ML20148H178

Insp Repts 50-369/88-04 & 50-370/88-04 on 880121-0226. Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operations,Safety Verification,Surveillance Testing,Maint Activities & Followup on Previous Insp Findings

ML20148H178
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	03/08/1988
From:	William Orders, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148H159	List: ML20148H153 ML20148H170 ML20148H178
References
50-369-88-04, 50-369-88-4, 50-370-88-04, 50-370-88-4, NUDOCS 8803290336
Download: ML20148H178 (9)

See also: IR 05000369/1988004

Text

-____-_-_ _ ______ _

-

UNITED STATES

,[pomfo6fD

NUCf. EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

' .1 *

o

[

REGION ll

"

n

J ..

j

101 MARIETTA STREET,N.W.

't~

ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

• %

/

,

Report Nos.:

50-369/88-04 and 50-370/88-04

Licensee: Duke Power Company

'422 Scuth Church Street

Charlotte, NC 28242

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station 1 and 2

Docket Nos:

50-369 and 50-370

.

License Nos:

NPF-9 and NPF-17

Inspection Conducted: J uary 21, 1988 - February 26, 1988

~

/)2/

d

[

Inspector:

E Orders,~ Senior Res ent inspector

' Gate Signed

,

Accompanying Personnel:

D. Nelson

. Croteau

8

[

'

"

Approved by:

T. 'A.7e'ebles, Seg< ion Chief

/ Vate Signed

~

Division of React'or Projects

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine unannounced inspection involved the areas of operations

,

safety verification,

surveillance testing, maintenance activities,

and

follow-up on previous inspection findings.

Results:

In the areas inspected, one violation was identified with two

examples involving a failure to follow procedures and an inadequate procedure

associated with performing equalizing charges on vital batteries and operating

the chemical and volume control system.

,

8803290336 880310

,

PDR

ADOCK 05000369

'

Q

DCD

_]

.

.

REPORT DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

• T. McConnell, Plant Manager

B. Travis, Superintendent of Operations

• 0. Rains, Superintendent of Maintenance

B. Hamilton, Superintendent of Technical Services

• N. McCraw, Compliance Engineer

• M. Sample, Superintendent of Integrated Scheduling

• L.

Firebaugh, OPS /NPE/MNS

• S. LeRoy, Licensing, General Office

D. Baxter, OPS /MNS/NPD

• S. Copp, Planning Engineer

R. Banner, Compliance

J. Snyder, Performance Engineer

• N. Athertor., Compliance

• W. Reesioe, Operations Engineer

• R. White, IAE Engineer

Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen,

technicians, operators, mechanics, security force members, and office

personnel.

• Attended exit interview

2.

Exit Interview (30703)

The inspection findings identified below were summarized on February 26,

1988, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above.

A violation,

described in paragraphs 9 and 11, was identified with two examples. The

following items we e discussed in detail:

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 369, 370/88-04-01, Long Term

Corrective Actions Associated With Nuclear Service Water Expansion

Joint Liner Failure (see paragraph 8).

(0 pen) Violation 369, 370/88-04-02, Failure to Follow Procedure and

Inadequate Procedure Associated with Battery Equalizing Charge and

Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System (see paragraphs 9 and 11).

(Closed) Licensee Identified Violation (LIV) 369/88-04-03, Inoperable

Gaseous Activity Monitor Due to Deficient Procedure (see paragraph

10).

The licensee representatives present offered no dissenting comments, nor

did they identify as proprietary any of the information reviewed by the

inspectors during the course of their inspection.

. . - _ - - . .

.

. . .

_ - -

.

-

,

,

..

.

,

2

3.

Unresolved Items

An unresolved item (UNR) is a matter about which more information is

required to determine whether it is acceptable or may involve a violation

or deviation. There were no unresolved items identified in this report.

4.

Plant Operations (71707, 71710)

.

'The inspection staff reviewed plant operations during the report period to

verify conformance with applicable regulatory requirements. Control room

logs, shift supervisors' logs, shift turnover records and equipment

removal and restoration records were routinely perused. Interviews were

conducted with plant operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics,

and performance personnel.

