ENS 43815: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 11/30/2007 10:52 CST | | event date = 11/30/2007 10:52 CST | ||
| last update date = 11/30/2007 | | last update date = 11/30/2007 | ||
| title = Manual Hpci Isolation Due | | title = Manual Hpci Isolation Due to Steam Leak Increase | ||
| event text = At 1052 on 11/30/2007 while in Mode 3 for a maintenance outage, a previously identified steam leak on the packing of valve 3-FCV-073-0006A, HPCI Steam Line Condensate Inboard Drain Valve, increased. The room temperatures were not rising at the time of the increased leakage, alleviating the potential automatic isolation of the system. Upon review of the condition, the Operations staff closed the steam isolation valves and declared HPCI INOPERABLE to minimize the spread of contamination in the area. After HPCI was isolated, inspection of the valve identified a Code Class 2 piping through wall leak on a tee upstream of 3-FCV-073-0006A which contributed to the increased leakage observed prior to isolation of the system. | | event text = At 1052 on 11/30/2007 while in Mode 3 for a maintenance outage, a previously identified steam leak on the packing of valve 3-FCV-073-0006A, HPCI Steam Line Condensate Inboard Drain Valve, increased. The room temperatures were not rising at the time of the increased leakage, alleviating the potential automatic isolation of the system. Upon review of the condition, the Operations staff closed the steam isolation valves and declared HPCI INOPERABLE to minimize the spread of contamination in the area. After HPCI was isolated, inspection of the valve identified a Code Class 2 piping through wall leak on a tee upstream of 3-FCV-073-0006A which contributed to the increased leakage observed prior to isolation of the system. | ||
This event is reportable as an 8-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) as; 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat'; and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.' | This event is reportable as an 8-hour Non-Emergency Notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v)(B) as; 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat'; and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the Safety Function of structures or systems that are needed to: mitigate the consequences of an accident.' | ||
Latest revision as of 21:15, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Browns Ferry  Alabama (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+0.97 h0.0404 days <br />0.00577 weeks <br />0.00133 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Timothy Boland 17:50 Nov 30, 2007 |
| NRC Officer: | Jeff Rotton |
| Last Updated: | Nov 30, 2007 |
| 43815 - NRC Website
| |
Browns Ferry with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |