05000237/FIN-2015002-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Self-Revealing | | identified by = Self-Revealing | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71153 | ||
| Inspector = J Cameron, R Ruiza, | | Inspector = J Cameron, R Ruiza, Bolandd Lords, G Roach, M Bielby, M Learn, M Porfirio, M Ziolkowski, T Goa, Bolandd Lords, G Roach, M Bielby, M Learn, M Porfirio, M Ziolkowski, T Go, J Vinyard | ||
| CCA = P.3 | | CCA = P.3 | ||
| INPO aspect = PI.3 | | INPO aspect = PI.3 | ||
| description = A finding preliminarily determined to be of lowto-moderate safety significance, and an associated Apparent Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; TS 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves; and TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, was self-revealed on February 7, 2015, following the discovery that one of the Unit 2 electromatic relief valves (ERVs) would not have performed its intended safety function. Vibration induced wear experienced while operating at extended power uprate (EPU) power levels resulted in the degradation of multiple ERV actuator subcomponents, which rendered the valve inoperable. This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern in that the licensee has replaced all Unit 2 and 3 ERV actuators with a hardened design successfully utilized at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, which has also experienced significant steam line vibrations post EPU. The inspectors determined that the licensees apparent failure to ensure measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of SSCs, in particular ERV 2-0203-3C (2C), was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of design control and equipment performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel, using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Resolution in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, since it involves the failure to implement effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. This cross-cutting issue is conditional depending on the outcome of the preliminary White finding. [P.3] | | description = A finding preliminarily determined to be of lowto-moderate safety significance, and an associated Apparent Violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control; TS 3.4.3, Safety and Relief Valves; and TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating, was self-revealed on February 7, 2015, following the discovery that one of the Unit 2 electromatic relief valves (ERVs) would not have performed its intended safety function. Vibration induced wear experienced while operating at extended power uprate (EPU) power levels resulted in the degradation of multiple ERV actuator subcomponents, which rendered the valve inoperable. This finding does not represent an immediate safety concern in that the licensee has replaced all Unit 2 and 3 ERV actuators with a hardened design successfully utilized at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, which has also experienced significant steam line vibrations post EPU. The inspectors determined that the licensees apparent failure to ensure measures be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, equipment, and processes that are essential to the safety-related functions of SSCs, in particular ERV 2-0203-3C (2C), was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attributes of design control and equipment performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. A Significance and Enforcement Review Panel, using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, preliminarily determined the finding to be of low to moderate safety significance. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Resolution in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, since it involves the failure to implement effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. This cross-cutting issue is conditional depending on the outcome of the preliminary White finding. [P.3] | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:53, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Dresden  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000237/2015002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2015 (2015Q2) |
| Type: | Violation: White |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Cameron R Ruiza Bolandd Lords G Roach M Bielby M Learn M Porfirio M Ziolkowski T Goa Bolandd Lords G Roach M Bielby M Learn M Porfirio M Ziolkowski T Go J Vinyard |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
| ' | |