ENS 51669: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
| event date = 01/20/2016 13:11 CST | | event date = 01/20/2016 13:11 CST | ||
| last update date = 01/20/2016 | | last update date = 01/20/2016 | ||
| title = Primary-Secondary Containment Pressure Differential Exceeded Due | | title = Primary-Secondary Containment Pressure Differential Exceeded Due to Ccp Exhaust Fan Trip | ||
| event text = At 1308 CST on January 20, 2016, the main control room received an alarm that the containment building (VR) ventilation system continuous containment purge (CCP) exhaust fan (1VR07CB) tripped. At 1311 CST, primary-to-secondary containment differential pressure was reported to be +0.411 psid. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4, Primary Containment Pressure, Action A.1, was entered due to the differential pressure outside the � 0.25 psid requirement. At 1327 CST, the CCP B subsystem was restarted and at 1339 CST, primary-to-secondary differential pressure was restored to within the limits of TS 3.6.1.4. The cause of the trip of the 1VR07CB is under investigation. | | event text = At 1308 CST on January 20, 2016, the main control room received an alarm that the containment building (VR) ventilation system continuous containment purge (CCP) exhaust fan (1VR07CB) tripped. At 1311 CST, primary-to-secondary containment differential pressure was reported to be +0.411 psid. Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.6.1.4, Primary Containment Pressure, Action A.1, was entered due to the differential pressure outside the � 0.25 psid requirement. At 1327 CST, the CCP B subsystem was restarted and at 1339 CST, primary-to-secondary differential pressure was restored to within the limits of TS 3.6.1.4. The cause of the trip of the 1VR07CB is under investigation. | ||
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function due to the differential pressure being outside the primary containment initial conditions to ensure that containment pressures remain within design values during a loss of coolant accident. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function for the same reason. | This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function due to the differential pressure being outside the primary containment initial conditions to ensure that containment pressures remain within design values during a loss of coolant accident. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the primary containment function for the same reason. | ||
Latest revision as of 20:45, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Clinton  Illinois (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| LER: | 05000461/LER-2016-001 |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.67 h-0.0279 days <br />-0.00399 weeks <br />-9.17766e-4 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | David Tickle 18:31 Jan 20, 2016 |
| NRC Officer: | Steve Sandin |
| Last Updated: | Jan 20, 2016 |
| 51669 - NRC Website
| |
Clinton with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | |