The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of
Technical Specification 6.8.1.c (Procedures) for the failure to correctly position a valve during a surveillance. The procedure required operators to position the essential Chiller
AB return
Header B isolation Valve CHW-786B closed but operators left the valve in the open position. This resulted in cross connecting the essential services chilled water Loops A and B, which led to an unplanned entry into
Technical Specifications 3.7.12 and 3.0.3. The violation was revealed through a control room alarm. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program as Condition Report
CR-WF3-2008-0778. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, would have become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, with both loops of the essential services chilled water system cross connected, the system was no longer single-failure proof. A leak in one of the essential chilled water loops would have caused both units to become
inoperable. Using the Manual Chapter 0609, \"
Significance Determination Process,\" Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance because it was a qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss-of-operability in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter Part 9900, Technical Guidance, \"
Operability Determination Process for Operability and Functional Assessments.\" This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance area, Work Practices component, because operators failed to implement self-checking techniques when performing procedure steps
H.4(a) (Section 1R22)
