March 1:
18,1997. Accordingly, one additional commitment has been added as B16389-1 below.
)
The following are Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's (NNECO's) commitments contained j
within this letter. All other statements contained within this letter are for information only.
I i
1 f
B15820-1 NNECO commits to modify the procedure for performing the local leak rate test (LLRT) on the vacuum breaker to include testing of the shaft packing and stuffing box. LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A integrated leak rate testing (ILRT) prior to startup for operating Cycle 16.
- - B15820-2 NNECO commits to modify the containment side bolting flange of valves 1-AC-9 &
1-AC-12 during refueling outage 15. LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A ILRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16.
B15820 3 NNECO commits that changes will be made to the procedure to perform the LLRT on the bolting flange between valves 1-HS-4 and 1-HS-5 during refueling outage 15.
LLRTs will be performed before the overall containment Type A ILRT prior to stanup for operating Cycle 16.
i B16211-1 NNECO will complete by May 31,1997 (prior to performing the next ILRT), the program administrative control document, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," which will identify the specific roles and responsibilities of 22010 f*
implementing and maintaining the program. This document will also list the primary containment isolation barriers with associated basis for each penetration.
kh;I 9704220301 970417 1 PDR ADOCK 05000245 8
5pppgsps
U.S'. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B16389\\Page 2 of 3 l
B16211-2 NNECO will determine Appendix J Program stafling requirements and obtain program management approval by May 31,1997.
B16211-3 NNECO will develop an Appendix J action plan which will identify the importance of conservative decision making regarding implementation of Appendix J requirements from all perspectives including design, operation and engineering.
NNECO will incorporate this plan into an administrative procedure, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," by May 31,1997.
B 16211-4 NNECO will determine Appendix J programmatic enhancement training requirements and include in administrative procedure, " Containment Leak Rate Testing Program Administration," by May 31, 1997. NNECO will implement this training by September 30,1997.
B16211-5 NNECO commits that the following corrective actions, identified by the Appendix J program review, will be completed prior to startup for operating Cycle 16.
- The LLRT surveillance procedures, which require revision to provide a valid LLRT, will be revised prior to performance of the as-left LLRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16.
- Evaluate the need to modify Millstone Unit No.1 Technical Specifications to include air lock leakage acceptance criteria.
- Revise ILRT procedure to include correct containment penetration valve lineup j
for each containment penetration and include containment temperature survey in accordance with ANSI N45-4 -1972 prior to performance ofILRT for Refueling Outage 15.
- Modify containment penetrations X-30f and X-34f to allow valid Type C test of isolation valves 1-RR-111 A/B and 1-RR-25A/B.
- Modify surveillance procedures for the following penetrations to allow valid Type 1
C test:
X-21l A Post Accident Sampling 1-PAS-24,1-PAS-25 X-14 RWCU 1-CU-2 A X-16A/B Core Spray 1-CS-5A/B X-42 Standby Liquid Control 1-SL-7 X-47 Reactor Recirculation 1-RR-37 Resise ILRT procedure to provide LLRT for containment air pressure and e
verification flow connections on containment penetrations prior to performance ofILRT prior to startup for operating Cycle 16.
..__...__.____._____........__.__.m l
U.S: Nuclear. Regulatory Commission
. B16389\\Page 3 of 3 I
. Revise Main Steam Isolation Valve LLRT procedure to correct leakage to accident pressure of 43 psig.
- Modify containment penetration X-35E by installing an' additional containment
- - l l
isolation valve and associated test connections. Revise LLRT procedure to test
]
l the new containment isolation valve and implement testing.
j Modify penetrations X-25 and X-202D to allow valid Type C test.
i B 16389-l' NNECO commits that the LLRT procedure will be revised to perform Type B l
testing of each flanged connection at penetrations X-35 A, B, C, D and E prior to the j
next required LLRT during the current outage.
i 4
Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY l
l-P. D.Tiinnenkamp M
Director, Unit Operations Attachment: LER 96-046-04 cc: Dr. W. D. Travers, Director, Special Projects i
H. J. Miller, Region I Administrator 1
S. Dembek, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No.1 T. A. Eastick, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit No.1 1
j.-
l i
1 i
.. ~ _.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000336/LER-1996-001, :on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program |
- on 960625,discovered Reactor Coolant Sys Heatup Rate Exceeded Tech Spec.Caused by Design & Procedural Weaknesses Re Plant Heatup Controls.Revised Plant Operating Procedures & Heatup/Cooldown Computer Program
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-001-02, :on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power |
- on 960120,supplementary Leak Collection & Release Sys Declared Inoperable Due to Equipment Failure of Door Latch.Door Repaired & Plant Returned to 100% Power
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-002, :on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash |
- on 960108,determined That Ice Plug in Common Line Resulted in Inability to Backwash Svc Water Strainers. Caused by Mod to Backwash Line Piping.Ice Plug Removed, Restoring Ability to Backwash
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000423/LER-1996-002-02, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Identified. Caused by Inadequate Procedure.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000423/LER-1996-002, :on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual |
- on 960310,inadequate Surveillance for Determining Shutdown Margin When Unisolating Rcl Occurred Due to Procedure Inadequacy.Changes Will Be Made to Technical Requirements Manual
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000245/LER-1996-003, :on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements |
- on 960111,discovered Existing Anchorage of EDG Day Tank Not Seismically Adequate.Caused by Original Design Deficiency.Anchorage of EDG Tank Will Be Graded to Meet Design Basis of Seismic Load Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys |
- on 960205,failed to Recognize Requirement to Enter TS LCO 3.0.3 Following Discovery of Ice Blockage. Caused by Inadequate Problem Identification Methods.Design Basis Summary Documents Have Been Prepared Re TS Safety Sys
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000245/LER-1996-003-02, Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | Forwards LER 96-003-02 Which Documents an Event That Occurred at Mnps,Unit 1 on 960111,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i) & 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii).Commitments Made in Ltr,Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-003-01, :on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised |
- on 960312,temporary I-Beams Located Overhead of Recirculation Spray Sys HXs Discovered.Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Work Control Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-01, :on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment |
- on 960319,determined That Auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Were in Noncompliance W/Ts.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Revised Operating Procedure to Preclude cross-connected Sys Alignment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-004, :on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented |
- on 960131,svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys Susceptibility to Freezing Following Loss of Intake Structure non-vital Heating Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Original Design.Design Change Implemented
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-004-02, :on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements |
- on 960316,auxiliary Feedwater Isolation Valves Noncompliance W/Ts Occurred.Caused by Misinterpretation of Ts.Event Reviewed W/Station Personnel to Caution Others on TS Surveillance Requirements
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-005-01, :on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability |
- on 960212,discovered PEO Improperly Utilized to Replace Automatic Backwash Function of Svc Water Strainer Backwash Sys.Caused by Failure to Enter TS Action Statement. Revise Procedures for IST SWS Pump Operability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-02, :on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated |
- on 960321,service Water Booster Pump Auto Start Discovered Disable.Caused by Inadequate Review.C/A: Bypass Jumper Removed & Mod Initiated
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-005-03, :on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised |
- on 960321,design Noncompliance Noted for High Temp Automatic Start Feature of SWS Booster Pumps.Caused by Weakness in Design Control Process.Operating Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-006-01, :on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established |
- on 960207,service Water Pump Motor Flood Protection Not Provided.Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls.Administrative Controls Established
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-006-02, :on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner |
- on 960330,plant Shutdown Required by TS for AFW Containment Isolation Valves Declared Inoperable.Caused by Opened Valves Outside Containment.Unit Was Shutdown in Orderly Manner
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000423/LER-1996-007, :on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed |
- on 960403,containment Recirculation Spray, Quench Spray & Safety Injection Sys Were Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Design Reviews of Rss,Qss,Si & Other Sys Will Be Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000336/LER-1996-007, :on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised |
- on 960220,discovered RCS C/D Rate Exceeded TS Limit.Caused by Use of Wrong Temp Sensor.Plant Operating Procedures,Heatup/C/D Monitoring Computer Program & Operator Training Involving These Events Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-01, :on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable |
- on 960403,CRS & Qs Sys Found Outside Design Basis Due to Design Errors.Restored Sys to Appropriate Design Basis Requirements Prior to Declaring Sys Inoperable
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-007-02, Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | Forwards LER 96-007-02 Which Supplements Rept Submitted on 960502,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B),10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B&D), 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B&D).Commitments in Response to Event, Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-008, :on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced |
- on 960222,concluded That Condition of Wire Mesh Screen Encl Over Two Containment Recirculation Suction Pipes Outside Design Basis.Caused by Const/Installation Error.Screen Encl Being Replaced
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-008-01, :on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism |
- on 960412,reactor Protection Sys Lead/Lag Time Constants Found non-conservative.Caused by Failure of Vendor to Identify Conservative Calibr Requirements.Tss Changed to Correctly Identify Direction of Conservatism
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000423/LER-1996-009, :on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint |
- on 960423,inoperable Shutdown Margin Monitors from Low Count Rate Occurred Due to Inadequate Design Control.Reduced SMM Setpoint
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000245/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed |
- on 960109,isolation Condenser Makeup Water Temperature Below Design Basis Limit,Determined.Caused by Inadequate Design Specification.Preliminary Assessment of non-ductile Failure of Isolation Condenser Sys Performed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-009-01, :on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change |
- on 960216,post LOCA Contianment Pressure Prevented Timely Extraction of PASS Air Sample & H Sample. Caused by Inadequate Assessment of Revised Post LOCA Response Analysis.Implemented Design Change
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-009-02, Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | Submits Table of Commitments Re LER 96-009-02 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-010, :on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,identified That Containment Hydrogen Monitor Flow Could Not Be Established W/Containment at Atmospheric Pressure Due to Improper Setting of Sys Pressure Regulators.Sys Calib Procedure Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-010-02, :on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted |
- on 960425,determined That Potential Failure Mode of Rod Control Sys Acopian Power Supplies Could Create Unanalyzed Condition.Caused by Inadequate Design Review. Reset Feature Will Be Deleted
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000336/LER-1996-011-01, :on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised |
- on 960222,required Time to Enter Mode 5 Exceeded.Caused by Effective Action Not Being Initiated to Revise SDC & Cooldown Rate Monitoring Procedures.Operating & Surveillance Procedures Will Be Revised
| | | 05000423/LER-1996-011-02, :on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/ |
- on 960512,determined That Both Trains of CR Envelope Pressurization Sys Inoperable Due to Imbalance in air-conditioning Sys.Cr air-conditioning Sys Rebalanced.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-012, :on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/ |
- on 960515,containment Leakage in Excess of TS Limits Noted,Due to Valve Leakage.Containment Spray Line Penetration 100 Flushed to Remove Any Boron Deposits.W/
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000336/LER-1996-012-01, :on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected |
- on 960228,SIS Drain Stop Valves Failed to Meet Functional Requirements of Ts.Caused by Personnel Error & Inadequate Retest Requirements.C/A:Valve 2-SI-618 Modified & Safety Related Solenoid Valves Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-012-02, :on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits |
- on 960515,containment Leakage Exceeded Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Boric Acid Residue.Performed Flush of Line to Remove Boron Deposits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000423/LER-1996-013, :on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified |
- on 960612,design Deficiency in Rhrs.Caused by Inconsideration That Failure Mode of RHS Flow Control Valves Could Create High RHS Heat Exchanger CCP Discharge Temps. Actuators for Heat Exchanger Valves,Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000336/LER-1996-013-01, :on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply |
- on 960314,assessed Wide Range Logarithmic Neutron Flux Monitors Nuclear Instrumentation Channels A,B,C & D as Inoperable Due to Potential Susceptability to Common Mode Failure.Replaced Failed Power Supply
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-013-02, :on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement |
- on 960515,determined Design Deficiency in Residual Heat Removal System (Rhs).Caused by Original Plant Design.Corrective Actions Will Be Described in Supplement
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000336/LER-1996-014-01, :on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3 |
- on 960311,weekly TS Surveillances Missed. Caused by Personnel Error W/Respect to Scheduling.C/A: Implemented Requirements of Surveillance Procedure Sp 2614A-3
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | | 05000423/LER-1996-014-02, :on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown |
- on 960516,surveillances for Emergency Diesel Generator Performed During Operation,Versus Shutdown.Caused by Misinterpretation of Shutdown Stipulation.Surveillances Performed During Shutdown
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-05, Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | Forwards LER 96-015-05,documenting Event That Occurred at Plant,Unit 3 on 960610,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). Commitments Made within Ltr Submitted | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-04, Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | Forwards LER 96-015-04,documenting Condition Determined at Unit 3 on 960610.Util Commitments in Response to Event Contained within Attachment 1 to Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000336/LER-1996-015-01, :on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures |
- on 960312,failed to Perform Action Requirement for TS LCO 3.3.1.1.Caused by Failure to Recognize Applicability of TS During Abnormal Equipment Configuration. Revised Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000423/LER-1996-015-02, Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | Forwards LER 96-015-02 Re Inadequate Electrical Separation Between Redundant Protection Trains Associated W/Reactor Trip Switches & Reactor Trip Breaker Indicating Lights | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000423/LER-1996-016-02, :on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches |
- on 960619,switchgear Cabinet in Noncompliance W/Seismic Design Basis & Subsequently Inadvertent Esfa Signal Occurred.Personnel Did Not Latch Known Seismic Latches as Required.Engaged Latches
| | | 05000336/LER-1996-016-01, :on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested |
- on 960312,common Power Supply Cable to 4 Condenser Pit Level Switches Found Improperly Connected. Caused by Inadequate Work Control.Cable Properly Connected & Trip Circuits Tested
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000336/LER-1996-017, :on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified |
- on 960320,discovered That Hydrogen Monitoring Sys Does Not Meet Single Failure Criterion by Reg Guide 1.97.Caused by Failure to Adequately Consider Sys Design Basis Requirements.Design Change Modified
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-017-02, :on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised |
- on 960621,determined Design Deficiency Existed in Tornado Protection Ventilation Dampers,Could Have Affected EDGs Following Tornado.Caused by Inadequate Original Plant Const Design.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000336/LER-1996-018-01, Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | Forwards LER 96-018-01,documenting Condition That Was Discovered at Unit 2 on 960319.LER Suppl Provides Update on Analyses & Investigation of Condition.Attachment 1 Is Clarification of Original Commitment Associated W/Ler | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000336/LER-1996-018, :on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced |
- on 960316,gaps Discovered in Encls Door Seals for Motor Control Ctrs B51 & B61.Caused by Weakness in Existing Program to Inspect & Verify Integrity of Environ Protective Barriers.Doors for MCC B51 & MCC B61 Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000423/LER-1996-019-02, :on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept |
- on 960627,RCS PORV Block Valves Were Determined to Be Unable to Perform Intended Safety Functions.Caused by Structural Design Deficiency.C/A Will Be Provided in Supplement to Rept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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