ENS 44748: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 01/01/2009 14:30 EST | | event date = 01/01/2009 14:30 EST | ||
| last update date = 03/02/2009 | | last update date = 03/02/2009 | ||
| title = Two Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due | | title = Two Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to Component Failure | ||
| event text = EVENT DESCRIPTION: During return to service testing for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #3, it was noted that the fuel rack limiting cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position. The fuel rack limiting cylinder is designed to limit the stroke distance of the fuel rack assembly during the initial EDG start sequence. Once the EDG is at rated speed, ~10 seconds, the fuel rack limiting cylinder should return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #3 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. As a result, EDG #3 remains inoperable. | | event text = EVENT DESCRIPTION: During return to service testing for Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) #3, it was noted that the fuel rack limiting cylinder was not returning to its non-limiting position. The fuel rack limiting cylinder is designed to limit the stroke distance of the fuel rack assembly during the initial EDG start sequence. Once the EDG is at rated speed, ~10 seconds, the fuel rack limiting cylinder should return to its non-limiting position. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #3 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. As a result, EDG #3 remains inoperable. | ||
During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's (#1, #2, and #4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition as described above existed on EDG #4. EDG's #1 and #2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDG's remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG #4 was declared inoperable at 1430 on 1/01/09. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #4 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG #3 and EDG #4 may have prevented on-site emergency power to Emergency busses 3 & 4 and thus the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | During performance of subsequent surveillance testing on the remaining EDG's (#1, #2, and #4), in accordance with Technical Specifications, a similar condition as described above existed on EDG #4. EDG's #1 and #2 did not exhibit the same behavior and therefore, these EDG's remained operable during this sequence of events. Consequently, EDG #4 was declared inoperable at 1430 on 1/01/09. Failure of this component to operate as expected may have prevented EDG #4 from fulfilling its safety function during the postulated Loss of Off Site Power and/or Loss of Coolant Accident conditions. The concurrent failure of this component on EDG #3 and EDG #4 may have prevented on-site emergency power to Emergency busses 3 & 4 and thus the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:12, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Brunswick  North Carolina (NRC Region 2) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+1.6 h0.0667 days <br />0.00952 weeks <br />0.00219 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | C. Dunsmore 21:06 Jan 1, 2009 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Mar 2, 2009 |
| 44748 - NRC Website
| |
Brunswick with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |