ENS 47096: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 07/26/2011 16:00 EDT | | event date = 07/26/2011 16:00 EDT | ||
| last update date = 07/26/2011 | | last update date = 07/26/2011 | ||
| title = Unanalyzed Conditions Involving | | title = Unanalyzed Conditions Involving the Safety Related Direct Current (Dc) System | ||
| event text = Information was received in regards to an old design issue identified in a Component Design Basis Inspection Unresolved Item. Two issues were identified with the Safety-Related Direct Current (DC) System: | | event text = Information was received in regards to an old design issue identified in a Component Design Basis Inspection Unresolved Item. Two issues were identified with the Safety-Related Direct Current (DC) System: | ||
1. The plant's licensing basis states that non-safety-related electrical equipment, whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the specified safety-related electrical equipment required safety functions, is qualified as required. However, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) backup lift oil pump motors and the Containment Emergency Lighting Panel L49E1 are located inside containment and are not environmentally qualified. This could challenge the adequacy of electrical separation between the potentially grounded non-safety related equipment and the safety related batteries. | 1. The plant's licensing basis states that non-safety-related electrical equipment, whose failure under postulated environmental conditions could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of the specified safety-related electrical equipment required safety functions, is qualified as required. However, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) backup lift oil pump motors and the Containment Emergency Lighting Panel L49E1 are located inside containment and are not environmentally qualified. This could challenge the adequacy of electrical separation between the potentially grounded non-safety related equipment and the safety related batteries. | ||
Latest revision as of 22:06, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Davis Besse  Ohio (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000346/LER-2011-004 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-3.22 h-0.134 days <br />-0.0192 weeks <br />-0.00441 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Tom Cobbledick 16:47 Jul 26, 2011 |
| NRC Officer: | Bill Huffman |
| Last Updated: | Jul 26, 2011 |
| 47096 - NRC Website
| |
Davis Besse with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |