ML100550640

Developmental Revision B - Technical Requirements Manual Bases B 3.4 - Reactor Coolant System

ML100550640
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	02/02/2010
From:	Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML100550640 (15)

Text

Safety Valves, Shutdown B 3.4.1 (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-1 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.1 Safety Valves, Shutdown

BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer safety valves pr ovide, in conjunction with the Reactor Trip System, overpressure protection for the RCS. The pressurizer safety

valves are totally enclosed pop-type, spring-loaded, self-actuated valves

with backpressure compensation. The safety valves are designed to prevent the system pressure from exceeding the system Safety Limit (SL), 2735 psig, which is 110% of the design pressure (Ref. 1).

Because the safety valves are totally enclosed and self-actuating, they

are considered independent components. The relief capacity for each

valve, 420,000 lb/hr, is based on postulated overpressure transient conditions resulting from a complete loss of steam flow to the turbine.

This event results in the maximum surge rate into the pressurizer, which

specifies the minimum relief capacity for the safety valves. The discharge

flow from the pressurizer safety valves is directed to the pressurizer relief

tank. This discharge flow is indicated by an increase in temperature

downstream of the pressurizer safety valves or increase in the pressurizer

relief tank temperature or level.

Overpressure protection is required in MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (with

the reactor vessel head on); however, in MODE 4, MODE 5 and MODE 6

with the reactor vessel head on, overpressure protection is provided by

operating procedures and by meeting the requirements of Technical

Specification 3.4.12, "Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS)."

The upper and lower pressure limits are based on the

+ 3% tolerance.

The lift setting is for the ambient conditions associated with MODES 1, 2, and 3. This requires either that the valves be set hot or that a correlation

between hot and cold settings be established.

The pressurizer safety valves are part of the primary success path and

mitigate the effects of postulated accidents above 350 F. OPERABILITY of the safety valves ensures that the RCS pressure will be limited to

110% of design pressure. The consequences of exceeding the American

Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) pressure limit (Ref. 2) could

include damage to RCS components, increased LEAKAGE, or a requirement to perform additional stress analyses prior to resumption of reactor operation.

Safety Valves, Shutdown B 3.4.1 BASES (continued)

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-2 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The pressurizer safety valves protect the RCS from being pressurized

above the RCS pressure Safety Limit. The pressurizer safety valves

provide overpressurization protection during both power operation and

hot standby. However, the pressurizer safety valves are not assumed to

function to mitigate a DBA or transient in MODES 4 and 5 (Ref. 3).

TR This requirement is provided to ensure continuity in the restructuring of Standard Technical Specifications. Reactor Coolant System

overpressure protection is provided in MODES 4 and 5 by the Cold

Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) covered by Technical

Specification LCO 3.4.12.

Reference 4 specifies requirements which, when met, may preclude the

need for this TR.

A Note modifies this TR to indicate that the lift setting of the pressurizer

Code safety valves can be outside the required lift setting when in MODE 4 for the purpose of setting at hot ambient conditions. Safety valves can lift at a slightly different pressure as the valve temperature

varies. Therefore, setting the safety valve for nominal operating

conditions in MODE 1 may result in a lift pressure drifting outside the

required tolerance limits as the plant is shutdown to MODE 5. This

exception is allowed for entry and oper ation into and exit from MODES 4 and 5 provided a preliminary cold setting was made prior to heatup.

APPLICABILITY The OPERABILITY of one pressurizer Code safety valve ensures that overpressure protection is provided in MODES 4 and 5. OPERABILITY of

Code safety valves is not required in MODE 6. Code safety valve

OPERABILITY requirements for MODES 1, 2, and 3 are covered in

Technical Specification 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves."

ACTIONS A.1 With no pressurizer Code safety valves OPERABLE, the plant must be

placed in a condition which minimizes the risk of a pressure spike large

enough to actuate a safety valve. This is done by suspending all

operations involving positive reactivity changes. The immediate

Completion Time for performance of Required Action A.1 shall not

preclude completion of actions to establish a safe condition.

Safety Valves, Shutdown B 3.4.1 BASES Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-3 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A ACTIONS (continued)

A.2 In addition to Action A.1, an OPERABLE Residual Heat Removal loop

shall be placed in operation in the shutdown cooling mode. This provides

overpressure protection through the Residual Heat Removal suction and

discharge relief valves. The immediate Completion Time requires an

operator to initiate actions to place the loop in shutdown cooling. Once

actions are initiated, they must be continued until the loop is in the

shutdown cooling mode.

