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{{#Wiki_filter:©2019 Nuclear Energy InstituteApril 23, 2019Defining Used Fuel Performance Margins  
{{#Wiki_filter:Defining Used Fuel Performance Margins April 23, 2019
©2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 2White Paper ConceptNEI White Paper
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute
*Current Understanding
 
*Methods*Risk Insights
White Paper Concept Defining Used                                                  Thermal Fuel                NEI White Paper                   Margin      Source Term Margin
*Guidance*Schedule / Prioritization Thermal MarginRadiological MarginCriticality MarginConfinement MarginVendor Amendments &/or TopicalsEPRI TopicalsRoadmap*PIRTs (as applicable)
* Current Understanding Performance
NRCAlignment in 2019 NRCInvolvement 2019-20 NRCApproval 2020 +NRCApproval 2020 +Risk-appropriate Regulatory Framework for Used Fuel Storage and Transportation*Not all elements of the roadmap will be addressed in the same manner or at the same paceDefining Used Fuel Performance MarginSource Term MarginMoisture Margin
* Methods                   Radiological Margin
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 3High Level TOC I.Introduction II.Summary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins III.Risk Insights IV.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Source Terms V.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Thermal VI.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Radiological VII.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Criticality VIII.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Confinement IX.Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Moisture X.Applications XI.ConclusionWhite Paper Overview
* Risk Insights Margin Risk-appropriate Regulatory
©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 4
* Guidance
* Schedule / Prioritization Confinement                  Framework for Used Fuel Margin Storage and Transportation Criticality NRC Margin Alignment                      Roadmap*
in 2019 Moisture Margin              Vendor Amendments
                                                                                      &/or Topicals          NRC Approval PIRTs (as applicable)                                                       2020 +
NRC Involvement                                                              EPRI Topicals 2019-20                                                                                       NRC Approval 2020 +
*Not all elements of the roadmap will be addressed in the same manner or at the same pace          ©2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 2
 
White Paper Overview High Level TOC I. Introduction II. Summary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins III. Risk Insights IV. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Source Terms V. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Thermal VI. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Radiological VII. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Criticality VIII. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Confinement IX. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Moisture X. Applications XI. Conclusion
                                                                      ©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 3
 
Introduction (1 of 2)


==Background:==
==Background:==
brief overview of the history that has led us to a highly conservative regimeInitial DFS was going to be for <20 years so easy to be conservative ("it's only temporary")Some "limits" were based on very conservative values ("we know it's not a problem")Increasingly more information and detail being requested by NRC staff reviewers Result is overly conservative designs, and ever increasing costs for application preparation and NRC review feesAlso results in unnecessary requirements and restrictions on licenseesIntroduction (1 of 2)
brief overview of the history that has led us to a highly conservative regime Initial DFS was going to be for <20 years so easy to be conservative (its only temporary)
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 5Objective: improve safety by focusing efforts on the most safety significant parameters, phenomenon, etc. thereby improving regulatory efficiency develop more accurate analytical models and analysis approaches, as well as more realistic, scientifically based limits, for source terms and thermal, radiological, criticality, and confinement safety analyses. accomplished through understanding and identifying the existing margin between realconditions and actualsafety limits and criteria, and then applying that knowledge in a risk informed manner Meet the regulatory requirement to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safetyIntroduction (2 of 2)
Some limits were based on very conservative values (we know its not a problem)
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 6Source term development conservatisms vs. real conditionsModeling approaches that lead to conservative resultsAllowable values (limits) that include significant conservatisms to real, scientifically based limits or thresholdsSummary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins
Increasingly more information and detail being requested by NRC staff reviewers Result is overly conservative designs, and ever increasing costs for application preparation and NRC review fees Also results in unnecessary requirements and restrictions on licensees
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 7Use risk insights to inform the processIdentify those areas that are more significant vs. those that are less significant to safety
                                                          &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 4
*Focus our efforts and resources on the more significant issues
 
*Less focus on those that have little safety significance
Introduction (2 of 2)
*PIRT(s) may be utilized, as applicable, to identify the inputs and modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, More or less focus does not mean less safety, it means enhanced safety because we are focusing on the right thingsRisk Insights
Objective: improve safety by focusing efforts on the most safety significant parameters, phenomenon, etc. thereby improving regulatory efficiency develop more accurate analytical models and analysis approaches, as well as more realistic, scientifically based limits, for source terms and thermal, radiological, criticality, and confinement safety analyses.
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 8Review the conservatisms in how source terms are generatedInputs to source term codes How much accuracy in the fuel data (burnup, enrichment detail, power history) is adequate without being too conservativeRealistic vs. boundingSource Terms
accomplished through understanding and identifying the existing margin between real conditions and actual safety limits and criteria, and then applying that knowledge in a risk informed manner Meet the regulatory requirement to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 91st step: Focus the effortIdentify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, Use results to identify areas that don't have a large impact and hence don't require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed
                                                              &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 5
)Identify areas for modeling simplificationDevelop a consensus
 
-based modeling approachConsider a best practices guide Thermal: Modeling
Summary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins Source term development conservatisms vs. real conditions Modeling approaches that lead to conservative results Allowable values (limits) that include significant conservatisms to real, scientifically based limits or thresholds
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 10Work to develop a peak cladding temperature (PCT) limit that is based on more scientific informationCurrently in the US we are treating 400&#xba;C as a "knife edge" limitThis is not the case; for example it is reported in Europe a limit of 450&#xba;C has been usedThermal: Acceptance Criteria for PCT
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 6
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 11Modeling and Computation1st step: define the parameters on which the effort should be focused  
 
*Identify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, *Use results to identify areas that don't have a large impact and hence don't require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed)Identify areas for modeling simplification
Risk Insights Use risk insights to inform the process Identify those areas that are more significant vs. those that are less significant to safety
*Develop a consensus
* Focus our efforts and resources on the more significant issues
-based modeling approach
* Less focus on those that have little safety significance
*Consider a best practices guide including reporting of results Radiological (1 of 3)
* PIRT(s) may be utilized, as applicable, to identify the inputs and modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, More or less focus does not mean less safety, it means enhanced safety because we are focusing on the right things
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 12Acceptance Criteria for Fuel QualificationWork to develop Criteria for Fuel Qualification for radiological shielding
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 7
*Currently in the US, Fuel Qualification for shielding is complex and requires demonstration by calculation
 
*Dose Rate measurements / benchmarks can be employed to inform criteria. Radiological (2 of 3)
Source Terms Review the conservatisms in how source terms are generated Inputs to source term codes How much accuracy in the fuel data (burnup, enrichment detail, power history) is adequate without being too conservative Realistic vs. bounding
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 13Criteria for Dose Rate Measurements / ComplianceDevelop Critical Parameters for Dose Rates
                                                      &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 8
*Average dose rates adequate for Off
 
-Site Dose compliance
Thermal: Modeling 1st step: Focus the effort Identify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, Use results to identify areas that dont have a large impact and hence dont require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed)
*Maximum dose rate / locations identified adequately and controlled (shielding) during operational evolutions Radiological (3 of 3)
Identify areas for modeling simplification Develop a consensus-based modeling approach Consider a best practices guide
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 14Analysis MethodsPWR/BWR -Having to assume worst case geometric location of materials in conjunction with worst case tolerances on all components.In particular on tolerancingof components a statistical treatment is justified and should be permissible.BWR -Fresh fuel is evaluated.Guidance should be available for BWR burnup credit.While NUREGs have been issued on this subject they contain a significant caution in that the quantity of information is limited and that further work is needed.This does not provide a clear path to a successful licensing effortCriticality Control (1 of 3)
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 9
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 15Safety/Administrative MarginA 5% margin required is excessive when all normal/off
 
-normal/accident worst case conditions have already been considered, including code uncertainty and bias.TransportModerator in the TSC under normal conditions.NRC interpretation of 71.55(b) unless exception is taking under 71.55(c).Packages are constructed and designed to not allow significant leakage (dispersal requirements under 71.51 limit the amount of material).Criticality Control (2 of 3) 
Thermal: Acceptance Criteria for PCT Work to develop a peak cladding temperature (PCT) limit that is based on more scientific information Currently in the US we are treating 400&#xba;C as a knife edge limit This is not the case; for example it is reported in Europe a limit of 450&#xba;C has been used
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 16Damaged FuelIn the context of both storage and transportation system the assumption of "floating" fuel and optimum size/spacing introduces a significant conservatism.EPRI analysis have shown that a more "realistic" impact of fuel configuration as a result of damage is small
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 10
.MaterialsThe 75% or 90% credit on neutron absorber panels seems excessive given current fabrication controls and testing methods.Criticality Control (3 of 3)
 
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 17Understand design margin basis, material susceptibility, and aging management concernsImplement aging management programs that include inspections and repair/mitigation processes that preserve/restore marginAnalytical assessment informs aging management programs to preserve confinement integrityRecognize time to address any identified degradationUnderstand potential operational challenges to confinement integrityAnalytical assessment informs reasonable limits to prevent loss of integrityConfinement (1 of 2)
Radiological (1 of 3)
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 18NRC has already made progress in the area of containment thru issuance of several ISG's
Modeling and Computation 1st step: define the parameters on which the effort should be focused
:ISG-5, ISG-15 (supersedes ISG-4), ISG-18, ISG-19Specifically, the removal of helium leak testing of the closure welds (ISG-18) provided significant dose reductions during loadingAlso, interim pathway for licensing moderator exclusion in ISG
* Identify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results,
-19Confinement (2 of 2)
* Use results to identify areas that dont have a large impact and hence dont require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed)
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 19MoistureCurrent limit (0.43 gram mole in NUREG-1536) derived from a test geared to understand how dry a cask could getPNL-6365 drying report
Identify areas for modeling simplification
*3 of 4 tests loaded the cask with dry fuel (not from a SFP)*Wet-loaded canister took at least 5 attempts and 1.5
* Develop a consensus-based modeling approach
-3 days to dryHow dry do we need to be to avoid any issues?CNWRA report states
* Consider a best practices guide including reporting of results
*5-55 moles (0.1
                                                          &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 11
-1.0 L) of water are insufficient to be a corrosion concern
 
*17.4 moles of water may be sufficient to reach flammability criteria (after >72 years of radiolysis) HBU Demo cask measured 5.4 moles (maximum) of water after the drying process, or <0.1 liters of water
Radiological (2 of 3)
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 20Better understanding of source term marginMinimize impact on spent fuel management
Acceptance Criteria for Fuel Qualification Work to develop Criteria for Fuel Qualification for radiological shielding
*Avoids unnecessarily delaying loading due to site dose budget More effective ALARA planning
* Currently in the US, Fuel Qualification for shielding is complex and requires demonstration by calculation
*Use it where it's neededImprove off
* Dose Rate measurements / benchmarks can be employed to inform criteria.
-site dose calculations
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 12
*Reduce need for unnecessary loading restrictions
 
*Reduce frequency of 72.212 updates for off
Radiological (3 of 3)
-site doseMore efficient use of resources for thermal licensing calculations
Criteria for Dose Rate Measurements / Compliance Develop Critical Parameters for Dose Rates
*Applicant and regulator have more emphasis on safety by focusing on more impactful areasApplications (1 of 2)
* Average dose rates adequate for Off-Site Dose compliance
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 21Better understanding of criticality marginReduce B-10 requirements
* Maximum dose rate / locations identified adequately and controlled (shielding) during operational evolutions
*Simplifies validation testing
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 13
*Significant cost reductionEliminate need to cycle SFP boron concentration
 
*Current higher boron concentrations required for cask loading that needs to be diluted back down for plant operationApplications (2 of 2)
Criticality Control (1 of 3)
&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 22ScheduleNEI White Paper  
Analysis Methods PWR/BWR - Having to assume worst case geometric location of materials in conjunction with worst case tolerances on all components. In particular on tolerancing of components a statistical treatment is justified and should be permissible.
&#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 23Vision
BWR - Fresh fuel is evaluated. Guidance should be available for BWR burnup credit. While NUREGs have been issued on this subject they contain a significant caution in that the quantity of information is limited and that further work is needed. This does not provide a clear path to a successful licensing effort
&#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 24Industry looks forward to NRC's feedback and continued dialogue in this effort to enhance used fuel safety by focusing resources on safety significant areas Conclusion}}
                                                              &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 14
 
Criticality Control (2 of 3)
Safety/Administrative Margin A 5% margin required is excessive when all normal/off-normal/accident worst case conditions have already been considered, including code uncertainty and bias.
Transport Moderator in the TSC under normal conditions. NRC interpretation of 71.55(b) unless exception is taking under 71.55(c). Packages are constructed and designed to not allow significant leakage (dispersal requirements under 71.51 limit the amount of material).
                                                          &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 15
 
Criticality Control (3 of 3)
Damaged Fuel In the context of both storage and transportation system the assumption of floating fuel and optimum size/spacing introduces a significant conservatism. EPRI analysis have shown that a more realistic impact of fuel configuration as a result of damage is small.
Materials The 75% or 90% credit on neutron absorber panels seems excessive given current fabrication controls and testing methods.
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 16
 
Confinement (1 of 2)
Understand design margin basis, material susceptibility, and aging management concerns Implement aging management programs that include inspections and repair/mitigation processes that preserve/restore margin Analytical assessment informs aging management programs to preserve confinement integrity Recognize time to address any identified degradation Understand potential operational challenges to confinement integrity Analytical assessment informs reasonable limits to prevent loss of integrity
                                                          &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 17
 
Confinement (2 of 2)
NRC has already made progress in the area of containment thru issuance of several ISGs:
ISG-5, ISG-15 (supersedes ISG-4), ISG-18, ISG-19 Specifically, the removal of helium leak testing of the closure welds (ISG-18) provided significant dose reductions during loading Also, interim pathway for licensing moderator exclusion in ISG-19
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 18
 
Moisture Current limit (0.43 gram mole in       How dry do we need to be to NUREG-1536) derived from a                 avoid any issues?
test geared to understand how           CNWRA report states dry a cask could get
* 5-55 moles (0.1-1.0 L) of PNL-6365 drying report                       water are insufficient to be a
* 3 of 4 tests loaded the cask               corrosion concern with dry fuel (not from a
* 17.4 moles of water may be SFP)                                       sufficient to reach
* Wet-loaded canister took at                 flammability criteria (after >72 least 5 attempts and 1.5-3                 years of radiolysis) days to dry HBU Demo cask measured 5.4 moles (maximum) of water after the drying process, or <0.1 liters of water
                                                                &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 19
 
Applications (1 of 2)
Better understanding of source term margin Minimize impact on spent fuel management
* Avoids unnecessarily delaying loading due to site dose budget More effective ALARA planning
* Use it where its needed Improve off-site dose calculations
* Reduce need for unnecessary loading restrictions
* Reduce frequency of 72.212 updates for off-site dose More efficient use of resources for thermal licensing calculations
* Applicant and regulator have more emphasis on safety by focusing on more impactful areas
                                                            &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 20
 
Applications (2 of 2)
Better understanding of criticality margin Reduce B-10 requirements
* Simplifies validation testing
* Significant cost reduction Eliminate need to cycle SFP boron concentration
* Current higher boron concentrations required for cask loading that needs to be diluted back down for plant operation
                                                          &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 21
 
Schedule NEI White Paper
                    &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 22
 
Vision
      &#xa9;2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 23
 
Conclusion Industry looks forward to NRCs feedback and continued dialogue in this effort to enhance used fuel safety by focusing resources on safety significant areas
                                &#xa9;2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 24}}

Latest revision as of 21:19, 19 October 2019

Presentation Slides: Defining Used Fuel Performance Margins, NEI
ML19109A134
Person / Time
Site: Nuclear Energy Institute
Issue date: 04/19/2019
From: Richter M
Nuclear Energy Institute
To: Christian Jacobs
Spent Fuel Licensing Branch
Jacobs C
References
Download: ML19109A134 (24)


Text

Defining Used Fuel Performance Margins April 23, 2019

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute

White Paper Concept Defining Used Thermal Fuel NEI White Paper Margin Source Term Margin

  • Current Understanding Performance
  • Methods Radiological Margin
  • Risk Insights Margin Risk-appropriate Regulatory
  • Guidance
  • Schedule / Prioritization Confinement Framework for Used Fuel Margin Storage and Transportation Criticality NRC Margin Alignment Roadmap*

in 2019 Moisture Margin Vendor Amendments

&/or Topicals NRC Approval PIRTs (as applicable) 2020 +

NRC Involvement EPRI Topicals 2019-20 NRC Approval 2020 +

  • Not all elements of the roadmap will be addressed in the same manner or at the same pace ©2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 2

White Paper Overview High Level TOC I. Introduction II. Summary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins III. Risk Insights IV. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Source Terms V. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Thermal VI. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Radiological VII. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Criticality VIII. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Confinement IX. Guidance for Further Advancing the Definition of Performance Margin for Moisture X. Applications XI. Conclusion

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 3

Introduction (1 of 2)

Background:

brief overview of the history that has led us to a highly conservative regime Initial DFS was going to be for <20 years so easy to be conservative (its only temporary)

Some limits were based on very conservative values (we know its not a problem)

Increasingly more information and detail being requested by NRC staff reviewers Result is overly conservative designs, and ever increasing costs for application preparation and NRC review fees Also results in unnecessary requirements and restrictions on licensees

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 4

Introduction (2 of 2)

Objective: improve safety by focusing efforts on the most safety significant parameters, phenomenon, etc. thereby improving regulatory efficiency develop more accurate analytical models and analysis approaches, as well as more realistic, scientifically based limits, for source terms and thermal, radiological, criticality, and confinement safety analyses.

accomplished through understanding and identifying the existing margin between real conditions and actual safety limits and criteria, and then applying that knowledge in a risk informed manner Meet the regulatory requirement to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 5

Summary of Performance Margins and Current Methods Margins Source term development conservatisms vs. real conditions Modeling approaches that lead to conservative results Allowable values (limits) that include significant conservatisms to real, scientifically based limits or thresholds

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 6

Risk Insights Use risk insights to inform the process Identify those areas that are more significant vs. those that are less significant to safety

  • Focus our efforts and resources on the more significant issues
  • Less focus on those that have little safety significance
  • PIRT(s) may be utilized, as applicable, to identify the inputs and modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, More or less focus does not mean less safety, it means enhanced safety because we are focusing on the right things

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 7

Source Terms Review the conservatisms in how source terms are generated Inputs to source term codes How much accuracy in the fuel data (burnup, enrichment detail, power history) is adequate without being too conservative Realistic vs. bounding

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 8

Thermal: Modeling 1st step: Focus the effort Identify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results, Use results to identify areas that dont have a large impact and hence dont require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed)

Identify areas for modeling simplification Develop a consensus-based modeling approach Consider a best practices guide

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 9

Thermal: Acceptance Criteria for PCT Work to develop a peak cladding temperature (PCT) limit that is based on more scientific information Currently in the US we are treating 400ºC as a knife edge limit This is not the case; for example it is reported in Europe a limit of 450ºC has been used

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 10

Radiological (1 of 3)

Modeling and Computation 1st step: define the parameters on which the effort should be focused

  • Identify the inputs, modeling approaches/techniques that have large impact on the results,
  • Use results to identify areas that dont have a large impact and hence dont require scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable value can be assumed)

Identify areas for modeling simplification

  • Develop a consensus-based modeling approach
  • Consider a best practices guide including reporting of results

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 11

Radiological (2 of 3)

Acceptance Criteria for Fuel Qualification Work to develop Criteria for Fuel Qualification for radiological shielding

  • Currently in the US, Fuel Qualification for shielding is complex and requires demonstration by calculation
  • Dose Rate measurements / benchmarks can be employed to inform criteria.

