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{{#Wiki_filter:SCHEDULING NOTE Title:
{{#Wiki_filter:SCHEDULING NOTE Title:
* TRANSFORMATION AT THE. NRC (Publi'c)
* TRANSFORMATION AT THE. NRC (Publi'c)
Purpose: The purpose of the meeting is to provide the Commission with a discussion of the NRC staff's transformation recommendations and external stakeholders' views on transformation.
Purpose:             The purpose of the meeting is to provide the Commission with a discussion of the NRC staff's transformation recommendations and external stakeholders' views on transformation.
Scheduled:
Scheduled:           October 29, 2018 9:00 a.m.
October 29, 2018 9:00 a.m. Duration:
Duration:             Approx. 3 hours Location:             Commis~ioners' Conference Room, 1st fl OWFN
Approx. 3 hours Location:
* NRC Staff                                                                     15 mins.*
Commis~ioners' Conference Room, 1st fl OWFN
Dan Dorman, Acting Deputy Exe~cutive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration, and Human
* NRC Staff Dan Dorman, Acting Deputy Exe~cutive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration, and Human
* Capital Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, NMSS Topic:
* Capital Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, NMSS Topic: Overview of transformation initiatives and recommendations 15 mins.* Commission Q & A 5 mins. Panel 1 30 mins. Maria Korsnick, President and Chief Executive Officer, 5 mins. Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Dale Atkinson, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, NuScale 5 mins. Power, LLC . Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney, Nuclear, Climate & Clean Energy 5 mins. Program, Natural Resources Defense Council Mark MacNichol, International Representative, International Brotherhood 5 mins. of Electrical Workers /
Overview of transformation initiatives and recommendations Commission Q & A                                                               5 mins.
Danny Bost, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Southern Nuclear
Panel 1                                                                       30 mins.
* Lee Cox, Chief; North Carolina Radiation Protection Section, Department of Health and Human Services Topic:
Maria Korsnick, President and Chief Executive Officer,                         5 mins.
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)
Dale Atkinson, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, NuScale       5 mins.
Power, LLC                                         .
Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney, Nuclear, Climate & Clean Energy           5 mins.
Program, Natural Resources Defense Council Mark MacNichol, International Representative, International Brotherhood         5 mins.
of Electrical Workers
                                                                                    /
 
Danny Bost, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer,             .5mins.
Southern Nuclear
* Lee Cox, Chief; North Carolina Radiation Protection Section, Department     5 mins.
of Health and Human Services Topic:
* Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations
* Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations
* Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A Break Panel2 Bryan Hanson, Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation, and President and Chief Nuclear Officer, E?<elon Nuclear Dr. Todd Allen, Senior Visiting-Fellow, Third Way Jeff Semancik, Director, Radiation Division, Bureau of Air Management, Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
* Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A                                                         50 mins.
* Dave Lochbaum Jose Emeterio Gutierrez, President and Chief Executive Officer, Westinghouse Electric Company Heather Westra, Consultant, Prairie Island Indian Community Topic: .
Break                                                                       5 mins.
Panel2                                                                   30 mins.*
Bryan Hanson, Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation, and                 5mins.
President and Chief Nuclear Officer, E?<elon Nuclear Dr. Todd Allen, Senior Visiting-Fellow, Third Way                           5 mins.
Jeff Semancik, Director, Radiation Division, Bureau of Air Management,       5mins.
Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
* Dave Lochbaum                                                               5 mins.
Jose Emeterio Gutierrez, President and Chief Executive Officer,             5 mins.
Westinghouse Electric Company Heather Westra, Consultant, Prairie Island Indian Community               . 5mins.
Topic:             .
* Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations*
* Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations*
* Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A Discussion  
* Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A                                                           50 mins.
-Wrap-Up *For presentation only and does not include time for Commission Q & A's . / .5mins. 5 mins. 50 mins. 5 mins. 30 mins.* 5mins. 5 mins. 5mins. 5 mins. 5 mins. . 5mins. 50 mins. 5 mins. 2 U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulator y Commission Protecting Pe o ple and the Envir o nment Transformation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Meeting October 29, 2018 e U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting Peopk and the Environment Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration and Human Capital Programs Daniel Dorman NRC Panel will Address the Following Topics
Discussion - Wrap-Up                                                         5 mins.
*For presentation only and does not include time for Commission Q & A's .
          /
2
 
U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Transformation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Meeting October 29, 2018
 
e U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting Peopk and the Environment Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration and Human Capital Programs Daniel Dorman
 
NRC Panel will Address the Following Topics
* Overview of Transformation Initiatives and Next Steps
* Overview of Transformation Initiatives and Next Steps
* Stakeholder Feedback and Recommendations Proactive Efforts to Transform our Regulatory Framework
* Stakeholder Feedback and Recommendations
* Self-initiated effort to identify proposed changes to our framework, culture, and infrastructure  
 
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2 Drlttop,ncf-1'4>t<*illU(>lt>--dl.Ylgtw.                               NAC
NAC
* 90 day effort focused on specific areas
* 90 day effort focused on specific areas Modern Risk Informed Regulation Cannot Wait --* Our strong regulatory framework has served us well; the NRC mission will remain unchanged
 
Modern Risk Informed Regulation
                                            --
Cannot Wait
* Our strong regulatory framework has served us well; the NRC mission will remain unchanged
* We need to integrate our strong safety culture, organization, and principles into a culture that embraces change
* We need to integrate our strong safety culture, organization, and principles into a culture that embraces change
* There is a strong sense of urgency and energy that modern risk informed regulation can't wait
* There is a strong sense of urgency and energy that modern risk informed regulation can't wait
* The key transformational change is cultural e Ongoing Actions and Next Steps U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission P r otecting People and the Environment Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director e Building on Previous Success through Extensive Interaction with a Broad Range of Stakeholders
* The key transformational change is cultural
 
e Ongoing Actions and Next Steps
 
U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director
 
e Building on Previous Success through Extensive Interaction with a Broad Range of Stakeholders
* Built on previous successes
* Built on previous successes
* Solicited ideas from stakeholders
* Solicited ideas from stakeholders
* Interacted with internal and external stakeholders Stakeholder Input Shaped Common Themes and Recommendations  
* Interacted with internal and external stakeholders
-Need for systematic and expanded use of risk and safety insights in decision-making  
 
-Need for decision making that is not bound by current processes and focusses on timeliness as well as safety -Need for more performance based regulations  
Stakeholder Input Shaped Common Themes and Recommendations
-Need to permit licensees to make more changes to their facilities without NRC approval, while maintaining safety The Staff's Recommendations to Achieve Modern Risk Informed Regulation
              - Need for systematic and expanded use of risk and safety insights in decision-making
              - Need for decision making that is not bound by current processes and focusses on timeliness as well as safety
              - Need for more performance based regulations
              - Need to permit licensees to make more changes to their facilities without NRC approval, while maintaining safety
 
The Staff's Recommendations to Achieve Modern Risk Informed Regulation
* Develop an agency-wide process, organizational tools, and endorsement to expand the systematic Use of qualitative and quantitative risk and safety insights in licensing to scale the level of reviews needed to make findings of adequate protection
* Develop an agency-wide process, organizational tools, and endorsement to expand the systematic Use of qualitative and quantitative risk and safety insights in licensing to scale the level of reviews needed to make findings of adequate protection
* Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar change processes to allow additional flexibility for licensees to make changes without prior NRC approval
* Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar change processes to allow additional flexibility for licensees to make changes without prior NRC approval
* Initiate an optional performance-based, inclusive regulation for non-light water reactors
* Initiate an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive regulation for non-light water reactors
* Initiate rulemaking to define performance-based, technology-inclusive criteria for the licensing of l&C systems and leverage additional development standards for digital systems Acronyms
* Initiate rulemaking to define performance-based, technology-inclusive criteria for the licensing of l&C systems and leverage additional development standards for digital systems
 
Acronyms
* Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
* Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
* Instrumentation and Control (l&C)
* Instrumentation and Control (l&C)
* Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
* Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
* Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
* Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
* Office of the Secretary (SECY) 11
* Office of the Secretary (SECY) 11
 
*
*
* NUSCALE&#x17d; Power for all humankind I NuScale Perspective October 29, 2018 COO/CNO Rev i sion: 0 Copyright&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power LLC Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RB I Design Certification Review-Successes
* NUSCALE' Power for all humankind I NuScale Perspective October 29, 2018 COO/CNO Revision : 0 Copyright&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power LLC                                         Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RB
* Overall, review has progressed very well -maintaining schedule for the bulk of the application  
 
-excellent communication at all levels
I Design Certification Review-Successes
* Leadership of NRO executives appreciated  
* Overall, review has progressed very well
-NRO August 29, 2018 memo (ML18240A410) clarifying review expectations  
              - maintaining schedule for the bulk of the application
-open dialog on issues
              - excellent communication at all levels
* Key successes PM-1018-62199 Rev i s i on: O -safety classification of electrical systems design -control room and licensed operator staffing -digital instrumentation and control platform NuScale Nonproprietary Copyrigh t&#xa9; 2018 b y NuSca le Powe r , L LC ~Y.~o~o!h~
* Leadership of NRO executives appreciated
* Template#: 0000-2 0 955-F 01 R S I Design Certification Review-Challenges
              - NRO August 29, 2018 memo (ML18240A410) clarifying review expectations
* Not consistently realizing benefit of design safety -innovative design solutions to historic safety vulnerabilities seem to 'raise the regulatory bar' in some instances  
              - open dialog on issues
-unreasonable level of application detail and depth of staff review, especially in areas of low safety significance  
* Key successes
-review framework doesn't evaluate safety holistically  
              - safety classification of electrical systems design
-inadequate/unclear consideration of risk in application and review processes
              - control room and licensed operator staffing
* Consequences PM-1018-621 9 9 R e vision: 0 -innovative safety enhancements harder to get approved th~n safe alternatives that better fit existing regulations and guidance -current review costs exceeding our estimate -level of detail creates lifetime significant regulatory burden to manage licensing basis NuScale Nonproprietary Copyr i gh t&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power , LLC :-1 t'!!:l.~,~,!hr T e mplate#: 0000-20955-F0 1 R8 I Transformation Needs
              - digital instrumentation and control platform PM-1018-62199 Revision: O NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC
* Risk-informed regulation  
                                                                                ~ ~Y.~o~o!h~
-NuScale experience illustrates how difficult this transformation will be -existing framework, as currently implemented, is ill-suited for designs with significant departures from past safety concepts -urgent need to address for new applications
* Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RS
* Clarify scope and level of detail required in applications/review  
 
