ML111320651

Watch Request for Hearing on Post Fukushima SAMA Contention

ML111320651
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	05/12/2011
From:	Lampert M Pilgrim Watch
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
Shared Package
ML111320647	List: ML111320648 ML111320650 ML111320651
References
RAS 20249, 50-293-LR, ASLBP 06-848-02-LR
Download: ML111320651 (21)

Text

1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Docket # 50

-293-LR Entergy Corporation Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application

May 12, 2011 PILGRIM WATCH REQUEST FOR HEARING ON POST FUKUSHIMA SAMA CONTENTION In accordance with 10 C.F.R § 2.309 (c)(1), Pilgrim Watch files the following new contention:

The Environmental Report is inadequate post Fukushima Daiichi because Entergy's SAMA analysis ignores new and significant lessons learned regarding the possible off-site radiological and economic consequences in a severe accident.

The Environmental Report is inadequate post Fukushima Daiichi because Entergy's SAMA analysis ignores new and significant lessons learned regarding the possible off

-site radiological and economic consequences in a severe accident at a GE Mark 1 reactor very similar to Pilgrim.

Data from TEPCO Unit 2 shows that its nuclear chain reaction continued to generate high levels of I-131 for over a month after scram despite the efforts of TEPCO to terminate chain reaction by injection of borated water. Pilgrim's SAMA source terms have durations of at most 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> duration, the maximum plume duration allowed by the MACCS2 code, which assumes that once 2 the accident begins with reactor scram, a reactor completely ceases production of "fresh" short

-lived iodines, such as I

-131, which pose great radiological hazard if inhaled or ingested. By design, MACCS2 is unable to model the consequences of an accident at a reactor where the fission chain reaction continues apace despite reactor scram. This phenomenon was also noted at the Chernobyl Unit 4 accident of April 26, 1986, where, after large amounts of materials were dropped on the uncovered core, the nuclear chain reaction was observed to greatly accelerate and reach a peak on May 1, 1986, which resulted in large unanticipated radiation exposures at the May Day parade in Kiev. It seems possible that the accident containment measures taken at both Chernobyl and Fukushima introduced neutron moderators which allowed the fission reaction that had probably been stopped to later begin anew. Because of the huge design differences between the two reactors, their ongoing chain reactions indicate a fundamental shortcoming in not just the MACCS2 code, but with all PRAs conducted using tools based on the NRC's PRA Procedures Guide. All known reactor accident analysis codes assume that I

-131 available for release from a reactor core's inventory decreases according to its 8

-day radiological half

-life. No consequence code in the world allows the modeling of releases from reactor cores where the fission chain reaction continues many weeks after scram. While the resumption of fission at Chernobyl may have been ascribed to the graphite

-moderated design, such is not the case at Fukushima and Pilgrim. I. INTRODUCTION In the license renewal process, the Applicant is required under 10 CFR §51(c)(ii)(L) to perform a severe mitigation analysis if they had not previously done so. The purpose of a SAMA review is to ensure that any plant changes that have a potential for significantly improving severe accident safety performance are identified and addressed.

3 In the SAMA analysis process, the applicant analyzes costs of damages and costs of clean-up. However, NRC policy permits the Applicant to use a SAMA analysis code (MACCS2) that underestimates consequences for a number of reasons, two brought forward here are based on lessons learned on new and significant information from Fukushima.

1. The code limits the total duration of a radioactive release to no more than four (4) days, if the Applicant chooses to use four plumes occurring sequentially over a four day period.

1 Entergy chose not to take that option and limited its analysis to a single plume having a total duration of the maximum

-allowed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

2. In any case either a 24

-hour plume or a four-day plume is insufficient duration in light of lessons learned from Fukushima. The Fukushima crisis now stretches into its second month and shows that releases can extend into many days, weeks, and months; a longer release can cause offsite consequences that will affect cost

-benefit analyses.

