ML20211G092

Rev 14 Proposed ITS Pages,Providing Update for Remaining Open Issues Associated with NRC Review of ITS Submittal

ML20211G092
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/25/1999
From:	DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20211G084	List: ML20211G092 NRC-99-0078, Rev 14 to Application for Amend to License NPF-43,providing Update for Remaining Open Issues Associated with NRC Review of ITS Submittal.Brief Abstract of Changes Included in Rev & Revised Pages for Submittal & Rev Instructions,Included
References
NUDOCS 9908310157
Download: ML20211G092 (60)

Text

-

s' INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 2

Vakune 2

l SECTIONS 1A,2.0&3Af i'

Remove Replace 1.0 ITS pg 1.1-2 Rev 6 1.0 ITS pg 1.1-2 Rev 14 1.0 CTS M/U (1-1) pg 1 of 14 Rev 6 1.0 CTS M/U (1-1) pg i of 14 Rev 14 l

i l

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l cP900310157 990825 PDR ADOCK 05000341 PM p

Rev 14 08/26/99

s' l

Definitions

{

1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued)

{

CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by ob:;arvation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument f

channels measuring the same parameter.

{

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection G

of a simulated or actual signal into the channel l

as close to the sensor as practicable to verify I

h OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required

{

1 u

for channel 0PERABILITY. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of gl sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps.

CORE ALTERATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS:

a.

Movement (including replacement) of source range monitors, local power range monitors,

~~ m.7 intermediate range monitors, traversing incore probes, or special movable detectors; and b.

Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell.

Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position.

(continued) l FERMI - UNIT 2 1.1 2 Revision 14. 08/26/99 1

i

&LC'\\$sLb & I.D O*

nI

,p g e d on l.1 Art.e.

4# DEFINITIONS 4he--fel4ewmg-terms-are-demed-so-that untfer. in\\e. p.etet;en vi ihese Thedefinedtermdappearincapitalizedtypeand

-spes4.f4 cath:: ::y be-nh4eved, M. l' b: applicable throughout these Technical Specifications.*gF]ise.3

.tLa Se5dhh59 shall be that part of a Specification wMeh preser Fes remed ACT10N

-l+ ACTIO em measures-requ4 red under designated fonditions P -Qgec;hed Completwhe5)

%-QQ 1.2 TgAVERAGEfLANAR EXPOSURf shall b pplicable a specift lana eight ~~ [.7 '

i 6y,[BAGE PLARAR EXPOSURE And is equal to the sunfof the e sure of a he fuel r in H specif)ted bundle at'the spg ed_ height d ided by th umber f fuel rods)

Lin the fuel bundlef

[

AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE%

The A"E" ACE."LANAR-t4 HEAR-HEAT-GENERAT-10N-RATEUAPLHGRj) shall be applicab t-t to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the LINEAR ;;;AT all t tvius ia h GENERATt0M-RATES for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the i

'W^8Mid" A specified height divided by the number of fuel ads,1,n the fuel bundle.

^

CHANNEL CALIBRATION-

1. ^d

-1,4~ A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy to known values of the parameter wh4 the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CAllBRATION rtir-n '-fa:I di.., G...n.wi,e d ;1er: ::d/. -

shall encompas s' th:

""'I

~' "". i.n;1.d[the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST The CHANNEL d

• *ALIBRATION may' be performed byVany series of sequential, overlapping or (TMO5 8

C ch;;ni i; ;;litr: ed. / Calibra m n I h total channel steos c :5 th:t & : t'r:of-' instrument channels with resistance I

OM,

. thermocouple sensors sh*44-censist of v:ri-f4eetion of eper:bility ;f the I

w m arv,Iof the r.emaining ad1ust)

)

sensing-e-lement-and-aditr ut.

devices in the channel. [sim

-s conias e of a a mna ee tvtMaNe m

' Y</deTr$NW CHANNEL CHECK

~

of channel behavior

-1.5-A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessmen n shall include, where i

during operation.tj su;erv: tic This determinat M status-with ther possible, comparison of the channel indication aindications and/or stat O

3J ih5er ud ia Q' 6

measuring the same parameter.

w CHANNEL FUNCTIONAt TEST

-1. 6 ANNEL FUNC110NAL TEST shall be&

"*d"#'

J

&\\t deeius A.3 n&j;-;h: nds C e injection of a simulate signal into the channel th m & ckneel

-a.

a as close to the sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITYjn& ding reguindGr Nlu d/^MN""* * "4 *40:? f il "; L isa.

chad b,----Eis4able-channels.---the-4nject4on-of-a4imulated-signti /IWo/ M pef 48tOTY t

to-ver4f v-OpERABRITY 4nc4uding-alarm-and/or-trip functions, The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed byxany series of sequential,

8 "^ ^' i s t *

• tM.

overlapping or total channel steps. " ;L N "nl G272S 0(

endment No. 41 FERMI - UNIT 2-1-1 b*O PAGE 1

0F 14 RdG l' em e ' e

s' INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 4 IVolusse di! SECTIONS 3.3.1.123.3.4.I t _

3:,' l

/ - >

1 Remove Replace 3.3.1.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-7 Rev 6 3.3.1.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-7 Rev 14 3.3.2.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-20 Rev 6 3.3.2.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-20 Rev 14 3.3.3.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 3.3.3.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 14 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 12 3.3.4.1 DOCS pg 2 Rev 14 l

l l

\\

l i

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Rev 14 08/26/99 l

.s 6ptg49 '*

RPS Instrumentation

,b 3.3.1.1 Y

q\\

owl febte 3.3.1.1 1 (pose 1 of 3)

FvMcT10M CTS

{

asector Protection system instrueentetlen 43 CItoss /IEFW i Fou@ed I 3 14 AceLicA.LE co mir: oms v

Ml2Es On aEEllaED REFEaENCED g

CTita CIIAalNELs Fatpl 2 '2 '!,/

SPEctFIED Pts TalP REGulaED sLRVE!LLAllCE ALLO W8LE FLacTION CONDIflONs SYSTEM ACTIcel D.1 afeUIntstENTs s..;;/.9 &

OM-l 1.

Intermediate aanse

'I

~

C BR 3.3.1.1.1 I'3*I.! b 8

Itentters sa 3.3.1.1.4 divisters of.

sa 3.3.1.1.6 futt scale

==Ie sa 3.3.1.1.7 l'I'! I I e.

Neutron fluu.Nish sa 3.3.1.1.S 11 sa 3.3.1.1.15 igg /,g 5(83 sa 3.3.1.1.1 s

sa 3.3.1.1.5 Il divistens of sa 3.3.1.1 futL scale o

sa 3.3.1.1.15 b.

Insp 2

C se 3.3.1.1.6 NA 3* 3.l -i) lb 3

sa 3.3.1.1.15 5(83 2

sa 3.3.1.1.5 NA 8

sa 3.3.. 15 2.

-,ese Peuer aanse a,,y

! ! !+p5 P'#

@Q Aver-.

2 8'

• yg"=

3q p

- 3.3.i.i.7 A

s sa 3.3.1.1.

Sa 3.3.1.1.

sa 3.3.1.1.

(.3 (vl 4 W) H.43 */.

m

b. {Munr44Mstrastated 1

f J ;

3.5... ". 7 s Thermen Peuer.M sa 3.3.1.1.2

+ W it RTP and 2,.

I sa 3.3.1.1.3 s(115.5g1 NP$ lek sa 3.3.1.1.8 afp(b) 2 T

• T ~.T L." ~ ^

._l;- f -

' h ~ ' ' '^ '

• • • • [

e >+1+rfD (continued)

(e) With.ny control red withdrenet from o core cell contelning one or more fuel esseenties.

A O ^ ~^ 2:**'edian reset for einste leap operetten per Leo 3.4.1, aecirculotten Leops (bs '-.'",,e.!! ".

F r"rt")

=

w ist d W = o /..

,etio,..

/

4W=.s% on Ng u

(t) Each MRM cka*\\ frondt's InPuh h bo# kip QM f (F..uotcK,)

BWR/4 STS 3.3-7 Rev 1, 04/07/95

@EV' k ff hv G l

l Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 Table 3.3.2.1 1 (page 1 of 1) f$

Controt Rod Stock Instrumentation

[( T8Ls s 2.3. I,-1J 7 3. G-2.]

tr. 34 -l ))

AP,L: Caste noots on OfNER SPECIFIED REGUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE nalCTioM CcWIT!aus CNANNEL:

RfaUIREE NT:

VALUE 1.

tod Block Monitor g

j;j;jpgggj(%,4

- r-

~ ~"

a 3.l. Lt.3)

Intermosti to Pouer (b

p2 M 3.3.2.1/1 s (199.7/1 3 OP.I li'.1:t ti!"' '

'~

ich P.uer Le (c),(d)

(23 st 3.2.1.1 5 11.9/1251 c.

k

.3.2.1.4 di siens of 3.3.2.1.7 f L acetej k.