-both scope and content of application and review should be informed -"essentially complete" should be limited to the information necessary for safety finding -limited review of operational programs at DCA stage -disciplined review that considers the full regulatory framework, including downstream regulatory processes.
I Design Certification Review-Challenges
* NuScale provides opportunity to pilot these concepts -some opportunities still exist in current review PM-1018-621 9 9 Revision:
* Not consistently realizing benefit of design safety
0 -future applications NuScale Nonproprietary Copy ri gh t &#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power , LLC !-I ~Y.~o~.!b~. T e mpl a te#: 0000-2095 5-F0 1 RS PM-1 0 1 8-62199 Rev isio n: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power , LLC Dale Atkinson COO/CNO datkinson@nuscalepower
              - innovative design solutions to historic safety vulnerabilities seem to
.com Template#: 0000-20955-F01 R8
                'raise the regulatory bar' in some instances
,.--:---. NRDC Comments on: SECY-18-0060 "ACHIEVING MODERN RISK-INFORMED REGULATION" Geoffrey Fettus Senior Attorney, Nuclear Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) . i ! 
              - unreasonable level of application detail and depth of staff review, especially in areas of low safety significance
'.-~-.... NRDC Comments on: * "The Need for Cultural Transformation at the NRC"
              - review framework doesn't evaluate safety holistically
* Recommended Transformation Initiative "Strategy to Transform the Agency licensing-Review Process"
              - inadequate/unclear consideration of risk in application and review processes
* Consequences
              - innovative safety enhancements harder to get approved th~n less-safe alternatives that better fit existing regulations and guidance
              - current review costs exceeding our estimate
              - level of detail creates lifetime significant regulatory burden to manage licensing basis PM-1018-621 99 Revision: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright&#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC
:-1 t'!!:l.~,~,!hr Template #: 0000-20955-F01 R8
 
I Transformation Needs
* Risk-informed regulation
              - NuScale experience illustrates how difficult this transformation will be
              - existing framework, as currently implemented, is ill-suited for designs with significant departures from past safety concepts
              - urgent need to address for new applications
* Clarify scope and level of detail required in applications/review
              - both scope and content of application and review should be risk-informed
              - "essentially complete" should be limited to the information necessary for safety finding
              - limited review of operational programs at DCA stage
              - disciplined review that considers the full regulatory framework, including downstream regulatory processes.
* NuScale provides opportunity to pilot these concepts
              - some opportunities still exist in current review
              - future applications PM-1018-621 99 Revision: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright &#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC
                                                                                  !-I ~Y.~o~.!b~.
Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RS
 
Dale Atkinson COO/CNO datkinson@nuscalepower.com PM-1018-62199 NuScale Nonproprietary Revision: 0   Copyright &#xa9; 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC                         Template#: 0000-20955-F01 R8
 
                          ,.--:--- .
NRDC Comments on: SECY-18-0060 "ACHIEVING MODERN RISK-INFORMED REGULATION"
                                              .
Geoffrey Fettus Senior Attorney, Nuclear Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)
 
                                                                      '.- ~- ....
NRDC Comments on:
* "The Need for Cultural Transformation at the NRC"
* Recommended Transformation Initiative "Strategy to Transform the Agency licensing- Review Process"
* Recommended Transformation Initiative "10 CFR-50.59 and Similar Change Processes" NRDC
* Recommended Transformation Initiative "10 CFR-50.59 and Similar Change Processes" NRDC
* Advanced Reactors *
* Advanced Reactors
* Digital Instrumentation and Controls
* Digital Instrumentation and Controls *
* October 29, 2018 NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 1 . uTransform the agency Hcensing review process by development of
* October 29, 2018
 
NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 1 .
uTransform the agency Hcensing review process by development of
* an agencywide process and organizational tools to expand the
* an agencywide process and organizational tools to expand the
* systematic use of qualitative and quantitative risk and .safety insights; thereby,*
* systematic use of qualitative and quantitative risk and .safety insights; thereby,* enabling staff to scale the scope of review and level of detail needed to make a finding of reasonable assurance of adequate protection, beginning w.ith the licensing reviews for     NRDC
enabling staff to scale the scope of review and level of detail needed to make a finding of reasonable assurance of adequate protection, beginning w.ith the licensing reviews for
* reactors"
* reactors" NRDC
* October 29, 2018 *
 
                                                                                ,*" --- .
NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060
.Recommendation 2 11 Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar requirements to allow additional flexibility for l'icensees to make facility changes without
*. prior NRC _approval" NRDC
* October 29, 2018
 
NRDC Comments on SECY~18-0060 Recommendation 3                                                              /
  "Initiate an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive
* regulation for non-LWRsn NRDC.
* October 29, 2018
 
NRDC Comme-nts on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 4 "Initiate rulemaking to define high-level performance-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance that docume*nts the acceptable standards that may be used to meet these principles" NRDC
* October 29, 2018
* October 29, 2018
* NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060 . Recommendation 2 11 Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar requirements to allow additional flexibility for l'icensees to make facility changes without *. prior NRC _approval" ,*" ---. NRDC
 
* I October 29, 2018 NRDC Comments on SECY~18-0060 Recommendation 3 "Initiate an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive
I
* regulation for non-LWRsn
* ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL.
/ NRDC.
Transformation at the NRC Danny Bost Executive Vice President and CNO October 29, 2018 A Southern Nuclear                             A Georgia Power 1
* October 29, 2018 NRDC Comme-nts on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 4 "Initiate rulemaking to define high-level performance-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance that docume*nts the acceptable standards that may be used to meet these principles" NRDC
 
* October 29, 2018 I* ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL. Transformation at the NRC Danny Bost Executive Vice President and CNO October 29, 2018 A Southern Nuclear A Georgia Power 1
',
', Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
* Significant industry improvement in managing safety over last 30 years. *
* Significant industry improvement in managing safety over last 30 years.
*
* Transformation opportunity in revising regulatory processes to be more efficient and effective both for the NRC and the industry.
* Transformation opportunity in revising regulatory processes to be more efficient and effective both for the NRC and the industry.
* SECY-18-0060
* SECY-18-0060
* Step the in right direction
* Step the in right direction
* Important to Part 50 and Part 52 licensees  
* Important to Part 50 and Part 52 licensees
.& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
                                                                  .& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America
 
Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
* Applicability to Vogtle 3 and 4
* Applicability to Vogtle 3 and 4
* Improved understanding of safety margins
* Improved understanding of safety margins
* Changes in design and process possible without impacting safety
* Changes in design and process possible without impacting safety
* Vogtle 3 and 4 Regulatory Construction History
* Vogtle 3 and 4 Regulatory Construction History
* Under construction for 6 years since first safety-related rebar
* Under construction for 6 ~ years since first safety-related rebar
* Excellent regulatory compliance record
* Excellent regulatory compliance record
* Site focus on assuring compliance
* Site focus on assuring compliance
* Expand Vogtle 3 and 4 initiatives to formal pilot
* Expand Vogtle 3 and 4 initiatives to formal pilot
* Spotlight on risk-informed decision-making in context of reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
* Spotlight on risk-informed decision-making in context of reasonable assurance of adequate protection.
ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL. .& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America
ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL.                               .& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America
.* Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
 
.*
Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)
Vogtle 3 and 4 Risk-Informing Opportunities
Vogtle 3 and 4 Risk-Informing Opportunities
* NRC inspection consolidation
* NRC inspection consolidation
* License amendment level of effort
* License amendment level of effort
* Part 52 & AP1000 changes based on recognition of limited safety impact Excellent Compliance History Merits Resource Reduction A.. Southern Nuclear -4.. Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America NC Department of Health and Human Services NC Perspective on NRC Transformation Recommendations W. Lee Cox, Ill Chief, Radiation Protection Section October 29, 2018
* Part 52 & AP1000 changes based on recognition of limited safety impact Excellent Compliance History Merits Resource Reduction A.. Southern Nuclear -4.. Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America
. . .. . .. .. . . -****-. . .. ---*-* ---*-***--
 
*--*---------------*  
                                    '
----**** ----*----~~
NC Department of Health and Human Services NC Perspective on NRC Transformation Recommendations W. Lee Cox, Ill Chief, Radiation Protection Section October 29, 2018
 
. . .. . .. .. . . - ****- . ... ---*-* ---*-***-- *--*---------------* ----**** - - - - * - - - - ~ ~
Reflection on Transformation
Reflection on Transformation
* Similarities, Comparisons, and Lessons Learned -Reinvention  
* Similarities, Comparisons, and Lessons Learned
-Focused on Agency Success -Agency Success not a Priority for the Public or the Regulated Community  
                              - Reinvention
-Inclusion of Value-Added Regulatory  
                              - Focused on Agency Success
-Considerations NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
                              - Agency Success not a Priority for the Public or the Regulated Community
October 29, 2018 2
                              - Inclusion of Value-Added Regulatory
.~{ . *. '1/t.,,\,, ' Transformation Recommendations
                              - Considerations NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018       2
* Define high-level performa.nce-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance -Less.Prescriptive/Increased Flexibility  
 
-Leader/Champion for Change -Reliance on Familiar/Obsolete Technology and Processes  
                                                                                    .~{       .
--Example of State Complacency and the Transition to Drone Technology NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
                                                                                *. '1/t.,,\,,   '
October 29, 2018 3
Transformation Recommendations
-. -----*-* _,, __ , ___ -**--~--------~------------
* Define high-level performa.nce-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance
----*-~-----~  
      - Less.Prescriptive/Increased Flexibility
' > * ~-l f> ~:: ' ,..i'(:,;:,~, ,!~ -Transformation Recommendations https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuUJCd SHLNU&feature=em-share video user NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
      - Leader/Champion for Change
October 29, 2018 4 Transformation Recommendations
      - Reliance on Familiar/Obsolete Technology and Processes
      -- Example of State Complacency and the Transition to Drone Technology NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018                 3
 
-. -     - --   - *-* _,, __ ___ -**- -~--------~------------ -- - - * - ~ - - - - - ~
                            ,
                                                                                          '               >
                                                                                      * ~-     l f>
                                                                                                ~:: '
                                                                                            ,..i'(:,;:,~, ,!~ -
Transformation Recommendations https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuUJCd SHLNU&feature=em-share video user NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018                           4
 
                                                                                  '
Transformation Recommendations
* Licensing Review Process
* Licensing Review Process
* Revise 10 CFR 50.59 **Performance-Based, Technology-Inclusive Regulation for Non-LWRs.
* Revise 10 CFR 50.59
NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
**Performance-Based, Technology-Inclusive Regulation for Non-LWRs.
October 29, 2018 ' 5
NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 5
/ .. . .. ******* ... ------*-********-***  
 
--*---------*------
  .. .   .. *******   ... -- ---   -*-********-*** -- *-- -------*------ ----****-------~
----****-------~  
                ..   .     --* . . .. ....... ..   . . . ... ... . . - . . *-**- .. .. .. ..* ****-**---- __________ ___..;.;
.. . --* . . .. ....... .. . . . ... ... . . -. . *-**-.. .. . . ..* ****-**----
Additional Views
__________
      *
___..;.; Additional Views *
* Reduce the NRC Inspection Footprint When No Major Gaps are Identified
* Reduce the NRC Inspection Footprint When No Major Gaps are Identified
* Use of Rigorous Self-Assessments . ,.
* Use of Rigorous Self-Assessments
* Incorporate*
                                                                      .                                                         ,.
More Remote Review /
* Incorporate* More Remote Review
* Use Onsite Effort for Areas of Greater Safety Significance NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
                /
October 29, 2018 6
* Use Onsite Effort for Areas of Greater Safety Significance
. . .... -.. --... . --.... ___ ,, ___________________
/
,, ____ ., ___ , ______ ----------~~
NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018                                             6
 
. . .... - .. - - ... . - - .... ___ ___________________ ____
                                    ,,                 ,,   ., ___ ______ ----------~~
                                                                    ,
Closing
Closing
* Hurricane Florence -Incorporation of Value-Added Oversight by Federal, State and Local E~tities to Facilitate the Startup of a Reactor to Provide Needed Power. -No Losers = NRC Transformation Success NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation!
* Hurricane Florence
October 29, 2018 7 Perspectives on NRC Transformation Commission Meeting October 29, 2018 Bryan Hanson Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation
                      - Incorporation of Value-Added Oversight by Federal, State and Local E~tities to Facilitate the Startup of a Reactor to Provide Needed Power.
                      - No Losers = NRC Transformation Success NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 7
 
Perspectives on NRC Transformation Commission Meeting October 29, 2018 Bryan Hanson Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation
 
                                                                  \.
Risk-Informed Decision-Making Plant safety and reliability are high PRA is one    Margin to safety goals must guide                Many element of a opportunities to risk-informed    risk-informed      improve use of decision-making  decision-making framework                            PRA models framework Challenges with timely decisions on risk-informed initiatives Risk-informed decision-making improves safety
_.....,
1                                                  Exelon Generation.


Risk-Informed Decision-Making PRA is one element of a risk-informed decision-making framework Plant safety and reliability are high Margin to safety goals must guide risk-informed decision-making framework Challenges with timely decisions on risk-informed initiatives Many opportunities to improve use of PRA models Risk-informed decision-making improves safety _....., \. 1 Exelon Genera ti on.
Reactor Oversight Process Enhancements Revise ROP Action matrix to reflect normal plant operations, with baseline CDF between 10-5 and 10-6/year Close White findings upon successful completion of follow-up actions
Reactor Oversight Process Enhancements Revise ROP Action matrix to reflect normal plant operations, with baseline CDF between 10-5 and 10-6/year Close White findings upon successful completion of follow-up actions ----*.. ,-. ...,.. ._,,,_.,...
                -- -- *.. ,- . ...,.. ._,,,_.,... _,...__ ~--~ --'"---= .,_ -------
_,... __ ~--~ --'"---= .,_ -------Results: (1) more fidelity between risk and NRG/licensee response (2) better public understanding of relationship between ROP findings and true risk Reduce baseline inspections based on performance Additional proposals are set forth in Sept. 19, 2018 NE/ letter to Director of NRR, Ho Nieh _.....,, 2 E xe l o n Generation 
Results:
(1) more fidelity between risk and NRG/licensee response (2) better public understanding of relationship between ROP findings and true risk Reduce baseline inspections based on performance Additional proposals are set forth in Sept. 19, 2018 NE/ letter to Director         _.....,, of NRR, Ho Nieh 2                                                                                           ExelonGeneration


OPENING COMMENT The conversation from and about the NRC has improved greatly over the past few years. The trajectory is positive.
OPENING COMMENT The conversation from and about the NRC has improved greatly over the past few years. The trajectory is positive.
* Through its transformative efforts, the NRC has become decidedly more transparent, communicative, and flexible in its approach to the regulatory process and advanced reactor developers.
* Through its transformative efforts, the NRC has become decidedly more transparent, communicative, and flexible in its approach to the regulatory process and advanced reactor developers.
* A wide array of advanced reactor industry stakeho_lders are highly engaged with the Commission, and have acknowledged its willingness to adapt and innovate in its procedures.
* A wide array of advanced reactor industry stakeho_  lders are highly engaged with the Commission, and have acknowledged its willingness to adapt and innovate in its procedures.
2Q 1 H CENTURY CONFIDENT EXPERTS Lewis Strauss 11 lt is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too cheap to meter , will know of great periodic regional famines in the world only as matters of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a lifespan far longer than ours as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes him to age." . U.S. et E fiedrici ty Generati*o11 fro m Nude*ar Po er , '1960-2 0 13 0 +---------
 
-+-----------c.. Sowc e: EP I Ii B .r; t:: 1111 3: 3: 3:
2Q1 H CENTURY CONFIDENT EXPERTS U.S . et Efiedricity Generati*o11 from Nude*ar Po er,
                                                                          '1960-2013 Lewis Strauss 11 lt is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too                                                           0
                                                  + - - - - - - - - --+--- - - - - - - - - .r;            c..
cheap to meter, will know of great periodic                                                               t::
1111
                                                                                                            ~
regional famines in the world only as matters                                                             3:
3:
3:
of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a lifespan far longer than ours as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes him to age. " .
Sowce: EPI Ii B
 
THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
* General Fusion Helion Energy 'WR S uperCr i tica l National Ignition ENHS General Atomics Tri Alpha ~ps MIFTI EM2andMHR
* General Fusion Helion Energy
* G4M STAR
                          'WR SuperCritical
* NumerEx
* Starcore Nuclear Integral MSR SMAR               TAP.
* z Machine Integral M S R SMAR Leadtr PSl 00
FHA Leadtr PSl 00
* Fusion
* Fusion                 RAD!.
* Starcore Nuclear TAP. FHA RAD!. Science Center
* Science Center
* Lawrenceville Plasma Physics Westinghouse.
* Lawrenceville Plasma Physics Westinghouse .
* Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Ughtbridge X-Energy ARC-100 . DOE Next Gen Lockheed Martin HyperV S~TGR *L*ESSTAR .GEMSTAR Reactor Design Types PRISM
* Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory STAR                          Ughtbridge X-Energy
* Molten Salt Reacto r *
* G4M                                                                          ARC-100                       .
* F l uoride Salt-cooled H i gh Temperature Rea c tor F l
National Ignition                                                                                                              DOE Next Gen       Lockheed Martin ENHS                                                                                                                                  HyperV     S~TGR
* Li qu i d Meta l-c ooled Fa s t R e a ct or
* L*ESSTAR Reactor Design Types
* H i gh Temperature Gas Reactor
                                                                                                                                                . GEMSTAR General Atomics                                      NumerEx PRISM
* Pebble Bed Rea c tor
* Molten Salt Reactor
* Nu cl ear Batte ry Reacto r Thereon
                ~ps EM2andMHR Tri Alpha MIFTI
* Des i gns Advanced Nuclea r Fue ls SMR* 60
* z Machine
* Small M odular Reactor
                                                                                                                                *F l
* Fus i on Reacto r
                                                                                                                                                                                *
* Super-C r i tica l CO 2 Reac t or LC-1 c; ... I-r 1 W.1y ~r E f Jr rE u<oe w*tli attn but nn. in oncept t..y ",arnuel Brin tor ,.. tog, 1ph by C df" rk.;;01 **third way . P fresh thinking WHAT SHOULD THE REGULATOR LOOK LIKE? COMSECY 17-0006, examination of the Need for a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Leadership Model," dated February 6,2017 We ensure your 21st Century Nuclear is safe THEM: GIANT MUTANT ANTS (19505) A first entertainment use of induced mutant creatures
* Fluoride Salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactor
~--GRAND THEMES TO KEEP IN MIND
* High Temperature Gas Reactor
* Pebble Bed Reactor
* Nuclear Battery Reactor Thereon
* Designs Advanced Nuclear Fuels SMR* 60
* Small Modular Reactor
* Fusion Reactor
* Super-Critica l CO2 Reactor LC-1 c; ... I- r 1 W.1y ~r E f Jr rE u<oe w*tli attn but nn. in   oncept t..y ",arnuel Brin tor ,.. tog, 1ph by C df"   rk.;;01
                                                                                                                                                                                  *   .P *third way fresh thinking
 
WHAT SHOULD THE REGULATOR LOOK LIKE?
We ensure your 21st Century Nuclear is safe COMSECY 17-0006, "Re-examination of the Need for a U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Leadership Model," dated February 6,2017
 
THEM: GIANT MUTANT ANTS (19505)
A first entertainment use of radiation-induced mutant creatures
 
~ - -
GRAND THEMES TO KEEP IN MIND
* Vendors, investors, & consumers of energy products need to believe that the NRC can regulate at the pace of commerce, while maintaining the continued protection of public health and safety, promoting the common defense and security, and protecting the environment
* Vendors, investors, & consumers of energy products need to believe that the NRC can regulate at the pace of commerce, while maintaining the continued protection of public health and safety, promoting the common defense and security, and protecting the environment
* Initiatives need to ensure the NRC can recruit and maintain a vibrant staff that embraces the transformation at all levels of the organization
* Initiatives need to ensure the NRC can recruit and maintain a vibrant staff that embraces the transformation at all levels of the organization
* Changes in regulatory processes require a parallel engagement strategy that provides comfort to the public that the core mission of the N RC has not changed ADVANCED NUCLEAR CAMPAIGN Todd Allen Senior Fellow , Third Way tallen@thirdway.org Connecticut Department of ENERGY & -s.-ENVIRONMENTA L PROTECTION
* Changes in regulatory processes require a parallel engagement strategy that provides comfort to the public that the core mission of the NRC has not changed
/,..--*-. , .. --------------*-.
 
--------. --------------------------------------~ -------.__. -*----*-------------
ADVANCED NUCLEAR CAMPAIGN Todd Allen Senior Fellow, Third Way tallen@thirdway.org
--. ---*--------Connecticut's Perspective on the . NRC Staff's Recommendations and Additional Views on Transforma-tion for the Agency Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
 
' _,,.,--**-.  
Connecticut Department of ENERGY &
* * *" --* .~-~-* -----** *, "* *** -* ''*,-*** * *-'* * --~, -* -"* ..... * ****'* --* * * *** *-**" :",**** ---* * *-* -** -::**---.-
s.- ENVIRONMENTA L PROTECTION
;-.---****** * ** -~--;'" **,-: -**-* :* ----****,.-,*A***  
-
*** * "' -***---: ---.-* **-***-** ****-***;  
 
* ,,_,_~--* " ** *.**** . . Jnsights on TranSformation  
          - ----- ------*-. ---- ---- . - - - - ------ -- -
.** . ' ' ., ' . Co.nnecticut Department of Energy :and Environmental.Protection
                                                            /,..--*-.
:-.   
                                                                      ---- ------ -- --- ----- -----~ ------ - .__. -*- - --*- - ----------- -- . ---
.. -*-_.,. -* -' .. . . . .. . . . . . . . -. ' .. ' ,' ... ' . >' ' '. ',, ' . . . . NRCTranSformation .Efforts ... *''' . j ' . " .. -* ... ._ '. ~* --'' .~ * .. :. ---** -. . ' . * .... . .
                                                                                                                                                      ,..-- *- ---- ---
--*~ ' \ ...... ,. *----*-. ****-* *-* .... -----:*. **-----****-
Connecticut's Perspective on the .
-,**----~---*  
NRC Staff's Recommendations and Additional Views on Transforma-tion for the Agency Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
****-:**-**-*--
 
.. ----~-*~*  
_,,.,--**-.
.. . ,*' . . . .. . Focus.must remain on.Safety . . . ' . . . . . ' *connecticut Depa'rtment  
                                                                                                                                      '
*of Energy and Environmental Protection
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                .
**** -* *' u. -***. ____ ,..__,_ __ **** **-....... ---__ _,.._ *-------**  
  * * *" - - * .~-~- * ---   - - ** *, "* *** - * ''*,- *** * *- ' * * - - ~ , - * - "* ..... * ****'* --* * * *** *-**" :",**** -- -*     * *- * - ** -::**---.- ; - . - - - ****** *   ** - ~ - -;'" **,-: - * * - * :* - - - -****,.-,*A*** *** * "' - ***---: ---.-* **-***- ** ****-***; *             ,,_,_~-- * " ** *.****
----------*-*-*.  
                                                                                                                                        .
--*~-****--*.*--------.--**-*---*~**---~  
Jnsights on TranSformation .*
------*-*--.. -*--.. ----* ----,--. --**---* *-' -* . . -Risk Should be Managed not Accepted : ' . -*' Connecticut Department of Eriergyan_d Environmental  
                          .                                                         '                         '                                     .,                             '     .
*Protection  
Co.nnecticut Department of Energy :and Environmental.Protection :- .
-I . i Risk Should be Managed not Accepted Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
 
