ML19256E366

Motion to Compel Further Answers from Intervenor Mccorkle, in Response to 790703 Second Set of Interrogatories & ASLB 790827 Order.Intervenor 790906 Answers Contain Deficiencies in Form & Substance.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19256E366
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	09/14/1979
From:	Copeland J, Newman J BAKER & BOTTS, HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO., LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS, AXELRAD & TOLL
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 7911020229
Download: ML19256E366 (12)

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA c [. I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t

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BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ~

In the Matter of S S

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 S

(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S Station, Unit 1) S MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER ANSWERS FROM INTERVENOR McCORKLE I.

Houston Lighting & Power Company (Applicant) requests the Board to issue an order as described herein compelling further answers by Intervenor McCorkle to certain of Applicant's interrogatories and requiring that all of Ms.

McCorkle's answers to interrogatories be resubmitted under oath.

II.

On July 3, 1979, Applicant servad its second set of interrogatories and reque.sts for production of documents on Ms. Brenda McCorkle. Ms. McCorkle did not file the ,

answers to these interrogatories within the time required by 10 CFR S 2.740b (b) , and on Augtr,t 7, 1979, the Applicant filed a motion requesting the Board to issue an order com-pelling Ms. McCorkle to answer Applicant's second interroga-

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tories. The Board issued an order on August 27, 1979, 1259 313 7911o207_Elfi

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granting Applicant's motion and requiring Ms. McCorkle to respond within ten days after service of the order. On

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September 6, 1979, Ms. McCorkle ser ved her answers, a copy of which is attached hereto.

As can be seen by examination of the answers Ms.

McCorkle did not include the affidavit required by the Commission's Rules of Practice. Specifically, 10 CFR S 2.740b(b) provides that interrogatories should be answered separately and fully in writing under oath or affirmation.

Absent the proper oath or affirmat.t_'n Ms. McCorkle's answers to Applicant's second interrogatories are manifestly deficient and Ms. McCortle should be required to provide answers to the interrogatories under the oath or affirmation required by 5 2.740b(b).

III.

Aside from deficiencies as to the form of Ms.

McCorkle's answers, a number of her answers are deficient as to substance, and Applicant respectfully requests that the Board compel further answers as hereinafter described.

Applicant's, Interrogatory A was as follows:

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"Interrocaterv A - McCorkle Centent.icn 9:

1. McCorkle Contentien 9 states that '[n]o plan has been develop d to protect the plant operators frcm the danger of pisoning fran gases such as chlorine.... '

a. State why the protection provisions described in PSAR Sections 6.4 and 9.4, including chlorine -

detectors, autanatic isolation, centrol rocm leak tightness and self-contained breathing apparatus does not provide adequate protection agairst chlorine p isening. -

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b. Nhat provisions, in addition to those described in PSAR Sections 6.4 and 9.4, must be addM in order to constitute an acceptable ' plan'?

c. At page 6-14 of Suppleent No. 2 to the Safety Evaluation Rep::rt (hereinafter 'SER Supp. 2') the NRC Staff concludM that. the plant's toxic gas prutection is ac ptable. State each fact which to

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your knowledge demonstrates that this conclusion is in error,

d. Specify the facts upon which you rely in proving that Applicant's toxic gas protection design is not in ccnpliance with Regulatory Guide 1.95. State which provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.95 are not being cenplied with, and every reason, with every fact supporting these reasons, why you believe that the W'ent design is in noncenpliance.

2.a. Which toxic gases other than chlorira should tFa control rocm atrosphere be protected against?

b. State how you determined that such gases, if any, could be present at the control rocm air intakes."

Ms. McCorkle's answer was as follows:

"1.a. Chlorine detectors alone are not sufficient. Other gases frcm cutside the plant may enter and contaminate the operators.

b. Intervenor objects to this interrogatory en tra basis that it is not intervenor's responsibility to devise plans for HL&P; but is the respcnsibility of the properant of the facility.

c. Recently, a large sulfur (sic] well caughc fire near the proposed site. With this sort of accident near tFa facility ara tne wind blowing in the direction of the facility, there cculd be great darger for the personnel within.

d. I de not have Reg. Guide 1.95, so at present am u.uble to answer this question.

2.a. All toxic gases which could get into tra control recm, including gases frcm wells located nearby and toxic chemicals being transported on the rail line rearby.

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b. The wind could carry the gases frcm trair point of origin."

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As can be 0?en from Applicant's Interrogatories A.1 and A.2, Applicant sought information from Ms. McCorkle relating to her allegation that "no plan has been developed to protect the plant operators from the danger of poisoning from gases such at, chlorine." Applicant's design does in

'.act provide for protective devices to prevent plant op-erators from being effected by poisonous gases such as chlorine. Applicant does not believe that Ms. McCorkle's answera contain any information which facilitates the Appli-cant in understanding her contention. Accordingly, the Applicant will seek further information frot Ms. McCorkle by further interrogatories rather than burden the Board at this point. However, on the most fundamental question contained in the Applicant's answers, Interrogatory A. l(b) , Ms.

McCorkle objected to the interrogatory on "the basis that it is not intervenor's responsibility to devise plans for HL&P; but is the responsibility of the proponent of the facility."

This objection is a clear illustration of the necessity for this motion. If Ms. McCorkle is allowed to frustrate Appli-cant's efforts at discovery through such objections the discovery process will be totally frustrated and Applicant's efforts to seek further clarification and information will be seriously jeopardized.

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Applicant does, in fact, have a specific plan to protect against poisonous gases leaking into'the control room, and Applicant attempted to elicit from Ms. McCorkle what information she had which indicated these plans were deficient. Clearly, the most straight-forward manner to elicit such information is to ask Ms. McCorkle what changes she would make in Applicant's plan, and this was the ques-tior clearly posed by Interrogatory A.l(b). Ms. McCorkle shour. be ordered to eitha.r state that she has a plan for improvement of Applicant's current plans or state that she does not know what the deficiencies are or how to improve upon Applicant's plan.

Applicant's Interrogatory B was as follows:

"Interrocatorv B - McCorkle Centention 14:

1. This centention states that the fuel rods are not safe because of '. . . hydriding . . . .'

a. Define nydriding and explain Pow it causes clad failures and higher off-gas activities,

b. Ehat is the source of hydrogenout.urpurities that you contend will cause hydriding.

c. Khat engineering specifications on hydrogenous

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it: purities do you contend are necessary to prevent ~~

hydriding?

d. Is the hydrogen getter caterial placed in all fuel rods ineffective? If so, state every reason, and every fact supporting these reasons, why the hydrogen getter does not prevent hydriding.

2. This contentien also states that the fuel rods are

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not safe because of '. . . fuel densification . . . .'

a. Define fuel densificaticn and explain hcw it will increase in power spikes and heat generatica rate.

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b. What changes in linear heat generation rate caused by densification will render the fuel rods 'not

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safe'? State in answering this questien what alteration in linear heat generation rate you eqect over the lifetime of a fuel rod and how this alteration will affect fuel rod integrity,

c. What changes in the probability of local power spikes caused by densification will render the fuel rods 'not safe'? State in answering this question what increase in anticipated locali7ed spikes you expect and how this increase will affect fuel rod integrity.

d. State whether densification will have other effects en fuel rod thermal and mech nical performance.

Identify each of these effects and state every reason, and every fact supporting these reasons, why these effects will impact fuel red safety."

Ms. McCorkle's answ'r was as follows:

"1.a. Hydriding is the cPaical ccrbination of hydrogen with other e.t.ements, eswially active metals, forming ironic cc: pounds. The reaction with the fuel rod cladding inner surfaces causes cracks and holes in the cladding which allcws the radioactive gases inside the fuel rods to escape.

b. Any w. wends that contain h A en, espcially water vapor.

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c. All hydrogen must be recoved fmn the plant site that could get inside the fuel rods. The fuel rods should be assembled in a ccupletely hydrogen free environment.

d. It may not be ineffective in all fuel rods, but it is not successful in all fuel rods either.

2.a. Fuel densification is the shrinking of the volume of the 002 fuel pellets in the fuel rods.

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b. An increase that causes the fuel to melt in a local area. best of the change is early in the operating life of the fuel rods, but the total change depends en the construction of the fuel pellets.

c. Any increase will make the fuel rods unsafe.

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d. Yes, the heat generated can't be transferred to the reactor water so the electricity generated w2.11 be less.

The fuel rods nust collapse causing rMirwtd.ve leaks."

Interrogatory B.1 sought information with respect to Ms. McCorkle's contention on hydriding of fuel rods. Ms.

McCorkle was asked, for example, whether the hydrogen getter material placed in fuel rods is ineffective and, if so, why.

Ms. McCorkle's answer was that "it may not be effective in all Zuel rods, but it is not successful in all fuel rods either." This answer is clearly insufficient and Ms. McCorkle should be ordered to state with specificity why the hydrogen getter does not prevent hydriding, as was requested in Interrogatory B.l(d).

Interrogatories B.2(a) and B.2(b) were partially answered. However, Ms. McCorkle failed to explain how fuel densification will increase power spikes and heat generation rate; nor did Ms. McCorkle provide the alteration in linear heat generation rate expected over the lifetime of a fuel rod with an explanation as to how this alteration will effect fuel rod integrity. This information was clearly requested in Interrogatories B.2(a) and B. 2 'b) . Ms. _,

McCorkle filed no objection to these interrogatories and she

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should be required to answer them now.

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Ms. McCorkle again provided a partial answer to Interrogatory B.2(c), but failed to answer that part of the interrogatory calling for definition of the increase in anticipated localized spikes and how such increase would effech fuel rod integrity. Again, Ms. McCorkle filed no objection and should be required to answer this part of the interrogatory. Applicant's Interrogatory C was as follows:

" Interrogatory C - P Tle Cententien 17:

1. This cx:nnv - states that '[t]he containment as designed will allow _c - .sive leakage to bypass tba filtration systEEs . . . . '

a. hh t tehnien1 specification en bypass leakage is necessary to prevent ' excessive' leakage?

b. hht criteria shculd be used to judge wrather contain::ent leakage is ' excessive'? State in detail each quantitative or qualitative criteric.n used in your assess: rent.

c. Will unfiltered leakage of 20% of the total contain-ment leakage cause the total post accident offsite doses to exceed 10 CFR 100 guidelines? Will 10%

unfiltered leakage exceed the guidelines? 5%? If the answer to any or all of these is yes, state every reason, and every fact supporting these reasons, why this amount of unfiltered leakage will exceed the Part 100 gn W 1ir.es.

2. This contention also states that 'tba filter absorber

[ sic] may start a fire by auto-ignition, yet there is no water spray to prevent such auto-ignition as required by NPC regulation '

[ sic] Guide 1.52.'

a. What is the source of heat which will cause absorber auto-ignition?

b. hhat temperature limit will safely maintain the ab W e material belcw the auto-ignition point? t },h -

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c. Are water sprays the only cooling systen acceptable under the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.52?

If so, specifically identify that portion of Regula-

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tory Guide 1.52 which so indicatt ..

Ms. McCorkle's answer was as follows:

"1.a. Less than 1% of the total containment leakage and less than 1 cubic fcot per hour.

b. If it allows nere than 1% of tha radioactive contain-ment air to bypass the charcoal absorbers.

c. All are yes. It is larger than 1%. In addition 10CFR100 [ sic] will be changed to greatly reduce the allcwed arount of radiation to escape.

2.a. The weather and the heat generated in the reactor as well as the heat fran the r,%ctivity in the hN.

b. 10' C

c. No, a refrigeration system that can keep the tcngerature o# the exhaust gases belcw 10* C at all times."

Interrogatories C.1 and C.2 sought information with respect to Ms. McCorkle's contention related to the inadequacy of the Applicant's filtration system. In partic-ular, Interrogatory C.l(c) sought information with respect to the expected leakage rate and an answer as to what the facts were with respect to whether these expected leakage rates would exceed the Part 100 guidelines. Rather than

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answer how the Part 100 guidelines would be exceeded, Ms.

McCorkle answered that the Part 100 guidelines "will be changed to greatly reduce the allowed amount of radiation to escape." Obviously this is not a responsive answer. Appli-cant clearly sought information from Ms. McCorkle as to what -

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she anticipated the leakage rates would be, and given those leakage rates, how would such unfiltered leakage exceed the Part 100 guidelines. Her answer is not responsive and she should be required to either provide the information or state that she does not know.

Respectfully submitted, C AJ OF COUNSEL: J/ Gregory Cppeland C.. Thomas Biddle, Jr.

BAKER & BOTTS Cp'arles G. Thrash, Jr.

3000 One Shell Plaza 3000 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 Houston, Texas 77002 LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS, Jack R. Newman AXELRAD & TOLL Robert H. Culp 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W. 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20036 ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULAIORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of S S

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 S

(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S Station, Unit 1) S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Applicant's Motion to Compel Further Answers from Intervenor McCorkle in the above-captioned proceeding were served cn the following by deposit in the United States mai , ostage prepaid, or by hand-delivery this /n#A day of  ;*t44+ ,

1979. /

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman Richard Lowerre, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Assistant Attorney General Board Panel for the State of Texas U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. O. Box 12548 Washington, D. C. 20555 Capitol Station Austin, Texas 787]1 Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum Route 3, Box 350A Hon. Charles J. Dusek Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Mayor, City of Wallis P. O. Box 312 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Wallis, Texas 77485 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mon. Leroy H. Grebe U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission County Judge, Austin County Washington, D. C. 20555 P. O. Box 99

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Bellville, Texas 77418 Chase R. Stephens Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Office of the Secretary of the Appeal Board Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 R. Gordon Gooch, Esq. Atomic Safety and Licensirq Jaker & Botts Board Panel -

1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D. C. 20006 Commission ashingt 9

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Steve Schinki, Esq.

Staff Counsel U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 John F. Doherty 4438 1/2 Leeland Houston, Texas 77023 Madeline Bass Framson 4822 Waynesboro Drive Houston, Texas 77035 Robert S. Framson 4822 Waynesboro Drive Houston, Texas 77035 Cairo Hinderstein 8739 Link Terrace Houston, Texas 77025 D. Marrack 420 Mulberry Lane Bellaire, Texas 77401 Brenda McCorkle 6140 Darnell Houston, Texas 77074 F. H. Potthoff, III 7200 Shady Vijla, #110 Houston, Texas 77055 Wayne E. Rentfro P. O. Box 1335 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 James M. Scott, Jr.

8302 Albacore Houston, Tex'as 77074 ~

VT.4 Gre'go '

J ppeland

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