ML19317F477
| ML19317F477 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/1976 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19317F472 | List: |
| References | |
| RO-270-76-06, RO-270-76-6, NUDOCS 8001140709 | |
| Download: ML19317F477 (2) | |
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DUKE POWER COMPANY OCONEE UNIT 2 r
Report No.:
R0-270/76-6 Report Date:. July 21, 1976 Occurrence Date:_. July 6,.1976 Facility: Oconee Unit 2, Seneca, South Carolina
. Identification of Occurrence: Manual containment 3 solation valves discovered during unit startup Conditions Prior to Occurrence: Unit startup in prograss Description of Occurrence:
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On July 6, 1976, during the startup of Oconee Unit 2, it was discovered that manual containment isolation valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were open with no administrative controls in effect at a time when containment integrity was required.- This condition existed for a period of approximately 31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br /> during which containment integrity was required by Oconee Technical Specifi-cation 3.6.1.
Upon discovery,' administrative controls over valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were instituted to assure compliance with Specification 3.6.1.
Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:
.On July 3, 1976, while.0conee Unit 2 was in a cold shutdown condition, valves 2IA-90 and 2IA-91 were opened to supply instrument air to the Reactor
. Building.
This occurred approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the preheatup valve check list had been completed. Proper documentation of the opening of these containment. isolation valves was not provided on an out-of-normal sheet.
-Subsequent heatup of the reactor coolantLsystem on July 5, 1976 occurred-while the valves were still open.
The apparant,ause of this occurrence was the~ failure to. properly' document an out st-aormal condition and to institute appropriate administrative controls.
_ Analysis of Occurrence:
This incident.resulted in a loss of containment integrity for approximately-
.31 hours3.587963e-4 days <br />0.00861 hours <br />5.125661e-5 weeks <br />1.17955e-5 months <br />. 'During this period,'the maximum. reactor coolant system temperature and pressure conditions were 383 F and 1,000 psig,-respectively.
It is considered that since the reactor was subcritical during this period,
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the reactor' coolant temperature and pressure conditions were well below the normal operating conditions, and due to the short duration of time
-thia. condition existed, the probability of ' an nincident requiring 'immediate containment isolation was exceeding 1yJremote.
It is,'therefore, concluded
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- -that the health;andfsafety of the public was not affected by this' incident.
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o Corrective Action:
The necessity of properly complying with station procedures and directives re)2 ting to this occurrence has been stressed to all personnel involved.