. . / . . . . . ( . . -* . ., -* *----------*-.... --~---.. ----* . *---. --* --* **-. . . --* -. . -----. . Risk Should be Managed not Accepted . . . . -Connecticut*Departmentof Energy and Environmental Protection .
  . ~ -*- _.,. -* - ' .. .. . . . .. . . . . - . ' .. ' ,' ..       ' . >' ' '.                 ',, ' .                 .     . .
, ***--***--" -**-***----
NRCTranSformation .Efforts. .                                                                                   *'''
--.--*. *-**,-* ---. *-*-------~----*~--_.:, ____ ., ______ . ::-*----*  
                                                                                                                                    . j
.:. ---~---**:*--*  
                                                                                                                        . . ' .
-* ------*--'  
                                                            ' .  .. -* ... ._ '. ~* - - '' .~ *.. :. - - -** -
-----*---------
                                                                                                                    *.... ~ . .  
... *---*-------
                                                                "
--*-***-*** *****-. --.--.. ----------*-----------.-----...--*/  
 
----****----*  
                                                                                                                                            --*~
*Decisions Should be.Based on Science
                                                                                                                                          '     \
*-**-*** --:--~*--. ---**-*;*. -:-**-,--.. *-** --***-**-*****--*---------*-
  . . . . . . ,. *- -- -*- . ****-* *-* .... ---- -:*. **-----****- -,**----~---* ****-:**-**-*-- . ----~-*~* ..   . ,*' . .     .     ..       .
----**-***,*--------1  
Focus.must remain on.Safety
.-** ---*-** -****---~------
                    .               .                                       . '       .                       .           . .   . '
--** ---.. -. ' ,* '-.' . . . ' -Engage the CommunitiesthatBearthe Risk*
                *connecticut Depa'rtment *of Energy and Environmental Protection
.. ...--***-. .Questions?
 
,..----....  
**** - * *' u. -***. ____ ,..__,_ __ **** **- . . . . . . . - -- __ _,.._ *-------** ----- -----*-*-*. -- *~- ****--*.*--------.--**-*---*~**---~ ------   * - * - -. . - * - - .. - - - - * - ---,--. - - **---* *-
' ----* .. **-* -* --** --: ---------* --... ------* * ---* -**-----------*----.*---
                    '                                                         -* .                                                                                                               .     -
*** I Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Transformation Success: Narrowing the Gap Between Perception and Reality
Risk Should be Managed not Accepted :
* Dave Lochbaun, Self-Unen,ployed October 29, 2018 NRC has demonstrated proficiency at responding swiftly and effectively to unanticipated safety and security challenges (e.g., PWR CRDM nozzle cracking in spring 2001 and 9/11 later that year) NRC c , an successfully apply that capacity to future challenges such as those listed in SECY-18-0060 BUT, and it's a big BUT: Transformation success depends on keeping the gap between perception and reality as narrow as possible.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        .
2 Year-Plu Date Date Outage Date Date Outage Outage Outage Length Outage Outage Length Reactor Began Ended (years) Reactor Began Ended (years) Ferm, Urn 1 10/5/66 7 1 8/70 3.8 Surry Urn 2 9/10/88 9/19/89 1.0 Pahsades 8. 11173 10/1/74 1.1 Palo Ve r de Urn 1 3/5/89 7/5/90 1.3 Browns Ferry Urn 2 3 22/75 9/10/76 1.5 Calver Chf s Urn 2 3/17/89 5/4/9 1 2.1 Browns Ferry Urn 3/22/75 9/24/76 1.5 Calvert Chffs Urnt 1 5/5/89 1 0/4/90 1.4 Surry Urn 2 2 1 4/7 9 8, 9/80 1.5 F1 zPa rick 11 1 27/91 1/23/93 1.2 Three Mile Island Unit 1 2/17/79 10/9/85 66 Brunsmck Unit 2 /21/92 5/1 5/93 1.1 Turkey Point Urn 3 2/11/81 4 11/82 1.2 Brunswick Urnt I /21/92 2/11/94 1.8 San Onotre Unit 1 2 26/82 11, 28/84 2.8 Nine ,le Pom Unit I 3/20/82 7/5/83 1.3 Indian Point Unit 3 3;25/82 6/8/83 1.2 Oyster Creek 2/1 2/83 1 /1/84 .7 South Te as Proiec 2/3/93 5/22/94 Unit 2 1.3 52 year-plus South Te as Pro1ect Unit 1 2/4/9 3 2/25/94 1.1 Indian Point Urnt 3 /27/93 7/2/95 2.3 outages to St Lucie Urn 1 2/26/83 5/16/84 .2 Browns Ferr y Unit 3 9'7/83 11/28/84 .2 P1lgnm 12'1 0/8 3 2/30/84 1.1 Sequoyah Unit 1 3/2/93 4/20/9 4 1.1 restore safety Ferm, Unit 2 12/25/93 1/1 8/95 1.1 Mame Yankee 1/1 4/9 5 1/1 8,'9 1.0 levels to Peach Bottom Unit 2 128/8 7 13/85 1.2 Fort St. Vram 6/13/8 /11/86 1.8 Salem Urn 1 5/1 6/9 5 4/20/9 8 29 acceptable Salem Urn 2 6.'7/9 5 8/30/97 2.2 Browns Ferry Urn 2 9 1 5/8,d 5/24/9 1 6.7 Millstone Unit 2 2/20/96 5/11/99 3.2 levels, 50 on Browns Fe ry Urn 3 3/9/85 11/1 9/9 5 1 0.7 Bro ms Fe ry Urn 3119/8 5 6, 12,'07 22.2 Millstone Unit 3 3/30/96 7/1/9 8 2.3 NRC's watch Crys al River Urn 3 9/2/9 2/6/9 8 1.4 Davis-Besse 6/9/8 5 12/24/86 1.5 Clinton 9/5/96 5/27/99 2.7 Sequoyah Urn 2 8 '22/85 5 3/88 2.7 LaSalle County Urn 2 9.20/9 4/11 '99 2.6 Sequoyah Urn 1 8 22/85 1/10/88 3.2 LaSalle County Urn I 9/22/96 8/1 3/98 1.9 Rancho Seco 12/26/8 5 4/11/88 2.3 D.C. Cook Unit 2 9/9/9 7 6/25/00 2.8 P11Qnm , 11/8 6 6/1 5/89 3.2 D.C. Coo Urn 1 9/9/97 1 2/21/00 3.3 Peach Bottom Unit 2 3;3 1/87 5, 22/89 2.1 Davis-Besse 2/1 6/02 3/1 6/04 2.1 Peach Bottom Urnt 3 3/3 1/87 1 2/11/89 2.7 Fort Calhoun 4/9/1 1 2/21/1 3 2.7 Nine 1le Pom Unit 121 1 9/8 7 8/12/90 2.6 Source: UCS report No More Fort Calhouns!, February 2015. Online at report.pdf?
                                                                                                                                                          '     .
ga=2.196753579.62578069.1538585309-730957765.1502383429 3
        - *' Connecticut Department of Eriergyan_d Environmental *Protection -
Lessons from year-plus reactor outages: 1. Owners were not knowingly operating unsafe reactors, hoping not to get caught. 2. Owners were operating what they perceived to be sufficient safe reactors, but they were not. 3. The gap between perception and reality is reflected by the time required to re-close the gap. 4. 44 year-plus outages during the SALP years (1980-1999), an average of 2.2 per year 5. 2 year-plus outages during the ROP years (2000-date), an average of less than 0.11 per year 6. ROP narrowed the gap between perception and reality, thus preventing uncorrected safety problems from growing to the point where it takes longer than a year to remedy them once detected 4 Lessons from ROP for transformations:
 
: 1. Unintended consequences and initially correct deferral decisions undermined by changing landscapes need to be detected and corrected in a timely and effective manner. 2. Baseline gap-monitoring for non-transformation areas (aka back-burner issues) to guard against undue delays and cumulative effects of regulation.
Risk Should be Managed not Accepted Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
 
    .                                         .               / . .                       .     .                         ( .
  .   -* .
            .
              ~ ., -* *---- --- -- -*- . . . . --~- -- .. ----* . *-   -- . ~~
                                                                                .
                                                                                  - -* --*   **-.
                                                                                                .
                                                                                                  . . -   -* - . .   - -- - -
Risk Should be Managed not Accepted                           .     .                           .     .         -
Connecticut*Departmentof Energy and Environmental Protection .
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        ,
  ***--***--" - **-***---- -- .--*. *-**,-* --- . *-*--- ----~-- --*~-- _.:, ____ ______ . ::-*----*
                                                                                  .,                  .:. - --~---**:*--* -* ------*--' -----*---------...*---*------- --*- ***-*** *****-. --.-- .. ------ ----*-----------.-----...--*/ - ---****----*
*Decisions Should be.Based on Science
 
  *-**-*** -- :--~*--. --- **-*;*. -:-**-,--..*-** --***-**- *****--*---------*- ----**- ***,*--------1     .-** - --*-** -****---~------ --** - -- .. - . ' ,* '-.'
                                                                                                    .   . .                               ' -
Engage the CommunitiesthatBearthe Risk*
 
.....--***-.                                                                                                                                                       ,..----....
                                            - - - -* .. **-* - * - - ** --: -------- - * - - ... ------* * - -- * - **- - ---- - -- - - * - - - - . * - - - *** I
                                                                                                                                                                  '
.Questions?
Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection
 
Transformation Success:
Narrowing the Gap Between Perception Reality and
* Dave Lochbaun, Self-Unen,ployed October 29, 2018
 
NRC has demonstrated proficiency at responding swiftly and effectively to unanticipated safety and security challenges (e.g., PWR CRDM nozzle cracking in spring 2001 and 9/11 later that year)
NRC c ,a n successfully apply that capacity to future challenges such as those listed in SECY-18-0060 BUT, and   it's a big BUT:
Transformation success depends on keeping the gap between perception and reality as narrow as possible.                       2
 
