ML20135F064

Insp Rept 50-445/85-02 on 850101-0228.Violation Noted: Failure to Follow Administrative Requirements of Startup Administrative Procedure CP-SAP-12, Deviations to Test Instructions/Procedures

ML20135F064
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak, 05000101
Issue date:	04/17/1985
From:	Hunnicutt D, Kelley D, Will Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20135F045	List: IR 05000101/2002028 ML20135F043 ML20135F055
References
50-445-85-02, 50-445-85-2, NUDOCS 8509170139
Download: ML20135F064 (15)

See also: IR 05000445/1985002

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-445/85-02 Construction Permit CPPR-126

Docket: 50-445 Category: A2

Applicant: Texas Utilities Electric Company (TUEC)

Skyway Tower

400 North Olive Street

Lock Box 81

Dallas, Texas 75201

Facility Name: Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) Unit 1

Inspection At: Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1985

Inspectors: > > NZ . / >,

D. L 1(efley', Senior RisiHent _ eactor Inspector

$ll1lW N

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(SRRI)

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W. F. Sm th, Resident Reactor Inspector (RRI)

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Approved: k

D. M. Hunnicutt, Section Chief, Reactor Project

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Date

Section B

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted: January 1 through February 28, 1985

(Report 50-445/85-02)

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- Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of (1) preoperational test

4 results evaluation; (2) applicant actions on previous inspection findings;

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(3) plant, tours; and (4) plant-status. The inspection involved 145 inspector-

hours by two NRC' inspectors.

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l Results: Within the 4 areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure.

to follow procedures, paragraph 2). In addition, 8 open items exist in

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paragraph 2 pending applicant action, and 3. unresolved items exist in paragraph

2 requiring additional information.

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DETAILS

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1. Persons Contacted

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k Applicant Personnel

• J. C. Kuykendall, Manager, Nuclear Operations

-*C. H. Welch,-Quality Assurance Supervisor.

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*J. C. Smith,-Quhlib Assurance

• R. B. Seidel, Optrations: Superintendent.

• R. E. Camp, Assistant Project General Manager, Unit 1

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• R. R. Wistrand, Administration Superintendent

*R. A. Jones, Manager, Plant Operations-

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• T. L..Gosdin,' Support ~ Services Superintendent

i *D. W..Braswell, Engineering Superintendent

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l '*D. E. Deviney, Operations QA Supervisor

j *M. R. Blevins, Maintenance Superintendent

! S.. M. Franks, .Special Project and Technical Support Lead

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j * Denotes those present at exit interview.

The NRC inspectors also interviewed other applicant employees during this

inspection period.

? 2. Preoperational Test Results Evaluation

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[j The NRC Resident Inspectors conducted an inspection of preoperational test  ;

data packages which had been completed, approved by the Joint Test' Group '

! (JTG) and placed in the station permanent records storage facility. The

2- objectives of this -inspection were to:- '

o Assure that the applicant is performing an adequate evaluation of

test results,

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o Assure.that all test data are either within previously established

acceptance criteria, or..that deviations are_ properly dispositioned, *

i o- Evaluate the adequacy of.the applicant's methods for correcting

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deficiencies and for retesting, if necessary,

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o Evaluate the adequacy of. the applicant's administrativeL practices in

, _ maintaining proper testLdiscipline concerning test' execution, test

_ alteration, and test records, and. *

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. 'o- Verify that the applicant'is following his procedures for review,

evaluation, and acceptance of, test results.

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The inspection of each preoperational test package consisted of:

o A review of all test changes to verify that (1) each change was

approved in accordance with pertinent administrative procedures, (2)

the procedure was annotated to identify test changes, (3) the test

change had been completed if it entailed specific actions, and (4)

none of the changes altered the basic objectives of the test.

o A review of all test deficiencies to verify that, (1) each had been

resolved, that the resolution had been accepted by appropriate

management and the JTG, and that retest requirements had been

completed; (2) any system or process changes necessitated by a test

deficiency were properly documented and reviewed.

o A review of the test summary and evaluation to ensure that, (1) the

System Test Engineer (STE) evaluated the test results and signified

that the testing demonstrated that the system met design requirements;

(2) the applicant specifically compared test results with established

acceptance criteria.

o A review of the " official test copy" of the test procedure to verify

that, (1) data sheets had been completed (10 percent minimum sample);

(2) all data were recorded where required and were within acceptance

tolerances (10 percent minimum sample); (3) all test deficiencies

identified were noted and had received appropriate reviews and

evaluations; and (4) individual test steps and data sheets have been

properly signed and dated.

o A review of Quality Assurance involvement to verify that, (1) QA/QC

witness and hold points were observed where called for;

(2) Preoperational Test packages were audited as required by

administrative procedures.

o Verification that the test results have been approved by the

applicant's Joint Test Group and that the review and approval is

documented as required by administrative procedures.

Inspection of the completed preoperational test data packages listed below

revealed minor problems that are generic in nature. These are addressed

below, rather than in the specific comments provided for each package.

Since the preoperational test program for Unit 1 was essentially

- completed, the NRC inspectors considered it appropriate to address these

at this time, so that Unit 2 testing can be improved accordingly:

a. Section 4.8 of Startup Administrative Procedure CP-SAP-21, " Conduct

of Testing," provides instructions for making corrections to test

procedure or data sheet entries, i.e., lining through the entry once,

then dating and signing or initialling the correction. The procedure

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directs that data shall not be erased, obliterated, or covered by

" whiteout"'or other means. This is a standard, industry-wide

practice, which the applicant has meticulously adhered to with one

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general exception. In most test data packages, when the System Test

Engineer (STE) found it necessary to repeat procedure steps, he lined -

through the previous signature, signed and dated the lineout,_and

then signed off the step again when he repeated the step. This is

, the method prescribed by procedure. However, there were instances

when the STE lined through a previous signature without signing and

4 ' dating the lineout, followed by signoff of the step.again when it'was

repeated. If it was assumed that the requirements of.CP-SAP-21, step

4.8 were being followed, then the steps appeared to be missing the

required signoffs, the result being no certification that the steps

had been performed at all. The specifics in each data package where

this problem existed were corrected during final review, in most

cases. Whether or not corrected, th'e NRC inspectors were able'to

find other information in the test data packages such as the

chronological test logs, that substantiated actual reperformance of-

the steps in question. Thus, it is an administrative problem which

complicates-data package review rather than a failure to perform the

required test steps. The generic aspects of this problem were

discussed with the applicant's representatives, with the suggestion

by the RRI that test step signoffs need not be lined through if the

step was in fact performed, because the dates accompanying subsequent

signoffs clearly indicate each time the step:is performed. If a

situation occurs where a step is signed by mistake, the STE could

annotate that the signature is void and explain why in the margin or

in the log. The applicant has committed to take this under

advisement under " lessons learned" for' Unit 2 and will advise the RRI

of action taken at a later date. This is (open) Open Item

445/8502-01.

b. CP-SAP-12, " Deviations to Test Instructions / Procedures," provides the

requirements and responsibilities for initiation and approval of

minor changes (deviations) to test instructions and procedures. Most

preoperational testing procedures require minor changes just prior

to, or during performance of the test to accommodate last-minute

design changes affecting the test, to correct editorial or typo-

graphical. errors that were missed during the procedure review and

approval process, or to allow alternate testing methods when

unanticipated equipment' problems occur. There were indications of a

trend toward_three problems in the implementation of this procedure:

(1) Section 4.2.4 of CP-SAP-12 requires the author (usually the STE)

of a test procedure deviation (TPD) to describe the reason for

the deviation in the space provided on the TPD form. Examples

exist where technical changes were explained as " typo error."

In other cases the reason just did not leave the reviewer with a

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clear understanding as to why the change was necessary. The

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specifics have been clarified or corrected on a case basis. The

applicant has indicated prior knowledge of this trend and has

committed to correct it for Unit 2 testing under " lessons learned."

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Actions taken will be reviewed for adequacy by the NRC and for

tracking purposes shall remain (open) Open Itam 445/8502-02.

(2) CP-SAP-8, " Review, Approval and Revision of Test-Instruction /

, Procedures" and CP-SAP-12 both control the method of changing

test procedures and instructions. Whether the procedure is

revised formally in accordance with CP-SAP-8 or a TPD is utilized

.in accordance with CP-SAP-12, a change must be documented and

, approved in accordance with one of these procedures in order.to

ensure that the objectives of the original test as described in-

the FSAR are kept intact. The RRI observed that during JTG

reviews of completed test data packages, deficiencies found which

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required a change to the procedures after the test was performed '

j were documented on a' Test Deficiency Report (TDR) and not in

i accordance with CP-SAP-8 or 12. The applicant explained that

revising the procedure in accordance with CP-SAP-8 or 12 after

the test had been completed had no value because the TDR

. documented and explained the change, the reason for the change,

the retesting requirements, completion of corrective actions and

retesting, and in addition, the JTG ultimately approved the

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action stated on the TDR. While the RRI agreed that this is the

best way to handle and document such changes, CP-SAP-8 and 12 do

not provide for it, thus administrative provisions must be made

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to continue this practice. The applicant committed to make the

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appropriate administrative procedure revisions. This will remain

j (open) Open Item 445/8502-03 until the action is completed.-

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I (3) Since there is no provision in CP-SAP-12 to limit the extent of

test procedure deviation reports, the complexity and number of

TPDs has increased gradually to the point where full revisions

should be considered. An example of this is described in the

specific comments for ICP-PT-64-10 below. While it was explained

by the applicant. and is understood by the NRC that the JTG

i ultimately approved the changes during the completed test package

review, the confusion brought about by numerous pen-and-ink

, changes can have a detrimental effect on the quality of the test,

i particularly when there is insufficient space on the page to

enter the changes. The applicant also noted this trend and had

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indicated that action will be'taken under " lessons learned" for

Unit 2. The NRC will. review this action at a later date and

i evaluate its adequacy. This is (open) Open Item 445/8502-04.

c. In addition to the general commen't's'made above, the NRC inspectors

had the following specific comments and concerns related to the

completed preoperational test packages inspected

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(1) ICP-PT-29-02, Revision 1, " Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems"

There were several instances where the STE failed to initiate

a TPD to authorize minor changes to the procedure, for what

appeared to be unnecessary requirements or editorial errors. For

example, step 7.3.12 was written twice. Instead of deleting the

duplication, the STE did not sign the second step, then six months

later lined through it and added the remark " Void-duplication of

the step on page 15." Data sheets 2, 6, 10 and 14 call for air

compressor shutdown time, t2. The data was not recorded, and

the remark, "no test step to record t2." was entered. These

data points should have been deleted by TPD, because apparently

the shutdown time has no .ignificance when in manual operation.

The data sheets contained a " reviewed by" signature blank which

was not signed. The applicant's representative explained that

the signature blanks should not have been in the procedure. If

not, they should have been deleted by TPD in accordance with

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CP-SAP-12, not left blank in the completed data package. In

each case during the review of completed preoperational test

data packages, the NRC inspector was shown by the applicant that

the action (or lack thereof) taken by the STE was technically

correct in-so-far as-testing of the system is concerned. However,

this practice is not permitted by administrative procedures. The

above examples constitute a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, failure to follow procedure (445/8502-05).

(2) ICP-PT-29-01, RT1, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Auxiliary

Systems, Retest 1,"

No deviations or violations were found.

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(3) 1CP-PT-29-02, RT1, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Control Circuit

Functional and Start Test," Retest 1, (Phase I and II).

On data sheet 9, the STE annotated that position 6 of the

temperature selector switch does not exist for stator

temperatures, yet the procedure called for these data. This

requirement should have been deleted by a TPD instead of being

left blank. Again, as above, the STE was technically correct,

but he did not follow the administrative' requirements of

CP-SAP-21 to initiate an approved change. This is another

example of failure to follow procedure addressed under violation

445/8502-05 above.

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(4) ICP-PT-29-03 REDO, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Load Tests"

(Repeat of test).

TDR 3425 identified a probitm with No. 2 starting air compressor

relief valve lifting below its proper lift pressure. The

corrective action entered on the TDR form required the valve to

be repaired and/or reset. The work document describing comple-

tion of this work stated that the relief valve was not the

problem and that perhaps the pressure gages should be checked.

There was no documentation in the preoperational test data

package showing what action was taken, if any. On October 8,

1984, the TDR was signed off by the STE as " corrective action

completed," with no apparent followup to determine the cause of

the relief valve lifting prematurely. On October 22, 1984,

during performance of ICP-PT-29-03, Retest 1 (below), the relief

valve again lifted prematurely. The STE initiated TDR 3723 to

document the problem. As of the time of this inspection, the

followup actions were not completed. The applicant was requested

to explain why the cause of the relief valve problem was not

resolved prior to starting the second test, and what final action

was taken to solve the problem. The applicant committed to

provide this information. This is (open) Unresolved

Item 445/8502-06.

(5) 1CP-PT-29-03, RT-1, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Load Test,

Retest 1."

Paragraph 7.1 of this procedure was subjected to many pen-and-ink

(TPD) changes. Incorporation of these changes by the STE rendered this

section of the completed preoperational test package illegible.

As a result, the NRC inspectors could not determine the adequacy

of the test results. The applicant indicated that corrective

actions would be taken including a possible repeat of the test.

This is (open) Unresolved Item 445/8502-07.

(6) ICP-PT-29-03, RT-2, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Load Test,

Retest 2,"

There were no violations or deviations noted during review of

this test. However, it appeared that there may have been some

discontinuity with regard to design drawing updates. The NRC

inspector noted that ICP-PT-29-03, RT-1, did not have any

referenced drawing revision updates prior to starting the test.

This in itself did not indicate a problem, because 1CP-PT-29-03

REDO which had a similar referenced drawing list, was updated

about two months earlier. However, upon review of ICP-PT-29-03,

RT-2, which also had a similar list of referenced drawings, the

MlFinspector noted that about 40 drawing revisions

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were changed about 10 days before 1CP-PT-29-03, RT-1, was started.

.This raised the question of whether or not ICP-PT 2Y-03, RT-1

referenced drawings were current during' performance of that test,

or, the current design information was evaluated against the test

procedure. The applicant commented that the sequence of events

were probably misleading, and has committed to provide an

explanation. This is (open) Unresolved Item 445/8502-08.

(7) ICP-PT-29-04, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Sequencing and

Operational Stability Test"

No violations or deviations'were found.

(8) ICP-PT-29-04, RT-1, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Sequencing and

-Operational Stability Test, Retest 1."

This' test data package contained 22 TPDs and 9 TDRs. It-

contained many TPD pen-and-ink entries, which rendered the data

package illegible. Consequently the NRC inspectors were unable

to determine whether or not the test objectives were met. The

applicant indicated that corrective actions would be taken

including a possible repeat of the test. This is the second

example of this problem found during NRC inspections of completed

preoperational test data packages. The NRC inspector noted that

the previous example (1CP-PT-29-03, RT-1) was performed by_the

same STE. These two test data packages are the only cases where

the NRC inspectors had been unable to determine the adequacy of

test results due to illegible entries. The applicant acknowl-

- edged this and is taking corrective actions in that regard also.

Thisis(open)UnresolvedItem 445/8502-09.

-(9) ICP-PT-29-05, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Reliability Test."

No violations or deviations were found.

(10) ICP-PT-29-05, REDO, Revision 0, " Diesel Generator Reliability

Tests" (Repeat of Tcst).

No violations or deviations were found.

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(11) 1CP-PT-48-02, Revision 0, " Containment Spray System Response

Time and Chemical-Additive Flow Test."

No violations or deviations were found.

(12) ICP-PT-64-05, Revision 1, " Safeguards Test Cabinets / Turbine Trip

Test Cabinets Blocking Circuits Operational Test."

The RRI noted that this preoperational test procedure was utilized

by the STE in a neat and professional manner, and provided an

excellent test data package. No violations or deviations were

found.

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(13) ICP-PT-64-10, Revision 0, " Safeguards Relay Actuation Test."

Prior to the start of this test, the STE executed a 56 page TPD

which had 61 instructions, a few of which required replacing

about 45 of the procedure's 207 pages. On July 2, 1984, this

massive change appeared to have been approved in one day by the

Shift Supervisor and by the Lead Startup Engineer. The TPD

contained inadequate or improper justifications, and in one case

a detailed justification (No. 43) was provided for a change

description that did not exist in the TPD. That is, the change

descriptions skipped from No. 42 to No. 44. The change could

have been made in the procedure, but when the TPD was typed,

instruction number 43 was apparently omitted. A second TPD,

which involved the replacement of 11 more procedure pages, made

additional changes and corrected errors made in the first TPD.-

It became readily apparent upon review of this test data package

that there should be controls over the extent of changes a TPD

can incorporate without full JTG approval. Startup

Administrative Procedures presently have no limits. The

applicant pointed out that although such large changes do not

have the benefit of a JTG review before or during a test, the

JTG has the ultimate opportunity and responsibility to rule on

the acceptability of all changes during the final review of the

completed test data package. The RRI acknowledged this.

However, such extensive changes without a thorough technical

review are subject to error which can affect the quality of

safety-related systems through improper test methods or

equipment manipulation. Since the RRI was unable to determine

whether change number 43 was incorporated, it remains unresolved

as to the acceptability of this completed test data package.

The applicant must demonstrate how this change was incorporated,

assess the impact on the test if not incorporated, and consider

what controls should be implemented to keep the scope of TPDs

down to manageable size and complexity. This is (open)

Unresolved Item 445/8502-10.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(14) 1CP-PT-02-02, "118 VAC RPS Inverters, (REDO)"

This test package was neat and well annotated. The TPDs and TDRs

were well documented and corrective actions were well defined.

No violations or deviations were identified.

(15) 1CP-PT-57-10, " Load Group Assignment."

No violations or deviations were identified, hcwever, two open

items associated with TDRs are listed below. The applicant is

researching records to provide the information to close out

these items.

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o TDR-3676 identified a failure to accomplish the slow

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transfer of train B bus 12A2 when initiated by the test

procedure. The cause was determined to be binding of the

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activating bar for device 52b/1EG2. Maintenance Action

Request (MAR) 84-4036 was initiated to adjust the activating

bar. A note on the MAR specified that the retest for the

MAR would be added later. Neither the retest for the MAR

nor the MAR are included in the completed test document.

This is (open) Open Item 445/8502-11.

o TDR-3966 was issued during the completed test package

review. The TDR (item 4) identified 15 drawing changes

pertaining to the referenced drawings in the test package.

The corrective action was to note the changes beside the

referenced drawings. There is no documentation to show

that the thanges were reviewed to ascertain if they

impacted the results of the test. This is (open) Open

Item 445/8502-12.

3. Applicant Action on Previous Inspection Findings

a. (Closed) Unresolved Item 8340-01: Concerns over whether or not the

applicant was going to have sufficient records from which to determine

retests of systems (or subsystems) subjected to extensive electrical

rework af ter preoperational testing was completed. In early 1983 many

electrical cables were determinated, rerouted and/or modified, and ,

reterminated. The NRC inspector expressed concern in NRC Inspection

Report 50-445/83-40 that such records will be vital to ensure that

systems are fully retested, and that NRC examination of work packages

will be on going to establish the level of confidence required by the

NRC. Such an examination was subsequently conducted, and no problems

were found that would preclude an adequate retesting program. In the

interest of conservatism, the applicant had decided to repeat the

control and interlock sections of 34 preoperational tests and

completely repeat 4 others. This conservative approach coupled with

what appeared to be adequate construction rework records has

established an acceptable level of confidence. This item is

considered closed.

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b. (Closed) Violation 8340-01: Failure to follow procedures. During

the months of July, August, and September 1983, an estimated 12,000

documents were transmitted from the Startup group to the applicant's

record center with incorrectly filled out transmittal forms. This

was contrary to the requirements of station administrative procedure

STA-302, " Station Records." In their response to the notice of

violation the applicant indicated that although the requirements of

STA-302 were not being completely followed, each transmittal had the

required " unique identifier," and thus all documents were retrievable.

As such, plant safety was not affected. Permanent corrective action

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included retraining and direction of Records Center personnel to

ensure that their activities were in full compliance with STA-302.

Subsequently, in August 1984, an NRC inspection of quality assurance

was conducted (see NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-31 dated

February 12,1985). The area of records transmittal was addressed and

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appeared to be under control with no problems noted. This item is'

closed.

c. (Closed) Open Item 8223-01: This item addressed the inability to

attain the required system flow rates during the performance of the

Station Service Water (SSW) preoperational test procedure

1CP-PT-04-01. Corrective actions taken by the applicant included 1

clearing out partially clogged instrument lines, verification of

installed instrument calibration, removal of possible air bubbles

from installed instruments by filling and venting, revising the test

procedure to obtain additional data points in order to better ,

determine the pressure-flow characteristics of the system and its

pumps, and use of back-up test instruments to verify flows. The

repeat performance of ICP-PT-04-01 achieved satisfactory results.

The NRC inspectors witnessed the repeat test in June 1984, which is

documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-21, dated August 14,

1984. This item is closed,

d. (Closed) Violation 8308-01: Failure to follow procedures. During

Hot Functional Testing conducted in March 1983, the SRRI noted that

ten steps of IP0-001A, Revision 0, " Plant Startup from Cold Shutdown

to Hot Standby" had been changed without using proper administrative

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controls. The applicant's response indicated that the cause was an

i oversight by control room personnel. Most of the operating procedures

were in draft form, and thus, as a function of procedure check-out,

control room personnel were making pen-and-ink error corrections.

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Personnel using IP0-001A failed to notice that the procedure was

already approved and as such, come under specific administrative ,

revision controls. Corrective action taken by the applicant was to

issue CPSES Special Order No. 1-S0-83-005, " Operating Procedures -

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Use and Changes During Testing" on March 4,1983, in accordance with

STA-207, "Special Order, Night Orders, and Management Memorandums."

The order outlined requirements for the use of operating procedures

during preoperational testing, and cautioned personnel that changes to

1 approved operating procedures are to be made in accordance with

approved administrative controls. The trial-testing and correction of

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plant operating procedures during the initial testing program is

I encouraged by Regulatory Position C 7 of Regulatory Guide 1.68, which

l is a commitment in the CPSES FSAR.

From the time of this violation in March 1983, through January 1985,

there has been a significant amount of preoperational testing. The

NRC inspectors have not observed any further problems in the

Operations area of procedure revision control, thus, the applicant's

t preventive actions appear to be adequate. This violation is closed,

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e. (Closed) Open Item 8308-03: This open item was issued to track the

resolution of comments made by the SRRI while reviewing 12 Initial

Startup (ISU) procedures which he received in draft form. Five of

these procedures yielded specific comments which are documented in NRC

Inspection Report 50-445/83-08 dated April 29, 1983. All comments

provided by the SRRI have been satisfactorily resolved and are

appropriately reflected in the issued procedures approved by the

Station Operation Review Committee (SORC). This item is closed.

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f. (Closed) Open Item 8221-01: In September 1982, during a routine

inspection, the SRRI noted that station operating logs were lacking

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consistency in format and detail. This was brought to the attention

of the applicant in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-21 dated

October 20, 1982. The applicant took the comment under advisement.

Since that time up to the present, the SRRI and the RRI have been

reviewing the logs as a part of routine plant tours. The attributes

checked have been that the logs accurately reflect plant status and

changes thereto, tests in progress, documentation of problems

encountered during a given shift, and finally, overall compliance with

Operations Department Administrative Procedure 00A-301, " Operating

Logs." The resident inspectors found that the logs generally met the

above criteria. This item is closed.

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g. (Closed) Open Item 8221-02: During the routine September 1982, "

inspection the SRRI noted an organizational change where the Texas

Utilities Services, Incorporated (TUSI) Engineering and Construction

Manager became the Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) Startup

Manager. This item was considered open pending the applicant's

review of possible FSAR changes. Since that time, this individual has

become the Assistant Project General Manager, and other organizational

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changes have taken place. As of the time of this inspection, the

FSAR, through amendment 53 dated July 13, 1984, appears to reflect the

. current organization in this area. This item is closed.

4. Plant Tours

During this reporting period, the SRRI and RRI conducted several inspection

tours of Unit 1. In addition to the general housekeeping activities and

general cleanliness of the facility, specific attention was given to

areas where safety related equipment was installed and where activities '

were in progress involving safety-related equipment. These areas were

inspected to ensure that:

o Work in progress was being accomplished using approved procedures.

o Special precautions for protection of equipment were implemented, and

additional cleanliness requirements were being adhered to for

maintenance, flushing, and welding activities.

o Installed safety-related equipment and components were being protected

and maintained to prevent damage and deterioration.

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Also during these tours, the SRRI and RRI reviewed the control room and

q shift supervisors' log books. Key items in the log review were: .

o. plant status

j o changes in plant status

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! o tests in progress

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! o; . documentation of problems which arise during operating shifts

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Overall housekeeping practices in Unit 1 are excellent. There were no

j problems found in the operating logs.

! No violations or deviations were found..during the plant tours.

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i 5. Plant Status as of February 28, 1985 ' .

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a. Unit No. 1 is 99% complete with 403 of 422 areas turned over to

operations custody and 331 of 332 subsystems turned over to operations t

] custody. " Custody" means having immediate authority and responsi-

l bility for operational control of systems or equipment. '

The applicant has accepted 286 of 332 subsystems for final acceptance.

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i b. Of the 199 preoperational tests, all are completed on field testing,  !

j and one is pending review and approval of completed data. Seven are  ;

i pending NRC completed data inspections. '

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c. The following NRC inspection findings are open pending applicant i

action and NRC followup inspection to confirm completion for closure.

The quantitles are based on a manually maintained open items list ,

] held by the NRC Resident Inspector's office at CPSES. t

l Last Report This Report  ;

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i Violations 10 12

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Deviations 0 0 I

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Open Items 100 97 i

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Unresolved 7 14 .

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Total 117 123

Action is underway to complete these items. Closure will be

documented in futurc inspection reports.

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d. Unit No. 2 is 72% complete. The preoperational test program on

systems associated with NRC inspections has not yet started.

6. Exit Interview

An exit interview was conducted on March 1, 1985, with applicant

representatives identified in paragraph 1. During the interview, the SRRI

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and RRI reviewed the scope of this inspection report and discussed the

inspection findings. The applicant acknowledged the findings.

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