Activities within the control room were monitored during shifts and at

shift changes. Actions and/or activities observed were conducted as

prescribed in applicable station administrative directives. The complement

of licensed personnel on each shift met or exceeded the minimum required

by Technical Specifications.

Plant tours taken during the reporting period included, but were not

limited to, the turbine buildings, the auxiliary building, Units 1 and 2

electrical equipment rooms, Units 1 and 2 cable spreading rooms, and the

station yard zone inside the protected area.

During the plant tours, ongoing activities, housekeeping, security,

equipment status and radiation control practices were observed,

a.

Unit 1 Operations

Unit 1 operated at full power for the entire reporting period except

for a reduction to 30% on February 2 to correct high sodium levels in

'

the steam generators.

The chemistry problem was corrected and full-

power was restored the following day.

The high sodium levels were

'

i

attributed to a leaking turbine building heating water system (YH)

converter allowing sodium into the condensate makeup system.

b.

Unit 2 Operations

Unit 2 operated at full power for the entire reporting period with no

significant problems.

No violation or deviations were identified.

5.

Surveillance Testing (61726)

l

Selected surveillance tests were analyzed and/or witnessed by the

inspector to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy and conformance

with applicable Technical Specifications.

l

I

I

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.__ _ - - .

_ _ _ _ _ - ..

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_

______

i

'

'

-

.

.

,

'

3

,

w

i

Selected tests were witnessed to ascertain that current written approved

procedures were available and in use, that test equipment in use was

,

calibrated, that test prerequisites were met, that system restoration was

completed and test results were adequate.

-

Detailed below are selected tests which were either reviewed or witnessed:

PROCE0VRE

EQUIPMENT / TEST

PT/2/A/4401/05A

KC Train A Heat Exchanger Perform Test

.

PT/0/A/4350/28A

125 Volt Vital Battery Weekly Inspector

'

PT/2/A/4201/01

Containment Sump Recirc Test

.

PT/0/A/4350/28B

125 V0LT VITAL BATTERY Quarterly

4

Inspection

PT/0A/4601/08B

SSPS Train B PT

i

PT/2/A/4401/01A

KC Train A Performance Test

i

PT/2/A/4350/04

4 KV Sequence Undervoltage

]

PT/2/A/4252/01

Auxiliary Feedwater #2 Performance Test-

PT/2/A/4601/01

Protective System Channel 1 Function

Test

PT/2/A/4208/04A

NS Train 2A Heat Exchanger Test

PT/2/A/4401/05B

KC Train B Heat Exchanger Performance

Test

.

PT/0/A/4601/078

Reactor Trip Breaker Response Time

Testing

PT/2/A/4403/08

RN Train A Flow Balance

PT/2/A/4252/01B

Motor Driven Aux. Feedwater Pump 2B Performance

Test

PT/1/A/4200/28

Slave Relay Test

PT/1/A/4601/02

Protective System Channel II

Functional Test

PT/1/A/4403/018

RN Train B Performance Test

PT/1/A/4150/17A

Unit 1 Pressurizer Heater

Capacity Test

?

PT/1/A/4208/03A

Train A NS Heat Exchanger

Perf. Test

l

PT/1/A/4403/02

RN Valve Stroke Timing

,

PT/1/A/4206/01B

NI Pump 28 Performance Test

]

PT/1/A/4350/23A

Hydrogen Mitigation Test

6.

Maintenance Observations (62703)

Routine maintenance activities were reviewed and/or witnessed by the

j

resident inspection staff to ascertain procedural and performance adequacy

j

and conformance with applicable Technical Specifications.

I

The selected activities witnessed were examined to ascertain that, where

applicable, current written approved procedures were available and in use,

that prerequisites were met, that equipment restoration was completed and

maintenance results were adequate.

"

No violations or deviations were identified.

,

d

- -

,.wv-~-,

,,s--

a-

, - - ,

, . , .

-,n_

~

- . - - - - - - - _ - _ - _

-- _

_

._

- - - - _ _ _ _ ,

'

.

-

.,-.

4

7.

Follow-up on Previous Inspection Findings (92702)

The following previously identified items were reviewed to asccitain that

the licensee's responses, where applicable, and licensee actions were in

compliance with regulatory requirements and corrective actions have been

completed.

Selective verification included record revie.. . observations,

.

and discussions with licensee personnel.

(CLOSED) Violation 50-369/86-08-02, Failure to follow procedures during

criticality and removal of equipment from service.

Adequate corrective

actions have been taken.

(CLOSED)

Violation 50-369/86-30-01, Failure to comply with TS 6.8.1 -

OP/1/A/6200/04-ND flow with no KC resulting in water hammers.

This

incident was discussed with licensed personnel stressing procedural

compliance and use of alternate methods to verify plant conrutions.

Safety related hangers were checked for damage by the licensee and no

damage was found. Adequate corrective actions have been taken.

(CLOSED) Violation 50-369, 370/86-04-01, Failure to have an operable ECCS

'

flowpath. This violation involved inoperability of both safety injection

pumps since suction from the volume control tank would not automatically

transfer to the refueling water storage tank. Department Directive 2.8.2

(T) Rev. O and Station Directive 2.8.2 Rev. I were instituted prov ding

i

guidance on determining operability. A functional review was performed to

determine the design purpose of each motor operated valve (MOV) which

receives an Engineerei Safety Features signal and the information was

incorporated in the Technical Specification Reference Manual as an aid to

determine operability.

A Technical Specification interpretation was

incorporated referencing the use of the Station Directive and Technical

Specification Reference Manual in determining operability. The Department

[

Directive, Station Directive, Technical Specification Reference Manual,

and Technical Specification interpretation were reviewed by the inspector.

Adequate corrective actions have been taken.

1

(CLOSED)

Inspector Followup Item 50-370/84-32-02, Need for operational

procedure regarding degraded Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF).

The

licensee has attached a note to T.S. 3.7.14 which states the shift

supervisor is to ensure security is informed as SSF components are

declared

inoperable and also when those components are returned to

operable status.

(CLOSED)

Inspector

Followup

Item 369-84-17-01 and 370-84-14-01,

Environmental Qualification Requirement NM/ Duke Agreement. From July 28

through August 1,

1986 NRC representatives reviewed the

licensees

implementation of a program required by 10 CFR 50.49 for establishing and

maintaining the environmental qualification (EQ) of electrical equipment.

The findings indicated that a program had been implemented to meet the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 except for certain deficiencies documented in

Inspection Report 50-369, 370/86-20. These deficiencies are being tracked

as followup items to 50-369, 370/86-20. Based on the inspection findings

i

and separate followup items being tracked, this item is c'osed.

!

.

_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _

_ __ _ __ _ _ _

'

'

.

,

1

5

8.

Nuclear Service Water Pump Damage

On January 19, 1988 during the performance of PT/1/A/4403/08, Nuclear

Service Water (RN) Train B Flow Balance, it was detected that adequate

flow could not be achieved through the containment spray (NS) nor the

component cooling (KC) heat exchangers. The required flow rates were 6000

GPM for=the KC heat exchanger and 3800 GPM for the NS heat exchanger. The

actual flow rates were 5900 GPM and 3600 GPM respectively.

Based on the test results, site personnel requested that Corporate Design

Engineering provide a justification for continued operation (JCO).

The

JCO, which was provided that evening, justified continued safe operation

with flow rates of 5600 and 3500 GPM respectively.

The calculations

supporting the JC0 were reviewed by the resident inspection staff.

4

In as much as the flow rates through the KC and NS heat exchangers had

dropped rather dramatically since the previous test perfermed on

October.29, 1987 at which time the respective flow rates were 6448 and

4001 GPM, the test group decided to perform a head curve test on the pun;p.

This took place on January 26, 1988. The results of the head curve test

indicated that the pump had lost a significant amount of capacity as can

be seen on the Attachment. Accordingly, the pump, associated train and

supported equipment were declared inoperable.

The pump was torn down for inspection and possible impeller replacement.

Upon disassembling the pump, the maintenance technicians found a large

'

piece (approximately 1/8" x 8" x 36") of stainless steel sheet metal in

the pump throat.