Year-Plu Date       Date   Outage                               Date     Date   Outage Outage     Outage   Length                             Outage   Outage   Length Reactor                   Began     Ended     (years) Reactor                     Began     Ended   (years)
Ferm, Urn 1               10/5/66   7 1 8/70     3.8 Surry Urn 2               9/10/88   9/19/89   1.0 Pahsades                 8. 11173   10/1/74     1.1   Palo Verde Urn 1           3/5/89     7/5/90   1.3 Browns Ferry Urn 2       3 22/75   9/10/76     1.5   Calver Chf s Urn 2         3/17/89     5/4/91    2.1 Browns Ferry Urn         3/22/75   9/24/76     1.5   Calvert Chffs Urnt 1       5/5/89   10/4/90   1.4 Surry Urn 2               2 14/79  8, 9/80     1.5   F1 zPa rick               11 127/91 1/23/93   1.2 Three Mile Island Unit 1 2/17/79   10/9/85     66   Brunsmck Unit 2             /21/92   5/15/93   1.1 Turkey Point Urn 3       2/11/81   4 11/82     1.2   Brunswick Urnt I             /21/92   2/11/94   1.8 San Onotre Unit 1         2 26/82   11,   28/84   2.8   South Te as Proiec 2/3/93    5/22/94    1.3
        ,le Pom Unit I   3/20/82     7/5/83     1.3   Unit 2 Nine Indian Point Unit 3       3;25/82     6/8/83     1.2   South Te as Pro1ect Unit 1 2/4/ 93  2/25/94   1.1 52 year-plus Oyster Creek              2/12/83    1 / 1/84      .Indian Point Urnt 3         /27/93   7/2/95   2.3   outages to St Lucie Urn 1           2/26/83   5/16/84       .2 Sequoyah Unit 1            3/2/93    4/20/94    1.1 Browns Ferry Unit 3       9'7/83   11/28/84       .2 Ferm, Unit 2              12/25/93  1/18/95    1.1 restore safety P1lgnm                  12'10/83    2/30/84     1.1   Mame Yankee                1/14/ 95  1/18,'9   1.0  levels to Peach Bottom Unit 2       128/8     7 13/85      1.2  Salem Urn 1               5/16/95    4/20/98    29 Fort St. Vram             6/13/8       /11/86     1.8   Salem Urn 2                 6.'7/95  8/30/97     2.2   acceptable Browns Ferry Urn 2       9 15/8,d   5/24/91      6.7   Millstone Unit 2           2/20/96   5/11/ 99   3.2   levels, 50 on Browns Fe ry Urn 3         3/9/85   11/ 19/95    10.7  Millstone Unit 3          3/30/96    7/1/98    2.3 Bro ms Fe ry Urn         3119/85  6, 12,'07   22.2   Crys al River Urn 3         9/2/9      2/6/98    1.NRC's watch Davis-Besse               6/9/85  12/24/86     1.5   Clinton                     9/5/96   5/27/99   2.7 Sequoyah Urn 2           8 '22/85   5 3/88       2.7   LaSalle County Urn 2       9. 20/9   4/11 '99   2.6 Sequoyah Urn 1           8 22/85     1/10/88     3.2   LaSalle County Urn I       9/22/96   8/13/98     1.9 Rancho Seco             12/26/85  4/11/88       2.3   D.C. Cook Unit 2           9/9/97  6/25/00     2.8 P11Qnm                     , 11/ 86 6/15/89       3.2   D.C. Coo Urn 1             9/9/97   12/21/00   3.3 Peach Bottom Unit 2       3;31/87   5, 22/89     2.1   Davis-Besse               2/16/02   3/16/04   2. 1 Peach Bottom Urnt 3       3/31/87 12/11/89       2.7   Fort Calhoun               4/9/1   12/21/13    2.7 Nine   1le Pom Unit     12119/87 8/12/90         2.6 Source: UCS report No More Fort Calhouns!, February 2015. Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/np-ft-calhouns-full-report.pdf? ga=2.196753579.62578069.1538585309-730957765.1502383429                                     3
 
Lessons from year-plus reactor outages:
: 1. Owners were not knowingly operating unsafe reactors, hoping not to get caught.
: 2. Owners were operating what they perceived to be sufficient safe reactors, but they were not.
: 3. The gap between perception       and   reality is reflected by the time required to re-close the gap.
: 4. 44 year-plus outages during the SALP years (1980-1999), an average of 2.2 per year
: 5. 2 year-plus outages during the ROP years (2000-date), an average of less than 0.11 per year
: 6. ROP narrowed the gap between perception and reality, thus preventing uncorrected safety problems from growing to the point where it takes longer than a year to remedy them once detected 4
 
Lessons from ROP for transformations:
: 1. Unintended consequences and initially correct deferral decisions undermined by changing landscapes need to be detected and corrected in a timely and effective manner.
: 2. Baseline gap-monitoring for non-transformation areas (aka back-burner issues) to guard against undue delays and cumulative effects of non-regulation.
: 3. To maximum extend practical, objective metrics needed to ensure desired outcomes are achieved without unintended consequences.
: 3. To maximum extend practical, objective metrics needed to ensure desired outcomes are achieved without unintended consequences.
: 4. ROP is superior to SALP, but not infallible.
: 4. ROP is superior to SALP, but not infallible.
5 Davis-Besse Perception (SALP) PLANT NAME: DAV1S-BESSE REGION: 3 UNIT RPT ASSESSMENT PERIOD 03/95 . 07/01/93 -01/21/95 09/93 12/01/91 -06/30/93 I I 04(_92 I 01Lo1L90 -Il/30/91 I I 1IL90 I 03l01/89 -06l30l90 I I 07/89 I 01/01/88 -02/28/89 OPS MAINT I f~it~ l 2 1 I 2 I 1 I 2 I 2 I 2 I 2 SALP perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer NUR G-1214 2-23 ENG 1 *'"" l: 1 2/1/1 I 2 ] 2L1L 1: I I 2 I 2L1Ll I I 2 I 21111 I 6 Davis-Besse Perception (ROP) Initiating  
5
... Events 1Q/2001 Reactor Safe t y Mit i gating Barrier Sy s t e ms lntegn1y Emergenc y Preparedness R a diation Safety Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Most Significant Inspection Findings ROP also perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer Safeguards T Phy sical Protect ion 7 JQ/2 00 3 2 Q/2 00 3 1 Ql2 00 3 4Q/2 00 Initia t ing Events Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems Ba rrier I eg rity Davis-Besse Reality Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Safeguarr.
 
Physical P ro t ectio1 ost Sign" ficar t lnsped'ion Fndings y (1) ir*'l''"'*'"'~"i"mi 1~*1'.;,i~~-
Davis-Besse Perception (SALP)
.. * '*"' ,>&#xa3; ,
PLANT NAME:   DAV1S-BESSE REGION: 3 UNIT       RPT         ASSESSMENT PERIOD       OPS    MAINT  ENG 03/95     . 07/01/93 - 01/21/95       I  f~it~ l      1    *'" l:
f"1i:"'"-~~  
09/93       12/01/91 - 06/30/93       2        1      1  2/1/1 I       I 04(_92 I   01Lo1L90 - Il / 30/91 I  2  I     1  I   2 ] 2L1L1:I I        I  1IL90   I   03l01/89 - 06l30l90   I I     2  I  2 I 2L1Ll I I        I  07 / 89 I   01/01/88 - 02/28/89   I 2 I     2 I   2 I 21111 I SALP perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer NUR G- 1214                               2-23 6
':-;*/} 1,t.1-,.,, \,<'' "" Reality showed Davis-Besse to have come closer to accident than any reactor since Three Mile Island NRC and industry are on the same page ( often the same sentence on the same page) for many risk calculations, such as: 1. Peak cladding temperatures during postulated loss of coolant accidents
 
Davis-Besse Perception (ROP)
Reactor                                          Radiation          Safeguards Safety                                            Safety
                                      ~*~                                                                    T Initiating Events
                      ... Mitigating Systems    ~
Barrier lntegn1y Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Most Significant Inspection Findings 1Q/2001 ROP also perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer 7
 
Davis-Besse Reality Reactor                                                      Radiation                                       Safeguarr.
Safety                                                        Safety Public Initiating  Mitigating        Barrier                                                                                                Physical Events      Systems          I egrity                                                            Radiation Protectio1 Safety ost Sign"ficar t lnsped'ion Fndings ir*'l''"'*'"'~"i"mi         ~~~r~~~,*~f~~f::
JQ/2003                                                                1~*1'.;,i~~-.. * '*"' ,>&#xa3; , f"1i:"'"-~~ ':-;*/} 1,t.1-,.,, \,<'' ""
2Q/2003              y (1) 1Ql2003 4Q/200 Reality showed Davis-Besse to have come closer to accident than any reactor since Three Mile Island
 
NRC and industry are on the same page
( often the same sentence on the same page) for many risk calculations, such as:
: 1. Peak cladding temperatures during postulated loss of coolant accidents
: 2. Peak containment pressures during postulated steam line break accidents
: 2. Peak containment pressures during postulated steam line break accidents
: 3. Steam generator tube wall crack growth rates 4. Pipe wall thinning rates due to erosion/corrosion
: 3. Steam generator tube wall crack growth rates
: 4. Pipe wall thinning rates due to erosion/corrosion
: 5. Safety-related component failures to start and failures to run Unless both are wrong, tiny gap between perceptionandreality 9
: 5. Safety-related component failures to start and failures to run Unless both are wrong, tiny gap between perceptionandreality 9
NRC and industry are not in the same book, yet alone on the same page, for high risks . .\"\'O tlood prot~cti )JI Yello,Y findin!2 AKO ._*rnror Drop on Cuit l ydlc w fincli112
 
:\1\ . tato1 Drop on l*nit Yello\Y fin lin2 :\lonticdlo flood protection ydlo,,* fiudirnz Ocouee .-nfe . hutdo,Yn focihtY Yellow find i nll Palo \*er le Yoided C * . uct1011 hue Yellow findin!2 \\"atr. B;i r llo l protection Yellow fiudin!! Licensee 6 CDF 1.4 E-05 4. E-06 1. E-06 I. E-* 6 .4 E-I.OE-6 6.6E-6 -0 .O E-06 .0 -6 1. E-04 59 &deg;o 6.0E-05 1.15 &deg;o -* E-05 1.45 &deg; 0 I. E-"'.-E-05 1 1 LI0-0 4_ ~I LI 1 166 00_ N f Lll_ 4 -.6E-5 -* 5 E-O: 1 1 I LO "' 701 6 "'.6 -5 10 &deg;o .6 -5 6.3:E-06 Whichever is wrong, massive gap between perception and reality -~
NRC and industry are not in the same book, yet alone on the same page, for high risks Licensee 6 CDF
. My prime concern with transformations: . Changes are not occurring in isolation, enabling progress towards desired outcome to be effectively monitored and mid-course corrections implemented, if necessary.
      ..\"\'O tlood prot~cti )JI Yello,Y findin!2 1.4 E-05  1. E-04  59  &deg;o AKO ._* rnror Drop on Cuit l ydlc w fincli112
: 4. E-06    6.0E-05    1.15  &deg;o
:\1\   . tato1 Drop on l *nit ~
Yello\Y fin lin2
: 1. E-06   -
* E-05  1.45  &deg; 0 I. E -* 6  I. E-
                                            .4E-     "' .- E-05           1 1LI0 - 0 4_
                                                                            ~ILI 116600_
I.OE- 6    - .6E- 5 NfLll _      4 6.6E- 6    -
* 5E-O:             1 ILO "' 701 6 1
:\lonticdlo flood protection
                                                  -0  "' .6 - 5 ydlo,,* fiudirnz Ocouee .-nfe . hutdo,Yn focihtY Yellow find inll
                                            .OE-06                10 &deg;o Palo \*er le Yoided        C *
                                            .0 - 6      .6 - 5
      . uct1011 hue Yellow findin!2
      \\"atr . B;i r llo l protection 6.3:E-06 Yellow fiudin!!
Whichever is wrong, massive gap between perception                               and       reality
                                                                                            -~
 
.My prime concern with transformations: .
Changes are not occurring in isolation, enabling progress towards desired outcome to be effectively monitored and mid-course corrections implemented, if necessary.
Instead, transformations are proposed concurrent with extensive changes to the ROP and other regulatory constructs.
Instead, transformations are proposed concurrent with extensive changes to the ROP and other regulatory constructs.
Can performance shortfalls be readily and reliably detected when the yardsticks are all new without proven track* records? I know the perception is ''yes, of course." But is that also the real answer? 11
Can performance shortfalls be readily and reliably detected when the yardsticks are all new without proven track* records?
,-------Gap management straw-pers-ons:
I know the perception is ''yes, of course." But is that also the real answer?
: 1. Annual self-evaluations by two NRC teams. a) One team looking for evidence that desired outcomes have been achieved or are target to do so. b) One team looking for evidence of unintended consequences from transformation initiatives and adverse consequences in non-transformation areas. 2.
11
* Commission briefing and/or ACRS meeting with presentations by both teams 12 List of Acronyms ACRS -Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards  
 
* . CDF -Core damage frequency CFR -Code of Federal Regulations CRDM -Control Rod Drive Mechanism ENG -Engineering MAINT -Maintenance NRC -~uclear Regulatory Commission OPS -Operations PS -Plant Support (e.g., training, security, etc.-C...
-- -
PWR -Pressurized Water Reactor ROP -Reactor Oversight Process SALP -Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance 13
Gap management straw-pers-ons:
: 1. Annual self-evaluations by two NRC teams.
a) One team looking for evidence that desired outcomes have been achieved or are on-target to do so.
b) One team looking for evidence of unintended consequences from transformation initiatives and adverse consequences in non-transformation areas.
: 2. *Commission briefing and/or ACRS meeting with presentations by both teams 12
 
List of Acronyms ACRS - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards *
. CDF - Core damage frequency CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CRDM - Control Rod Drive Mechanism ENG - Engineering MAINT - Maintenance NRC - ~uclear Regulatory Commission OPS - Operations PS - Plant Support (e.g., training, security, etc.-C...
PWR - Pressurized Water Reactor ROP - Reactor Oversight Process SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance 13
 
* @ Westinghouse 1
* @ Westinghouse 1
* Apply SECY-18-0600 recommendat_ions across all NRC business lines -Use of risk information  
* Apply SECY-18-0600 recommendat_ions across all NRC business lines
-Embrace the Staff's sense .of urgency -.
  - Use of risk information
* Westinghouse's current journey provides_
  - Embrace the Staff's sense .of urgency
lessons learned -External help is essential  
                                                      -.
-Operational tran_?parency leads to efficiency in execution  
* Westinghouse's current journey provides_ lessons learned
@ Westinghouse 2
  - External help is essential
. .,
  - Operational tran_?parency leads to efficiency in execution
* Change process (10 CFR 50.59) needs a risk-informed  
@ Westinghouse 2
'alternative
 
* License renewals and amendments  
..,
-Greater predictability in the scope and depth of review
* Change process (10 CFR 50.59) needs a risk-informed
          'alternative
* License renewals and amendments
            - Greater predictability in the scope and depth of review
* Reviews should be commensurate with safety significance
* Reviews should be commensurate with safety significance
* Use the reasonable assurance standard .
* Use the reasonable assurance standard .
* Commission policy on "forward fitting" new guidance ) * *
* Commission policy on "forward fitting" new guidance
* Predictable advanced reactor licensing  
                                                          )
* @Westinghouse 3
    * *
* Sharing and evaluating budget execution data will promote efficiency gains -Confirm staff time is spent on safety significant activities  
* Predictable advanced reactor licensing
-Analyze inspection data to drive program enhancements  
    * @Westinghouse 3
-Improve understanding with external stakeholders  
* Sharing and evaluating budget execution data will promote efficiency gains
@Westinghouse The cultural discomfort that comes with change gives way to a healthier process 4
  - Confirm staff time is spent on safety significant activities
./ @ Westinghouse 5
  - Analyze inspection data to drive program enhancements
Transformation at the NRC Heather Westra Prairie Island Indian Community Welch, Minnesota October 29, 2018 Location Prairie Island Indian Community Minnesota Pra irie I s l and Dakota .. Goodhue Wabasha D od ge O lm s t e d 'M n ona 2 3
  - Improve understanding with external stakeholders The cultural discomfort that comes with change gives way to a healthier process
Indian Reservations in the Continental United States Data Sources: This map was compiled from unknown sources by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) at 1: 2,000,000 scale. Map Information
@Westinghouse 4
: Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area; Scale 1: 5645860 Th e numbe r s on the map represent the locations of I ndian reservations.
 
Please reference these numbers with the accompanying sheets entitled " Indian Reservations
./
-BIA/CAST 5/96".
  @ Westinghouse 5
 
Transformation at the NRC Heather Westra Prairie Island Indian Community Welch, Minnesota October 29, 2018
 
Location Prairie Island Indian Community             Minnesota Prairie Island Dakota
                                                          .
Goodhue Wabasha Dodge          Olmsted            'Mnona 2
 
3 Indian Reservations in the Continental United States Data Sources:
This map was compiled from unknown sources by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) at 1:2,000,000 scale.
Map Information:
Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area ; Scale 1:5645860 The numbers on the map represent the locations of Indian reservations. Please reference these numbers with the accompanying sheets entitled
" Indian Reservations- BIA/CAST 5/96 ".
 
The NRC and Federally Recognized Indian Tribes Encourage and facilitate Tribal involvement in the areas that the NRC has
The NRC and Federally Recognized Indian Tribes Encourage and facilitate Tribal involvement in the areas that the NRC has
* jurisdiction.
* jurisdiction. Tribal Policy Statement~ 2017.
Tribal Policy Statement~
*_ NRC Tribal Policy Statement-fully integrated within NRC
2017. *_ NRC Tribal Policy Statement-fully integrated within NRC
* Trust Responsibility
* Trust Responsibility
* Government-to-Government Consultation  
* Government-to-Government Consultation
*
    * *outreach to Tribes
* outreach to Tribes
* Understanding Tribal Counterparts 5
* Understanding Tribal Counterparts 5
Recommendations NRC Tribal Policy Integrated Across all Program Areas.
Recommendations NRC Tribal Policy Integrated Across all Program Areas.
* NRC staff familiar with Tribal Policy and Protocol Manu,;11
* NRC staff familiar with Tribal Policy and Protocol Manu,;11

Revision as of 12:31, 20 October 2019

M181029: Scheduling Note and Slides - Transformation at the NRC (Public Meeting)
ML18304A168
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/29/2018
From:
NRC/SECY
To:
References
Download: ML18304A168 (85)


Text

SCHEDULING NOTE Title:

  • TRANSFORMATION AT THE. NRC (Publi'c)

Purpose: The purpose of the meeting is to provide the Commission with a discussion of the NRC staff's transformation recommendations and external stakeholders' views on transformation.

Scheduled: October 29, 2018 9:00 a.m.

Duration: Approx. 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Location: Commis~ioners' Conference Room, 1st fl OWFN

  • NRC Staff 15 mins.*

Dan Dorman, Acting Deputy Exe~cutive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration, and Human

  • Capital Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, NMSS Topic:

Overview of transformation initiatives and recommendations Commission Q & A 5 mins.

Panel 1 30 mins.

Maria Korsnick, President and Chief Executive Officer, 5 mins.

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)

Dale Atkinson, Chief Operating Officer and Chief Nuclear Officer, NuScale 5 mins.

Power, LLC .

Geoffrey H. Fettus, Senior Attorney, Nuclear, Climate & Clean Energy 5 mins.

Program, Natural Resources Defense Council Mark MacNichol, International Representative, International Brotherhood 5 mins.

of Electrical Workers

/

Danny Bost, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, .5mins.

Southern Nuclear

  • Lee Cox, Chief; North Carolina Radiation Protection Section, Department 5 mins.

of Health and Human Services Topic:

  • Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations
  • Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A 50 mins.

Break 5 mins.

Panel2 30 mins.*

Bryan Hanson, Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation, and 5mins.

President and Chief Nuclear Officer, E?<elon Nuclear Dr. Todd Allen, Senior Visiting-Fellow, Third Way 5 mins.

Jeff Semancik, Director, Radiation Division, Bureau of Air Management, 5mins.

Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

  • Dave Lochbaum 5 mins.

Jose Emeterio Gutierrez, President and Chief Executive Officer, 5 mins.

Westinghouse Electric Company Heather Westra, Consultant, Prairie Island Indian Community . 5mins.

Topic: .

  • Perspectives on NRC Staff transformation recommendations*
  • Stakeholder suggestions for other ideas the agency should explore Commission Q & A 50 mins.

Discussion - Wrap-Up 5 mins.

  • For presentation only and does not include time for Commission Q & A's .

/

2

U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Transformation at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Meeting October 29, 2018

e U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting Peopk and the Environment Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal, Compliance, Administration and Human Capital Programs Daniel Dorman

NRC Panel will Address the Following Topics

  • Overview of Transformation Initiatives and Next Steps
  • Stakeholder Feedback and Recommendations

Proactive Efforts to Transform our Regulatory Framework

  • Self- initiated effort to identify proposed changes to our framework, culture, and infrastructure ~ 2 S. 2D18 J.~TO Tt~TNffl
  • Narrow focus on enabling :er ::!::=-~--*

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  • 90 day effort focused on specific areas

Modern Risk Informed Regulation

--

Cannot Wait

  • Our strong regulatory framework has served us well; the NRC mission will remain unchanged
  • We need to integrate our strong safety culture, organization, and principles into a culture that embraces change
  • There is a strong sense of urgency and energy that modern risk informed regulation can't wait
  • The key transformational change is cultural

e Ongoing Actions and Next Steps

U.S.NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Protecting People and the Environment Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, and Waste Programs Andrea Kock, Deputy Director

e Building on Previous Success through Extensive Interaction with a Broad Range of Stakeholders

  • Built on previous successes
  • Solicited ideas from stakeholders
  • Interacted with internal and external stakeholders

Stakeholder Input Shaped Common Themes and Recommendations

- Need for systematic and expanded use of risk and safety insights in decision-making

- Need for decision making that is not bound by current processes and focusses on timeliness as well as safety

- Need for more performance based regulations

- Need to permit licensees to make more changes to their facilities without NRC approval, while maintaining safety

The Staff's Recommendations to Achieve Modern Risk Informed Regulation

  • Develop an agency-wide process, organizational tools, and endorsement to expand the systematic Use of qualitative and quantitative risk and safety insights in licensing to scale the level of reviews needed to make findings of adequate protection
  • Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar change processes to allow additional flexibility for licensees to make changes without prior NRC approval
  • Initiate an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive regulation for non-light water reactors
  • Initiate rulemaking to define performance-based, technology-inclusive criteria for the licensing of l&C systems and leverage additional development standards for digital systems

Acronyms

  • Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)
  • Instrumentation and Control (l&C)
  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
  • Regulatory Information Conference (RIC)
  • Office of the Secretary (SECY) 11
  • NUSCALE' Power for all humankind I NuScale Perspective October 29, 2018 COO/CNO Revision : 0 Copyright© 2018 by NuScale Power LLC Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RB

I Design Certification Review-Successes

  • Overall, review has progressed very well

- maintaining schedule for the bulk of the application

- excellent communication at all levels

  • Leadership of NRO executives appreciated

- NRO August 29, 2018 memo (ML18240A410) clarifying review expectations

- open dialog on issues

  • Key successes

- safety classification of electrical systems design

- control room and licensed operator staffing

- digital instrumentation and control platform PM-1018-62199 Revision: O NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright© 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC

~ ~Y.~o~o!h~

  • Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RS

I Design Certification Review-Challenges

  • Not consistently realizing benefit of design safety

- innovative design solutions to historic safety vulnerabilities seem to

'raise the regulatory bar' in some instances

- unreasonable level of application detail and depth of staff review, especially in areas of low safety significance

- review framework doesn't evaluate safety holistically

- inadequate/unclear consideration of risk in application and review processes

  • Consequences

- innovative safety enhancements harder to get approved th~n less-safe alternatives that better fit existing regulations and guidance

- current review costs exceeding our estimate

- level of detail creates lifetime significant regulatory burden to manage licensing basis PM-1018-621 99 Revision: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright© 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC

-1 t'!!:l.~,~,!hr Template #: 0000-20955-F01 R8

I Transformation Needs

  • Risk-informed regulation

- NuScale experience illustrates how difficult this transformation will be

- existing framework, as currently implemented, is ill-suited for designs with significant departures from past safety concepts

- urgent need to address for new applications

  • Clarify scope and level of detail required in applications/review

- both scope and content of application and review should be risk-informed

- "essentially complete" should be limited to the information necessary for safety finding

- limited review of operational programs at DCA stage

- disciplined review that considers the full regulatory framework, including downstream regulatory processes.

  • NuScale provides opportunity to pilot these concepts

- some opportunities still exist in current review

- future applications PM-1018-621 99 Revision: 0 NuScale Nonproprietary Copyright © 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC

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Template#: 0000-20955-F01 RS

Dale Atkinson COO/CNO datkinson@nuscalepower.com PM-1018-62199 NuScale Nonproprietary Revision: 0 Copyright © 2018 by NuScale Power, LLC Template#: 0000-20955-F01 R8

,.--:--- .

NRDC Comments on: SECY-18-0060 "ACHIEVING MODERN RISK-INFORMED REGULATION"

.

Geoffrey Fettus Senior Attorney, Nuclear Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)

'.- ~- ....

NRDC Comments on:

  • "The Need for Cultural Transformation at the NRC"
  • Recommended Transformation Initiative "Strategy to Transform the Agency licensing- Review Process"
  • Recommended Transformation Initiative "10 CFR-50.59 and Similar Change Processes" NRDC
  • Advanced Reactors
  • Digital Instrumentation and Controls *
  • October 29, 2018

NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 1 .

uTransform the agency Hcensing review process by development of

  • an agencywide process and organizational tools to expand the
  • systematic use of qualitative and quantitative risk and .safety insights; thereby,* enabling staff to scale the scope of review and level of detail needed to make a finding of reasonable assurance of adequate protection, beginning w.ith the licensing reviews for NRDC
  • reactors"
  • October 29, 2018 *

,*" --- .

NRDC Comments on SECY-18-0060

.Recommendation 2 11 Revise 10 CFR 50.59 and other similar requirements to allow additional flexibility for l'icensees to make facility changes without

  • . prior NRC _approval" NRDC
  • October 29, 2018

NRDC Comments on SECY~18-0060 Recommendation 3 /

"Initiate an optional performance-based, technology-inclusive

  • regulation for non-LWRsn NRDC.
  • October 29, 2018

NRDC Comme-nts on SECY-18-0060 Recommendation 4 "Initiate rulemaking to define high-level performance-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance that docume*nts the acceptable standards that may be used to meet these principles" NRDC

  • October 29, 2018

I

  • ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL.

Transformation at the NRC Danny Bost Executive Vice President and CNO October 29, 2018 A Southern Nuclear A Georgia Power 1

',

Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)

  • Significant industry improvement in managing safety over last 30 years.
  • Transformation opportunity in revising regulatory processes to be more efficient and effective both for the NRC and the industry.
  • Step the in right direction
  • Important to Part 50 and Part 52 licensees

.& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America

Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)

  • Applicability to Vogtle 3 and 4
  • Improved understanding of safety margins
  • Changes in design and process possible without impacting safety
  • Vogtle 3 and 4 Regulatory Construction History
  • Under construction for 6 ~ years since first safety-related rebar
  • Excellent regulatory compliance record
  • Site focus on assuring compliance
  • Expand Vogtle 3 and 4 initiatives to formal pilot
  • Spotlight on risk-informed decision-making in context of reasonable assurance of adequate protection.

ONE TEAM. ONE VISION. ONE GOAL. .& Southern Nuclear .& Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America

.*

Transformational Change (SECY-18-0060)

Vogtle 3 and 4 Risk-Informing Opportunities

  • NRC inspection consolidation
  • License amendment level of effort
  • Part 52 & AP1000 changes based on recognition of limited safety impact Excellent Compliance History Merits Resource Reduction A.. Southern Nuclear -4.. Georgia Power Building the future of nuclear power in America

'

NC Department of Health and Human Services NC Perspective on NRC Transformation Recommendations W. Lee Cox, Ill Chief, Radiation Protection Section October 29, 2018

. . .. . .. .. . . - ****- . ... ---*-* ---*-***-- *--*---------------* ----**** - - - - * - - - - ~ ~

Reflection on Transformation

  • Similarities, Comparisons, and Lessons Learned

- Reinvention

- Focused on Agency Success

- Agency Success not a Priority for the Public or the Regulated Community

- Inclusion of Value-Added Regulatory

- Considerations NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 2

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Transformation Recommendations

  • Define high-level performa.nce-based l&C safety design principles and develop associated regulatory guidance

- Less.Prescriptive/Increased Flexibility

- Leader/Champion for Change

- Reliance on Familiar/Obsolete Technology and Processes

-- Example of State Complacency and the Transition to Drone Technology NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 3

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Transformation Recommendations https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MuUJCd SHLNU&feature=em-share video user NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 4

'

Transformation Recommendations

  • Licensing Review Process
    • Performance-Based, Technology-Inclusive Regulation for Non-LWRs.

NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 5

.. . .. ******* ... -- --- -*-********-*** -- *-- -------*------ ----****-------~

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Additional Views

  • Reduce the NRC Inspection Footprint When No Major Gaps are Identified
  • Use of Rigorous Self-Assessments

. ,.

  • Incorporate* More Remote Review

/

  • Use Onsite Effort for Areas of Greater Safety Significance

/

NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 6

. . .... - .. - - ... . - - .... ___ ___________________ ____

,, ,, ., ___ ______ ----------~~

,

Closing

- Incorporation of Value-Added Oversight by Federal, State and Local E~tities to Facilitate the Startup of a Reactor to Provide Needed Power.

- No Losers = NRC Transformation Success NCDHHS, DHSR, Radiation Protection Section! NRC Transformation! October 29, 2018 7

Perspectives on NRC Transformation Commission Meeting October 29, 2018 Bryan Hanson Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Generation

\.

Risk-Informed Decision-Making Plant safety and reliability are high PRA is one Margin to safety goals must guide Many element of a opportunities to risk-informed risk-informed improve use of decision-making decision-making framework PRA models framework Challenges with timely decisions on risk-informed initiatives Risk-informed decision-making improves safety

_.....,

1 Exelon Generation.

Reactor Oversight Process Enhancements Revise ROP Action matrix to reflect normal plant operations, with baseline CDF between 10-5 and 10-6/year Close White findings upon successful completion of follow-up actions

-- -- *.. ,- . ...,.. ._,,,_.,... _,...__ ~--~ --'"---= .,_ -------

Results:

(1) more fidelity between risk and NRG/licensee response (2) better public understanding of relationship between ROP findings and true risk Reduce baseline inspections based on performance Additional proposals are set forth in Sept. 19, 2018 NE/ letter to Director _.....,, of NRR, Ho Nieh 2 ExelonGeneration

OPENING COMMENT The conversation from and about the NRC has improved greatly over the past few years. The trajectory is positive.

  • Through its transformative efforts, the NRC has become decidedly more transparent, communicative, and flexible in its approach to the regulatory process and advanced reactor developers.
  • A wide array of advanced reactor industry stakeho_ lders are highly engaged with the Commission, and have acknowledged its willingness to adapt and innovate in its procedures.

2Q1 H CENTURY CONFIDENT EXPERTS U.S . et Efiedricity Generati*o11 from Nude*ar Po er,

'1960-2013 Lewis Strauss 11 lt is not too much to expect that our children will enjoy in their homes electrical energy too 0

+ - - - - - - - - --+--- - - - - - - - - .r; c..

cheap to meter, will know of great periodic t::

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regional famines in the world only as matters 3:

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of history, will travel effortlessly over the seas and under them and through the air with a minimum of danger and at great speeds, and will experience a lifespan far longer than ours as disease yields and man comes to understand what causes him to age. " .

Sowce: EPI Ii B

THE ADVANCED NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

  • General Fusion Helion Energy

'WR SuperCritical

  • Starcore Nuclear Integral MSR SMAR TAP.

FHA Leadtr PSl 00

  • Fusion RAD!.
  • Science Center
  • Lawrenceville Plasma Physics Westinghouse .
  • Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory STAR Ughtbridge X-Energy
  • G4M ARC-100 .

National Ignition DOE Next Gen Lockheed Martin ENHS HyperV S~TGR

  • L*ESSTAR Reactor Design Types

. GEMSTAR General Atomics NumerEx PRISM

  • Molten Salt Reactor

~ps EM2andMHR Tri Alpha MIFTI

  • z Machine
  • F l
  • Fluoride Salt-cooled High Temperature Reactor Liquid Metal-cooled Fast Reactor
  • High Temperature Gas Reactor
  • Pebble Bed Reactor
  • Nuclear Battery Reactor Thereon
  • Designs Advanced Nuclear Fuels SMR* 60
  • Small Modular Reactor
  • Fusion Reactor
  • Super-Critica l CO2 Reactor LC-1 c; ... I- r 1 W.1y ~r E f Jr rE u<oe w*tli attn but nn. in oncept t..y ",arnuel Brin tor ,.. tog, 1ph by C df" rk.;;01
  • .P *third way fresh thinking

WHAT SHOULD THE REGULATOR LOOK LIKE?

We ensure your 21st Century Nuclear is safe COMSECY 17-0006, "Re-examination of the Need for a U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Leadership Model," dated February 6,2017

THEM: GIANT MUTANT ANTS (19505)

A first entertainment use of radiation-induced mutant creatures

~ - -

GRAND THEMES TO KEEP IN MIND

  • Vendors, investors, & consumers of energy products need to believe that the NRC can regulate at the pace of commerce, while maintaining the continued protection of public health and safety, promoting the common defense and security, and protecting the environment
  • Initiatives need to ensure the NRC can recruit and maintain a vibrant staff that embraces the transformation at all levels of the organization
  • Changes in regulatory processes require a parallel engagement strategy that provides comfort to the public that the core mission of the NRC has not changed

ADVANCED NUCLEAR CAMPAIGN Todd Allen Senior Fellow, Third Way tallen@thirdway.org

Connecticut Department of ENERGY &

s.- ENVIRONMENTA L PROTECTION

-

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Connecticut's Perspective on the .

NRC Staff's Recommendations and Additional Views on Transforma-tion for the Agency Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

_,,.,--**-.

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Risk Should be Managed not Accepted :

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Risk Should be Managed not Accepted Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

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  • Decisions Should be.Based on Science
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Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection

Transformation Success:

Narrowing the Gap Between Perception Reality and

  • Dave Lochbaun, Self-Unen,ployed October 29, 2018

NRC has demonstrated proficiency at responding swiftly and effectively to unanticipated safety and security challenges (e.g., PWR CRDM nozzle cracking in spring 2001 and 9/11 later that year)

NRC c ,a n successfully apply that capacity to future challenges such as those listed in SECY-18-0060 BUT, and it's a big BUT:

Transformation success depends on keeping the gap between perception and reality as narrow as possible. 2

Year-Plu Date Date Outage Date Date Outage Outage Outage Length Outage Outage Length Reactor Began Ended (years) Reactor Began Ended (years)

Ferm, Urn 1 10/5/66 7 1 8/70 3.8 Surry Urn 2 9/10/88 9/19/89 1.0 Pahsades 8. 11173 10/1/74 1.1 Palo Verde Urn 1 3/5/89 7/5/90 1.3 Browns Ferry Urn 2 3 22/75 9/10/76 1.5 Calver Chf s Urn 2 3/17/89 5/4/91 2.1 Browns Ferry Urn 3/22/75 9/24/76 1.5 Calvert Chffs Urnt 1 5/5/89 10/4/90 1.4 Surry Urn 2 2 14/79 8, 9/80 1.5 F1 zPa rick 11 127/91 1/23/93 1.2 Three Mile Island Unit 1 2/17/79 10/9/85 66 Brunsmck Unit 2 /21/92 5/15/93 1.1 Turkey Point Urn 3 2/11/81 4 11/82 1.2 Brunswick Urnt I /21/92 2/11/94 1.8 San Onotre Unit 1 2 26/82 11, 28/84 2.8 South Te as Proiec 2/3/93 5/22/94 1.3

,le Pom Unit I 3/20/82 7/5/83 1.3 Unit 2 Nine Indian Point Unit 3 3;25/82 6/8/83 1.2 South Te as Pro1ect Unit 1 2/4/ 93 2/25/94 1.1 52 year-plus Oyster Creek 2/12/83 1 / 1/84 .7 Indian Point Urnt 3 /27/93 7/2/95 2.3 outages to St Lucie Urn 1 2/26/83 5/16/84 .2 Sequoyah Unit 1 3/2/93 4/20/94 1.1 Browns Ferry Unit 3 9'7/83 11/28/84 .2 Ferm, Unit 2 12/25/93 1/18/95 1.1 restore safety P1lgnm 12'10/83 2/30/84 1.1 Mame Yankee 1/14/ 95 1/18,'9 1.0 levels to Peach Bottom Unit 2 128/8 7 13/85 1.2 Salem Urn 1 5/16/95 4/20/98 29 Fort St. Vram 6/13/8 /11/86 1.8 Salem Urn 2 6.'7/95 8/30/97 2.2 acceptable Browns Ferry Urn 2 9 15/8,d 5/24/91 6.7 Millstone Unit 2 2/20/96 5/11/ 99 3.2 levels, 50 on Browns Fe ry Urn 3 3/9/85 11/ 19/95 10.7 Millstone Unit 3 3/30/96 7/1/98 2.3 Bro ms Fe ry Urn 3119/85 6, 12,'07 22.2 Crys al River Urn 3 9/2/9 2/6/98 1.4 NRC's watch Davis-Besse 6/9/85 12/24/86 1.5 Clinton 9/5/96 5/27/99 2.7 Sequoyah Urn 2 8 '22/85 5 3/88 2.7 LaSalle County Urn 2 9. 20/9 4/11 '99 2.6 Sequoyah Urn 1 8 22/85 1/10/88 3.2 LaSalle County Urn I 9/22/96 8/13/98 1.9 Rancho Seco 12/26/85 4/11/88 2.3 D.C. Cook Unit 2 9/9/97 6/25/00 2.8 P11Qnm , 11/ 86 6/15/89 3.2 D.C. Coo Urn 1 9/9/97 12/21/00 3.3 Peach Bottom Unit 2 3;31/87 5, 22/89 2.1 Davis-Besse 2/16/02 3/16/04 2. 1 Peach Bottom Urnt 3 3/31/87 12/11/89 2.7 Fort Calhoun 4/9/1 12/21/13 2.7 Nine 1le Pom Unit 12119/87 8/12/90 2.6 Source: UCS report No More Fort Calhouns!, February 2015. Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/03/np-ft-calhouns-full-report.pdf? ga=2.196753579.62578069.1538585309-730957765.1502383429 3

Lessons from year-plus reactor outages:

1. Owners were not knowingly operating unsafe reactors, hoping not to get caught.
2. Owners were operating what they perceived to be sufficient safe reactors, but they were not.
3. The gap between perception and reality is reflected by the time required to re-close the gap.
4. 44 year-plus outages during the SALP years (1980-1999), an average of 2.2 per year
5. 2 year-plus outages during the ROP years (2000-date), an average of less than 0.11 per year
6. ROP narrowed the gap between perception and reality, thus preventing uncorrected safety problems from growing to the point where it takes longer than a year to remedy them once detected 4

Lessons from ROP for transformations:

1. Unintended consequences and initially correct deferral decisions undermined by changing landscapes need to be detected and corrected in a timely and effective manner.
2. Baseline gap-monitoring for non-transformation areas (aka back-burner issues) to guard against undue delays and cumulative effects of non-regulation.
3. To maximum extend practical, objective metrics needed to ensure desired outcomes are achieved without unintended consequences.
4. ROP is superior to SALP, but not infallible.

5

Davis-Besse Perception (SALP)

PLANT NAME: DAV1S-BESSE REGION: 3 UNIT RPT ASSESSMENT PERIOD OPS MAINT ENG 03/95 . 07/01/93 - 01/21/95 I f~it~ l 1 *'" l:

09/93 12/01/91 - 06/30/93 2 1 1 2/1/1 I I 04(_92 I 01Lo1L90 - Il / 30/91 I 2 I 1 I 2 ] 2L1L1:I I I 1IL90 I 03l01/89 - 06l30l90 I 2 I 2 I 2 I 2L1Ll I I I 07 / 89 I 01/01/88 - 02/28/89 I 2 I 2 I 2 I 21111 I SALP perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer NUR G- 1214 2-23 6

Davis-Besse Perception (ROP)

Reactor Radiation Safeguards Safety Safety

~*~ T Initiating Events

... Mitigating Systems ~

Barrier lntegn1y Emergency Preparedness Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety Physical Protection Most Significant Inspection Findings 1Q/2001 ROP also perceived Davis-Besse to be a top performer 7

Davis-Besse Reality Reactor Radiation Safeguarr.

Safety Safety Public Initiating Mitigating Barrier Physical Events Systems I egrity Radiation Protectio1 Safety ost Sign"ficar t lnsped'ion Fndings ir*'l"'*'"'~"i"mi ~~~r~~~,*~f~~f::

JQ/2003 1~*1'.;,i~~-.. * '*"' ,>£ , f"1i:"'"-~~ ':-;*/} 1,t.1-,.,, \,< ""

2Q/2003 y (1) 1Ql2003 4Q/200 Reality showed Davis-Besse to have come closer to accident than any reactor since Three Mile Island

NRC and industry are on the same page

( often the same sentence on the same page) for many risk calculations, such as:

1. Peak cladding temperatures during postulated loss of coolant accidents
2. Peak containment pressures during postulated steam line break accidents
3. Steam generator tube wall crack growth rates
4. Pipe wall thinning rates due to erosion/corrosion
5. Safety-related component failures to start and failures to run Unless both are wrong, tiny gap between perceptionandreality 9

NRC and industry are not in the same book, yet alone on the same page, for high risks Licensee 6 CDF

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Whichever is wrong, massive gap between perception and reality

-~

.My prime concern with transformations: .

Changes are not occurring in isolation, enabling progress towards desired outcome to be effectively monitored and mid-course corrections implemented, if necessary.

Instead, transformations are proposed concurrent with extensive changes to the ROP and other regulatory constructs.

Can performance shortfalls be readily and reliably detected when the yardsticks are all new without proven track* records?

I know the perception is yes, of course." But is that also the real answer?

11

-- -

Gap management straw-pers-ons:

1. Annual self-evaluations by two NRC teams.

a) One team looking for evidence that desired outcomes have been achieved or are on-target to do so.

b) One team looking for evidence of unintended consequences from transformation initiatives and adverse consequences in non-transformation areas.

2. *Commission briefing and/or ACRS meeting with presentations by both teams 12

List of Acronyms ACRS - Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards *

. CDF - Core damage frequency CFR - Code of Federal Regulations CRDM - Control Rod Drive Mechanism ENG - Engineering MAINT - Maintenance NRC - ~uclear Regulatory Commission OPS - Operations PS - Plant Support (e.g., training, security, etc.-C...

PWR - Pressurized Water Reactor ROP - Reactor Oversight Process SALP - Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance 13

  • @ Westinghouse 1
  • Apply SECY-18-0600 recommendat_ions across all NRC business lines

- Use of risk information

- Embrace the Staff's sense .of urgency

-.

  • Westinghouse's current journey provides_ lessons learned

- External help is essential

- Operational tran_?parency leads to efficiency in execution

@ Westinghouse 2

..,

'alternative

- Greater predictability in the scope and depth of review

  • Reviews should be commensurate with safety significance
  • Use the reasonable assurance standard .
  • Commission policy on "forward fitting" new guidance

)

  • *
  • Predictable advanced reactor licensing
  • @Westinghouse 3
  • Sharing and evaluating budget execution data will promote efficiency gains

- Confirm staff time is spent on safety significant activities

- Analyze inspection data to drive program enhancements

- Improve understanding with external stakeholders The cultural discomfort that comes with change gives way to a healthier process

@Westinghouse 4

./

@ Westinghouse 5

Transformation at the NRC Heather Westra Prairie Island Indian Community Welch, Minnesota October 29, 2018

Location Prairie Island Indian Community Minnesota Prairie Island Dakota

.

Goodhue Wabasha Dodge Olmsted 'Mnona 2

3 Indian Reservations in the Continental United States Data Sources:

This map was compiled from unknown sources by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) at 1:2,000,000 scale.

Map Information:

Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area ; Scale 1:5645860 The numbers on the map represent the locations of Indian reservations. Please reference these numbers with the accompanying sheets entitled

" Indian Reservations- BIA/CAST 5/96 ".

The NRC and Federally Recognized Indian Tribes Encourage and facilitate Tribal involvement in the areas that the NRC has

  • jurisdiction. Tribal Policy Statement~ 2017.
  • _ NRC Tribal Policy Statement-fully integrated within NRC
  • Trust Responsibility
  • Government-to-Government Consultation
  • *outreach to Tribes
  • Understanding Tribal Counterparts 5

Recommendations NRC Tribal Policy Integrated Across all Program Areas.

  • NRC staff familiar with Tribal Policy and Protocol Manu,;11
  • Agency guidance documents includes tribes Recognition that Tribal Interests and Rights Extend Past Reservation Boundaries
  • Consultation
  • Ceded lands, aboriginal lands Include Cultural Risks in Analyses
  • Recognize traditional cost-benefit models don't include potential impacts to tribal culture/traditions NRC Encourage Licensee Outreach to Indian Tribes
  • Develop working relationship 6