[ Insp SR 3.3.2.1 MA g

io1$PtLih t d in klo' l&

~

g4

!ii:;g ut 4

TBts, l

scot l bg 1.t.

g cy.... ii sei.,

3y,.;.;.;

c2.y n7 e

t.>.t.,

a

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.ini.a.,

ie,#

gig g

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MiliiOJ

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l (TBts 16 7) gm s itch-shut 4

a 3.3.2.1 3.

e.

30 (5. I A. 3. * >

L

[(T8L5.3.(,-1,*)l$

x Lind e e ss)mTP F -

'"3

(.)

TNennu Pawa

,i.ux,TPg.1.7.].

r u v.3.cr-i,O m,,,, L k

(c) muat we>f I and e 90% RTP and a 1.7c THERMAL PtWER 90% PTP and teEPR 4 1.

Ge). NRMAL POWER t [13 and e 905 RTP apdMCPR e 1.h With TNERNAL P.WER s g0p tTP.

, l, Y. l, [/Pp/.'mfr.'f/

)

(p

...ct.,

e..ii.n in ts.. nut ition.

(n t 3 3 6 -> /A 7 )

BWR/4 STS 3.3-20 Rev 1, 04/07/95 R e v M ll Revlo I

i l

l l

e DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.3.1. PAM INSTRUMENTATION A.5 CTS Table 4.3.7.5 1 footnote # states that the provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable. This is not required in ITS 3.3.3.1 because any potential confusion concerning when the surveillance is. required is eliminated by specifying the precise 7

requirements for performance of the Surveillance such that an explicit exception to 4.0.4 is not necessary. The ITS SR 3.3.3.1.2 Note 2 h

modifies the Frequency such that it is "Not required to be performed Q

until 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for one channel and 7 days for the second channel after >

I 15% RTP." This is an administrative change with no impact on safety.

TECHNICAL CHA N C MORE RESTRICTIVE None TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE

" Generic" LR.1 CTS Table 3.3.7.5-1. Action 81, requires that with the Operable channels less than the minimum required, initiate the preplanned alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter (s) within "3

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and restore the inoperable channel within 7 days. ITS 3.3.3.1, Action C, requires the channel restored within 7 days, but does not require the preplanned alternate method of monitoring to be initiated within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. This is acceptable because the requirement to initiate an alternate monitoring plan does not impact the requirement to restore the channel within 7 days.

k Furthermore, the probability of an accident during the allowed s

repair time is minimal. Regulatory control of changes to this requirement (e.g., Technical Specification amendment or 10 CFR 50.59) is not necessary to provide adequate protection of the I

public health and safety since the requirement for post accident instrument channel Operability and actions for inoperable instrumentation, continues to be required by the Technical l

Specifications.

1 1

l FERMI - UNIT 2 2

REVISION 14, 08/26/99l a

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.4.1 - AWS-RPT INSTRUMENTATION A.4 For CTS Specification 3.3.4 (and ITS 3.3.4.1). the AWS RPT system instrumentation is interpreted to include the actuated device (s).

Each instrumentation channel (reactor water level and reactor pressure) ultimately provides signals that can result 1.n all four breakers tripping. Therefore, any inoperable breaker is s

necessarily associated with both trip systems being inoperable.

I For the case of an inoperable AWS-RPT breaker CTS 3.3.4 Action e does not allow inoperable channels to be placed in trip, but required both trip systems be restored or the plant to shutdown.

Due to the reformatting to ITS, where multiple Condition entry applies, and the ITS presentation of Action A for any number of inoperable channels, the ITS option for tripping channels must be

\\

taken exception to in order to conform to CTS requirements. Since l

ITS Action A can apply to one or many inoperable channels, the Note to Required Action A.2 is provided to direct a restoration requirement (and preclude a channel tripping allowance) in the event of an inoperable trip breaker. This explicit limitation is only a clarification of the requirements that would be imposed by C

compliance with CTS 3.3.4 requirements. The changes to the time 3

allowed to restore the inoperable breaker / channels are addressed by DOC L.1.

Therefore, this change only reflects a presentation

. _.y) clEffication necessitated by the ITS format.

~

~ ~~

A.5 CTS 4.3.4.2 requires an LSFT "and simulated automatic operation" of all channels. The simulated automatic operation is interpreted in the CTS to be included in the LSFT, since the CTS LSFT definition " includes the actuated device." ITS SR 3.3.4.1.4 n

O requires an LSFT but explicitly states " including breaker

]

actuation." Since the ITS LSFT definition is revised to exclude g

the actuated device (refer to Section 1.0), explicitly adding g

" breaker actuation" captures the CTS requirement. This clarification is an administrative presentation preference only.

A.6 CTS Table 3.3.41, Note (*), allows required surveillance testing "without placing the trip system of the tripped condition provided the other channel in the same trip function is OPERABLE." ITS SR Note 2 provides the same allowance stated as " entry into the associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed provided the associated Function maintains trip capability." This represents consistency in presentation with other Specifications, and as such, is considered an administrative change.

J FERMI UNIT 2 2

REVISION 14 08/26/99l

f INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 5

/ s *4 L Volume 5:l SECTIONS 3.3.5.D3.3.8.23

~

~

• Remove Replace 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 14 i

3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 14 j

B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 14 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 17 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-17 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-24) pg 2 of 8 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 CTS hW (3/4 3-24) pg 2 of 8 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 3 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 DOCS pg 4 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 NUREG WU pg 3.3-42 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-42 Rev 14 l

3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-44 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-44 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-45 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-45 Rev 14 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-112 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-112 Rev 14 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-119 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-119 Rev 14 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 6 Rev 12 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 6 Rev 14 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 7 Rev 12 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 7 Rev 14 3.3.6.2 DOCS pg 8 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-65 Rev 13 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-65 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-66 Rev 6 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-66 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-67 Rev 6 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-67 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-68 Rev 14 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-4 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-4 Rev 14 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-5 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-5 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg 1 Rev 12 3.3.6.3 DOCS pg i Rev 14 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-67 Rev 13 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-67 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg 3.3-67 (Insert) Rev 14 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3 201 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-20i Rev 14 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-202 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-202 Rev 14 B 3.3 6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-202 (Insert) Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-202 (Insert) Rev 14 1

B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3 203 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 NUREG M/U pg B 3.3-203 Rev 14 j

1 Rev 14 08/26/99

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 6)

Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation

. - -. - ~ _ _ _. _ _ - _ _ _

MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE 1.

Core Spray System a.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3.

4(b)

B SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a),$(a)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b.

Drywell 1.2.3 4(b)

B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 Q

c. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 4

C SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 441 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 A

(In #ction Permissive)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 L12 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 4(a),$(a) 4 B

SR 3.3.5.1.1

= 441 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 Aw

. d." ~ Manual Initiation 1.2.3.

2(c)

C SR-3.3.5.1.6 NA

{

4(a)5(a) 2.

Low Pressure Coolant In #ction (LPCI) System a.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4

B SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a),$(a)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)

(a) When associated sLbsystem(s) of LCO 3.5.2 are required to be OPERABLE.

p (b) Also required to initiate the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG).

f e4 (c) Individual component controls.

J J FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 41 Revision 14 08/26/99

E ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1

)

Table 3.3.5.1 1 (page 3 of 6)

.,j Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SlRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE RMCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE

\\A 2.

LPCI System (continued) i h.

Manual Initiation 1.2.3.

2(C)

C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 4(a)5(a) 3.

High Pressure Coolant Injection (WCI) System

^

a.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.

4 B

SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 103.8 Level - Low Low.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l

Level 2 2(d). 3(d, SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b.

Drywell 1.

4 B

SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l

2(d). 3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.

2 C

SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 219 inches Level-High. Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ol 2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 g

SR 3.3.5.1.5

)

d. Condrisate Storage 1.

2 D

SR 3.3.5.1.1

= 0 inches Tank Level-Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 (l

2(d), 3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 e.

Suppression Pool Water 1.

2 D

SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 5.0 inches Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 Nl 2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) m N

g (a) When the associated subsystem (s) are required to be OPERABLE.

M (c) Individual couponent controls.

] l (d) With reactor steam done pressure > 150 psig.

1

,./

_ l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 43 Revision 14 08/26/99

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 j

i Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 6)

I Emergency Core Cooling System Instrutentation APPLICABli CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE y

3.

IPCI System (continued) g f.

Manual Initiation 1

1(C)

C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 2(d),3(d) 4.

Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A

'l a.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.

2 E

SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 Level - Low Low Low.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l

Level 1 2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l

b.

Drywell 1.

2 E

SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l

2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 j

c.

Automatic 1.

1 F

SR 3.1.5.1.2 s 117 seconds Depressurization SR 3.3.5.1.4 l

System Initiation 2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.5

N

~

Timer-d d.

Reactor Vessel Water 1.

1 E

SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 171.9 Level-Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches ll (Confirmatory) 2(d),3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l

e.

Core Spray P mp 1,

1 per pump F

SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 125 psig Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2

\\l I

Pressure - High 2(d), 3(d)

SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 G

(continued) d (c) Individual cog onent controls.

)

I G l (d) With reactor steam dame pressure > 150 psig.

E

\\

I e

J l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 44 Revision 14 08/26/99

I ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LC0. and APPLICABILITY (continued) analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref.1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of i

the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equi > ment in the low pressure ECCS. but high enough to ensure tlat the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.d. 2.h.

Manual Initiation

\\n The Manual Ini.tiatio.n c.hannel provides manual-initiation-

~~ ~,<

~__ ~.s~"" t is one manual initiation channel for each of the CS and LPCI subsystems (i.e., two for CS and two for LPCI).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

c r4 4

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the individual components. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE Y..

when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1 l

l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1-10 Revision 14 08/26/99 j

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES. LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level-High function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can 3reclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to

C0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

y 3.f.

Manual Initiation

(

The Manual Initiation channel provides manual initiation

• k capability by means of individual component controls. There N

is one manual initiation channel for the HPCI System.

N The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of 7

the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the C

channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of individual controls. The Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI

~

System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

-.n.~,+

n Automatic Deoressurization System 4.a. 5.a.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low.

Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1.

The core cooling function of the ECCS.

along with the scram action of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of I

l FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1 -17 Revision 14 08/26/99 i

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FERMI UNIT 2 3/4 3-24

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enrtar Ph4R RAI G 5' PAGE A 0F 08

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Rev G )

3 1

8 cv 14 I w

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 - ECCS INSTRUMENTATION A.9 CTS 4.3.3.3 requires ECCS Response Time testing however, the

]

details of the testing acceptance criteria are located in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM): outside of Technical Specifications. Since the ECCS response time acceptance criteria includes testing only the ECCS system response (and utilizing assumed values for the ECCS instrumentation response), the 1

required Surveillance is more appropriately required in the ECCS Specification, ITS 3.5.1.

This change is a presentation preference only with no technical change or change in intent.

Refer to Section 3.5 for further discussion of any changes from the CTS presentation.

A.10 CTS Table 3.3.31 Actions 30.a 31. and 33, as they apply to inoperable ADS actuation channels, result in options to declare 7

associated ADS Trip System inoperable.

(Note: refer to DOC L.1 D

for discussion of CTS change from declaring ECCS inoperable to declaring ADS trip system inoperable for CTS Action 30.a.).

The CTS actions would then transfer to Action c of CTS 3.3.3, and provide additional time for restoration.

ITS 3.3.5.1 Actions E l

and G combine these restoration times for clarity. Any technical m

changes are addressed in other discussions of change. The revised prEie'ntation preference is an administrative change with no impact on safety. { Note also that CTS Action 30.b (converted to ITS 7

Required Action E.1) does not transfer to CTS Action c for additional time; it declares the ADS valves inoperable and 3

transfers Actions to LCO 3.5.1.

The ITS 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time of g

Required Action E.1 matches the CTS Action 30.b time, and the ITS g

RequiredActionG.1matchesthetransferofActionstoLC03.5.1.}

A.11 CTS 4.3.3.2 requires an 18 month LSFT of all ECCS Instrumentation channels (which would include ADS Manual Inhibit function). CTS Table 4.3.3.1-1. Item 4.1, also required an 18 month Channel Functional Test of the ADS manual Inhibit function.

ITS Table 3.3.5.11 only requires the LSFT (SR 3.3.5.1.5) for this a

function. The Channel Functional Test for this function is e

adequately encompassed by the LSFT performance. Eliminating a g

reference to performing a Channel Functional Test is therefore an oc administrative change that eliminates a duplicative test.

/

FERMI - UNIT 2 3

REVISION 14 08/26/99l

1

)

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.5.1 - ECCS INSTRUMENTATION j

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 CTS Table 3.3.31 Actions 30.a and 32 allow the trip system associated with inoperable channels to be tripped to comply with the required action, and thereby allowing continued operation.

ITS 3.3.5.1 Required Action C.2 does not allow this option: but rather requires that inoperable channels be restored to Operable status.

If inoperable channels are not restored ITS 3.3.5.1 Action G would be entered, requiring the associated ECCS features lk to be declared inoperable. The Functions associated with these required actions are functions that perform a dual role (where tripping the trip system would: 1) not be clear what direction to trip to, and 2) result in the affected system continuing to be in an inoperable state) or functions that would inappropriately start the affected system. Therefore, tripping the associated trip system is replaced with the more appropriate " restore channel to OPERABLE status" otherwise declare associated ECCS features inoperable.

M.2 CTS Table 3.3.31 Actions 31, 33, and 34 allow 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to restore inoperable channels, regardless of whether the associated HPCI or

_s _ _,

ADS function is inoperable in both hivisions (resulting in a~ loss ~

~~ ~

~

of that ECCS function). For certain specified inoperabilities n

that result in a loss of initiation function. ITS 3.3.5.1 Required d

Actions D.1 and F.1 (and associated Notes) provide a more lg restrictive time of "I hour from discovery of loss of [HPCI/ ADS]

v initiation capability" to restore or declare the associated ECCS function inoperable. This provides a more appropriate action that will not adversely impact safety.

M.3 CTS Table 3.3.31 Note (a), allows required surveillance testing which causes channels to be inoperable without taking Actions for inoperable channels "provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter." ITS SR Note 2 provides the same intended allowance by stating " entry into the g

associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function l@

or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability." In 3

the case of some trip Functions literal compliance with the CTS allowance may not ensure trip capability remains (i.e., a single channel that is monitoring the parameter will not produce an initiation signal: the logic is 2 out of 2). This represents a j

more restrictive change, which has no significant impact on safety.

FERMI - UNIT 2 4

REVISION 14 08/26/99l

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 o,\\

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seersency Core Casting systee Instruonntation

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ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1

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ECCS In$trumentation 3.3.5.1 9.\\

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C, Emersency Care Coating systes instrumentation U (Mf I J,13./

j M.4-1 APPLICABLE CC 33fl0Ns uOnes ca aseUInes a:FratuCro pgg g OTWa CMuutLs Patut sPsCIFIED PER aseulaED suaWEILLANCE atanuant PlaICTION CONDITIOus PUNCTION ACTION A.1 afeUlaEnENTF VALUE 3.

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ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1

7.h.

Manual Initiation I

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, and The Manual Initiationairtrcimnw. channel 'ntr c-einnals APPLICABILITY 4=+c th:.;;r:; & t: Ecce 'acie

+a-provi h5 anual initiation i

(continued) capability and sea eadnad a+ +a +ka m u + =- 4M ret::t he for each of the 4attr - 9 *+4a=

There is one pu b9 rMk*bndMdu CSanJdP4 subsystems (i.e..twoforCSandtwoforLPCI).

o

..m.,

i cqoua4 ccwho k LmamaA tMalimShanMA The Manuai Ininauon tuncuan is no sumed in any accident or transient analyses in th AR. However, the.

Function is retained for overall red ancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the h plant licensin,jL, basi w:ndan{ bon iS

)

w There is no Al ow e a ue o h s -unction since the channels are chanically actuated based solely on the T

position of...;. ;rM;tt:::. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function dr- ^ -? n ";=^ - ) is only required to be OPERABLE when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LC0 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

vw 2.

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-low (Recirculation Discharce Valve Permissive)

Low rea steam done pressure signals are used s permissives r recirculation discharge valve osure. This ensures that t LPCI subsystems inject in he proper RPV location assumed the safety analysis.

he Reactor Steam 7.

l Dome Pressure 5 Low one of the Func ns assumed ~to be'

' ~ " " "

1 OPERABLE and capable o losing the alve during the p,gg([7

>,/ function of the ECCS, along the scram action of the I

transients analyzed in Re rence and 3.

The core cooling Bs'5 5tf-RPS, ensures that the fuel a

ladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 C 50.46. The Reactor Steam Dome J

Pressure-Low Functio s directly used in the analysis of the recirculatio ine break (Ref.

The Reactor 5 m Dome Pressure-Low signal re initiated DQ i

from four p sure transmitters that sense the eactor done la J pressure The lowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valve se prior to connencement of LPCI injection flow into h ore, as assumed in the safety analysis.

(continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-112 Rev I, 04/07/95 l

0E\\f I A {

/$5V /2 -

ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE

.f.

Hioh Pressure Coolant Iniection Pume Discharae SAFETY ANALYSES. Flow-tow (Byou's) (continued)

LCO, and j

I APPLICABILITY The High P essure Coolant Injecti Pump Discharge Flow-w h Allowab Value is high enough t ensure that pump flo rate I%

is suf cient to protect the p p, yet low enough to nsure

.k that he closure of the mini m flow valve is init ted to

' all full flow into the c e.

e channal is required o be OPERABLE when t HPCI is j

equired to be OPERABL. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI M

3.

anual Initiation I

y g nj The Manual initiation push bu n channel intred.ce M anals on.a-M

.inta t h PPCI h;ic te provid anual initiation capability f

=d u =:=e=u

....mm ;==m (orWpo8Hi inst.

....i.iiun.

There is one-

. L.;;en for the HPCI (ntkm I.S System.

gj & fiedcluhtnd)

The Manual Initiation Function is n sumed in any 4

accident or transient analyses in it R.

However, the Function is retained for overall rec ancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by_the_.NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Valve for thTs Function since the J

channel is mechanically "ctuated based solely Jn the position of tin ;=h b;_ =. M W c.il-Ae Manual

~.. -,,.

Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

Automatic Deoressuriration System 4.a. 5.a.

Reactor Vessel Water level-tow Low low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability'to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives i

one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level I is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed (continued)

BWR/4 STS B 3.3-119 Rev I, 04/07/95 8 6\\/ N

[

'~

SEV lb

1 o

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.2 - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION TECHNICAL CHANGES - LESS RESTRICTIVE

Speci fic" L.1 CTS Table 3.3.2-1 and Table 4.3.2.1 1. Function 6.a. requires that the reactor vessel water level Function be Operable (in addition

' to other specified conditions) when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment and during Core Alterations.

ITS Table 3.3.6.2-1 Function 1 eliminates the handling fuel and Core Alterr, tion Applicabilities for the reactor vessel water level Function (but retains the other Applicabilities consistent with

{

the CTS). The reactor vessel low level Function only actuates in the event of a vessel draindown event (i.e., an event initiated as a result of an operation with a potential for draining the reactor i

vessel). Reactor vessel water level Function is not assumed to actuate to provide secondary isolation for any event that is postulated to occur during core alterations or fuel handling (which is performed with the reactor cavity flooded). Therefore, this is a less restrictive change with no impact on safety.

L.2 Inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation affects two aspects of Secondary Containment Integrity - the secondary containment isolation valves (SCIVs) and the standby gas treatment (SGT) system. CTS 3.3.2 Actions b.1 and c for inoperable secondary containment isolation instrumentation direct entry into CTS Table 3.3.2-1 Actions 24 and 27.

In the case of CTS 3.3.2 Action b.1 there is an allowance for a 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> delay (changed to 12 or 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in the ITS. see DOC LC.1) before taking Action 24 or

27. CTS Table 3.3.2-1. Action 24 for inoperable secondary j

containment isolation instrumentation, requires Secondary 4

Containment Integrity be established with the SGT system operating I

within one hour. Action 27 is similar, except that it provides an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> allowar.ce to restore manual initiation capability (refer to DOC A.6 for a discussion of this allowance). Actions 24 and 27 are applicable at times when the Secondary Containment Integrity is already required by CTS 3.6.5.1.

Therefore, it is not necessary to explicitly repeat the requirement to establish Secondary Containment Integrity.

i FERMI UNIT 2 6

REVISION 14 08/26/99l w

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.2 - SECONDARY CONTAINMEN'T ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION L.2 (continued)

If one secondary containment isolation instrumentation trip system is affected by the inoperable instrumentation (i.e., CTS 3.3.2 Action b.1), Secondary Containment Integrity would not be lost because the otbr trip system would still be available to close its SCIVs. In this case, the restoration of the SCIV portion of Secondary Containment Integrity would require no action for compliance with CTS 3.3.2 or ITS 3.3.6.2, and therefore no change is introduced. (Note however, the Actions for inoperable SCIVs would apply.) This aspect is discussed within this less restrictive change DOC for completeness.

If both trip systems were affected by the inoperable instronentation (i.e., CTS 3.3.2, Action c) Secondary Containment Integrity would be lost because both divisions of SCIVs would be affected. In this case, the CTS Table 3.3.2-1 actions would require establishing Secondary Containment Integrity within one hour, which for SCIVs is equivalent to ITS Required Action C.1.1 (e.g., Secondary Containment Integrity was affected by the 3

inoperable instrumentation resulting in a loss of isolation J

capability -- isolating the penetrations will restore it).

y i

ITS Required Action C.1.2 provides an alternative to isolating the k

secondary containment.

If isolation capability is maintained k

j (i.e., at least one trip system has the minimum required channels l

operable), declaring the affected SCIVs inoperable would place you j

in ITS 3.6.4.2, Required Action A.1, which allows 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> to j

isolate the penetration. This is equivalent to the CTS since Secondary Containment Integrity would not be lost.

If isolation capability is lost (i.e., both trip systems affected), ITS 3.3.6.2. Required Action B allows I hour to restore isolation capability.

If this is not achieved, Required Action C.1.2 would allow declaring the affected SCIVs inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ITS 3.6.4.2, Required Action B.1 would then allow 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to isolate i

the affected penetrations for a total of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> from the time the instrumentation was declared inoperable until the penetrations are isolated, restoring Secondary Containment Integrity. This less restrictive change (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> versus 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />) is acceptable because of the relatively brief time involved, the minimal probability of an event during this time, and any remaining manual capabilities that remain to effect the isolation.

.)

FERMI UNIT 2 7

REVISION 14 08/26/99l

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.2 - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION L.2 (continued)

As for the CTS requirement to establish SGT operating. CTS Table 3.3.2-1 Actions 24 and 27 require starting the affected SGT subsystem (s) within one hour.

ITS Required Action C.2.1 provides this same requirement. However, instead of starting the affected SGT subsystem (s), Required Action C.2.2 provides a less restrictive option to allow declaring the affected SGT subsystem (s) inoperable. The action to initiate the associated SGT subsystem is the compensatory action for losing the automatic initiation instrumentation for that subsystem. Taking that action i

allows for unlimited continued operation. Declaring the affected SGT subsystem (s) inoperable avoids placing the SGT subsystem (s) in operation but limits the time you are allowed to operate (7 days for one subsystem, immediate shutdown for two subsystems) under this provision. These actions are the same as the actions in CTS 3.6.5.3 for the SGT system. Under the CTS, if you take the g

actions in CTS 3.6.5.3 for inoperable SGT subsystem (s). Secondary tc Containment Integrity would be maintained. Therefore, under the CTS there would not be any additional action required to restore" Secondary Containment Integrity. Since there are accepted safe actions in the CTS for loss of a SGT subsystem function which still allow for the secondary containment to be considered

' TCi~

Operable. allowing these;same actions will continue to ensure-

-~

continued safe operation when the impact on the secondary containment function is solely due to instrumentation that effects the automatic start of SGT system. Therefore, this less restrictive change (not starting the affected SGT subsystem (s))

will have a negligible impact on safety.

RELOCATED SPECIFICATIONS i

None TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES The CTS Bases for this Specification have been replaced by Bases that reflect the format and applicable content of ITS 3.3.6.2 consistent with the BWR STS, NUREG 1433 Rev. 1.

FERMI -' UNIT 2 8

REVISION 14 08/26/99l

LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3

)

3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.3 Low Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.6.3 The LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. and 3.

ACTIONS C0WITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A.

One LLS valve A.1 Restore channel (s) to 14 days inoperable due to OPERABLE status, ineperable channel (s).

(continued)

-_~~

.)

^

l ' FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 65 Revision 14 08/26/99

i LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3

]

ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME h

M B.

NOTE---------

B.1 Restore one tailpipe 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Separate Condition pressure switch for entry is allowed for 11 OPERABLE SRVs to each SRV.

OPERABLE STATUS.

MQ One or more safety /

relief valves (SRVs)

B.2 Restore one tailpipe 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> with one or more pressure switch in Function 3 channel (s) each Division for an inoperable.

OPERABLE SRV in the lowest setpoint group, to OPERABLE status.

MQ

............ NOTE -- - --- -

LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable.

B.3 Restore both tailpipe Prior to pressure switches for entering H0DE 2

^

11 OPERABLE SRVs.

or 3 from H0DE 4 including 4 of 5 OPERABLE SRVs with Y

the lowest relief v

setpoints, to OPERABLE status.

C.

Required Action and C.1 Be in H00E 3.

12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A MQ or B not met.

C.2 Be in H0DE 4.

36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> E

Two LLS valves inoperable due to inoperable channels.

)

l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 66 Revision 14 08/26/99 C

9 LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMEfffS

.....................................N0TE-------

Refer to Table 3.?.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

31 days 3

SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 31 days gl portion of the channel outside primary C

containment.

SR 3.3.6.3.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

18 months N,

SR 3.3.6.3._4_ Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

18 months s

[ l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 67 Revision 14 08/26/99

LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 Table 3.3.6.3 1 (page 1 of 1)

Low Low Set Instrunentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE 1.

Reactor Steam Dame Pressure-High 1 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 s 1113 psig SR 3.3.6.3.3 SR 3.3.6.3.4 2.

Low Low Set Pressure Setpoints 2 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 Low:

SR 3.3.6.3.3 Open s 1037 psig SR 3.3.6.3.4 Close (a)

High:

9 Open s 1067 psig o

Close (a) bl 3.

Tailpipe Pressure Switch 2 per SRV SR 3.3.6.3.2

= 25 psig and SR 3.3.6.3.3 s 35 psig (g

SR 3.3.6.3.4 (a) = 100 psi below actual opening setpoint

.,r -,w x - % -,

-,m., -

s - m.t.

w.

J A l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3-68 Revision 14, 08/26/99

9 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3

]

BASES APPLICABILITY The LLS instrumentation is recuired to be OPERABLE in KODES 1, 2, and 3 since consicerable energy is in the nuclear system and the SRVs may be needed to provide pressure relief. If the SRVs are needed.-then the LLS function is required to ensure that the primary containment design basis is maintained. In MODES 4 and 5. the reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be a)proached by assumed operational transients or accidents.

