05000443/FIN-2012007-01: Difference between revisions

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{{finding
{{finding
| title = Inadequate 10 Cfr 50.59 Evaluation
| title = Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation
| docket = 05000443
| docket = 05000443
| inspection report = IR 05000443/2012007
| inspection report = IR 05000443/2012007
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| significance = Green
| significance = Green
| cornerstone = Barrier Integrity
| cornerstone = Barrier Integrity
| violation of = None
| violation of =  
| identified by = NRC
| identified by = NRC
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.17
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.17
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| CCA = N/A for ROP
| CCA = N/A for ROP
| INPO aspect =  
| INPO aspect =  
| description = The team identified a Severity Level lV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 in that NextEra made changes to an analysis listed in the Technical Specifications (TS) without obtaining a license amendment. The team found that prior to replacing incore probe detectors used to determine neutron and gamma flux in the core NextEra added two correction factors to the S3FINC code in order to adjust the signals produced by the detectors. The changes were made under the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The team also found that a third correction factor had been applied in 2002 to address a divergence between the measured and predicted flux levels. In this case the changes were made without using the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The team's review determined that in 1992 the licensee had evaluated the methodology used to convert the detector signal to a flux map via YAEC-1855PA, Seabrook Station Unit 1 Fixed Incore Detector System Analysis. This analysis had been submitted to the NRC as part of License Amendment Request 92-14. The NRC had evaluated and approved the analysis in a Safety Evaluation associated with License Amendment2T. The analysis was then listed in Section 6.8.1 .6.b.10 of the TS. The team determined that the changes impacted the analysis and assumptions used as the basis for the conclusions reached in the NRC Safety Evaluation. Following identification of the issue, NextEra entered the issue into the corrective action program, performed an operability assessment, and planned to correct the discrepancy between the license and plant configuration. The team determined that the failure to perform an assessment of the changes made to the plant in 2002 and that the incorrect conclusion reached in the 2010 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation constituted a performance deficiency. Because the issue impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory function, traditional enforcement was used to disposition the violation. The issue was considered more than minor because the changes involved a change to the TS, and the NRC review and approval was required prior to implementing. The team used IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,' to evaluate the risk significance of the issue. The team determined the issue adversely impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and had very low safety significance (Green) per Table 4a in the Phase 1 screening because it only potentially impacted the fuel barrier.
| description = The team identified a Severity Level lV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 in that NextEra made changes to an analysis listed in the Technical Specifications (TS) without obtaining a license amendment. The team found that prior to replacing incore probe detectors used to determine neutron and gamma flux in the core NextEra added two correction factors to the S3FINC code in order to adjust the signals produced by the detectors. The changes were made under the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The team also found that a third correction factor had been applied in 2002 to address a divergence between the measured and predicted flux levels. In this case the changes were made without using the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The team\'s review determined that in 1992 the licensee had evaluated the methodology used to convert the detector signal to a flux map via YAEC-1855PA, Seabrook Station Unit 1 Fixed Incore Detector System Analysis. This analysis had been submitted to the NRC as part of License Amendment Request 92-14. The NRC had evaluated and approved the analysis in a Safety Evaluation associated with License Amendment2T. The analysis was then listed in Section 6.8.1 .6.b.10 of the TS. The team determined that the changes impacted the analysis and assumptions used as the basis for the conclusions reached in the NRC Safety Evaluation. Following identification of the issue, NextEra entered the issue into the corrective action program, performed an operability assessment, and planned to correct the discrepancy between the license and plant configuration. The team determined that the failure to perform an assessment of the changes made to the plant in 2002 and that the incorrect conclusion reached in the 2010 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation constituted a performance deficiency. Because the issue impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory function, traditional enforcement was used to disposition the violation. The issue was considered more than minor because the changes involved a change to the TS, and the NRC review and approval was required prior to implementing. The team used IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings,\' to evaluate the risk significance of the issue. The team determined the issue adversely impacted the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and had very low safety significance (Green) per Table 4a in the Phase 1 screening because it only potentially impacted the fuel barrier.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018

01
Site: Seabrook NextEra Energy icon.png
Report IR 05000443/2012007 Section 1R17
Date counted Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Barrier Integrity
Identified by: NRC identified
Inspection Procedure: IP 71111.17
Inspectors (proximate) L Scholl
K Mangan
L Doerflein
M Orr
INPO aspect
'