2. Computer codes in use are totally incapable of modeling an 8

-week chain reaction that continues after a scram. MACCS2 is no exception. Like all the computer codes, it is incapable of modeling a "severe accident" release that lasts 8 weeks or longer. The MACCS2 code used by Entergy, and all other codes, assumes that the reactor is scrammed when the accident begins, the reactor is scrammed, and that the production of all fission products ceases at that time.

We know that criticality was continuing at Fukushima Unit 2 through April 27, 2011, and to shorter duration at Unit 1, because of their continued post

-scram high findings of I

-131 reported by TEPCO. The reactors were shut down, scrammed, on March 11

.th I-131 has 1 NUREG/CR-6613 Code Manual for MACCS2: Volume 1, User's Guide, 2

-2 2 The MACCS2 uses a Gaussian plume model with Pasquill

-Gifford dispersion parameters (Users code 5

-1). Its equation is limited to plumes of 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> duration.

4 an 8-day half-life. If criticality had stopped after the reactors scrammed, the I

-131 would have largely decayed. It would not, be at the levels we have seen reported, that exceed the Cesium readings.

Conventional accident analysis of reactor accidents begin at reactor scram, t=0, and assume that the fission chain reaction ceases completely at that time, and that thereafter there is only "spontaneous" nuclear decay, with it being common practice to ignore the very tiny amount of "spontaneous fission" triggered by random neutrons from cosmic radiation hitting a fissile atom and creating infinitesimal amounts of I

-131. A large problem created by the ongoing chain reaction is the calculation of food doses.

The code has no way of modeling the continual production of I

-131 and I-134 which can get to people both by milk and from fresh leafy

-vegetable consumption.

The Atomic Safety & Licensing Board has an obvious duty to re

-evaluate the Applicant's SAMA analysis on the basis on this new and significant information and the public health and safety consequences.

II. THE CONT E NT IO N IS WI THIN T HE S C O PE OF TH ES E P R O CE E DI N G S This contention a ddr esses a d e f e c t or dispute r eg arding the Applic ant's SAMA an a l y si s , a C a t e g o r y 2 is s u e , and thus is with in the s c ope of this p r o c ee di n g. The fund a m ental purp o s e of the N a t i on a l Envir onment a l P ol ic y A c t, N EP A, 42 USC § 4332, is to "h e lp publ i c o f fi cials ma k e d e c is i ons that a re b a s e d on und erst andi n g of environme ntal c on s e q u e n ce s, a nd t a ke d e c is i ons that p rote c t, r esto r e a nd e nh a n c e the environme n t." 40 C F R § 1500.1 (c). (E mp h asis a d d e d). I n i ts a ppl i ca t io n for l i cense r e n e w a l of P i l grim, Ent e r g y w a s r e qui r e d und e r 10 5 C F R § 51 to p rovide a n a n a l ysis of the i m p ac ts o n the environme n t that could r esult if it is a l l ow e d to c ont i nue b e y ond the in i t i a l l i ce n s e. T h e e nv ironm ental i m p ac ts that must be consid e r e d in a n E IS include those wh i c h a re "r easona b ly fo re s e e able" a nd h a v e "catastroph i c conse q u e n ce s, e v e n if their p r o b a bi l i t y o f o cc u r re n c e is low." 40 C F R §1502.22 (b)(1). The fa c t that the likelihood of a n i m p ac t m a y not be ea s i l y q u a nt i fi able is not a n e x cuse for f a i l ing to a ddr e ss it in a n E I S. NRC r egulations r equire that "to the e xtent that the r e a r e import a nt qu a l itative c onside ra t i ons or f actors that ca nnot be qu a nt i fi e d, these consid e r a t i ons or f a ctors will be discuss e d in q u a l itative t erms." 10 C FR§51.71. This n e w contentions s ee k s comp lian c e with NEPA a nd is b a s e d on the a ppl i cant's Environm e n t a l R eport (ER). 10 C F R§2.309 (f)(2).

III. T HE I S SUE R A I SED IN THE CONT E NTION IS M AT E RI A L The " is s ue r aised in t h[is n e w] content i on is mat e ri a l to the find i n gs the N RC must make to support the a c t ion that is invo l v ed in t he pro c e edin g." 10 C FR§2.309 (f)(iv) I n consid e ri n g the lic e n s e re n e w al for Mil lstone Nu c le ar Po w er St a t i o n, the A S L B stat ed that "[w]h e re a contenti o n a l l e g e s a d e fi cien c y or e r r or in t he a ppl i ca t ion, the d e fi c ie n c y or e r r o r must have some indep e nd ent h e a l t h a nd s a f e t y s i gnifi ca n ce." In t h e Matter of Do m in i on Nu clear Conne c t i cut, In c. (Mil lstone N u c le ar Pow er St a t ion, Units 2 and 3) Do c k et Nos. 50-33 6-L R, 5 0-423-L R A S L B P No. 0 4-824-01-L R J u l y 28, 2004, p. 7.

S e e P riv ate F u e l Stor a g e , L.L.C. (I n d e p e n d ent S p ent F u e l Stor a ge Install a t ion), L B P- 9 8-7, 47 NRC 142, 179-80 (1998), a f f'd in p a rt, C L I-9 8-13, 48 NRC 26 (1998). The d e fi cien c y h i g hl i ghted in th i s co ntention h a s en o rmous indep e nd ent he a l t h and s a f e ty si gnifi ca n ce. Further analysis to evaluate how changes to assumptions discussed herein are likely to significantly increase offsite costs that 6 justifies requiring Entergy to add mitigation to reduce the risk of a severe accident such as adding plant modifications, operational changes and training to increace publ ic safety during license renewal.

I V. T HERE IS A SU B S TA NTIAL B AS I S FOR THE CONT E NTI O N Duration Radioactive Releases The MACCS2 code used by Entergy limits the total duration of a radioactive release to no more than four (4) days, and then only if the Applicant chooses to use four plumes occurring sequentially over a four day period.

3 Entergy chose not to take that option. Entergy limited its analysis to a single plume having a total duration of maximum 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

4. MACCS2 is completely unable to model the impacts of an 8

-week release, with the accident at Fukushima Daachi now entering its third month with no end to the release in sight. This is a generi c shortcoming in what NRC considers to be the "state of art" computer model for which David Chanin (the expert Pilgrim Watch relies

) was principal developer and architect, and therefore ha s greater knowledge of its internal workings than anyone because of his ability to "read the code," because no full Model Description for MACCS2 was ever written, much less published.

3 NUREG/CR-6613 Code Manual for MACCS2: Volume 1, User's Guide, 2

-2 4 The MACCS2 uses a Gaussian plume model with Pasquill

-Gifford dispersion parameters (Users code 5

-1). Its equation is limited to plumes of 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> duration.

7 In any case a 10

-hour plume or even a four day plume is insufficient, as plainly shown by the fact that Fukushima crisis has stretched into its second month. As releases extend into days, weeks and even months, the offsite consequence will be larger, and this will affect the cost

-benefit analysis. We also have seen that, at Fukushima which like Pilgrim is at the coast, the plume changed direction during the extended period while criticality continued.

Severe Accident Releases

- Continued Criticality After Scram Entergy used the MACCS2 code to perform its SAMA analysis. The MACCS2, is incapable of modeling a "severe accident" release that lasts 8 weeks or longer because it, and all other consequence codes, assume that when the accident begins, the reactor is scrammed 5, and that the production of all fission products ceases at that time. However we know that criticality is

5 NUREG/CR-6613, 5-26 explains that, "The start time of the plume segment is from the time of accident initiation e.g., reactor scram;" and, 5

-26, "time of release -plume (seconds from scram

)"

8 continuing at Fukushima Units 2 and Unit 1, to a lesser extent, because of the continued high findings of I

-131 reported by TEPCO. This new and significant information requires a reanalysis of Pilgrim's SAMA, updating and correcting its assumption that there will be no continued criticality.

The following from the Gerson Lehrman Group (April 28, 2011) provides a succinct explanation.

Data released on April 28, 2011 by TEPCO is now unequivocal in showing ongoing criticalities at Unit 2, with a peak on April 13.

TEPCO graphs of radioactivity

-versus-time in water under each of the six reactors show an ongoing nuclear chain reaction creating high levels of "fresh" I

-131 in Unit 2, the same reactor pressure vessel (RPV) with a leak path to reactor floor, aux building, and outdoor trenches, that is uncontrollably leaking high levels of I

-131, Cs-134, Cs-137 into the Pacific Ocean.

Analysis When a nuclear reactor goes "critical" the fissioning of U

-235 or Pu-239 becomes a self-sustaining process, called a chain reaction. Fissile material hit by a neutron splits (or fissions) into two atoms with atomic numbers between ~90 and ~140 while "throwing off" a few neutrons which then hit other fissile atoms, and the reaction then continues until it's stopped, usually by dropping the control rods, or reactor scram. During normal reactor operation, short

-lived nuclides like I

-131 (8 day) that pose high radiological hazard are created, but they decay quickly. The half

-life of I-131 is much shorter than the refueling cycle, and I

-131 reaches an equilibrium value quickly. In contrast, the cesium radionuclides that are created decay much more 9 slowly. Reactor inventories of Cs-134 (2 years) and Cs

-137 (30 years) gradually rise during the cycle, reaching a maximum at end of cycle.

When Units 1

-3 were all scrammed on March 11, 2011 because of the earthquake

-caused station blackout, the chain reaction of splitting fissile U

-235 and Pu

-239 into numerous fission products came to an immediate stop. Reactor scram means that neutron-absorbing control rods are dropped into the reactor core to absorb enough neutrons that the chain reaction ceases.

Because I-131 has no long

-lived "parent" to "feed it" by parent decay, the levels of I

-131 in scrammed reactors with intact geometry will decrease exponentially with an 8-day half-life; after 5 half

-lives (40 days) the I

-131 levels are only 3% of what they were at scram.

But instead of seeing that expected decrease in I-131 levels relative to Cs

-134 and Cs-137 in the regular TEPCO press releases, I

-131 was seen to be increasing, instead of decreasing as the physics said it should.

Before TEOCO's April 28 press release with accompanying graphs and table, it seemed that something strange was happening with the elevated I

-131 levels, but until this latest news, it was impossible to know where, exactly, was the source of the high I-131 levels.

The answer is clear if you look at the graphs of groundwater radioactivity measurements from all six reactors. "Outlier" Unit 2 is very different; it has I

-131 levels roughly 20 times its levels of Cs

-134/137. The only possible source of I

-131 would be "pockets" of molten core in the Unit 2 RPV settled in such a way that the boron in the injected water is insufficient to stop the localized criticalities.

6 6 http://www.glgroup.com/News/TEPCO

-Data-Shows-Ongoing-Criticalities

-Inside-Leaking-Fukushima-Daiichi-Unit-2-53751.html?cb=1 10 Graph s 7 7 http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110426l.pdf

11 12 13 In summary, the reactors scrammed on March 11. Once that happened, U

-235 should have no longer fissioned, and I

-131 should have had no "parent" which would decay to create more I-131 as an ongoing process. At the time of the scam (t

-0) the Bq of I

-131 and Cs-134 and Cs-137 would all have been approximately equal; after five 1

-131 half-lives, the "reactor density" radioactivity of I

-131 should be only about 3% of the original.

But the above data by TEPCO reported, for example, on April 19, 2011 show instead of the level of I

-131 being below the levels of the two cesium nuclides, I

-131 is often twice as high as the two cesium nuclides reported.

The only apparent explanation is that, after almost two months, at least one of the scammed reactors (likely reactor 2) is still critical. This Lesson learned at Fukushima, that continued criticality can continue long after a reactor is scammed, requries Entergy to perform a fresh analysis to evaluate how these changes to assumptions and the resulting uncertainties would affect the overall cost benefit analysis.

14 V. THE CONT E NTI ON IS TIMELY Und e r 10 C.F.R 2.309 (c), the d e te r m i n a t i on wh ether the filing of a c ont e nt i on is "nont i me l y" is "b a s ed on a b alan c i n g of e i ght f a ctors, the most i mport ant of which is "g ood cause, i f a n y , f or the fa i l u r e to file on t i me." Crow B ut t e R e so u r c e s, I n c. (No rth Tr e nd E x p ansion Proj ect), L B P-0 8-6, 67 NRC 241 (2008) The f a ctors, a nd how e ac h poin t s to the c on c lus i on that th i s contention should be ac c epted, a r e set f o rth b elow. 1. G ood c a u s e, if an y, f or fail u r e t o f i l e on t i m e. The Fukushima disaster began on March 11, 2011.

The info rmation upon which th i s contention is b a s e d is not yet fully available. However sufficient information has been released by TEPCO to file this request. "Good ca us e" h a s b ee n consistent ly in t e rp r eted to me a n that a p r opo s e d n e w contention be b a s e d on info rmation that w a s n o t p revious l y a v a i l a b l e , a nd w a s t i me l y submi tted in l i ght of that n e w i n fo rmation. Domin i on Nu c le a r Co n n ec t i cut, I n c. (Mil lstone Nu c le a r P o w e r Station, Unit 3), C L I-09-5, 69 N.R.C. 115, 12 5-26 (200 9) c i ting P acific G a s & El e ctric Co. (Diablo C a n y o n P ow e r Plant I n d e p e n d e nt S p e n t F u e l Stor a g e Install a t ion), C L I-08-1, 67 N.R.C. 1, 6 (2008). Se e also, N R C D i g est, P r e h e a ri ng Matt ers, 29: "N e w l y arising info rmation h a s long b ee n r ec o g ni z e d a s p rovid i ng " g ood ca us e" for a cce p t a n c e of a late contention.

Cons u me r s P ow e r Co. (Midland P l ant, Units 1 and 2), L B P-8 2-63, 16 NRC 571, 577 (198 2), c i ting Indiana and Mi c h i g an Ele ctric Co. (D on a ld C. Cook Nu c l e a r Plant, Units 1 a nd 2), C L I-72-75, 5 AEC 1 3, 14 (197 2); Cincinn a ti G a s a nd Electric Co. (Wi l l i a m H. Z i mmer Nu c le a r Station), L B P-8 0-14, 11 NRC 570, 574 (1980), a p p ea l d i sm i ssed, A L A B-5 95, 11 NRC 860 (1980)."

15 H e re is it c l e a r that (1) the info rmation is n e w a n d could not h a v e b ee n p r e s ented earlie r , a nd (2) P i l grim W atch acted reasonably and p romp t l y a fter le arni n g of the n e w info rmation. S ee ,T e x a s Uti li t i e s E le ctric Co. (Coman c he P ea k S te a m Ele ctric Station, Units 1 a nd 2), C L I-92-12, 36 N.R.

C. 62, 69-73 (1992). 2. T h e n a t u r e of t h e re qu esto r's/p e ti t io n er's r i g h t u nd e r t h e A c t t o b e m a d e a p a rty to the p r o cee d i n g. P i l g rim W atch is a lr ea d y a p a r t y , a nd thus c le a r l y h a s the ri g ht und e r the A c t to b e , a p a r t y to this pro c e edin g. 3. T h e n a t u r e a n d e x te n t of the re qu esto r's/p e ti t io n er's p r o p erty, f i n a n cial or o t h e r i n t e rest in t h e p r o c ee d i n g. As s a id in P i l grim W atch's o r i ginal ly filed p e t i t i on (R e qu e st F or H e a r ing And P e t i t i on To Inte r v e ne B y P i l g rim W atch -M a y 2 5 , 200 6. P g.1), a nd a s remains the ca se , "P i l grim W atch is a no n-p r o f it c i t i z ens' o r g a ni z a t i on loc ated a t 148 W a shin gton S tr eet, Du x bu r y , Mass a chusetts, 0233

2. I t i s r e p re s ented p ro se b y Ma r y L a mp e r t who m akes h e r r esiden c e a nd pl a c e o f o c c up a t i on a nd r ec r ea t i on with i n ten (10) m iles of P i l g rim Nu c le a r P ow e r Statio n. Und e r 1 0 C F R § 2.309 P e t i t i on e rs h a ve standing to in t e rv e ne in the l i cense r e n e w a l p r o cee d i ngs of P i l g r im b eca u s e th e y l i ve with i n 10 m iles of the f a c i l i t y. For r e a ctor constr u c t ion a nd l i censi n g p r o c e edin gs, the NRC h a s r e c o g ni z e d a p resumpt i on that p eople who l i ve with i n close p r o x i m i t y o f the f a c i l i t y (5 0 m iles) h ave standing to in t e rv e n e in t he pro c e e di n gs."

16 4. T h e poss i b le e f f ec t of a n y o r d e r that m ay b e e n t e re d in the p r o cee d i n g on the re qu esto r's/p e ti t io ne r's i n t e rest. P e t i t i on e rs b e l i eve that i f P i l grim is a l l ow e d to op e r a te for a n a ddi tional tw e n t y y ea rs without re-evaluating its SAMA analyses to determine how changes to the assumptions regarding the duration of a release and figuring out how to model criticality occuring after a scam are likely to affect the cost benefit analyis the Petitioner's h ea l t h, s a f e t y , p r op e r t y a nd fin a n ce s of P e t i t i on e r s' memb e rs who l i v e , r e c re ate, condu c t busin e ss a n d own p r op e r t y with in the vi c in i t y of the P i l grim Nu c le a r P ow e r Station will be jepordized.

5. T h e avai l a b i l ity of o t h e r m e a n s f or p r o te cting t h e p e ti t io n er's i n t e r ests. None of the f a ctors sug g e st i n g "oth e r me ans" r efer re d to in S ec. 2,10.3.3.3E Factor #5 of the NRC D i g e st a re p r e s e nt h e r e. T h e re is no state jud i cial f o r um or other NRC l i censing p r o ce du r e to whi c h P i l g rim W atch ca n ta k e i t s c on c erns re g arding the f act that no g o v ernm e nt a g e n c y is wil ling to a ssu m e r espons i bi l i ty in t h e e v e nt of a n a c cident a t PNPS (Se e , Priv ate F u e l Stor a g e , L.L.C. (I n d e p e n d ent S p ent F u e l Stor a g e Install a t ion), L BP-00-2 3 , 52 NRC 114, 12 1-122 (200 0)). "The s u gg e st i on that a n o r g a ni z a t i on could a d e q u a te l y p r ot e c t i t s in t erest b y submi t t i ng a l i m ited a p p ea r a n ce stat ement gives insuf f ic i e nt r e g ard to the v alue of p articipatational ri g h t s e nj o y e d b y p arties - includi ng the e nt i t l ement to p re s e nt eviden ce. S i m i l a r l y , a ss ertions that the o r g a ni z a t i on m i g ht a d e qu a te l y p r ot e c t i t s in t e r e st by maki n g witness e s a v a i l able to a suc c essful p e t i t i on e r or b y t r ansm i t ting info r m a t i on in i t s possession to a p p ropri a te State a nd loc a l o f fi c i a ls a re without me r i t." Du k e P o w e r Co. (Amend m e nt to Ma t e ri a ls L i c ense S NM-1773 -- T r anspor t a t i on of S p e nt F u e l f r om O c on e e Nu c l ea r Station for Stor a g e at Mc Guire N u c le a r Station), A L A B-528, 9 NRC 146, 150 n.7 17 (197 9)." NRC Dig est, P r e h ea ri ng Matt ers, 38. And a "p e t i t i on und e r 10 C.F.R. § 2.206 for a show cause p r o cee di n g is not a n a d e qu ate a l t e r n a t ive me ans of prot ec t i n g a l ate p e t i t i on e r's in t e r e st s.... W ashin gton P ubl i c P ow e r S upp l y S ystem (W P P S S Nu c le a r Proj ec t No. 3), A L AB-747, 18 NRC 1 1 67, 11 7 5-1176 (198 3). S e e Florida P ow e r a nd L i g ht Co. (T u rk e y Point Nu c le a r G e n e r a t i n g Plan t, Units 3 a nd 4), L B P-90-5, 31 NRC 73, 81 (199 0), a ff'd, A L AB-950, 33 NRC 492, 49 5-96 (199 1). A fter a l l , d espi t e the long his t o r y of §2.206, the number of suc c essful p e t i tions b r ou g ht und e r that s ec t i on is e x tr e me l y s m a l l. Domin i on Nu c le a r Conn ec t i cut, I n c. (Mil lstone Nu c le a r P ow e r Station, Units 2 a nd 3), L B P-05-16, 62 NRC 56, 67 (2005). (Id.) 6. T h e e x te n t to w hich the p e ti t io n er's i n te rest w i l l b e re p re s ente d b y existing p a r ti e s. The other p arties to th i s p r o cee di n g a re Ent e r g y a nd the NRC S ta f f. Th r o u ghout th i s p r o cee di n g both NRC S ta f f a nd Ent e r gy (in c o n ce rt with ea c h othe r) h a v e consistent l y oppos e d P i l g rim W atch's in t e r e st s. Th e re is no re asona b le b asis to e x p ect that leop ard w i ll ch a n ge i ts spo t s. The NRC h a s a c c u ra te l y r e c o g ni z ed that, I n w e i g hi n g the [six t h] f a ctor, a bo ard w i ll not a ssu m e that the inte rests of a late p e t i t i on e r w i ll be a d e qu a te l y r e p r e s ented b y t h e NRC S ta f f. T he g e n e r al publ i c in t e r est, as in t e rp r eted b y the S t a f f , m a y o ft e n confli ct wi t h a late p e t i t i on e r's pri v ate inte r ests or p e r c e pt ions of the publ i c in t e r est. W ashin g t on P ubl i c P ow er Supp l y S y stem (WPP S S Nu c le a r P roje ct No. 3), A L AB-747,18 NRC 1167, 117 4-1175 n.22 (1983).