TECHNICAL

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.1.1

TSR 3.4.1.1 requires verification that the pressurizer safety valve is

OPERABLE in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

REFERENCES

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 5.5.13, "Safety and Relief Valves." 2. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III, NB 7000.

3. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.

4. Generic Letter 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issue 70, "Power-Operated Relief Valve and Block Valve Reliability," and

Generic Issue 94, "Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light-Water Reactors," Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f).

Pressurizer Temperature Limits B 3.4.2 (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-4 Technical Requirements (developmental) A B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.2 Pressurizer Temperature Limits

BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer is an ASME Section III, vertical vessel with hemispherical top and bottom heads constructed of carbon steel. The vessel is clad

with austenitic stainless steel on all surfaces exposed to the reactor

coolant. A stainless steel liner or tube may be used in lieu of cladding in

some nozzles. The surge line nozzle and removable electric heaters are

installed in the bottom head. Spray line nozzles, relief and safety valves

are located in the top head of the vessel. A small continuous spray is

provided through a manual bypass valve around the power-operated

spray valves. The temperature, and hence the pressure are controlled by

varying the power input to selected heater elements. The pressurizer is designed to withstand the effects of cyclic loads due to pressure and temperature changes. These loads are introduced by startup and

shutdown operations, power transients and reactor trips. During startup

and shutdown, the rate of temperature change is controlled by the

operator. Heatup rate is controlled by the input to the heater elements, and cooldown is controlled by spray. When the pressurizer is filled with

water, i.e., during initial system heatup, and near the end of the second

phase of plant cooldown, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure is

maintained by the letdown flow rate via the Residual Heat Removal

System.

These Bases address the control of the rate of change of temperature

and the effect of the thermal cycling on critical areas of the pressure

boundary of the pressurizer. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary, which includes the pressurizer, is defined in 10 CFR 50, section 50.2 (Ref. 1). General rules for design and fabrication are provided in

10 CFR 50, section 50.55a (Ref. 2). These design and fabrication rules

are based on the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

APPLICABLE

SAFETY ANALYSES The limits on the rate of change of temperature for the heatup and

cooldown of the pressurizer are not derived from Design Basis Accident

analyses (Ref. 3). The limits are prescribed during normal operation to

limit the cyclic, thermal loading on critical areas in the pressure boundary.

The limits on the rate of change of temperature have been established, using approved methodology, to preclude operation in an unanalyzed

condition.

Pressurizer Temperature Limits B 3.4.2 BASES (continued)

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-5 Technical Requirements (developmental) A TR TR 3.4.2 specifies the acceptable rates of heatup and cooldown of the pressurizer. These limits define allowable operating regions and permit a large number of operating cycles while providing a wide margin to cyclic

induced failure in the pressure boundary of the pressurizer.

APPLICABILITY The limits on the rate of change of temperature provide a definition of acceptable operation to limit cyclic temperature loading to analyzed

conditions. Although these limits were developed to provide rules for

operation during heatup and cooldown (MODES 3, 4, and 5), they are

applicable at all times.

ACTIONS A.1, A.2 and A.3.

If the rate of change of temperature is outside the limits, the rate of

temperature change must be restored to within limits in 30 minutes.

The 30-minute Completion Time reflects the urgency of restoring the

parameters to within the analyzed range. Most violations will not be

severe, and the corrective actions can be accomplished in this time in a

controlled manner. In addition to restoring operation to within limits, an

evaluation is required within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to determine if operation may

continue. This may require event-specific stress analyses or inspections.

A favorable evaluation must be completed before continuing operation.

The 72-hour Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Technical Specification 3.4.3, "RCS Pressure and Temperature Limits."

A Note is provided to clarify that all Actions must be completed whenever

this Condition is entered. The Note emphasizes the need to perform the

evaluation of the effects of the excursion outside the allowable limits.

Restoration to within limits is insufficient without the evaluation of the

structural integrity of the pressure boundary of the pressurizer.

B.1 and B.2

If a Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are

not met, the plant must be placed in a lower MODE and the pressure

reduced. This will allow a more careful examination of the event. The

6-hour Completion Time is reasonable, considering operating experience, to reach MODE 3 from full power. The additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> to reduce the

pressure to < 500 psig in an orderly manner also considers operating

experience. This reduction in pressure is possible without challenging the

plant systems or violating any operating limits.

