ML14043A117: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Nuclear Operating CompanySouth Texas Pro/cd Ekctric Generating Station P.. Box 289 Wadswortf Teas 77483 -vv-- --January 30, 2014NOC-AE- 140030771 OCFR50.4STI: 33814165U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
{{#Wiki_filter:Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Pro/cd Ekctric Generating Station P.. Box 289 Wadswortf Teas 77483 -vv-- --January 30, 2014 NOC-AE- 14003077 1 OCFR50.4 STI: 33814165 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control DeskWashington, DC 20555-0001 South Texas ProjectUnits 1 & 2Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"
Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"  


==References:==
==References:==
: 1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, NRC Bulletin 2012-01:Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, Dated July 27, 2012(ML12074A115)  
: 1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, NRC Bulletin 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, Dated July 27, 2012 (ML12074A115) (OMB Control No.: 3150-0012).
(OMB Control No.: 3150-0012).
: 2. Letter from G.T. Powell, STPNOC (NOC-AE-12002917), to NRC Document Control Desk, "Response to NRC Bulletin 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, Dated October 25, 2012 (ML12313A015)
: 2. Letter from G.T. Powell, STPNOC (NOC-AE-12002917),
: 3. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, (Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, " Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"), Dated December 20, 2013 (ML13351A314)
to NRC DocumentControl Desk, "Response to NRC Bulletin 2012-01:
On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued the Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System" (Reference  
Design Vulnerability inElectrical Power System, Dated October 25, 2012 (ML12313A015)
: 1) to all power reactor licensees and holders of combined licenses for nuclear power reactors.
: 3. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, (Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01,  
The Bulletin required that each licensee provide a response to the Required Action within 90 days of the date of the Bulletin.
" Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"),
STPNOC submitted the response to the NRC on October 25, 2012 (Reference 2).By letter dated December 20, 2013 (Reference 3), the NRC requested additional information (RAI) from licensees to verify that they have completed interim corrective actions and compensatory measures and to determine the status of each licensee's long term corrective actions. The RAI requires that each licensee provide a response by February 3, 2014. The enclosure to this letter provides the required response to the RAI.There are no commitments in this letter. 'it lie NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 3 If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Hung Le at (361) 972-7932 or me at (361) 972-7566.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on Tc-A,,.,w4 go. 20i,4 G.T. Powell Site Vice President hcl  
Dated December 20, 2013 (ML13351A314)
On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued the Bulletin2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System" (Reference  
: 1) to all power reactorlicensees and holders of combined licenses for nuclear power reactors.
The Bulletin requiredthat each licensee provide a response to the Required Action within 90 days of the date of theBulletin.
STPNOC submitted the response to the NRC on October 25, 2012 (Reference 2).By letter dated December 20, 2013 (Reference 3), the NRC requested additional information (RAI) from licensees to verify that they have completed interim corrective actions andcompensatory measures and to determine the status of each licensee's long term corrective actions.
The RAI requires that each licensee provide a response by February 3, 2014. Theenclosure to this letter provides the required response to the RAI.There are no commitments in this letter. 'itlie NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 3If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Hung Le at (361) 972-7932 or meat (361) 972-7566.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on Tc-A,,.,w4 go. 20i,4G.T. PowellSite Vice President hcl


==Enclosure:==
==Enclosure:==


Response to Request for Additional Information NOC-AE-14003077 Page 3 of 3cc:(paper copy)(electronic copy)Regional Administrator, Region IVU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 Balwant K. SingalSenior Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North (MS 8 B1)11555 Rockville PikeRockville, MD 20852NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN1 16Wadsworth, TX 77483Jim CollinsCity of AustinElectric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs RoadAustin, TX 78704A. H. Gutterman, EsquireMorgan, Lewis & Bockius LLPBalwant K. SingalU. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John RaganChris O'HaraJim von SuskilNRG South Texas LPKevin PolioRichard PenaL. D. BlaylockCity Public ServicePeter NemethCrain Caton & James, P.C.C. MeleCity of AustinRichard A. RatliffTexas Department of State HealthServicesRobert FreeTexas Department of State HealthServices Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 1 of 2Response to Request for Additional Information REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FORBULLETIN 2012-01, "DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM"On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2012-01,"Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System" (Agencywide Documents Access andManagement System Accession No. ML 12074A1 15), to all holders of operating licenses andcombined licenses for nuclear power reactors.
Response to Request for Additional Information NOC-AE-14003077 Page 3 of 3 cc: (paper copy)(electronic copy)Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 Balwant K. Singal Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North (MS 8 B1)11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN1 16 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Jim Collins City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Balwant K. Singal U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John Ragan Chris O'Hara Jim von Suskil NRG South Texas LP Kevin Polio Richard Pena L. D. Blaylock City Public Service Peter Nemeth Crain Caton & James, P.C.C. Mele City of Austin Richard A. Ratliff Texas Department of State Health Services Robert Free Texas Department of State Health Services Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 1 of 2 Response to Request for Additional Information REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR BULLETIN 2012-01, "DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM" On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2012-01,"Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML 12074A1 15), to all holders of operating licenses and combined licenses for nuclear power reactors.
In addition, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, isaddressing the issues identified in the bulletin as part of the licensing process.
In addition, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, is addressing the issues identified in the bulletin as part of the licensing process. Bulletin 2012-01 requested information about each facility's electric power system designs, in light of recent operating experience involving the loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power circuit (single-phase open circuit condition) at Byron Station, Unit 2.In order for the NRC staff to complete its review of responses to the bulletin, the following additional information is requested:
Bulletin 2012-01requested information about each facility's electric power system designs, in light of recentoperating experience involving the loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power circuit(single-phase open circuit condition) at Byron Station, Unit 2.In order for the NRC staff to complete its review of responses to the bulletin, the following additional information is requested:
: 1. Provide a summary of all interim corrective actions that have been taken since the January 30, 2012, event at Byron Station, Unit 2, to ensure that plant operators can promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on the offsite power circuits for Class-I E vital buses until permanent corrective actions are completed.
: 1. Provide a summary of all interim corrective actions that have been taken sincethe January 30, 2012, event at Byron Station, Unit 2, to ensure that plantoperators can promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions onthe offsite power circuits for Class-I E vital buses until permanent corrective actions are completed.
: 2. Provide a status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve issues with an open phase of electric power." STPNOC Response 1. Summary of All Interim Corrective Actions Lessons learned from the events at Byron station were reviewed and various interim corrective actions evaluated for safety and efficiency at the South Texas Project. Based on the plant's offsite power configuration, electrical design details, and operating experiences, the following actions were taken to ensure plant operators can promptly diagnose and respond to Open Phase Conditions (OPC):* Interim Corrective Actions o Daily switchyard walk-downs by operations staff are on-going to identify OPC vulnerabilities.
: 2. Provide a status and schedule for completion of plant design changes andmodifications to resolve issues with an open phase of electric power."STPNOC Response1. Summary of All Interim Corrective ActionsLessons learned from the events at Byron station were reviewed and various interimcorrective actions evaluated for safety and efficiency at the South Texas Project.
Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 2 o Operating procedures and training curriculum were reviewed and revised to ensure operators can diagnose and respond to an OPC.o Operating procedures were revised to ensure that whenever bus voltage is checked on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses that all three phases of ESF bus voltages are checked.o Transformer yard rounds by operations staff are performed daily and include general and detailed inspections of the transformers.
Based onthe plant's offsite power configuration, electrical design details, and operating experiences, the following actions were taken to ensure plant operators can promptly diagnose andrespond to Open Phase Conditions (OPC):* Interim Corrective Actionso Daily switchyard walk-downs by operations staff are on-going to identify OPCvulnerabilities.
o Semi-annual infrared inspections of yard equipment are being completed as part of routine inspections.
Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 2o Operating procedures and training curriculum were reviewed and revised toensure operators can diagnose and respond to an OPC.o Operating procedures were revised to ensure that whenever bus voltage ischecked on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses that all three phases ofESF bus voltages are checked.o Transformer yard rounds by operations staff are performed daily and includegeneral and detailed inspections of the transformers.
o Continuing training for the January 30, 2012 Unit 2 Byron station event was provided to all STP licensed operators.
o Semi-annual infrared inspections of yard equipment are being completed as partof routine inspections.
: 2. Status and Schedule for Completion of Plant Design Changes* Status o The industry is investigating options being researched by several vendors [Power and Control System 2000 (PCS2000), Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), Schweitzer, etc.) to detect OPC faults. There is currently no generic, off-the-shelf technology that has been proven to detect all the required open phase fault conditions for all plant and transformer designs.o The industry is fully engaged in the development of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) OPC Guidance Document, as well as development of enhancements to software tools being used to analyze OPC faults.o New OPC technology will be thoroughly evaluated, analyzed, and tested before installation.
o Continuing training for the January 30, 2012 Unit 2 Byron station event wasprovided to all STP licensed operators.
The OPC technology design goals are to ensure accurate detection without compromising nuclear safety and increasing plant risk.o Qualitative vulnerability studies of the OPC faults have been completed (Reference 2), and quantitative vulnerability studies are scheduled to start and be completed by the end of this year for South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2[Reference Condition Report (CR) 12-8728-9].
: 2. Status and Schedule for Completion of Plant Design Changes* Statuso The industry is investigating options being researched by several vendors [Powerand Control System 2000 (PCS2000),
* Schedule o The South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2 plan to follow the generic schedule provided in the Industry OPC Initiative from NEI.O It is our intention to meet the OPC milestones of this schedule; however, deviations may be required to accommodate outage schedules, software and hardware availability, manufacturer's delivery capabilities, licensing delays, etc.o Any deviation from the Industry OPC Initiative schedule will be documented in the STP corrective action program and through the deviation/exemption process addressed in the NEI OPC Guidance Document which is under development.}}
Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), Schweitzer, etc.) to detect OPC faults. There is currently no generic, off-the-shelf technology that has been proven to detect all the required open phasefault conditions for all plant and transformer designs.o The industry is fully engaged in the development of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) OPC Guidance  
: Document, as well as development of enhancements tosoftware tools being used to analyze OPC faults.o New OPC technology will be thoroughly evaluated,  
: analyzed, and tested beforeinstallation.
The OPC technology design goals are to ensure accurate detection without compromising nuclear safety and increasing plant risk.o Qualitative vulnerability studies of the OPC faults have been completed (Reference 2), and quantitative vulnerability studies are scheduled to start andbe completed by the end of this year for South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2[Reference Condition Report (CR) 12-8728-9].
* Scheduleo The South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2 plan to follow the generic scheduleprovided in the Industry OPC Initiative from NEI.O It is our intention to meet the OPC milestones of this schedule; however,deviations may be required to accommodate outage schedules, software andhardware availability, manufacturer's delivery capabilities, licensing delays, etc.o Any deviation from the Industry OPC Initiative schedule will be documented inthe STP corrective action program and through the deviation/exemption processaddressed in the NEI OPC Guidance Document which is under development.}}

Latest revision as of 15:27, 13 July 2018

South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System.
ML14043A117
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/30/2014
From: Powell G T
South Texas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
BL-12-001, NOC-AE- 14003077, STI: 33814165
Download: ML14043A117 (5)


Text

Nuclear Operating Company South Texas Pro/cd Ekctric Generating Station P.. Box 289 Wadswortf Teas 77483 -vv-- --January 30, 2014 NOC-AE- 14003077 1 OCFR50.4 STI: 33814165 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499 STPNOC Response to Request for Additional Information regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"

References:

1. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, NRC Bulletin 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, Dated July 27, 2012 (ML12074A115) (OMB Control No.: 3150-0012).
2. Letter from G.T. Powell, STPNOC (NOC-AE-12002917), to NRC Document Control Desk, "Response to NRC Bulletin 2012-01: Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System, Dated October 25, 2012 (ML12313A015)
3. Letter from NRC to All Power Reactor Licensees, (Request for Additional Information Regarding Response to Bulletin 2012-01, " Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System"), Dated December 20, 2013 (ML13351A314)

On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff issued the Bulletin 2012-01, "Design Vulnerability in Electrical Power System" (Reference

1) to all power reactor licensees and holders of combined licenses for nuclear power reactors.

The Bulletin required that each licensee provide a response to the Required Action within 90 days of the date of the Bulletin.

STPNOC submitted the response to the NRC on October 25, 2012 (Reference 2).By letter dated December 20, 2013 (Reference 3), the NRC requested additional information (RAI) from licensees to verify that they have completed interim corrective actions and compensatory measures and to determine the status of each licensee's long term corrective actions. The RAI requires that each licensee provide a response by February 3, 2014. The enclosure to this letter provides the required response to the RAI.There are no commitments in this letter. 'it lie NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 3 If there are any questions regarding this letter, please contact Hung Le at (361) 972-7932 or me at (361) 972-7566.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.Executed on Tc-A,,.,w4 go. 20i,4 G.T. Powell Site Vice President hcl

Enclosure:

Response to Request for Additional Information NOC-AE-14003077 Page 3 of 3 cc: (paper copy)(electronic copy)Regional Administrator, Region IV U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1600 East Lamar Boulevard Arlington, TX 76011-4511 Balwant K. Singal Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North (MS 8 B1)11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 NRC Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P. 0. Box 289, Mail Code: MN1 16 Wadsworth, TX 77483 Jim Collins City of Austin Electric Utility Department 721 Barton Springs Road Austin, TX 78704 A. H. Gutterman, Esquire Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP Balwant K. Singal U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission John Ragan Chris O'Hara Jim von Suskil NRG South Texas LP Kevin Polio Richard Pena L. D. Blaylock City Public Service Peter Nemeth Crain Caton & James, P.C.C. Mele City of Austin Richard A. Ratliff Texas Department of State Health Services Robert Free Texas Department of State Health Services Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 1 of 2 Response to Request for Additional Information REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR BULLETIN 2012-01, "DESIGN VULNERABILITY IN ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM" On July 27, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Bulletin 2012-01,"Design Vulnerability in Electric Power System" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML 12074A1 15), to all holders of operating licenses and combined licenses for nuclear power reactors.

In addition, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, is addressing the issues identified in the bulletin as part of the licensing process.Bulletin 2012-01 requested information about each facility's electric power system designs, in light of recent operating experience involving the loss of one of the three phases of the offsite power circuit (single-phase open circuit condition) at Byron Station, Unit 2.In order for the NRC staff to complete its review of responses to the bulletin, the following additional information is requested:

1. Provide a summary of all interim corrective actions that have been taken since the January 30, 2012, event at Byron Station, Unit 2, to ensure that plant operators can promptly diagnose and respond to open phase conditions on the offsite power circuits for Class-I E vital buses until permanent corrective actions are completed.
2. Provide a status and schedule for completion of plant design changes and modifications to resolve issues with an open phase of electric power." STPNOC Response 1. Summary of All Interim Corrective Actions Lessons learned from the events at Byron station were reviewed and various interim corrective actions evaluated for safety and efficiency at the South Texas Project. Based on the plant's offsite power configuration, electrical design details, and operating experiences, the following actions were taken to ensure plant operators can promptly diagnose and respond to Open Phase Conditions (OPC):* Interim Corrective Actions o Daily switchyard walk-downs by operations staff are on-going to identify OPC vulnerabilities.

Enclosure NOC-AE-14003077 Page 2 of 2 o Operating procedures and training curriculum were reviewed and revised to ensure operators can diagnose and respond to an OPC.o Operating procedures were revised to ensure that whenever bus voltage is checked on Engineered Safety Features (ESF) buses that all three phases of ESF bus voltages are checked.o Transformer yard rounds by operations staff are performed daily and include general and detailed inspections of the transformers.

o Semi-annual infrared inspections of yard equipment are being completed as part of routine inspections.

o Continuing training for the January 30, 2012 Unit 2 Byron station event was provided to all STP licensed operators.

2. Status and Schedule for Completion of Plant Design Changes* Status o The industry is investigating options being researched by several vendors [Power and Control System 2000 (PCS2000), Electrical Power Research Institute (EPRI), Schweitzer, etc.) to detect OPC faults. There is currently no generic, off-the-shelf technology that has been proven to detect all the required open phase fault conditions for all plant and transformer designs.o The industry is fully engaged in the development of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) OPC Guidance Document, as well as development of enhancements to software tools being used to analyze OPC faults.o New OPC technology will be thoroughly evaluated, analyzed, and tested before installation.

The OPC technology design goals are to ensure accurate detection without compromising nuclear safety and increasing plant risk.o Qualitative vulnerability studies of the OPC faults have been completed (Reference 2), and quantitative vulnerability studies are scheduled to start and be completed by the end of this year for South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2[Reference Condition Report (CR) 12-8728-9].

  • Schedule o The South Texas Project Unit 1 and Unit 2 plan to follow the generic schedule provided in the Industry OPC Initiative from NEI.O It is our intention to meet the OPC milestones of this schedule; however, deviations may be required to accommodate outage schedules, software and hardware availability, manufacturer's delivery capabilities, licensing delays, etc.o Any deviation from the Industry OPC Initiative schedule will be documented in the STP corrective action program and through the deviation/exemption process addressed in the NEI OPC Guidance Document which is under development.