05000382/FIN-2008004-04: Difference between revisions
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| CCA = H.14 | | CCA = H.14 | ||
| INPO aspect = DM.2 | | INPO aspect = DM.2 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c (Procedures) for the failure to open the Train A low pressure safety injection pump suction valve prior to pump operation during a surveillance. The butterfly valve was installed 90 degrees out of position and was closed when operators believed it was open. After starting the pump, operators observed loud noises coming from the unit and secured it 8 minutes later. Pump operation without adequate net positive suction head could cause damage. The valve's postmaintenance test was scheduled after the noted surveillance test, and the surveillance was not intended to check the valve's function. The safety injection train was considered inoperable but available at the time. Licensee personnel entered the noncited violation into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-WF3-2008-2280 and CR-WF3-2008-3045. This finding was more than minor because it affected both the configuration control and the equipment performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of the low pressure safety injection system. In addition, this condition, if left uncorrected, would also become a more significant safety concern. Equipment could be damaged without adequate postmaintenance checks prior to operation. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the finding was of very low risk significance because it did not: (1) represent a loss of safety function; (2) represent an actual loss of a single train of equipment for more than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; or (3) screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the decision-making component, in that, the plant personnel used nonconservative assumptions and chose to use the pump suction valve for system operation prior to verifying that the valve was properly assembled [H.1(b)] (Section 1R19) | | description = The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.c (Procedures) for the failure to open the Train A low pressure safety injection pump suction valve prior to pump operation during a surveillance. The butterfly valve was installed 90 degrees out of position and was closed when operators believed it was open. After starting the pump, operators observed loud noises coming from the unit and secured it 8 minutes later. Pump operation without adequate net positive suction head could cause damage. The valve\'s postmaintenance test was scheduled after the noted surveillance test, and the surveillance was not intended to check the valve\'s function. The safety injection train was considered inoperable but available at the time. Licensee personnel entered the noncited violation into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-WF3-2008-2280 and CR-WF3-2008-3045. This finding was more than minor because it affected both the configuration control and the equipment performance attributes of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of the low pressure safety injection system. In addition, this condition, if left uncorrected, would also become a more significant safety concern. Equipment could be damaged without adequate postmaintenance checks prior to operation. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, \"Significance Determination Process,\" Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the finding was of very low risk significance because it did not: (1) represent a loss of safety function; (2) represent an actual loss of a single train of equipment for more than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; or (3) screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the decision-making component, in that, the plant personnel used nonconservative assumptions and chose to use the pump suction valve for system operation prior to verifying that the valve was properly assembled [H.1(b)] (Section 1R19) | ||
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Latest revision as of 20:35, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2008004 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2008 (2008Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Henderson S Graves G Replogle R Smith W Sifre C Paulk R Azua D Overland S Makor |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
| ' | |