T1us, LLS instrumentation and associated pressure relief is not required.

ACTIONS AJ The failure of any reactor steam done pressure instrument channel to provide the arming, SRV opening and closing pressure set)oints for an individual LLS valve does not affect the a)ility of the other LLS SRV to perform its LLS function. A LLS valve.is OPERABLE if the associated logic has one Function'l channel, two Function 2 channels, and at least three Function 3 channels OPERABLE. Therefore, 14

. _../.A_

days is provided to restore the inoperable channel (s) to OPERABLE status (Required Action A.1).

If the inoperable channel (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action could result in an instrumented LLS valve actuation. The 14 day Completion Time is considered a)propriate because of the redundancy in the design (two L.5 valves are provided and any one LLS valve can perform the LLS function) and the very low probability of multiple LLS instrumentation channel failures, which renders the remaining LLS SRV inoperable,

-p occurring together with an event requiring the LLS function during the 14 day Completion Time.

l B.1. B.2. and B.3 Although the LLS circuitry is designed so that operation of a single tailpi>e pressure switch will result in arming both LLS logics: eac1 tailpipe pressure switch provides an input to both LLS logics. Since any overpressure event will normally open at least five SRVs and actuate their associated pressure switch inputs, the LLS logic and

-instrumentation remains capable of performing its safety function even with several SRV tailpipe pressure switch

)

l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.3-4 Revision 14, 08/26/99

1 LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued) instrument channels inoperable. Therefore. it is acceptable f

for plant operation to continue provided that within 24 (M,$

i hours, per Required Action B.1 and B.2. verification and/or I

restoration is made to ensure at least:

a) one tailpipe

{

l pressure switch in each Division OPERABLE on' one OPERABLE w

l N

SRV in the lowest SRV setpoint group: and b) at least 11 i

OPERABLE SRVs have at least one OPERABLE tailpipe pressure lm switch. Therefore, it is acceptable for plant operation to-4 continue even with only one tailpipe pressure switch I

D OPERABLE on each SRV. However, this is only acceptable i

jD provided each LLS valve is OPERABLE.

(Refer to Required Action A.1 and C.1 Bases).

I Required Action B.3 requires restoration of both tailpipe l

pressure switches on = 11 OPERABLE SRVs. including 4 SRVs s

out of the 5 lowest relief setpoint OPERABLE SRVs. to I

s OPERABLE status, prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4.

This will ensure that sufficient switches are OPERABLE at the beginning of a reactor startup (this is because the switches are not accessible during plant operation). The p

Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action could result in an inadvertent LLS valve actuation. As noted. LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. thus allowing entry into MODE 1 or 2 from MODE 2 or 3 with i

inoperable channels. This allowance is needed since the channels only have to be repaired prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 3 from MODE 4.

A Note has been provided in the Condition to modify the Required Actions and Completion Times conventions related to LLS Function 3 channels. Section 1.3. Completion Times.

e specifies that once a Condition has been entered. subsequent O

divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within g

limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LLS Function 3 channels provide appropriate compensatory f

measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each SRV with inoperable tailpipe pressure switches.

B 3.3.6.3 - 5 Revision 14 08/26/99 l FERMI UNIT 2 E

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 3.3.6.3 - LLS INSTRUMENTATION ADMINISTRATIVE A.1 In the conversion of the Fermi 2 current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the proposed plant specific Improved Technical Specifications (ITS), certain wording preferences or conventions are adopted which do not result in technical changes (either actual or interpretational). Editorial changes, reformatting, and revised numbering are adopted to make the ITS consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications NUREG 1433, Rev. 1.

A.2 ITS 3.3.6.3 SR Note is included as a clarification of the ITS presentation of SRs: specifying that ITS Table 3.3.6.31 be referred to determine which SRs apply for each Function. As such, its inclusion is an administrative presentation preference.

TECHNICAL CHANGES - MORE RESTRICTIVE M.1 CTS 3.4.2.2 requires Operability. Surveillances, and Action limitations for the LLS reactor pressure actuation I

~

iriitrumentation. The arming" instrumentation for the LLS Function (reactor pressure and SRV tail pipe pressure) is not addressed in the CTS requirements for the LLS Function. ITS Table 3.3.6.3 includes Function 1 and 3 for these arming" Functions. These additional requirements include Operability, Surveillance, and Action requirements.

In the case of the SRV tail-pipe arming Function, the ITS 3.3.6.3 Action B is provided, and is based on maintaining a high degree of reliability for the I

supporting function, while minimizing the potential for any unnecessary forced shutdown. Since opening any one of 15 SRVs l

will suffice to arm both LLS valves, the actions allow for continued operation with multiple inoperable tail pipe pressure 7s channels. The Actions include requirements to ensure that within

'Dg 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />s: a) a minimum of one tail pipe pressure channel in each division associated with 1 of the 5 lowest set Operable SRVs (to D

and b) Y assure arming in the event just the lowest set SRVs lift):

at least 11 Operable SRVs have at least 1 Operable tail pipe switch. Additionally, Required Action B.3 is provided to ensure a M significant number (at least 11 of 15) have both tail-pipe-N pressure switches Operable, including 4 of the 5 lowest set SRVs, md on any reactor startup from Mode 4.

?,

J FERMI UNIT 2 1

REVISION 14, 08/26/99l

LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6.3 Low Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation

}

LC0 3.3.6.3 The LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

ff APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1. 2. and 3.

Q lNSE7LT SS 6.S~ l I

(

L.k ACTIONS-

/

fREQUIREDACTION COMPLETION TIME Y

CONDITION I4 days hCW h A.

One LLS valve A.1 Restore channel (s) to 34:M5Urr inoperable due to OPERABLE status, inoperable channel (s).

(4c M.1)

I h '_

T--.

--. NOTE--

& // operasts.5%

B.

One or more saf

/

i with on Functio M0.

LCO 3.0.4 is not inc64dmq 4 4.f.

relief valves (

applicable.

g p,gg gg g, g;4 channel noperable.

& lowest rslied-

_m.

- - ~ -

6.3 Restore pipe Prior to Q6@d6' n,

yntg pressure switches o entering MODE 2 OPERABLE status.

or 3 from MODE 4 DolM.lh C

Res re one ta' pipe

[14 days

%........ NOTE Separate Condition pr(ssure swit to 0 ERABLE sta us.

entry is allowed for I

g..... {

.......j each S h

0 or mor S/RVs 4th o Func on 3 hannel inopera e.

l (continued)

BWR/4 STS 3.3 67 Rev 1. 04/07/95 Rev W m Rey a \\\\

RCJ (o \\

LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 Insert 3.3.6.3-1 B.1 Restore one tailpipe pressure 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> switch for 11 OPERABLE SRVs to OPERABLE STATUS.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> B.2 Restore one tailpipe pressure switch in each Division for an OPERABLE SRV in the lowest setpoint group, to OPERABLE status.

.naru FERMI - UNIT 2 Page 3.3-67 (Insert)

REVISION 14, 08/26/99

LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES APPLICABILITY approached by assumed operational transients or accidents.

%/

(continued)

Thus, LLS instrumentation and associated pressure relief is not required.

ACTIONS Note: Certain LCO Completion Ti ed on

)

Y approved top rts. In

/ \\ the times, the li theCompletionTimesas[

censee to use require s aff Safety Evalua un b r*

the AI The failure of any reactor steam dome pressure instrument channel to provide the arming, S/RV opening and closing pressure setpoints for an individual LLS valve does not affect the ability of the other LLS S/RVWto perform ps LLS function. A LLS valve is OPERABLE ff the associated logic, ';.;.. 'n't ".), has one Function I channel, two Function z cnannels, ane'three Function 3 channels OPERABLE.

m_Therefore.# !.__.; is provided to restore the inoperable Q4 dais.) channel (s) to OPERABLE status (Required Action A.1). If the inoperable channel (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status

?.3 within the allowable out of service time, Condition FTsust C be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required O,

Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action could result in an instrumented LLS valve actuation.

)

_Thef !.__. Completion Time is considered appropriate be s

47 Decause of the redundancy in the design (fevFLL5 valves are provided and any one LLS valve can perform the LLS function) and the very low channel failures, probability of multiple LLS instrumentation whichrendertheremainingLLSS/RVg.

inoperable, occurring together with an event requiring the kh3 I""CN ""i {ng the { :... y ompletion Timegg du

g ;;;, u n -

_ m - -'-

-~

d%

u,u, ud63 9E

'Althoug e LLS circuitry is designed so that operation of a single tailpipe pressure switch will result in arming both LLS logics '- - ---- ' ^ ' ""' '- ' each tailpipe D

pressure switch provides : d k;;^ input to r.'" - - LLS (continued)

BWR/4 STS 8 3.3-201 Rev.1,04/07/95 AW 14 s Rw 6 a

LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES Q*%QQ0 } } ACTIONS L 1 Icontinued) l h e d., Log}cfA). Si e each LLS logic normally rec es at 1 e'st five S R pressure-switch inputs (and also re ives the' ther S ignals @64 the er logic in the gg ' tame d Hion by ruing ), t LS logic an inste ntatio emains e of rforming it ety.. j p,3.by-3A funhion ih'y S/RV e nradfure switch trumaa+ lhannel-a=ae 4aaa la. Therefore, it is acceptable for l l plant operation to continue with only one tailpipe pressure O i switch OPERABLE on each However, this is only 1 o3 acceptable provided each LS valve is OPERABLE. - (Refer to Required Action A. d Bases). %q ltJS EE T _Re_ quired Action _ BJt equires restoration o 11 pipe l g g.3 (,.3-3 b pressure switches &to OPEIMBLE-status prior to entering f i i MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4Jts) ensure that-aR switches ar { PE1ABLE at the beginning of a reactor startup because the switches are not accessible during p(this i n lant s operation). The Required Actions do net allow placing the [ ' This w,il channel in trip since this action could result intLL tt valve actuation. As noted, LCO 3.0.4 is not applicab E thus allowing entry into MODE T8from MODE 2 Arith inoperable 4 { channels. inis ailowance is needed since th nnels o i y3 have to be repaired prior to entering MODE 2 ?., **? ?.eE $8,_0.,$_ n'0_....*.".".5' L...i".~~.'.T ' .v L ( ...n A fai of two press witch channels rIciatedwith t on RV ta ipj e e result in the 4 of the LLS nction (i.e. 1ple actuation f the S/RV would go undetected he LL 14gic). ever, the /RVs are organtz n groups and,'Wu g an event, oups of 5/RVs init y open (:etpoint re t same ett ngs for a total, ,) 1 S/RVs in three cups). Ther, pre, it would b unlikely that a s e S/RV woul e rh d to'a he LLS logic. refore, it is ceptable t '14 days to { restore on ressure switc of the associated RV to OPERAB status (Requir) Action C.1). ofwever, th s allo le out of servite time is on1 cceptable provid each LLS is CPERABLE (Refer to Reg ed Action A.1 and D.1 Bases). If one inoperable tallpipe pressure switch cannot I (continued) BWR/4 STS B 3.3-202 Rev1,04/07/95 {% EU d 0 Re6

l LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 q Insert B 3.3.6.3 3a l ... logi cs. Since any overpressure event will normally open at least five SRVs and actuate their associated pressure switch inputs, the LLS logic and instrumentation remains capable of performing its safety function even with { several SRV tailpipe pressure switch instrument channels inoperable. Therefore, it is acceptable for plant operation k to continue provided that within 24 hours, per Required g 5 i Action B.1 and B.2, verification and/or restoration is made s to ensure at least: a) one tailpipe pressure switch in each division OPERABLE on one OPERABLE SRV in the lowest SRV q setpoint group; and at least 11 SRVs have at least one o OPERABLE tailpipe pressure switch. J &)""*W~ =: :. -T ~~ Insert B 3.3.6.3 3b n O on 2'11 SRVs, including 4 SRVs out of the 5 lowest relief D setpoint OPERABLE SRVs, _,/ 1 FERMI UNIT 2 Page B 3.3 202 (Insert) REVISION 14, 08/26/99l

i LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 4* BASES tth 8.1,8.7_,and 6O ) ~ ,3 i ACTIONS -(md mued ( be restor to OPERABLE st s within the allowable out of servic me, Conditio st be entered and its Required f Acti aken. The Rpq red Actions do DDt' allow placing the lve actuation /s.ince this action egpfd result-in a LLS-j els in trip c I A Note has been provided in the Condition to modify the Required Actions and Completion Times conventions related to LLS Function 3 channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent' divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions h of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LLS Function 3 channels provide appropriate compensatory asures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each with inoperable tailpipe pressure swi}ches. ,l B If any Required Actio and associated Completion Time of Conditions A,X, or are not met, or two op-eare LLS valves 3 are inoperable due to inoperable channels, the LLS valves P, <3 m may be incapable of performing their__ intended function. Therefore,JhT-ass ciatea LLs va must be sarea $3 3 6.3-$} rinoper>bre i gg7 tely. A alve is LE if th a (Tated c (e.g. ic A) ha Functio el, I t[sFun n 2 chan s, and the unction 3 als J Q LOPERABtE., ~ SURVEILLANCE Reviewer's Note: scrimin-Frequencies _are-brsytron approved REQUIREMENTS topical reports. I er-for a 1TcenYur-te na'the ciesv-t censee must justify the.Frequeh % by the staff SER for the topical report As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LLS instrumentation function are 1ccated in the SRs column of Table 3.3.6.3-1. (continued) BWR/4 STS. B 3.3-203 Rev 1, 04/07/95 Rat N ll ReV(o

INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 10 etVolumme: 10 SECTIONS 3.9,3.10,4,8 & 5.01, + Remove Replace 5.7 CTS M/U (6-23) pg 2 of 2 5.7 CTS M/U (6-23) pg 2 of 2 Rev 14 5.7 DOCS pg i Rev 0 5.7 DOCS pg i Rev 14 5.7 NUREG M/U pg 5.0-24 Rev 0 5.7 NUREG M/U pg 5.0-24 Rev 14 1 1 Rev 14 08/26/99

?* High Radiation Area 45 7A ) [5.7 HighRadiationArea] s ~ 5.7.2 (continued) areas and the maximum allowable stay times for individuals in those areas. In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, direct or remote (such as closed circuit TV cameras) continuous d.1 surveillance may be made by personnel qualified in radiation / protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over ~' the activities being performed within the area. j V' 5.7.3 -- T;r i.Jivia.1-iiive i.eimon areas wun rauintion-4evei..T / jpM00-eres/hry-access-ible4, ...../.3, that are located within r - large areas such as reactor containment, where no encibsure exists for purposes of locking, er-that-eannet-be-<ontinuouc1;; ;nrf:f, i ItJ5E/L7 and where no enclosure can be reasonably constructed around the P-5'7-1 conspicuously posted, and a flashing light shall be'f=M individual area, that individual area shall bet-- and activated as a warning device. TD f b

• s e sn i

"""/ G - 5.0-24 - "r? I, 00/e7pis-

SPECIFtcA770N 5 7 ADMINISTRATIVF CONTR0tS HIGH RADfATION AREA (Continued) g* g, (, m. A radiation monitoring device which continuously indicates the radiation dose rate in the area. 6,7 (. b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them.

07. l.c.

A radiation protection qualtfled individual (i.e., qualified in radiation protection procedures) with a radiation dose rate monitoring device who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the Radiation Protection Supervisor ** in the RWP. g#,pfn43.2_ In addition to the requirements of Specification 6.12.1, areas accessible to individuals with radiation levels such that an individual could receive in I hour a dose equivalent greater than 1000 mress but less than 500 rads at one meter from sources of radioactivity shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry, and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Nuclear Shift Supervisor on duty and/or the radiation protection supervision. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by individuals under an approved RWP which shall specify the dose rate levels in the immediate work area and the maximum allowable stay. time for individuals in that area / Tor individual areas accessible to individuals with radiation levels such that a major portion of the T'7 *.5 individual's body could receive in I hour a dose in excess of 1000 mress* but less than 500 rads at one meter from sources of radioactivity that are located- ~. - within large areas, such as the containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, and no enclosure can be. reasonably constructed around the _ a flashing licht shall be__ activated as a warning device /picuously posted, and j individual areas, then that area shall be roped off cons 2 In lieu of the stay time specification of the RWP, continuous survel u ance, direct or remote (such 6 7.2 as use of closed circuit TV cameras) may be made by personnel qualified in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities within the area. - 5.13 leu w g,/ G7 3 yneasurement made at 30 centimeters from source of radioactivity. M f" alternas utte may designated for thif position. All rendirementi)- of ese Tec al Specific ons apply in the teettina with the mMarnattva_) 1t e an an v with the se ifted title / Alternative titles shall be specified in 'the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. FERMI - UNIT 2 6 23 Amendment No. JJ JJ, JJ 113 PAGE ,Q of 02 $V N

DISCUSSION OF CHANGES ITS: SECTION 5.7 - HIGH RADIATION AREA ADMINISTRATIVE A.1 In the conversion of the Fermi 2 current Technical Specifications (CTS) to the pre osed plant specific Improved Technical Specifications (.TS), certain wording preferences or conventions are adopted which do not result in technical changes (either actual or interpretational). Editorial changes, reformatting, and revised numbering are adopted to make the ITS consistent with the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Standard Technical Specifications NUREG 1433. Rev. 1. A.2 CTS 6.12.1 has been modified to better clarify the wording and provide correct section reference to 10 CFR 20.1601 (i.e. "c") for regulatory guidance on High Radiation Areas. Since the requirements are not changed. this is an administrative change with no impact on safety. A.3 CTS 6.12.1.c footnote has been modified in a Note to ITS 5.0 which clarifies the wording and intent of this CTS footnote. Since this is a clarification of intent which is consistent with current Technical Specifications. this change is administrative and will not impact safety. ~' ' ~ A.4 Not used. l TECHNICAL CHANGES MORE RESTRICTIVE None FERMI - UNIT 2 1 REVISION 14 08/26/99l

l INSERT THIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 11 l

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Velmane lli CTS MARKUP COMPILATIONi,

l Remove Replace 1 1 (1.0 CTS M/U) pg I of 14 Rev 6 1-1 (1.0 CTS M/U) pg i of 14 Rev 14 3/4 3-24 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U)pg 2 of 8 Rev 12 3/4 3-24 (3.3.5.1 CTS M/U)pg 2 of 8 Rev 14 6-23 (5.7 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 2 Rev 0 6-23 (5.7 CTS M/U) pg 2 of 2 Rev 14 l i l l Rev 14 08/26/99 l l

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1.2 AVERAGE kANAREXPOURfshall pplicable a specifi lana ight [.7 P ! AVERAGE PLARAR EXPOSURE d is e to the s of the e sure of a he fuel in specif bundle he s d_heicht ided by th umber f fuel rods) k in t e fuel bund 1 ( pecif L ~ AVIRAGE PLANAR LfNEAR HEAT GENERAT'ON RATE b N The MCT_^I:.Lfi'" L:.'C'a "E* M ENERATiON-RATE APLHGR shall be applicable hk to a specific planar height and is equal to the sum of the tfMEAR-MEAf all devius ta GENEMTIZ 37ES for all the fuel rods in the specified bundle at the 'b^*Wilf specified height divided by the number of fuel 9 s,in _the fuel bundle. NE CHANNEL CAlfBRATION. "d -1,4-A CHANNEL CALIBRATION shall be the adjustment, as necessary, of the channel output such that it responds with he necessary range and accuracy to known values of the_ parameter the channel monitors. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION C ""-- ' f : ?.d !..,.- .....m, j ;;;.; M ' tijn f_..:ti:::.f:: ::t' :ir.;'.d[theCHANNELFUNCTIONAL The CHANNEL snail encompass

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,' @ total channel stees c :5 th:t th:f iistrument channels with thermocouple sensors ib!' :er.eiet ef in'f t: tier, ef gn;b'1't; ef-the l - - = =e*, of_ n* e-aiainn adiuttabi l sens ing-element-end-edjus.-.. devicesinthechannel,f" casiose of arz inpta e g&Wxe = may//TS,$ M # CHANNEL CHECK of channel behavior -h5-A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitat1~ve assessmen shall include, where This determinat during operation.4 et;c;;ti:: M. status -witkother possible, comparison of the channel indication a indications andfor status derived from independ nt in trument chalinels E6s o measuring the same parameter. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST ANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shallybel L "!"# # 7, -h 6

• 94 ottsteeius A.

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w s $$bl Wlb k d@dM $g !E..: 4 f2 3}3g}w FERMI - UNIT 2 3/4 3 24 1 (ennar Pnft gkt-3 5 PAGE il 0F 08 ( Rev IL / 3 sev 14 I

SPECIF(CA7BN 5 7 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS HIGHRADfATIONAREA(Contir.ued) A r u ~ ^ ica <enstort.g devu dich er l ~.h ' A M a

1. • 6; radiation case rate in the area.

6 7.(. b. A radiation monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rate in the area and alarms when a preset integrated dose is received. Entry into such areas with this monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been established and personnel have been made howledgeable of them. f,7. l.c. A radiation protection qualified individual (i.e., qualified in radiation protection procedures) with a radiation dose rate monitoring device who is responsible for providing positive control over the activities within the area and shall perform periodic radiation surveillance at the frequency specified by the Radiation Protection Supervisor ** in the RWP. p#1-frrE2 In addition to the requirements of Specification 6.12.1, areas accessible to individuals with radiation levels such that an individual could receive in I hour a dose equivalent greater than 1000 areas but less than 500 rads at one meter from sources of radioactivity shall be provided with locked doors to prevent unauthorized entry, and the keys shall be maintained under the administrative control of the Nuclear shift Supervisor on duty and/or the radiation protection supervision. Doors shall remain locked except during periods of access by individuals under an approved RWP which shall specify the dose rate levels in the immediate work area and the maximum allowable stay. time for individuals in thau area.fTo~r individual areas accessible to I'7'3 individuals with radiation levels such that a ma,jor portion of the individual's body could receive in I hour a dose in excess of 1000 arens* but less than 500 rads at one meter from sources of radioactivity that are located within large areas, such as the containment, where no enclosure exists for purposes of locking, and no enclosure can be. reasonably constructed around the individual areas, then that area shall be roped-off, consolcuously posted, and _a flashino licht shall be activated as a warning device / In lieu of the stay slee specification of the RWP, continuous surveillance, direct or remote (such 5,7.2. as use of closed circuit TV cameras) may be made by personnel qua11ried in radiation protection procedures to provide positive exposure control over the activities within the area. 0.13 DEuw ~ g,[ G7 3 _=neasurement made at 30 centimeters from source of radioactivttv. 4. f= alternau utie may cesignated for thty position. All rJeiremen of se Tech a1 Specift ons apply ta *ke #aettian with the anernative it a as ma with the en ified tit 1*IAlternative titles shall be s)ecified 1'n 'the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. ~ FERMI - LRl!T 2 6-23 Amendment No. JJ, M, # 113 PAGE ,Q 0F 02 /WN

INSERT TIIIS PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 12 ) Volume 12: IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS" Remove Replace 1.0 ITS pg 1.12 Rev 6 1.0 ITS pg 1.1-2 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-41 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-43 Rev 14 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 12 3.3.5.1 ITS pg 3.3-44 Rev 14 3.3.t : ITS pg 3.3 65 Rev 13 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-65 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-66 Rev 6 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-66 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-67 Rev 6 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-67 Rev 14 3.3.6.3 ITS pg 3.3-68 Rev 14 l Rev 14 08/26/99

4 Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions (continued) CHANNEL CHECK A CHANNEL CHECK shall be the qualitative assessment, by observation, of channel behavior during operation. This determination shall include. where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be the injection G of a simulated or actual signal into the channel as close to the sensor as practicable to verify h OPERABILITY of all devices in the channel required Y for channel 0PERABILITY. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST may be performed by means of any series of gl sequential, overlapping, or total channel steps. CORE ALTERATION CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel, sources, or reactivity control components, within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. The following exceptions are not considered to be CORE ALTERATIONS: a. Movement (including replacement) of source range monitors, local power range monitors, intermediate range monitors, traversing incore '~' ~ probes, or special movable detectors: and b. Control rod movement, provided there are no fuel assemblies in the associated core cell. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position. (continued) l FERMI UNIT 2 1.1 2 Revision 14 08/26/99

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 .abl..,. -.1 1 space i s. t,i ) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS NODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OROTER CHANNELS FRON SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED StRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE RmCTION COWITIONS RMCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENTS VALUE 1. Core Spray System a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 inches Level - Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell 1.2.3 4(b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3,3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Reactor Steam Dome 1.2.3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 441 psig Q Pressure - Low TR 3.3.5.1.2 A (Injection Perwissive) SR 3.3.5.1.3 LD SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 QC 4(a),5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 441 psig SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 '"1p d.. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 2(CL C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA " - ' ~ * ' " k 4(a),$(s) 2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System a. Reactor Vessel Water 1.2.3. 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 e 24.8 inches Level-Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level 1 4(a). 5(a) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) (a) When associated subsystem (s) of LC0 3.5.2 are required to be OPERABLE. p (b) Also required to initiate the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG). e4 (c) Individual component cows. L l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 41 Revision 14 08/26/99

i ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 Ta',is J.J.o. M (page 3 of o) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrianentation APPLICABLI CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTMR CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDIIIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE \\n 2. LPCI System (continued) s h. Manual Initiation 1.2.3 2(C) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 1 4(a). 5(a) 3. High Pressure Coolant In,)ection (tPCI) System ^ a. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 103.8 i Level - Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l Level 2 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 b. Drywell 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d)3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 219 inches Level - High. Level 8 SR 3.3.5.1.2 Ol 2(d). 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 ) SR 3.3.5.1.5 Q d. Condensate Storage 1. 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 0 inctes 1 (l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 Tank Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 e. Suppression Pool Water 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 5.0 inches Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 Nl 2(d), 3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued) n b. g (a) When the associated subsystem (s) are required to be OPERABLE. M (c) Individual conponent controls, g l (d) With reactor steam dame pressure > 150 psig. s l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 43 Revision 14, 08/26/99

ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 ..) Table 3.J.ti.41 (p.,ge 4 of 6) Emergency Core Cooling System Instrtamentation APPLICABLE ColOITIONS MOKS OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SLRVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREENT5 VALUE y 3. }PCI System (continued) g k f. Manual Initiation 1, 1(C) C SR 3.3.5.1.6 NA 2(d),3(d) 4. Autunatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip System A 'l a. Reactre Vessel Water 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 = 24.8 Level-Low Low Low. SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches l Level 1 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l b. Drywell 1. 2 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 s 1.88 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.5.1.2 l 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l c. Automatic 1. 1 F SR 3.3.5.1.2 s 117 seconds Depressurization SR 3.3.5.1.4 '"N l System initiation 2(d).3Id) SR 3.3.5.1.5 }d liner d. Reactor Vessel Water 1. 1 E SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 171.9 Level-Low. Level 3 SR 3.3.5.1.2 inches !l (Confirmatory) 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 l e. Core Spray Ptsip 1, 1 per ptmp F SR 3.3.5.1.1 a 125 psig Discharge SR 3.3.5.1.2 il Pressure - High 2(d),3(d) SR 3.3.5.1.3 SR 3.3.5.1.4 SR 3.3.5.1.5 G (continued) (c) Individual component controls. Q l (d) With reactor steam dame pressure > 150 psig. l s s l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 44 Revision 14, 08/26/99 j x

e 4 LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ) 3.3 INSTRlMEhTATION 3.3.6.3 Low Low Set (LLS) Instrumentation LC0 3.3.6.3 The LLS valve instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6.31 shall be OPERABLE. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1. 2. and 3. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One LLS valve A.1 Restore channel (s) to 14 days inoperable due to OPERABLE status, inoperable channel (s). (continued) .~ i l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 65 Revision 14 08/26/99 1

t LLS Instrumentation ~ 3.3.6.3 ) ACliONS (continued) COM)ITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 3 7 B. - - -- NOTE------ B.1 Restore one tailpipe 24 hours Separate Condition pressure switch for entry is allowed for 11 OPERABLE SRVs to each SRV. OPERABLE STATUS. E One or more safety / . relief valves (SRVs) B.2 Restore one tailpipe 24 hours { with one or more pressure switch in Function 3 channel (s) each Division for an inoperable. OPERABLE SRV in the lowest setpoint group, to OPERABLE status. E ............N0TE LCO 3.0.4 is not applicable. ~b B.3 . Restore both tailpipe Prior to 'I pressure switches for entering MODE 2 ^ 11 OPERABLE SRVs, or 3 from MODE 4 'd including 4 of 5 OPERABLE SRVs with the lowest relief v setpoints,to OPERABLE status. C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 12 hours associated Completion Time of Condition A E or B not met. C.2 Be in MODE 4. 36 hours -IE Two LLS valves inoperable due to inoperable channels. ) l FERMI - UNIT 2 3.3 66 Revision 14, 08/26/99

J l LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 1 ) SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .....................................N0TE..................................... Refer to Table 3.3.6.31 to determine which SRs apply for each Function. SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31 days i 3 SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for 31 dayt gl portion of the channel outside primary C containment. SR 3.3.6.3.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months "~y. SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform LOGIC SYSTEH FUNCTIONAL TEST. 18 months I i l I w* l FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 67 Revision 14 08/26/99

O LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ) M ie 3.3.6.J 1 (page 1 of 1) Low Low Set Instrumentation REQUIRED CHMBELS PER SL5tVEILLANCE ALLOWBLE FLECTION FLsETION REQUIREENTS VALUE 1. Reactor Steam Dame Pressure-High 1 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 s 1113 psig SR 3.3,6.3.3 SR 3.3.6.3.4 2. Low Low Set Pressure Setpoints 2 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.1 Low: SR 3.3.6.3.3 Open s 1037 psig SR 3.3.6.3.4 Close (a) Hi : q s 1067 psig Q ose (a) h 3. Tailpipe Pressure Switch 2 per SRV SR 3.3.6.3.2 a 25 psig and (gl SR 3.3.6.3.3 s 35 psig SR 3.3.6.3.4 (a) = 100 psi below ectual opening setpoint. l_ FERMI UNIT 2 3.3 68 Revision 14, 08/26/99

O i INSERT tills PAGE IN FRONT OF VOLUME 13 i ( Volume l3:1 IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES '. i Remove Replace B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1 10 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-10 Rev 14 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-17 Rev 12 B 3.3.5.1 ITS pg B 3.3.5.1-17 Rev 14 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-4 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-4 Rev 14 i B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-5 Rev 6 B 3.3.6.3 ITS pg B 3.3.6.3-5 Rev 14 I I l l l l l Rev 14 08/26/99

E o e ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLIC/6LE SAFEfY ANAL (SES. LCO. 6.d igELipyltu - (antinued) analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref.1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure transmitters that sense the reactor dome pressure. The Allowable Value is low enough to prevent overpressuring the equipment in the low pressure ECCS, but high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. 1.d. 2.h. Manual Initiation b 3 The Manual Initiation channel provides manual initiation ~~ E capability by means of individual component controls. There-R is one manual initiation channel for each of the CS and LPCI subsystems (i.e.. two for CS and two for LPCI). The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the IRC in the plant licensing basis. c4 There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the individual components. Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function is only required to be OPERABLE Y when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LC0 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. 1 FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1-10 Revision 14 08/26/99 i L

l s ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES /WI : CME UFE'. IAALGES. %0,.m /NLIC/Slt TTY ;cor4ime.... Two channels of Suppression Pool Water Level-High Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can )reclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to _C0 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. g 3.f. Manual Initiation t The Manual Initiation channel provides manual initiation capability by means of individual component controls. There N is one manual initiation channel for the HPCI System. N The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the UFSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of 7 the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant I licensing basis. There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the V channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of individual controls. The Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases. _. ~. Automatic Deoressurization System 4.a. 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Lw Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far. fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS. along with the scram action of the RPS. ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 signals are initiated from four level transmitters that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due tb the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of l FERMI UNIT 2 B 3.3.5.1-17 Revision 14 08/26/99

l LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 j . l} wGch APPLICABILITY 'The LLS instrumentation is recuired to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 since consicerable energy is in the nuclear system ~and the SRVs may be needed to provide pressure relief. If the SRVs are needed, then the LLS function is required to ensure that the primary containment design basis is maintained. In MODES 4 and 5, the reactor pressure is low enough that the overpressure limit cannot be a>proached by assumed operational transients or accidents. Tius, LLS instrumentation and associated pressure relief is not required. ACTIONS Al The failure of any reactor steam done pressure instrument channel to provide the arming, SRV opening and closing pressure set)oints for an individual LLS valve does not affect the a)111ty of the other LLS SRV to perform its LLS function. A LLS valve is OPERABLE if the associated logic has one Function 1 channel, two Function 2 channels, and at least three Function 3 channels OPERABLE. Therefore,14 '3 days is provided to restore the inoperable channel (s) to ) OPERABLE status (Required Action A.1). If the inoperable channel (s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition C must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action could result in an instrumented LLS valve actuation. The 14 day Completion Time is considered appropriate because of the redundancy in the design (two LLS valves are provided and any one LLS valve can perform the LLS function) and the very low probability of multiple LLS instrumentation channel failures, which renders the remaining LLS SRV inoperable, -g occurring together with an event requiring the LLS function during the 14 day Completion Time. l B.1. B.2. and B.3 Although the LLS circuitry is designed so that operation of a single tailpi)e pressure switch will result in arming both LLS logics: eac1 tailpipe pressure switch provides an input to both LLS logics. Since any overpressure event will normally open at least five SRVs and actuate their associated pressure switch inputs, the LLS logic and instrumentation remains capable of performing its safety function even with several SRV tailpipe pressure switch ) l FERMI UNIT-2 B 3.3.6.3-4 Revision 14, 08/26/99 L A

C i s, LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued) instrument channels inoperable. Therefore, it is acceptable f{M hours, per Required Action B.1 and B.2. verification and/or for plant operation to continue provided that within 24 I restoration is made to ensure at least: a) one tailpipe g pressure switch in each Division OPERABLE on' one OPERABLE l N SRV in the lowest SRV setpoint group: and b) at least 11 i OPERABLE SRVs have at least one OPERABLE tailpipe pressure lm switch. Therefore, it is acceptable for plant operation to-4 continue even with only one tailpipe pressure switch l 21 OPERABLE on each SRV. However, this is only acceptable lD provided each LLS valve is OPERABLE. (Refer to Required Action A.1 and C.1 Bases). I Required Action B.3 requires restoration of both tailpipe I pressure switches on = 11 OPERABLE SRVs. including 4 SRVs g out of the 5 lowest relief setpoint OPERABLE SRVs. to i s OPERABLE status, prior to entering MODE 2 or 3 from MODE 4. This will ensure that sufficient switches are OPERABLE at the beginning of a reactor startup (this is because the switches are not accessible during plant operation). The p Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action could result in an inadvertent LLS valve actuation. As noted. LC0 3.0.4 is not applicable thus l allowing entry into MODE 1 or 2 from MODE 2 or 3 with inoperable channels. This allowance is needed since the channels only have to be repaired prior to entering MODE 2 or MODE 3 from MODE 4. A Note has been provided in the Condition to modify the Required Actions and Completion Times conventions related to e LLS Function 3 channels. Section 1.3. Completion Times. O specifies that once a Condition has been entered. subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in >g the Condition, discovered to be inoperable or not within limits, will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Recuired Actions g of the Condition continue to apply for each adcitional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable LLS Function 3 channels provide appropriate compensatory 4 measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each SRV with inoperable tailpipe pressure switches. I FERMI - UNIT 2 B 3.3.6.3-5 Revision 14 08/26/99 L_}}