05000333/FIN-2011005-04: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.5 | | CCA = H.5 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.1 | | INPO aspect = WP.1 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVl, Corrective Action, because Entergy personnel did not promptly correct the intermittent failure of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam admission valve 13MOV-131 to fully open on demand. Specifically, Entergy staff's troubleshooting performed in response to the October 29,2010, partial valve opening was not adequate in scope to identify the cause of the intermittent failure. As corrective action, a more extensive troubleshooting effort was undertaken by Entergy staff following a second failure of the valve to fully open on January 7,2011, which was successful at identifying and correcting the problem. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2011-00123. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the loose electrical connections in the 13MOV-131 motor control circuit affected the reliability of the RCIC system. Since the RCIC pump achieved rated discharge flow and pressure on both occasions that 13MOV-131 failed to fully open, the inspectors concluded that RCIC remained capable of performing its design function during the period that this condition existed. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Phase 1, lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined this finding was not a design qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work control, because Entergy personnel did not appropriately plan the scope of 13MOV-131 troubleshooting activity by incorporating consideration of the high risk significance of the RCIC system | | description = The inspectors identified a self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVl, Corrective Action, because Entergy personnel did not promptly correct the intermittent failure of reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) steam admission valve 13MOV-131 to fully open on demand. Specifically, Entergy staff\'s troubleshooting performed in response to the October 29,2010, partial valve opening was not adequate in scope to identify the cause of the intermittent failure. As corrective action, a more extensive troubleshooting effort was undertaken by Entergy staff following a second failure of the valve to fully open on January 7,2011, which was successful at identifying and correcting the problem. The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2011-00123. The finding was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the loose electrical connections in the 13MOV-131 motor control circuit affected the reliability of the RCIC system. Since the RCIC pump achieved rated discharge flow and pressure on both occasions that 13MOV-131 failed to fully open, the inspectors concluded that RCIC remained capable of performing its design function during the period that this condition existed. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the Phase 1, lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, worksheet in Attachment 4 to IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process. The inspectors determined this finding was not a design qualification deficiency resulting in a loss of functionality or operability, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment, and was not potentially risk significant due to external initiating events. Therefore, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work control, because Entergy personnel did not appropriately plan the scope of 13MOV-131 troubleshooting activity by incorporating consideration of the high risk significance of the RCIC system | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:43, 20 February 2018
Site: | FitzPatrick ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000333/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | M Gray S Mccarver E Knutson B Bickett B Sienel R Rolph |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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