18 NRC Di g est, P r e h e a ri n g Matt ers, 35; s e e also N R C P r a c t i c e D i g est, P r e h e a ring M a t t ers, 33: "P articip a t ion of t he NRC S ta f f in a l ic ensing p r o c e e di n g is not equival ent to p articip a t ion b y a priv a te in t e rv enor." The B o a rd a c c u ra t e l y s um m a ri z e d the re a l i t i e s in Tu r k e y Point (N RC P r a c t i c e Di g est, P r e h e a ring M a t ters, 3 4-35): "To wh a t e xtent will P e t i t i on ers' in t e r e st be r e p r e s ented b y e x is ting p arties?" must be answ e r e d, Non e. ' 7. Th e e x t e n t to w hich p e ti t io n er's p a r ti c i p a t i o n w i l l b r oa d e n the is s ue s or d elay the p r o ceedin g. This is s ue s p re s ented b y this contention show that f urth e r analysis is required based on new and significant information

. Ho we v e r, th i s "f a ctor i n cludes on ly that d e l a y which ca n be a t tribut e d di r ec t l y to the ta rdiness of the p e t i t i on. J amespo r t, supr a , A L A B-292, 2 NRC a t 631; South C arolina Ele ctric a nd G a s Co. (V ir g il C. S um m e r Nu c le a r Station, Un i t 1), L B P-8 1-11, 13 NRC 420, 425 (198 1). H e r e , the r e is noth i ng "ta r d y" a bout P i l g rim W atch's p e t i t i on to add th i s n e w p e t i t i o n. I t is b a s e d on a severe accident that occurred March 11 and on on

-going info rmation that b eca me publ i c on l y a short t i me a g o. 8. Th e e x te n t to w h i c h p e ti t io n er's p a r ti c i p a tion m ig h t reaso n a b ly ass i st in d e v e lo p i n g a so u n d rec o r d. Absent P i l grim W atch's p articip a t ion, it is a pp a r e nt that n e i t h e r a n y oth e r p a r t y n or the B o ard w i l l d e v elop an y r e c o r d wh a te v e r re g a rding the subje c t of this cont e nt i on.