The. metal was determined to be the liner from an expansion joint located

immddiately upstream of the putnp.

The expansion joint war repaired,

the pump impeller was replaced and the train was tested / returned to

service on January 29, within the allowed 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> action statement time

\\

frame.

'

!

All other RN pumps were visually inspected to verify that the expansion

(

joints were intact.

Longer term plans include inspection of the weld

attaching the liner to the expansion joint or replacement of the joint

,

l

with piping.

l

This issue will be carried as an inspector follow-up item (IFI 369,

l

370/88-04-01).

I

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Vital Battery Equalizing Charge

An assured vital 125 volt direct current (VDC) power supply is provided to

both units by four battery banks consisting of 59 lead-calcium battery

cells each. The batteries are continuously charged or "floated" on the

l

l

)

'

_;

.___ ____ __-__

. ..

o

'

.

.

6

Vital DC buses and assume load without interruption upon loss of a battery

charger or associated alternating current (AC) power source. The normal

float voltage is 2.23 VDC per cell or approximately 132 VDC for each bank.

Periodically, whenever battery parameters such as individual cell voltage

or specific gravity decrease to undesirable limits, an equalizing charge

is performed to return the bank to optimum condition. Vendor manual MCM

1356.01-3 recommends an initial maximum equalizing charge voltage of 2.39

VDC per cel'. (141 VDC per bank).

Instrumentation and Electrical (IAE)

procedure IP/0/A/3061/08, Water Addition and Equalize Charging for Vital

Batteries, appropriately states 141 VDC as the initial equalizing charge

voltage reduced by 2.39 volts for each jumpered cell.

Some individual

cells have retained undesirable low voltages following equalizing charge.

Therefore, the licensee, with verbal vendor concurrence, has increased the

equalize charge voltage up to 150 volts to correct the individual cell

problems.

However, the IAE procedure specifies 141 VDC not 150 VDC.

On February 10, 1988, the inspector observed an indicated voltage of 148

VDC during an equalize charge on battery EVCB that had been in progress

since February 9. When questioned about the increased voltage, the IAE

Technician

performing

the

charge

acknowledged

tne

procedural

non-compliance but stated that the IAE engineer authorized the higher

voltage.

The IAE engineer had been acting on the belief that the

procedure allowed him to specify a higher voltage.

IAE considers the

higher voltage justified based on verbal communication with the battery

vendor.

Several NRC concerns arise:

The IAE technician chose to ignore the procedure instructions based on

verbal instructions from the IAE engineer. The NRC considers this to be a

failure to follow the procedure; a change to the procedure should have

been made.

Whea warranted, methods are available to properly change

procedures.

Station Directive 4.2.1, Handling of Station Procedures,

contains detailed instructions on when and how to make major changes to

existing procedures.

This process includes a safety evaluation, second

review, and approval which was essentially short circuited by the IAE

personnel in this case. The practice of increasing the equalizing charge

voltage has previously taken place on other batteries thereby providing

ample opportunity for the need for a procedure change to be detected and

properly implemented.

This is violation 369, 370/88-04-02.

Other recent events were caused by licensee personnel not complying with

procedures.

On August 28, 1987, IAE technicians failed to return a

Residual Heat Removal Pump recirculation flow instrument to service due in

part to not following their procedure (Inspection Report 50-369,

370/87-41). On September 16, 1C87, technicians caused a Unit 1 blackout

due to testing of lockout relays beyond the scope of their procedures

(Inspection Report 50-369,

370/87-41).

On December 28,

1987, IAE

l

l

_

.-.

_

.

.

.

.

7

technicians actuated a reactor trip signal while conducting a test in the

Solid State Protection System by performing a procedure step expressly

forbidden dt.e to the conditions of the system at the time.

(Inspection

Report 50-369/370-87-43). Although each event is unique with respect to

procedure compliance, collectively they raise concerns about the

licensee's procedure work ethic in general. Each of these events resulted

in an NRC violation, yet the procedure compliance problem persists.

Future NRC inspections will closely monitor licensee corrective actions

associated with these violations and performance in the area of auherence

to procedures.

