ML19317F477: Difference between revisions

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| document report number = RO-270-76-06, RO-270-76-6, NUDOCS 8001140709
| document report number = RO-270-76-06, RO-270-76-6, NUDOCS 8001140709
| package number = ML19317F472
| package number = ML19317F472
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 2
| page count = 2
}}
}}


=Text=
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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 r
DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 r
Report No.:             R0-270/76-6                                                           ;
Report No.:
Report Date: . July 21, 1976                                                                 :
R0-270/76-6 Report Date:. July 21, 1976 Occurrence Date:_. July 6,.1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina
Occurrence Date:_ . July 6,.1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina
. Identification of Occurrence: Manual containment 3 solation valves discovered during unit startup Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit startup in prograss Description of Occurrence:
            . Identification of Occurrence: Manual containment 3 solation valves discovered during unit startup Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit startup in prograss                                     :
~
Description of Occurrence:
                    ~
On July 6, 1976, during the startup of Oconee Unit 2, it was discovered that manual containment isolation valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were open with no administrative controls in effect at a time when containment integrity was required.- This condition existed for a period of approximately 31 hours during which containment integrity was required by Oconee Technical Specifi-cation 3.6.1.
On July 6, 1976, during the startup of Oconee Unit 2, it was discovered that manual containment isolation valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were open with no administrative controls in effect at a time when containment integrity was required.- This condition existed for a period of approximately 31 hours during which containment integrity was required by Oconee Technical Specifi-cation 3.6.1.
Upon discovery,' administrative controls over valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were instituted to assure compliance with Specification 3.6.1.
Upon discovery,' administrative controls over valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were instituted to assure compliance with Specification 3.6.1.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
            .On July 3, 1976, while.0conee Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were opened to supply instrument air to the Reactor
.On July 3, 1976, while.0conee Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were opened to supply instrument air to the Reactor
            . Building.         This occurred approximately 24 hours after the preheatup valve check list had been completed. Proper documentation of the opening of these containment. isolation valves was not provided on an out-of-normal sheet.
. Building.
            -Subsequent heatup of the reactor coolantLsystem on July 5, 1976 occurred-while the valves were still open.         The apparant ,ause of this occurrence was the~ failure to. properly' document an out st-aormal condition and to institute appropriate administrative controls.
This occurred approximately 24 hours after the preheatup valve check list had been completed. Proper documentation of the opening of these containment. isolation valves was not provided on an out-of-normal sheet.
-Subsequent heatup of the reactor coolantLsystem on July 5, 1976 occurred-while the valves were still open.
The apparant,ause of this occurrence was the~ failure to. properly' document an out st-aormal condition and to institute appropriate administrative controls.
_ Analysis of Occurrence:
_ Analysis of Occurrence:
This incident.resulted in a loss of containment integrity for approximately-
This incident.resulted in a loss of containment integrity for approximately-
              .31 hours. 'During this period,'the maximum. reactor coolant system temperature and pressure conditions were 383 F and 1,000 psig,-respectively. It is
.31 hours. 'During this period,'the maximum. reactor coolant system temperature and pressure conditions were 383 F and 1,000 psig,-respectively.
                                        ~
It is considered that since the reactor was subcritical during this period,
considered that since the reactor was subcritical during this period, the reactor' coolant temperature and pressure conditions were well below the normal operating conditions, and due to the short duration of time
~
              -thia . condition existed, the probability of ' an nincident requiring 'immediate containment isolation was exceeding 1yJremote.
the reactor' coolant temperature and pressure conditions were well below the normal operating conditions, and due to the short duration of time
                                  ~
-thia. condition existed, the probability of ' an nincident requiring 'immediate containment isolation was exceeding 1yJremote.
It is,'therefore, concluded
It is,'therefore, concluded
:-that the health;andfsafety of the public was not affected by this' incident.              .
~
                                                                                                        -I 8001140 70 9'         -
:-that the health;andfsafety of the public was not affected by this' incident.
                                                                                                        ]
-I 8001140 70 9'
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o                                                                                       ,
o Corrective Action:
Corrective Action:
The necessity of properly complying with station procedures and directives re)2 ting to this occurrence has been stressed to all personnel involved.}}
The necessity of properly complying with station procedures and directives re)2 ting to this occurrence has been stressed to all personnel involved.}}

Latest revision as of 21:44, 1 January 2025

RO 270/76-06:on 760706,manual Containment Isolation Valves 2IA-90 & 2IA-91 Found Open W/No Administrative Controls During Startup.Caused by Improper Documentation of out-of- Normal Condition.Personnel Cautioned
ML19317F477
Person / Time
Site: Oconee 
Issue date: 07/21/1976
From:
DUKE POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML19317F472 List:
References
RO-270-76-06, RO-270-76-6, NUDOCS 8001140709
Download: ML19317F477 (2)


Text

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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 r

Report No.:

R0-270/76-6 Report Date:. July 21, 1976 Occurrence Date:_. July 6,.1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina

. Identification of Occurrence: Manual containment 3 solation valves discovered during unit startup Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit startup in prograss Description of Occurrence:

~

On July 6, 1976, during the startup of Oconee Unit 2, it was discovered that manual containment isolation valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were open with no administrative controls in effect at a time when containment integrity was required.- This condition existed for a period of approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> during which containment integrity was required by Oconee Technical Specifi-cation 3.6.1.

Upon discovery,' administrative controls over valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were instituted to assure compliance with Specification 3.6.1.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

.On July 3, 1976, while.0conee Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were opened to supply instrument air to the Reactor

. Building.

This occurred approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the preheatup valve check list had been completed. Proper documentation of the opening of these containment. isolation valves was not provided on an out-of-normal sheet.

-Subsequent heatup of the reactor coolantLsystem on July 5, 1976 occurred-while the valves were still open.

The apparant,ause of this occurrence was the~ failure to. properly' document an out st-aormal condition and to institute appropriate administrative controls.

_ Analysis of Occurrence:

This incident.resulted in a loss of containment integrity for approximately-

.31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />. 'During this period,'the maximum. reactor coolant system temperature and pressure conditions were 383 F and 1,000 psig,-respectively.

It is considered that since the reactor was subcritical during this period,

~

the reactor' coolant temperature and pressure conditions were well below the normal operating conditions, and due to the short duration of time

-thia. condition existed, the probability of ' an nincident requiring 'immediate containment isolation was exceeding 1yJremote.

It is,'therefore, concluded

~

-that the health;andfsafety of the public was not affected by this' incident.

-I 8001140 70 9'

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o Corrective Action:

The necessity of properly complying with station procedures and directives re)2 ting to this occurrence has been stressed to all personnel involved.