19 P i l grim W atch in t ends to c ov e r the ina d e qu a cies in Ent e r g y's SAMA a n a l ysis and show that, new and significant information require a reevaluation of the duration of an acciden

t. P i l g rim W atch in t e nds p rincip a l l y to r e l y u p on g ov e rn m e nt do c um ents and testi m o n y f r om David I. Chanin. I t would be u n r e asona b le a t th i s d a te to e x p ec t a to t a l l y unfu n d e d g r oup to p rovide detailed testi m o n y f r om these e x p e rts a t th i s t ime. I f it w e r e so r e quir e d, most memb e rs of the publ i c , no n-p r o fit publ i c in t e r est groups, a nd lo c a l g o v ernm ents would be un able to file due to la c k of r esour c es. R esour ce s for these g ro u ps n e c essa r i l y must b e p r e s e r v e d for e x p e rt witness e s r e qu i r e d at the summ a r y disposi tion a nd h e a ri n g st a ge of the s e pr o cee di n g s. W e trust t h a t it is not the in t ent of the Com m is sion to r estrict p articip a t i on on l y to inside rs with d e e p po c k ets. The P e t i t i on e r s a t isifies 10 C.F.R 2.309 (d), S ta ndin g: The P e t i t i on e r a l re a dy is a p a r t y to this h e a ri n g a nd h as satisfi ed the re qu irements. VI. CON CLUSI O N With respect to adequate assurance of public health and safety, we respectfully request that the Board accepts this Request for Hearing so that publ i c h ea l t h a nd s a f e t y will be p r o p e r l y prot e cted. Electronically signed Mary Lampert Pilgrim Watch, pro se 148 Washington Street Duxbury, MA 02332

Tel 781-934-0389 Email: mary.lampert@comcast.net May 12, 2011

20 STATEMENT OF DAVID CHANIN

1. I have more than 25 years of professional experience in the development, application, maintenance, and verification/validation of large scientific codes, primarily for assessing the environmental impacts of radiological releases, and have worked with various federal agencies and contractors, including the United States Department of Energy (DOE), the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Sandia National Laboratories, as a senior risk analyst, project leader, and as a consulting expert, to review, evaluate, and develop risk models to assess the economic and environmental impacts of radiological releases in commercial, military, and government sectors.

2. I also consult as an independent expert to assess the consequences of accidental or intentional releases of radioactive materials to the atmosphere.

3. Through Sandia National Laboratories, I was an architect and developer of the MACCS2 computer code, and I am familiar with the code. MACCS2 is used by the DOE, NRC staff, and NRC licensees to model the doses, health effects, and economic consequences that result from unintended radiological releases into the atmosphere. NRC and its licensees use the MACCS2 code as part of the Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis.

4. As a consultant to DOE, I was involved in the review and finalization of the MACCS2 Guidance Document and the Final MACCS2 SQA Gap Analysis. I also wrote the User's Guide Code Manual for MACCS2.

5. Along with a colleague, Walter Murfin, I pioneered a model for analyzing the economic impacts if land and structures were contaminated with plutonium from a weapons accident. Site 21 Restoration: Estimation of Attributable Costs from Plutonium

-Dispersal Accidents, SAND96-0957 (1996).

6. I have been the principal or collaborating author of a number of scientific and technical publications concerning nuclear risk modeling on behalf of Sandia National Laboratories, Los Alamos National Laboratory, American Nuclear Society Transactions, as well as for private industry and technical workshops.

7. I have read and reviewed the enclosed proposed contention and fully support all its statements.

Electronically signed David Chanin 1125 Vassar Dr. NE Albuquerque, NM 87106

-2620 Tel: 505 254 1849

Email: David@chaninconsulting.com Date: May 12, 2011