05000456/FIN-2013003-02: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.12 | ||
| Inspector = M Learn, M Perry, N Feliz, | | Inspector = M Learn, M Perry, N Feliz Adorno, R Edwards, R Ng, T Daun, T Go, V Meghani, A Dahbur, A Dunlop, A Garmoe, A Sallman, E Duncan, J Benjamin, J Neurauter, J Robbins | ||
| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(ii) when licensee personnel failed to scope four Unit 1 and Unit 2 Essential Service Water (SX) pump room sump pump discharge check valves and eight Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST room sump pump discharge check valves into the Maintenance Rule as required. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1498897, Review 1/2WF040A/B Valves for Inclusion Into MRule [Maintenance Rule], and planned to scope the components into the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors determined that the failure to scope the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SX pump room sump pump discharge check valves and Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST room sump pump discharge check valves into the Maintenance Rule was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Since a degraded SX or DOST sump check valve would degrade one or more trains of a system that supported a risk-significant system or function, a detailed risk evaluation was performed that determined the finding was of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions readily available in the applicable guidance document to demonstrate that not scoping the components into the Maintenance Rule was in accordance with Maintenance Rule requirements and therefore maintained safety. | | description = The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(2)(ii) when licensee personnel failed to scope four Unit 1 and Unit 2 Essential Service Water (SX) pump room sump pump discharge check valves and eight Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST room sump pump discharge check valves into the Maintenance Rule as required. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as IR 1498897, Review 1/2WF040A/B Valves for Inclusion Into MRule [Maintenance Rule], and planned to scope the components into the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors determined that the failure to scope the Unit 1 and Unit 2 SX pump room sump pump discharge check valves and Unit 1 and Unit 2 DOST room sump pump discharge check valves into the Maintenance Rule was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Since a degraded SX or DOST sump check valve would degrade one or more trains of a system that supported a risk-significant system or function, a detailed risk evaluation was performed that determined the finding was of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Decision-Making component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions readily available in the applicable guidance document to demonstrate that not scoping the components into the Maintenance Rule was in accordance with Maintenance Rule requirements and therefore maintained safety. | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:48, 20 February 2018
Site: | Braidwood ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000456/2013003 Section 1R12 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Learn M Perry N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Ng T Daun T Go V Meghani A Dahbur A Dunlop A Garmoe A Sallman E Duncan J Benjamin J Neurauter J Robbins |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(b) 10 CFR 50.65 |
CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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