10.

Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712, 92700)

The following LERs were reviewed to determine whether reporting

requirements have been met, the cause appears accurate, the corrective

actions appear appropriate, generic applicability has been considered, and

whether the event is related to previous events.

Selected LERs were

chosen for more detailed followup in verifying the nature, impact, and

cause of the event as well as corrective actions taken.

(CLOSED)

LER 369/86-10.

Inoperable gaseous activity monitor due to

defective procedure.

As corrective action, Procedure IP/0/A/3010/06,

Reactor Protection System Response Time Test, was revised to require

installing wiring and hardware to maintain the isolation capability of

gaseous activity monitor 1 EMF-39L with both trains of the Solid State

Protection System removed from service. TS 3.3.3.9 requires 1 EMF-39 to be

operable at all times but this monitor was inoperable on June 3,1986,

during performance of IP/0/A/3010/06.

This item is identified as a

Licensee Identified Violation (LIV 369/88-04-03) for violatior. of T. S.

i

3.3.3.9.

l

(CLOSED)

LER 369/86-11. D/G 1A auto-started due to a Unit 1 Train A

l

blackout actuation caused by a design deficiency. Under-voltage relays in

!

the blackout circuit were designed to pickup at a voltage which was too

high.

The licensee replaced the relays with relays of a icwer pickup

'

'

voltage.

I

11. Chemical and Volume Control (NV) System Operation

On February 3,1988, the Unit 1 diaphram on 1NV-474 ruptured causing a

spill when removing the cation bed demineralizer from service in the NV

system.

Investigation revealed that two steps had been reversed for no

apparent reason during the last procedure change of OP/1/A/6200/01,

Chemical and Volume Control System.

Reversal of the steps caused the NV

system flow to be totally secured while removing the cation bed from

!

service causing possible overpressurization of the low pressure section of

l

the NV system including the mixed bed demineralizers (300 psig design) and

letdown heat exchanger (600 psig design) and causing the 1NV-474 diaphram

i

to rupture. The actual pressure applied to the system is not known. This

event constitutes a violation of TS 6.8.1. for an inadequate procedure and

is another example of violation 369,

370/88-04-02 discussed in

paragraph 9.

!

_ -__ _

_ _ _ _ _ _

-.

. - - _ _ -__ _

_

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION

RN PUMP 1B HEAD CURVES

230

!

i

220 -

- -

- - - - - - -

--

- --~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

m

' ~~

x

~.

w

.

-.

F

210

---

-

-

- - f ~: ' '

-- --- --

---

- - - - - - - - - - -

--

<

86-H-

I

!

~.

S

N

i

._

u

I

,

-

o

200

- - - - - - -

-- f ---- -- - - - - - -

k ;---

- - - - - - - -

- - - - - -

---

'

-

s

F

5

W

88-HEAD

'

l

W

i

r

b

19 0

-t-- ---

- - -- - - - - - - - - f -

- - -

- - -

-t---

- - - - - -

, . , -

RIG HEAD - --- -

I

'

i

<-

o

I

,

N

6

!

\\

i

.

3-

180 -h---- -- --

-

j-

-

- - - - -

'\\

t

-

- -- 87-HE D o

-- --

--

-

-

--

1

- - - -

--;N

o

!

!

'

-

i

i

s

2

l

j

i

-

<z

170 -h -

-

-r-

- - - - - - - - - - - -

-t-

--

- - - --~ - - - - - - - '

-

--- --

s

>

-

Q

!

!

i

N

l

l

'

'

J

'

4

160 -

- - -

-

-- - - - + - -

- - -

- -

- - +

- ---

- - - - *

-- ---- -- c

-

l

H

.

l

'

O

I

\\

F

i

i

!

\\

150

I----

-

- - - I -- -

-

--

---

t------~---

-

'

I

!

i

,

140 - m,, m, nT n n, m , <

m m m ,rrrrr......

crrrrn n rrrrm n rr,rrrrrnT m ,......

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

FLOW (GPM)

- 86 HEAD

8 7--H EAD

88-HEAD

ORIG HEAD

.

,em-