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 12

Radiological (3 of 3)

Criteria for Dose Rate Measurements / Compliance Develop Critical Parameters for Dose Rates

  • Average dose rates adequate for Off-Site Dose compliance
  • Maximum dose rate / locations identified adequately and controlled (shielding) during operational evolutions

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 13

Criticality Control (1 of 3)

Analysis Methods PWR/BWR - Having to assume worst case geometric location of materials in conjunction with worst case tolerances on all components. In particular on tolerancing of components a statistical treatment is justified and should be permissible.

BWR - Fresh fuel is evaluated. Guidance should be available for BWR burnup credit. While NUREGs have been issued on this subject they contain a significant caution in that the quantity of information is limited and that further work is needed. This does not provide a clear path to a successful licensing effort

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 14

Criticality Control (2 of 3)

Safety/Administrative Margin A 5% margin required is excessive when all normal/off-normal/accident worst case conditions have already been considered, including code uncertainty and bias.

Transport Moderator in the TSC under normal conditions. NRC interpretation of 71.55(b) unless exception is taking under 71.55(c). Packages are constructed and designed to not allow significant leakage (dispersal requirements under 71.51 limit the amount of material).

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 15

Criticality Control (3 of 3)

Damaged Fuel In the context of both storage and transportation system the assumption of floating fuel and optimum size/spacing introduces a significant conservatism. EPRI analysis have shown that a more realistic impact of fuel configuration as a result of damage is small.

Materials The 75% or 90% credit on neutron absorber panels seems excessive given current fabrication controls and testing methods.

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 16

Confinement (1 of 2)

Understand design margin basis, material susceptibility, and aging management concerns Implement aging management programs that include inspections and repair/mitigation processes that preserve/restore margin Analytical assessment informs aging management programs to preserve confinement integrity Recognize time to address any identified degradation Understand potential operational challenges to confinement integrity Analytical assessment informs reasonable limits to prevent loss of integrity

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 17

Confinement (2 of 2)

NRC has already made progress in the area of containment thru issuance of several ISGs:

ISG-5, ISG-15 (supersedes ISG-4), ISG-18, ISG-19 Specifically, the removal of helium leak testing of the closure welds (ISG-18) provided significant dose reductions during loading Also, interim pathway for licensing moderator exclusion in ISG-19

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 18

Moisture Current limit (0.43 gram mole in How dry do we need to be to NUREG-1536) derived from a avoid any issues?

test geared to understand how CNWRA report states dry a cask could get

  • 5-55 moles (0.1-1.0 L) of PNL-6365 drying report water are insufficient to be a
  • 3 of 4 tests loaded the cask corrosion concern with dry fuel (not from a
  • 17.4 moles of water may be SFP) sufficient to reach
  • Wet-loaded canister took at flammability criteria (after >72 least 5 attempts and 1.5-3 years of radiolysis) days to dry HBU Demo cask measured 5.4 moles (maximum) of water after the drying process, or <0.1 liters of water

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 19

Applications (1 of 2)

Better understanding of source term margin Minimize impact on spent fuel management

  • Avoids unnecessarily delaying loading due to site dose budget More effective ALARA planning
  • Use it where its needed Improve off-site dose calculations
  • Reduce need for unnecessary loading restrictions
  • Reduce frequency of 72.212 updates for off-site dose More efficient use of resources for thermal licensing calculations
  • Applicant and regulator have more emphasis on safety by focusing on more impactful areas

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 20

Applications (2 of 2)

Better understanding of criticality margin Reduce B-10 requirements

  • Simplifies validation testing
  • Significant cost reduction Eliminate need to cycle SFP boron concentration
  • Current higher boron concentrations required for cask loading that needs to be diluted back down for plant operation

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 21

Schedule NEI White Paper

©2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 22

Vision

©2018 Nuclear Energy Institute 23

Conclusion Industry looks forward to NRCs feedback and continued dialogue in this effort to enhance used fuel safety by focusing resources on safety significant areas

©2019 Nuclear Energy Institute 24