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{{#Wiki_filter:Attachment 6 OBDI 202 - IOLE Process DRAFT OUTLINE COMMENTS Facility:
{{#Wiki_filter:DRAFT OUTLINE COMMENTS Facility:       Grand Gulf                                 First Exam Date: 6/28-7/02/2010 Written Exam Outline (Date)
Grand Gulf First Exam Date:
Comment                                           Resolution 1   No Comments 2
6/28-7/02/2010 Written Exam Outline (Date) Comment Resolution 1 No Comments 2   3   4   5     Administrative JPM Outline (Date) Comment Resolution 1 On the RO Conduct of Ops JPM, include the title (i.e. what is the JPM) Title will be added on following revisions.
3 4
2   3   4   5     Control Room / In-Plant System JPM Outline (Date) Comment Resolution 1 ES-301-2 for SRO-I: The SRO-I's don't have anything to test Safety Function 6.
5 Administrative JPM Outline (Date)
It doesn't appear there is an opportunity to evaluate their ability to manipulate electrical distribution/controls. There is an extra JPM that could address this (Battery Charger lineup).
Comment                                           Resolution On the RO Conduct of Ops JPM, include Title will be added on following revisions.
The outline for the SRO-Is meets the 1021 safety function requirements. No resolution needed.
1 the title (i.e. what is the JPM) 2 3
2 There are only 4 alternate path JPMs which is the minimum allowable. Add one alternate path JPM so there are a total of 5. A fifth alternate path JPM will be added.
4 5
3 JPM f involves transferring RPS power from normal to/from alternate. Confirm these actions can be performed in the simulator and not a "talk-through." Facility will verify where these actions are taken, and make changes accordingly.
Control Room / In-Plant System JPM Outline (Date)
4 It is not clear from the outline how JPM I Per 1021 this is a safety function 7. No Attachment 6 OBDI 202 - IOLE Process is a safety function 7. Followup with the exam author. further action needed.
Comment                                           Resolution ES-301-2 for SRO-I: The SRO-Is dont        No resolution needed.
5 Simulator Scenario Outline Comments (Date) Comment Resolution 1 In Scenarios 1 and 2, the first event (Normal) give credit to RO 1 and 2 for shifting Recirc Pumps to Fast Speed and placing a Feed Pump on the Master Level Controller in their BOP position.
have anything to test Safety Function 6.
The action following these is for the ATC to raise power with control rods. Is there any chance the SS will direct the ATC to do both actions in series? How do they train their SS for prioritization on this?
It doesnt appear there is an opportunity to evaluate their ability to manipulate electrical distribution/controls. There is an extra JPM that could address this (Battery Charger lineup).
Concern is that if the SS directs the ATC to do these, followed by pulling rods, the BOP will not get their Normal evolution credit per the ES-301-5. Discussed with exam authors. Will review as part of the exam validation.
The outline for the SRO-Is meets the 1021 safety function requirements.
2 Any concerns with exposing operators to 2 ATWS scenarios? Are they dissimilar enough? Examples: SRO-I 2 in Scenarios 1 and 3, RO 2 in Scenarios 3 and 5, SRO-I 3 in Scenarios 3 and 5 The number of scenarios will be decreased to address overlap issues.
There are only 4 alternate path JPMs         A fifth alternate path JPM will be added.
3 ES-301-5: If the sixth scenario is needed, it would put the applicants in a fourth scenario that may be unneeded.
which is the minimum allowable. Add 2
If it is needed for the applicants in addition to the five scenarios, are there surrogates in standby for support?
one alternate path JPM so there are a total of 5.
A surrogate will be provided.
JPM f involves transferring RPS power       Facility will verify where these actions are from normal to/from alternate. Confirm       taken, and make changes accordingly.
4 With 5 candidates, only 3 scenarios plus a spare are needed to administer the exam. The facility will review the content and see if the exam can be accomplished with 3 scenarios vice 5/6.
3 these actions can be performed in the simulator and not a talk-through.
5 Scenario 1 comments/questions:
4   It is not clear from the outline how JPM I   Per 1021 this is a safety function 7. No                                                             OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
 
is a safety function 7. Followup with the     further action needed.
exam author.
5 Simulator Scenario Outline Comments (Date)
Comment                                         Resolution In Scenarios 1 and 2, the first event         Discussed with exam authors. Will review as (Normal) give credit to RO 1 and 2 for       part of the exam validation.
shifting Recirc Pumps to Fast Speed and placing a Feed Pump on the Master Level Controller in their BOP position.
The action following these is for the ATC to raise power with control rods. Is there 1
any chance the SS will direct the ATC to do both actions in series? How do they train their SS for prioritization on this?
Concern is that if the SS directs the ATC to do these, followed by pulling rods, the BOP will not get their Normal evolution credit per the ES-301-5.
Any concerns with exposing operators to      The number of scenarios will be decreased to 2 ATWS scenarios? Are they dissimilar         address overlap issues.
enough? Examples: SRO-I 2 in Scenarios 1 and 3, RO 2 in Scenarios 3 and 5, SRO-I 3 in Scenarios 3 and 5 ES-301-5: If the sixth scenario is           A surrogate will be provided.
needed, it would put the applicants in a fourth scenario that may be unneeded.
3 If it is needed for the applicants in addition to the five scenarios, are there surrogates in standby for support?
With 5 candidates, only 3 scenarios plus     The facility will review the content and see if 4  a spare are needed to administer the          the exam can be accomplished with 3 exam.                                        scenarios vice 5/6.
Scenario 1 comments/questions:               This scenario will not be used.
: 1. Is shifting RR pumps typically done by the BOP?
: 1. Is shifting RR pumps typically done by the BOP?
: 2. What operator actions are required for the FHA rad monitor failure? 3. Because SLC will fail to inject boron, it cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS event.
: 2. What operator actions are required for the FHA rad monitor failure?
: 3. Because SLC will fail to inject 5
boron, it cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS event.
Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.
Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.
: 4. Change critical task 1 to "Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS." This scenario will not be used.
: 4. Change critical task 1 to Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS.                                                             OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
Attachment 6 OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
: 5. What actions are required in response the EHC fluid leak by the ACRO?
: 5. What actions are required in response the EHC fluid leak by the ACRO?
: 6. What actions are taken by the ACRO in response to the failure of the A FZ level indicator?
: 6. What actions are taken by the ACRO in response to the failure of the A FZ level indicator?
Scenario 2 comments/questions:
Scenario 2 comments/questions:             Text changes will be made. Questions
: 1. What actions are taken by the ACRO for the rod drift?
: 1. What actions are taken by the         resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
ACRO for the rod drift?
: 2. Raising power 5% with control rods will take a long time.
: 2. Raising power 5% with control rods will take a long time.
: 3. The wording for event 4 implies the HPCS pump will trip without any operator actions. What actions will the BOP be required to take for event 4.
: 3. The wording for event 4 implies the HPCS pump will trip without any operator actions. What actions will the BOP be required to take for event 4.
: 4. Change the first critical task to "Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches  
: 4. Change the first critical task to Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches on the FZ range.
 
: 5. Change the second critical task to Manually initiate Division II ECCS prior to RPV pressure going below 300 psig.
on the FZ range."
: 5. Change the second critical task to "Manually initiate Division II ECCS prior to RPV pressure going below 300 psig."
: 6. What is the 300 psig limit in the second critical task based on?
: 6. What is the 300 psig limit in the second critical task based on?
: 7. What size LOCA is the main event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then RCIC and main feedwater should be available for maintaining level.
: 7. What size LOCA is the main event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then RCIC and main feedwater should be available for maintaining level.
: 8. What actions is the ACRO expected to take in response to the Division II failure to auto start? Text changes will be made. Questions resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
: 8. What actions is the ACRO expected to take in response to the Division II failure to auto start?
Scenario 3 comments/questions:
Scenario 3 comments/questions:              Text changes will be made. Questions
: 1. What actions are required for the failure of the RHR Hx bypass valve? 2. Scenario 1 has the BOP operating the RR system and this scenario has the ACRO operating  
: 1. What actions are required for the     resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
 
failure of the RHR Hx bypass valve?
the same system. Which operator is responsible for RR?
: 2. Scenario 1 has the BOP operating the RR system and this scenario has the ACRO operating the same system. Which operator is responsible for RR?
: 3. Event 5 has the ACRO responding to the loss of heater drain pumps. What are the  
: 3. Event 5 has the ACRO responding to the loss of heater drain pumps. What are the ACRO actions?
 
: 4. Is the FW rupture in the drywell                                                         OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
ACRO actions?
: 4. Is the FW rupture in the drywell Text changes will be made. Questions resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
Attachment 6 OBDI 202 - IOLE Process basically the same event as the LOCA in the drywell in scenario
 
2?  5. With a FW rupture in the drywell, why is an ED necessary (since
 
the rupture will depressurize the RPV)? 6. If the FW rupture does not rapidly depressurize the RPV then why can level not be maintained with HPCS?  Scenario 4 comments/questions:
: 1. What are the actions for the ACRO on the control rod drifting
 
out? 2. The control rod drift is basically the same event as event 3 in


scenario 2 (just different directions).
basically the same event as the LOCA in the drywell in scenario 2?
: 3. It is not clear from the critical tasks as written, what the actual tasks are. Rewrite the critical tasks so they are specific and  
: 5. With a FW rupture in the drywell, why is an ED necessary (since the rupture will depressurize the RPV)?
 
: 6. If the FW rupture does not rapidly depressurize the RPV then why can level not be maintained with HPCS?
measurable.
Scenario 4 comments/questions:          Scenario 4 will not be used.
: 4. With power initially at 5%, it would seem there would be no need to pull rods to increase RPV pressure - just increase the pressure setpoint for the bypass valves. 5. This scenario does not meet the minimum "bean count" for events for the BOP.
: 1. What are the actions for the ACRO on the control rod drifting out?
: 6. Can RCIC be manually isolated during event 4/5? Scenario 4 will not be used.
: 2. The control rod drift is basically the same event as event 3 in scenario 2 (just different directions).
Scenario 5 comments/questions:
: 3. It is not clear from the critical tasks as written, what the actual tasks are. Rewrite the critical tasks so they are specific and measurable.
: 1. What actions are required by the BOP for events 2, 3, and 8?
: 4. With power initially at 5%, it would seem there would be no need to pull rods to increase RPV pressure - just increase the pressure setpoint for the bypass valves.
: 2. This scenario does not meet the minimum "bean count" for events for the BOP.
: 5. This scenario does not meet the minimum bean count for events for the BOP.
: 3. The main event for this scenario is basically the same as scenario
: 6. Can RCIC be manually isolated during event 4/5?
: 1. 4. Change critical task 1 to "Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS."
Scenario 5 comments/questions:           Text changes will be made. Questions
: 1. What actions are required by the resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
BOP for events 2, 3, and 8?
: 2. This scenario does not meet the minimum bean count for events for the BOP.
: 3. The main event for this scenario is basically the same as scenario 1.
: 4. Change critical task 1 to Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS.
: 5. The HPCS jockey pump event exercises the same TS as event 4 in scenario 2.
: 5. The HPCS jockey pump event exercises the same TS as event 4 in scenario 2.
: 6. Events 6 and 7 are the same event - delete event 7.
: 6. Events 6 and 7 are the same event - delete event 7.                                                       OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
Text changes will be made. Questions resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
: 7. From the wording, it appears SLC will fail to inject boron and cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS event. Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.
Attachment 6 OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
: 7. From the wording, it appears SLC will fail to inject boron and cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS  
 
event. Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.
: 8. It does not seem like scramming the reactor as a result of thermal hydraulic instabilities meets the critical task threshold. Discuss with exam author.
: 8. It does not seem like scramming the reactor as a result of thermal hydraulic instabilities meets the critical task threshold. Discuss with exam author.
Scenario 6 comments/questions:
Scenario 6 comments/questions:             Text changes will be made. Questions
: 1. What size LOCA is the main event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then HPCS should be available for  
: 1. What size LOCA is the main           resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.
 
event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then HPCS should be available for maintaining level.
maintaining level.
: 2. It is not clear what reduced injection systems in event 6 means.
: 2. It is not clear what "reduced injection systems" in event 6  
: 3. Change the first critical task to Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches on the FZ range.
 
: 4. Change the second critical task to The crew restores RPV level to greater than -191 inches.
means. 3. Change the first critical task to "Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches  
 
on the FZ range."
: 4. Change the second critical task to "The crew restores RPV level to greater than -191 inches."
: 5. The main event is basically the same as scenario 2 and probably scenario 3.
: 5. The main event is basically the same as scenario 2 and probably scenario 3.
: 6. What would happen if the operators took no action for events 5, 6, and 7?
: 6. What would happen if the operators took no action for events 5, 6, and 7?                                                         OBDI 202 - IOLE Process}}
Text changes will be made. Questions resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.}}

Latest revision as of 18:46, 13 November 2019

2010-06-DRAFT-Outline Comments
ML101450219
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/25/2010
From: Garchow S
NRC Region 4
To:
Entergy Operations
References
50-416/10-301
Download: ML101450219 (5)


Text

DRAFT OUTLINE COMMENTS Facility: Grand Gulf First Exam Date: 6/28-7/02/2010 Written Exam Outline (Date)

Comment Resolution 1 No Comments 2

3 4

5 Administrative JPM Outline (Date)

Comment Resolution On the RO Conduct of Ops JPM, include Title will be added on following revisions.

1 the title (i.e. what is the JPM) 2 3

4 5

Control Room / In-Plant System JPM Outline (Date)

Comment Resolution ES-301-2 for SRO-I: The SRO-Is dont No resolution needed.

have anything to test Safety Function 6.

It doesnt appear there is an opportunity to evaluate their ability to manipulate 1 electrical distribution/controls. There is an extra JPM that could address this (Battery Charger lineup).

The outline for the SRO-Is meets the 1021 safety function requirements.

There are only 4 alternate path JPMs A fifth alternate path JPM will be added.

which is the minimum allowable. Add 2

one alternate path JPM so there are a total of 5.

JPM f involves transferring RPS power Facility will verify where these actions are from normal to/from alternate. Confirm taken, and make changes accordingly.

3 these actions can be performed in the simulator and not a talk-through.

4 It is not clear from the outline how JPM I Per 1021 this is a safety function 7. No OBDI 202 - IOLE Process

is a safety function 7. Followup with the further action needed.

exam author.

5 Simulator Scenario Outline Comments (Date)

Comment Resolution In Scenarios 1 and 2, the first event Discussed with exam authors. Will review as (Normal) give credit to RO 1 and 2 for part of the exam validation.

shifting Recirc Pumps to Fast Speed and placing a Feed Pump on the Master Level Controller in their BOP position.

The action following these is for the ATC to raise power with control rods. Is there 1

any chance the SS will direct the ATC to do both actions in series? How do they train their SS for prioritization on this?

Concern is that if the SS directs the ATC to do these, followed by pulling rods, the BOP will not get their Normal evolution credit per the ES-301-5.

Any concerns with exposing operators to The number of scenarios will be decreased to 2 ATWS scenarios? Are they dissimilar address overlap issues.

2 enough? Examples: SRO-I 2 in Scenarios 1 and 3, RO 2 in Scenarios 3 and 5, SRO-I 3 in Scenarios 3 and 5 ES-301-5: If the sixth scenario is A surrogate will be provided.

needed, it would put the applicants in a fourth scenario that may be unneeded.

3 If it is needed for the applicants in addition to the five scenarios, are there surrogates in standby for support?

With 5 candidates, only 3 scenarios plus The facility will review the content and see if 4 a spare are needed to administer the the exam can be accomplished with 3 exam. scenarios vice 5/6.

Scenario 1 comments/questions: This scenario will not be used.

1. Is shifting RR pumps typically done by the BOP?
2. What operator actions are required for the FHA rad monitor failure?
3. Because SLC will fail to inject 5

boron, it cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS event.

Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.

4. Change critical task 1 to Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS. OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
5. What actions are required in response the EHC fluid leak by the ACRO?
6. What actions are taken by the ACRO in response to the failure of the A FZ level indicator?

Scenario 2 comments/questions: Text changes will be made. Questions

1. What actions are taken by the resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.

ACRO for the rod drift?

2. Raising power 5% with control rods will take a long time.
3. The wording for event 4 implies the HPCS pump will trip without any operator actions. What actions will the BOP be required to take for event 4.
4. Change the first critical task to Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches on the FZ range.
5. Change the second critical task to Manually initiate Division II ECCS prior to RPV pressure going below 300 psig.
6. What is the 300 psig limit in the second critical task based on?
7. What size LOCA is the main event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then RCIC and main feedwater should be available for maintaining level.
8. What actions is the ACRO expected to take in response to the Division II failure to auto start?

Scenario 3 comments/questions: Text changes will be made. Questions

1. What actions are required for the resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.

failure of the RHR Hx bypass valve?

2. Scenario 1 has the BOP operating the RR system and this scenario has the ACRO operating the same system. Which operator is responsible for RR?
3. Event 5 has the ACRO responding to the loss of heater drain pumps. What are the ACRO actions?
4. Is the FW rupture in the drywell OBDI 202 - IOLE Process

basically the same event as the LOCA in the drywell in scenario 2?

5. With a FW rupture in the drywell, why is an ED necessary (since the rupture will depressurize the RPV)?
6. If the FW rupture does not rapidly depressurize the RPV then why can level not be maintained with HPCS?

Scenario 4 comments/questions: Scenario 4 will not be used.

1. What are the actions for the ACRO on the control rod drifting out?
2. The control rod drift is basically the same event as event 3 in scenario 2 (just different directions).
3. It is not clear from the critical tasks as written, what the actual tasks are. Rewrite the critical tasks so they are specific and measurable.
4. With power initially at 5%, it would seem there would be no need to pull rods to increase RPV pressure - just increase the pressure setpoint for the bypass valves.
5. This scenario does not meet the minimum bean count for events for the BOP.
6. Can RCIC be manually isolated during event 4/5?

Scenario 5 comments/questions: Text changes will be made. Questions

1. What actions are required by the resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.

BOP for events 2, 3, and 8?

2. This scenario does not meet the minimum bean count for events for the BOP.
3. The main event for this scenario is basically the same as scenario 1.
4. Change critical task 1 to Insert control rods either by scram or via RC&IS.
5. The HPCS jockey pump event exercises the same TS as event 4 in scenario 2.
6. Events 6 and 7 are the same event - delete event 7. OBDI 202 - IOLE Process
7. From the wording, it appears SLC will fail to inject boron and cannot be used to mitigate the ATWS event. Therefore, attempting to initiate SLC is not a critical task.
8. It does not seem like scramming the reactor as a result of thermal hydraulic instabilities meets the critical task threshold. Discuss with exam author.

Scenario 6 comments/questions: Text changes will be made. Questions

1. What size LOCA is the main resolved. Will be reviewed in validation.

event? I.e., if there is a rapid depressurization then there is no need to ED and this would not be a critical task. If there is no rapid depressurization then HPCS should be available for maintaining level.

2. It is not clear what reduced injection systems in event 6 means.
3. Change the first critical task to Open at least 7 SRVs prior to RPV level reaching -210 inches on the FZ range.
4. Change the second critical task to The crew restores RPV level to greater than -191 inches.
5. The main event is basically the same as scenario 2 and probably scenario 3.
6. What would happen if the operators took no action for events 5, 6, and 7? OBDI 202 - IOLE Process