ML18092A036

N.C. State University - Annual Report for 2017

ML18092A036
Person / Time
Site:	North Carolina State University
Issue date:	03/29/2018
From:	Hawari A I North Carolina State University
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML18092A036 (28)

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NC STATE UNIVERSITY 29 March 2018 Document Control Desk US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Re: Annual Report for 2017 License No. R-12 0 Docket No. 50-297 Nuclear Reactor Program Department of Nuclear Eng i neering www.ne.ncsu.edu/nrp Ca mpu s Bo x 7909 2500 Stinson Drive Raleigh , NC 27695-7909 919.515.7294 (voice) 919.513.1276 (fax) In accordance with Technical Specification 6.7.4, the annual operating report fo r our facility is attached. If you have any questions regarding this correspondence or require additional information, please contact Gerald Wicks at 919-515-4601 or wicks@ncsu

.edu. I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct. Executed on 29 March 2018.

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Director, Nuclear Reactor Program North Carolina State University

Enclosures:

Annual Operating Report for 2017 Attachment A: PULSTAR Reactor Environmental Radiation Surveillance Report 1 NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PULSTAR REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT DOCKET NUMBER 50

-297 For the Period: 01 January 2017 - 31 December 2017 The following annual report for 2017 is submitted in accordance with Section 6.7.4 of the North Carolina State University PULSTAR Reactor Technical Specifications:

Reactor operations have been routine during this reporting period.

During the period from May through November the reactor operated continuously, with brief shutdown periods, for 3293 hours0.0381 days <br />0.915 hours <br />0.00544 weeks <br />0.00125 months <br /> to accommodate the needs of a user.

The following is a brief summary of the types of experiments performed:

Teaching Laboratories, Short Courses, Resear ch and Services:

Core thermal power measurements Dynamic reactivity measurements Axial power and peaking factor measurements (flux mapping)

Reactor power determination using photodiode arrays Neutron fluence and spectral measurements In-core detector certification Accelerated lifetime testing for nuclear detectors Neutron radiography Positron production facility Neutron Diffraction Isotope Production Crude oil Food samples Fish tissues Laboratory animal tissue Human hair, nails, and urine Polymers and plastics Sediment/soil/rocks Silicon crystals Textiles Water 2 Figure 1 - Reactor Utilization by Protocol Utilization Hours Percent Education 651 12% Research 482 9% Surveillance 131 2% Service 990 1 8% 1Special 3293 59% 2TOTAL 5547 100% NOTES: 1Non-routine 3293 hour0.0381 days <br />0.915 hours <br />0.00544 weeks <br />0.00125 months <br /> continuous test. 2Utilization hours (5547 h) exceed ed critical hours (3284.8 h) since there was typically more than one user of the reactor facility at a given time.

None The reactor surveillance program has revealed no significant or unexpected trends in reactor systems performance during this reporting period. The Reactor Safety and Audit Committee (RSAC) performed its annual audit for the facility and determined that all phases of operation and supporting documents were in compliance.

3 Total Energy Output in 201 7: 127.7 Megawattdays Critical hours in 2017: 3284.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Cumulative Total Energy Output Since Initial Criticality:

1926.9 Megawattdays Emergency Shutdowns - NONE Unscheduled Shutdowns - Twelve 13-FEB-2017 Linear Level Over

-Power SC RAM. On February 13, 2017, at approximately 18:07 a Linear Level Over

-Power SCRAM was received in the control room. The RO followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The SCRAM occurred during the increase in reactor power from 28 watts to 50 kW. The SCRAM was due to the Linear Level Monitor not auto

-ranging and at no time did an over power condition exist. The reactor was authorized for restart on February 13, 2017 at 19:10. 16-FEB-2017 Electronic Noise SCRAM. On February 16, 201 7, at approximately 1 3: 48 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The RO followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The Low Flow SCRAM was the result of operating the Emergency Hand

-Hand Radio (Walkie

-Talkie) in close proximity to the control console. The cause and effect was repeatable. A tag was attached to the radio to warn personnel to not use the radio near the control console. The reactor was authorized for restart on February 16, 2017 at 13:51. 11-SEPT-2017 Shutdown due to Fire Drill.

On September 11, 201 7, at approximately 7:27 a fire alarm was received in the control room. The RO followed procedure and proceeded to shutdown the reactor. The RO then notified the DSRO as required and at this time was informed that the fire alarm was a drill.

The reactor was authorized for restart on September 11, 2017 at 7:33. 13-SEPT-2017 Shutdown due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On September 13, 2017, at approximately 2:03 the reactor operator noticed a sudden decrease in primary flow indication which is indicative of air in the flow annubar. The RO proceeded to shutdown the reactor. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The flow annubar was vented and flow indication returned to normal.

The reactor was authorized for restart on September 13, 2017 at 8:30.

15-SEPT-2017 SCRAM due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On September 1 5, 2017, at approximately 23:12 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition

. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

4 The SCRAM was caused by air being trapped in the flow annubar resulting in a false low flow indication. Actual flow was nominally 500 gpm. The flow annubar was vented and flow indication returned to normal.

The reactor was authorized for restart on September 1 5, 2017 at 23:54. 1-OCT-2017 SCRAM due to Loss of Commercial Power.

On October 1, 201 7, at approximately 20:21 a power flicker caused the reactor to SCRAM. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The loss of commercial power was due to a transformer malfunction at the campus substation.

The reactor was authorized for restart on October 1, 2017 at 22: 45. 2-OCT-2017 SCRAM due to Loss of Commercial Power.

On October 2, 2017, at approximately 4:16 a power flicker caused the reactor to SCRAM. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The loss of commercial power was due to repair activities at the campus substation resulting from the transformer malfunction the previous day.

The reactor was authorized for restart on October 2, 2017 at 5:35. 1-NOV-2017 SCRAM due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On November 1, 2017, at approximately 6:03 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The SCRAM was caused by air being trapped in the flow annubar resulting in a false low flow indication. Actual flow was nominally 500 gpm. The flow annubar was vented and flow indication returned to normal.

The reactor was authorized for restart on November 1, 2017 at 8:

1 0. 1-NOV-2017 SCRAM due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On November 1, 2017, at approximately 23:55 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The SCRAM was caused by air being trapped in the flow annubar resulting in a false low flow indication. Actual flow was nominally 500 gpm. The flow annubar was vented and flow indication returned to normal.

The reactor was authorized for restart on November 2, 2017 at 00:35. 2-NOV-2017 SCRAM due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On November 2, 2017, at approximately 20:46 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The reactor operator followed procedure and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required. The SCRAM was caused by air being trapped in the flow annubar resulting in a false low flow indication. Actual flow was nominally 500 gpm. The flow annubar was vented and flow indication returned to normal.

The reactor was authorized for restart on November 2, 2017 at 23:45. 3-NOV-2017 SCRAM due to Air in Flow Annubar.

On November 3, 2017, at approximately 6:49 a Low Flow SCRAM was received in the control room. The reactor operator followed procedure 5 and confirmed that a SCRAM occurred and verified that the reactor had shutdown and was in a safe condition. The RO then notified the DSRO as required.

The SCRAM was caused by air being trapped in the flow annubar resulting in a false low flow indication. Actual flow was nominally 500 gpm.

The reactor was shutdown pending an investigation into the cause and mitigation of the air being trapped in the flow annubar.

The reactor was authorized for restart on November 8, 2017 at 7:15. Preventative maintenance, tests and calibrations are scheduled, performed and tracked utilizing the PULSTAR Surveillance File System. Each major component of the Reactor Safety System defined in Section 3.3, and all surveillance required by Section 4 of the Technical Specifications are monitored by this file system to ensure that maintenance and calibrations are performed in a timely manner. All historical data relating to those components, in addition to many other sub

-systems, are maintained in these files.

8 27 PS-1 Pool RTD - T2 - On November 9, 2016 under Maintenance Number 826 the pool RTD was removed from the pool for a scheduled calibration. Upon inspection the tubing was found to be cracked and the wiring was damaged from contact with the water. The RTD was temporarily replaced with an old spare RTD while an order was placed for a new RTD. The temporary RTD was calibrated and placed into service.

A new RTD was ordered, received, calibrated and placed into to service on Jan 31, 2017.

The polyethylene tubing was replaced with stainless tubing to prevent this type of failure from occurring in the future.

828 PS-1-11 Pool Temperature Switch - The existing pool temperature switch was replaced with a new unit. The existing unit was performing satisfactory but was aging. This was not a corrective maintenance due to equipment failure but was a planned maintenance activity.

The new unit was calibrated and placed into service.

8 29 PS-6-06-2A - Stack Gas Radiation Monitor - The pre-amplifier to the stack gas detector failed on February 9, 2017 and was replaced with the pre

-amplifier from the Filter GM detector on March 7, 2017. The stack gas detector was calibrated and returned to service on March 7, 2017. While out of service, the Auxiliary GM monitor was used to meet Technical Specification 3.5.

8 30 PS-3-02 Secondary Filter System - The filter differential pressure transducers failed giving a false DP causing excessive back

-flushing of the filters.

Transducers were replaced and the DP readings returned to normal. 8 31 PS-6-08-2A - Filter GM Radiation Monitor - The pre-amplifier from the Filter GM detector was used to replace the failed pre

-amplifier for the Stack Gas Radiation Monitor on March 7, 2017. The Filter GM detect or is not a required channel and was taken out of service.

8 32 PS-7-02-1A - Auxiliary Generator - The auxiliary generator battery was reading low. Battery was replaced. 8 33 PS-3-02-5A - Cooling Tower Solenoid Bleed Valve - The cooling tower solenoid bleed valve was stuck open causing a continuous blowdown of the cooling tower basin. The valve was replaced. 8 34 PS-5-01-1A - Main HVAC Supply Damper Actuator- During the startup checklist the actuator for the Main HVAC Supply Damper failed in the closed position. The actuator determined to be faulty and was replaced.

6 835 PS-2-0 3A - Primary Flow Annubar- Entrained air in the primary piping is becoming trapped in the upstream side of the flow annubar causing a false low flow reading. This reading occasionally falls below the 475 gpm SCRAM setpoint causing a Low Primary Flow SCRAM. The primary flow reading will return to normal when the annubar is vented. To prevent this from happening in the future a design change is being evaluated to relocate the annubar.

836 PS-2-03A - Primary Flow Annubar- This is a repeat of the entrained air in the primary piping and is detailed in Maintenance Log Number 835. A sample of the entrained gas from the primary piping was taken and analyzed. It was determined that the gas was indeed air. Dissolved air concentrations in the primary water are slightly higher than normal due to a lower primary water temperature and increase in city water make

-up. This slightly higher than normal dissolved air concentration along with the continuous operation allows the air to accumulate and become trapped in the flow annubar. A design change to relocate the annubar was approved in November 2017 and implemented in January 2018.

Design changes to the reactor facility are reviewed to determine whether or not a 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation was required.

Evaluations were performed for all design changes.

8 18 Installation of Thermo Area Radiation Monitoring System - This modification will replace the obsolete Victoreen radiation monitors with Thermo radiation monitors

. The design change package was approved on May 2, 2017. Installation is pending.

8 30 Relocation of Original Flow Annubar and Installation of an Additional Flow Annubar - This modification will relocate the original flow annubar to a location that is not susceptible to entrained air in the primary system. A second redundant flow annubar will be located downstream in the primary piping. The design change was approved in November 2017 and installation was completed in January 2 018. Procedure changes were reviewed to determine whether or not a 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation was required. Based on the screening reviews none required a full 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation.

Due to the license renewal that was submitted in April, 2017, a review of all procedures is ongoing. All procedures are being evaluated, revised, reaffirmed, or retired. This process is scheduled to be completed prior to the issuance of the license renewal. 8 17 PS-6-19 Thermo Radiation Monitor Calibration, Operation, and Maintenance, Revision 1 - This procedure was revised to incorporate the calibration of count rate equipment.

8 19 Special Procedure 2.7 - Unplanned Event Notification and Reporting, Revision 4 - This revision added the requirement for the prompt notification of the NRP Director, MEO and RHP for all events.

8 22 Emergency Procedure 1 - Emergency Plan Activation, Response, and Actions, Revision 19 - This procedure implement the newly approved Emergency Plan, Revision 10. Attachment 1 - PULSTAR Emergency Organizational Chart and Attachment 5 - Radiation Monitoring Systems and Reactor Instrumentation have been revised to reflect the new Emergency Plan.

8 23 Emergency Procedure 4 - Emergency Classification, Revision 7 - This procedure impleme nts the newly approved Emergency Plan, Revision 10. Emergency Action Level (EAL) definitions and criteria have been revised to reflect the new Emergency Plan.

824 Emergency Procedure 6 - Training, Revision 7 - This procedure implements the newly approved Emergency Plan, Revision 10. Emergency training, drills, and equipment inventory are combined into 7 one procedure resulting the retirement of Emergency Procedures 7 and 9.

825 Emergency Procedure 10 - Determination of Concentration, Release Rate, and Off

-Site Dose from Airborne Effluent, Revision 6 - This procedure implement the newly approved Emergency Plan, Revision 10.

Experiment changes were reviewed to determine whether or not a 10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation was required.816 NRP-OP-411 - Deuterium System Procedures, Revision 2.2 -The procedure was revised to clarify procedural sequencing of steps to protect equipment and to verify the system is in a safe, secure configuration prior to leaving it unattende

d. 821 Production of Mo The purpose of this experimental review is to allow for the production of Mo

-99. This document sets the requirements and limitations for the production, handling and shipping of Mo-99. 820 License Renewal Package - The facility operating license renewal package for the PULSTAR with a power uprate to 2.6 MW was submitted to the NRC on March 29, 2017 and is currently under review.

826 Security Plan for Shipment of Hazardous Material - This plan has been updated to current regulatory requirements.

827 Emergency Plan - The Emergency Plan was revised and submitted as part of the license renewal package. The Plan was reviewed by the NRC and found to be compliant with the regulations. The Plan was implemented on October 1, 2017.

Reportable Event On May 10, 2017 a reportable event occurred at the PULSTAR reactor involving failure to a have a licensed operator in the control room when the reactor key was in the reactor console.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified and a written report was filed with the NRC on May 15, 2017.

Corrective actions were identified resulting engineered and administrative controls being implemented to prevent a reoccurrence.

8 Releases to the sanitary sewer are given below:

Period (1) (2) (3) (4)1 (5) 2017 Number of Batches Total Ci Total Volume Liters Diluent Liters Tritium Ci 01 JAN - 31 MAR 2 518 6,550 24,400 515 01 APR - 30 JUN 4 853 13,400 172,500 834 01 JUL - 30 SEP 6 678 20,400 253,000 651 01 OCT - 31 DEC 4 492 13,300 23,400 488 2 017 2,488 Ci of tritium was released during this year.

2017 2,541 Ci of total activity was released during this year.

1Based on gross beta activity only. Tritium did not require further dilution.

The gross beta

-gamma activity of the batches in (i) above were less than 2 10-5 ml. Isotopic analyses of these batches indicated low levels of typical corrosion and activation products. No fission products were detected.

All liquid effluent met the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 for release to the sanitary sewer.

9 Year Month Total Time Hours Curies 2017 JANUARY 744 3.24E-01 FEBRUARY 6 72 8.54E-02 MARCH 744 1.78E-01 APRIL 720 8.95E-02 MAY 744 0.00E+00 JUNE 720 3.98E-01 JULY 744 1.48E+00 AUGUST 744 7.63E-01 SEPTEMBER 720 1.31E+00 OCTOBER 744 1.38E+00 NOVEMBER 720 1.80E+00 DECEMBER 744 3.25E-01 TOTAL 8760 8.125 Particulate filters from the Stack Particulate Monitoring Channel were analyzed upon removal. There was no particulate activity with a half-life greater than 8 days indicated on most filters during this reporting period. Antimony-124 was detected in amounts below 0.1 percent of 10 CFR 20 Appendix B Table 2 effluent limit in air on some filters.

Total activity of Argon-41 released was 8.125 curies in 2017. The yearly average concentration of Argon-41 released from the PULSTAR reactor facility exhaust stack in 2017 was 3.9 10-8 /ml. Dose calculations for the year were performed usin g methods given in the Final Safety Analysis Report and gave results less than the 10 CFR Part 20 constraint level of 10 mrem. These results are consistent with environmental monitoring data given in Attachment A.

Refer to gaseous waste i.(2) above.

Low levels of naturally occurring radioactivity and Antimony

-124 at concentrations below 0.1 percent of the regulatory limit were detected.

10 Total volume of solid waste was 45 ft 3. Total activity for solid waste was 1.649 mCi. Transfer of solid radioactive waste to the university broad scope radioactive materials license was made in Feb 2017, Aug 2017, and Oct 2017. The University Environmental Health and Safety Center arranges disposal of hazardous wastes.

Thirty individuals were monitored for external radiation dose during the reporting period. Internal dose monitoring was not required for any individual. Collective deep dose

-equivalent for 1 Jan 2017 to 31 Dec 2017 was 1.465 person-rem. Individual deep dose

-equivalent ranged from 0.001 rem to 0.

588 rem with a median of 0.0 20 rem and average of 0.051 rem. Radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facility indicated that:

Radiation in the majority of areas w as 5 mrem/h or less. Radiation in the remaining areas w as higher due to reactor operations. Contamination in most areas was not detectable

. When contamination was detected, the area or item was confined or decontaminated

. Refer to Attachment A for results of environmental sampling and analysis.

Radiation surveys performed in unrestricted areas near the reactor facility indicated that:

Radiation was at background levels for most areas (background is approximately 10 µrem/h). Contamination was not detectable. Net radiation readings ranged from 0 to 30 µrem/h while the reactor was operating at power. However, radiation was at background levels in all routinely occupied spaces. Water samples from Rocky Branch Creek and an on

-site ground water monitoring well were analyzed in 2017 for tritium, gross beta activity, gross alpha activity, and gamma radiation. All sample results were consistent with background radioactivity. Environmental monitoring of Rocky Branch Creek and groundwater is routinely performed in accordance with facilit y procedures.