05000266/FIN-2010002-07: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71152 | ||
| Inspector = A Dahbur, J Bozga, J Gilliam, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe, | | Inspector = A Dahbur, J Bozga, J Gilliam, J Jandovitz, M Kunowski, M Phalen, M Thorpe Kavanaugh, N Feliz Adorno, P Cardona Morales, R Edwards, R Ruiz, R Winter, S Burton, T Bilik | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to evaluate seismic piping interactions. Specifically, for a plant configuration where the stem of a spent fuel pool cooling system valve contacted an adjacent service water pipe, the licensee's evaluation to demonstrate that the existing spent fuel pool cooling system piping and valves met the design basis acceptance criteria of United States of America Standard (USAS) B31.1-1967 used a method of analysis that did not evaluate the dynamic effect of impact forces as specified by the design basis piping code. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, compliance with the seismic Category I design basis requirements of USAS B31.1-1967 was to ensure valve SF-2, the valve connection between two sections of spent fuel pool cooling system piping, would function as required during a seismic Category I design basis event. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design deficiency of the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool cooling piping system that: did not result in loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool; did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped assembly; and did not result in loss of spent fuel pool inventory greater than 10 percent of spent fuel pool volume. The finding had no cross-cutting aspect because it was a legacy design issue, not reflective of current performance. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, \"Design Control,\" was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to evaluate seismic piping interactions. Specifically, for a plant configuration where the stem of a spent fuel pool cooling system valve contacted an adjacent service water pipe, the licensee\'s evaluation to demonstrate that the existing spent fuel pool cooling system piping and valves met the design basis acceptance criteria of United States of America Standard (USAS) B31.1-1967 used a method of analysis that did not evaluate the dynamic effect of impact forces as specified by the design basis piping code. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of design control and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, compliance with the seismic Category I design basis requirements of USAS B31.1-1967 was to ensure valve SF-2, the valve connection between two sections of spent fuel pool cooling system piping, would function as required during a seismic Category I design basis event. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design deficiency of the structural integrity of the spent fuel pool cooling piping system that: did not result in loss of cooling to the spent fuel pool; did not result from fuel handling errors that caused damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped assembly; and did not result in loss of spent fuel pool inventory greater than 10 percent of spent fuel pool volume. The finding had no cross-cutting aspect because it was a legacy design issue, not reflective of current performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:39, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Point Beach  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2010002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur J Bozga J Gilliam J Jandovitz M Kunowski M Phalen M Thorpe Kavanaugh N Feliz Adorno P Cardona Morales R Edwards R Ruiz R Winter S Burton T Bilik |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |