Information Notice 2014-08, Need for Continuous Monitoring of Active Systems (Including Vacuum Drying Process): Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 May 16, 2014
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2014-08: NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF ACTIVE SYSTEMS IN LOADED SPENT FUEL STORAGE CANISTERS (INCLUDING VACUUM DRYING PROCESS)  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 May 16, 2014 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2014-08:               NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF
 
ACTIVE SYSTEMS IN LOADED SPENT FUEL
 
STORAGE CANISTERS (INCLUDING VACUUM
 
DRYING PROCESS)


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license under Title 10 of the
All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license under
 
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the


Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72, "Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor- Related Greater than Class C Waste", 10 CFR Part 72 Certificate of Compliance holders, and
Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor- Related Greater than Class C Waste, 10 CFR Part 72 Certificate of Compliance holders, and


all 10 CFR Part 72 general licensees.
all 10 CFR Part 72 general licensees.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to
 
supplement IN 2011-10 Thermal Issues Identified during Loading of Spent Fuel Storage Casks
 
to inform addressees of additional information and lessons learned pertaining to the incident
 
that occurred during the loading of spent fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station.
 
NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and take


issuing this information notice (IN) to supplement IN 2011-10 "Thermal Issues Identified during Loading of Spent Fuel Storage Casks"
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC
to inform addressees of additional information and lessons learned pertaining to the incident that occurred during the loading of spent fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station.  NRC expects that recipients will review the inform


ation for applicability to their facilities and take actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Line 38: Line 57:
canister containing fuel assemblies and located within a transfer cask was left unattended for
canister containing fuel assemblies and located within a transfer cask was left unattended for


the evening. A cooling system, which circulated water in the annulus between the canister and
the evening. A cooling system, which circulated water in the annulus between the canister and
 
transfer cask to keep cladding temperatures below allowable limits, was found to be inoperable


transfer cask to keep cladding temperatures below allowable limits, was found to be inoperable the next morning. The NRC conducted a reactive team inspection at the Byron Generating Station in September 2010, and issued Inspection Report Nos. 05000454/2010007,  
the next morning. The NRC conducted a reactive team inspection at the Byron Generating
 
Station in September 2010, and issued Inspection Report Nos. 05000454/2010007,
05000455/2010007, and 07200068/2010002 (Agencywide Documents Access and
05000455/2010007, and 07200068/2010002 (Agencywide Documents Access and


Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140226). Issues that arose as a result of the reactive team inspection were also addressed during a scheduled design and quality assurance inspection at Holtec International, who holds the HI-STORM 100 Certificate of Compliance, from October 25 -29, 2010 (Inspection Report No. 72-1014/10-201, ADAMS
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140226). Issues that arose as a result of
 
the reactive team inspection were also addressed during a scheduled design and quality
 
assurance inspection at Holtec International, who holds the HI-STORM 100 Certificate of
 
Compliance, from October 25 -29, 2010 (Inspection Report No. 72-1014/10-201, ADAMS


Accession No. ML110450157).
Accession No. ML110450157).


ML14121A089 On May 2, 2011, the NRC issued Information Notice 2011-10 (ADAMS Accession No. ML111090200) to inform addressees of the incident that occurred during the loading of spent
ML14121A089 On May 2, 2011, the NRC issued Information Notice 2011-10 (ADAMS Accession No.
 
ML111090200) to inform addressees of the incident that occurred during the loading of spent


fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station. In this information notice the NRC expected that recipients would review the information for applicability to their facilities and take actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station. In this information notice the NRC
 
expected that recipients would review the information for applicability to their facilities and take
 
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.


However, after issuing IN 2011-10, the NRC continued to have technical discussions regarding
However, after issuing IN 2011-10, the NRC continued to have technical discussions regarding


the vulnerability of unattended vacuum drying process. On February 6, 2014, the NRC held a
the vulnerability of unattended vacuum drying process. On February 6, 2014, the NRC held a


public meeting at NRC headquarters to discuss pot
public meeting at NRC headquarters to discuss potential safety issues associated with the


ential safety issues associated with the vacuum drying process during spent nuclear fuel cask loading operations (ADAMS Accession No. ML14065A014).  During the public meeting the NRC provided an overview of potential issues associated with the Byron Generating Station event and a representative from the utility
vacuum drying process during spent nuclear fuel cask loading operations (ADAMS Accession


provided an overview of the event and actions taken at the Byron Generating Station.  A
No. ML14065A014). During the public meeting the NRC provided an overview of potential


representative from the Nuclear Energy Institute provided an overview related to the safety significance of the event and actions taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10.  In general these actions meet NRC's expectations that the vacuum drying process should be continuously
issues associated with the Byron Generating Station event and a representative from the utility


monitored during all phases. As a result of
provided an overview of the event and actions taken at the Byron Generating Station. A


the public meeting, the NRC learned what actions have been taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10 and what type of additional information
representative from the Nuclear Energy Institute provided an overview related to the safety
 
significance of the event and actions taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10. In general
 
these actions meet NRCs expectations that the vacuum drying process should be continuously
 
monitored during all phases. As a result of the public meeting, the NRC learned what actions
 
have been taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10 and what type of additional information


need to be provided in this supplement, as described below.
need to be provided in this supplement, as described below.
Line 72: Line 115:
The inspection reports referenced above provide detailed summaries of the incident as well as
The inspection reports referenced above provide detailed summaries of the incident as well as


findings and observations, underlying implications, and other information. As a result of the
findings and observations, underlying implications, and other information. As a result of the
 
inspections, subsequent reviews and technical analyses, IN 2011-10, and discussions during
 
the public meeting held on February 6, 2014, the NRC identified unresolved potential safety
 
issues related to the incident:
(1) A loaded spent fuel storage cask was left unattended with an inoperable cooling system.
 
Even though vacuum drying was secured when the cooling system failure occurred, the


inspections, subsequent reviews and technical analyses, IN 2011-10, and discussions during the public meeting held on February 6, 2014, the NRC identified unresolved potential safety issues related to the incident:
entire process was put at risk because the cooling system failure went undetected for an


(1) A loaded spent fuel storage cask was left unattended with an inoperable cooling system.  Even though vacuum drying was secured when the cooling system failure occurred, the entire process was put at risk because the cooling system failure went undetected for an entire night, which resulted in an uncontrolled temperature increase inside the canister.
entire night, which resulted in an uncontrolled temperature increase inside the canister.


(2) Subsequent failure of the cooling system resulted in the licensee not being in compliance with the cask technical specifications of ensuring that the peak cladding temperature is
(2) Subsequent failure of the cooling system resulted in the licensee not being in compliance


maintained below recommended limits and that the spent fuel is maintained under flooded or inert conditions if a failure of the vacuum drying system occurred.
with the cask technical specifications of ensuring that the peak cladding temperature is
 
maintained below recommended limits and that the spent fuel is maintained under flooded
 
or inert conditions if a failure of the vacuum drying system occurred.


In summary, cask vendors and licensees should review their operating procedures to ensure
In summary, cask vendors and licensees should review their operating procedures to ensure
Line 86: Line 142:
they are adequate to maintain peak cladding temperature below recommended limits during
they are adequate to maintain peak cladding temperature below recommended limits during


vacuum drying. To achieve these objectives, the cask operating procedures should also be reviewed to determine if they adequately address the need for continuous monitoring of the vacuum drying process. Cask vendors and licensees should consider the need for continuous
vacuum drying. To achieve these objectives, the cask operating procedures should also be
 
reviewed to determine if they adequately address the need for continuous monitoring of the
 
vacuum drying process. Cask vendors and licensees should consider the need for continuous


monitoring of the vacuum drying process such that operators are available to take any
monitoring of the vacuum drying process such that operators are available to take any


necessary actions to put the system into compliance with technical specifications, if a system failure occurred. The monitoring can be done by means other than direct observation.
necessary actions to put the system into compliance with technical specifications, if a system
 
failure occurred. The monitoring can be done by means other than direct observation.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below.
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


/RA/  A. Hsia for
matter to the technical contact listed below.


Mark Lombard, Director Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation
/RA/ A. Hsia for
 
Mark Lombard, Director
 
Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation


Office of Nuclear Material Safety
Office of Nuclear Material Safety
Line 111: Line 177:


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below.
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


/RA/   A. Hsia for
matter to the technical contact listed below.
 
/RA/ A. Hsia for


Mark Lombard, Director
Mark Lombard, Director
Line 124: Line 192:


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Jorge Solis, SFST


301-287-9094 E-mail: Jorge.Solis@nrc.gov
===Jorge Solis, SFST===
                      301-287-9094 E-mail: Jorge.Solis@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.


G:\SFST\Solis\IN-2014-008-ML14121A089.doc ADAMS P8 Accession No.: ML14121A089 OFC: NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E  NMSS E NAME: JSolis CAraguas MSampson REinziger
G:\SFST\Solis\IN-2014-008-ML14121A089.doc
 
ADAMS P8 Accession No.: ML14121A089 OFC:     NMSS     E     NMSS E       NMSS       E     NMSS     E   NMSS       E  NMSS     E
 
NAME: JSolis             CAraguas     MSampson         REinziger     THsia        MLombard


THsia  MLombard  DATE: 04/29/14 04/29/14 04/30/14 05/01/14 05/01/14 05/16/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}
DATE:     04/29/14       04/29/14     04/30/14         05/01/14     05/01/14     05/16/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 06:11, 4 November 2019

Need for Continuous Monitoring of Active Systems (Including Vacuum Drying Process)
ML14121A089
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/16/2014
From: Mark Lombard
NRC/NMSS/SFST
To:
Solis J
References
IN-14-008
Download: ML14121A089 (4)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 May 16, 2014 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2014-08: NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING OF

ACTIVE SYSTEMS IN LOADED SPENT FUEL

STORAGE CANISTERS (INCLUDING VACUUM

DRYING PROCESS)

ADDRESSEES

All holders of and applicants for an independent spent fuel storage installation license under

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the

Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor- Related Greater than Class C Waste, 10 CFR Part 72 Certificate of Compliance holders, and

all 10 CFR Part 72 general licensees.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to

supplement IN 2011-10 Thermal Issues Identified during Loading of Spent Fuel Storage Casks

to inform addressees of additional information and lessons learned pertaining to the incident

that occurred during the loading of spent fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station.

NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and take

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

On August 28-29, 2010, a Holtec HI-STORM 100 spent fuel storage system multipurpose

canister containing fuel assemblies and located within a transfer cask was left unattended for

the evening. A cooling system, which circulated water in the annulus between the canister and

transfer cask to keep cladding temperatures below allowable limits, was found to be inoperable

the next morning. The NRC conducted a reactive team inspection at the Byron Generating

Station in September 2010, and issued Inspection Report Nos. 05000454/2010007,

05000455/2010007, and 07200068/2010002 (Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140226). Issues that arose as a result of

the reactive team inspection were also addressed during a scheduled design and quality

assurance inspection at Holtec International, who holds the HI-STORM 100 Certificate of

Compliance, from October 25 -29, 2010 (Inspection Report No. 72-1014/10-201, ADAMS

Accession No. ML110450157).

ML14121A089 On May 2, 2011, the NRC issued Information Notice 2011-10 (ADAMS Accession No.

ML111090200) to inform addressees of the incident that occurred during the loading of spent

fuel storage canisters at the Byron Generating Station. In this information notice the NRC

expected that recipients would review the information for applicability to their facilities and take

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, after issuing IN 2011-10, the NRC continued to have technical discussions regarding

the vulnerability of unattended vacuum drying process. On February 6, 2014, the NRC held a

public meeting at NRC headquarters to discuss potential safety issues associated with the

vacuum drying process during spent nuclear fuel cask loading operations (ADAMS Accession

No. ML14065A014). During the public meeting the NRC provided an overview of potential

issues associated with the Byron Generating Station event and a representative from the utility

provided an overview of the event and actions taken at the Byron Generating Station. A

representative from the Nuclear Energy Institute provided an overview related to the safety

significance of the event and actions taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10. In general

these actions meet NRCs expectations that the vacuum drying process should be continuously

monitored during all phases. As a result of the public meeting, the NRC learned what actions

have been taken by industry in response to IN 2011-10 and what type of additional information

need to be provided in this supplement, as described below.

DISCUSSION

The inspection reports referenced above provide detailed summaries of the incident as well as

findings and observations, underlying implications, and other information. As a result of the

inspections, subsequent reviews and technical analyses, IN 2011-10, and discussions during

the public meeting held on February 6, 2014, the NRC identified unresolved potential safety

issues related to the incident:

(1) A loaded spent fuel storage cask was left unattended with an inoperable cooling system.

Even though vacuum drying was secured when the cooling system failure occurred, the

entire process was put at risk because the cooling system failure went undetected for an

entire night, which resulted in an uncontrolled temperature increase inside the canister.

(2) Subsequent failure of the cooling system resulted in the licensee not being in compliance

with the cask technical specifications of ensuring that the peak cladding temperature is

maintained below recommended limits and that the spent fuel is maintained under flooded

or inert conditions if a failure of the vacuum drying system occurred.

In summary, cask vendors and licensees should review their operating procedures to ensure

they are adequate to maintain peak cladding temperature below recommended limits during

vacuum drying. To achieve these objectives, the cask operating procedures should also be

reviewed to determine if they adequately address the need for continuous monitoring of the

vacuum drying process. Cask vendors and licensees should consider the need for continuous

monitoring of the vacuum drying process such that operators are available to take any

necessary actions to put the system into compliance with technical specifications, if a system

failure occurred. The monitoring can be done by means other than direct observation.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below.

/RA/ A. Hsia for

Mark Lombard, Director

Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Jorge Solis, NMSS/SFST/TCB

301-287-9094 E-mail: Jorge.Solis@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below.

/RA/ A. Hsia for

Mark Lombard, Director

Division of Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical Contact:

Jorge Solis, SFST

301-287-9094 E-mail: Jorge.Solis@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

G:\SFST\Solis\IN-2014-008-ML14121A089.doc

ADAMS P8 Accession No.: ML14121A089 OFC: NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E NMSS E

NAME: JSolis CAraguas MSampson REinziger THsia MLombard

DATE: 04/29/14 04/29/14 04/30/14 05/01/14 05/01/14 05/16/14 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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