Pressurizer Temperature Limits B 3.4.2 BASES (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-6 Technical Requirements (developmental) A TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.2.1

TSR 3.4.2.1 verifies that the rate of heatup and the rate of cooldown are

within limits. "Step wise" cooling must be avoided as discussed in

Reference 4. The 30-minute Frequency is considered reasonable in view

of the instrumentation available in the control room to monitor the status

of the RCS. The Surveillance has been modified by a Note which

requires the Surveillance to be performed only during heatup and

cooldown of the system.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50.2, "Definitions." 2. 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards." 3. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.

4. Westinghouse letter WAT-D-8376, "Reactor Coolant System

Accelerated Cooldown," dated November 5, 1990.

RCS Vents B 3.4.3 (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-7 Technical Requirements (developmental) A B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.3 RCS Vents

BASES BACKGROUND The Reactor Vessel Head Vent System (RVHVS) is installed on the reactor vessel head. The RVHVS consists of a safety-grade venting flow

path with redundancy around process solenoid valves. Two one inch

solenoid-operated globe valves are mounted in series in each redundant

portion of the flow path. The piping between these valves is provided with

a temperature monitor. Any leakage through the upstream valve will be

detected as an increase in temperature. The two redundant upstream

valves are open/close isolation valves and are powered by opposite vital

power buses. The two redundant downstream valves are throttle valves

that are used to regulate the release rate of the non-condensible gases

and steam. The two throttle valves are also powered by opposite vital

power buses. All four valves are remote, manual-operated from the

control room. The valves are normally closed, de-energized and

designed to fail closed in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.48. The

system provides venting during plant startup/shutdown or for

post-accident. The system is designed to operate in the containment

atmosphere during and after a design basis event. However, the system

is not utilized during emergency operation until an inadequate water level

in the reactor vessel has been determined. During an incident with

hydrogen generation and release, a venting period of approximately

ten minutes is acceptable without violating the combustible concentration

of hydrogen in the containment.

The capability and the function of the system are consistent with the

requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action

Plan Requirements" (Ref. 1). Direct operator action is required to actuate

the system. System actuation is only required when the accumulation of

non-condensible gases could impair forced or natural circulation and, hence, cooling of the core.

APPLICABLE

SAFETY ANALYSES The RVHVS is designed to ensure that non-condensible gases do not

accumulate under the reactor vessel head and thereby impair the cooling

of the core. However, in designing the accident sequences for theoretical

hazard evaluation, the RVHVS is not assumed to be a system that

directly serves to prevent or mitigate a DBA or transient (Ref. 2).

RCS Vents B 3.4.3 BASES (continued)

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-8 Technical Requirements (developmental) A TR TR 3.4.3 requires that the two redundant vent paths are OPERABLE.

One condition for OPERABILITY is that the upstream manual isolation valve is locked open. However, in case of one inoperable path, one

condition for continued operation (while restorative actions take place) is

that the inoperable path is maintained closed with power removed from

both valve actuators. With two paths inoperable, no requirement exists

with respect to isolation during the much shorter time of restorative

actions.

APPLICABILITY The TR is basically protecting against uncovering the core and reduces the possibility for impairment of natural or forced circulation through the

core. This is mainly a concern during the production of power and early

in the decay heat removal phase. Accordingly, Applicability is consistent

with operation in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. In higher-numbered MODES, the

heat flux in the core is low and protection by this TR is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2

With one vent path inoperable, it is necessary to immediately start actions

to see to that the inoperable path is closed and fully isolated from the

Reactor Coolant System. The inoperable path must be restored to

OPERABLE condition in 30 days. It should be noted that during this

period of time one path is fully OPERABLE. If the need for venting should

occur during this time period, the OPERABLE path will provide 100% of

the required venting capacity. Based on this, 30 days is an acceptable

time period for restoring the inoperable path.

B.1 With two paths inoperable, it is required to restore one path in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

The 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is based on operating experience and is a reasonable time

period for identifying and correcting problems which could be associated

with an inoperable path.

RCS Vents B 3.4.3 BASES Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-9 Technical Requirements (developmental) B ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A

or B are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition in which the TR

does not apply. This is accomplished by placing the unit in MODE 3

within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 in an additional 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The allowed

Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to

reach the required conditions from full power conditions in an orderly

manner and without challenging plant systems.

TECHNICAL

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.3.1, TSR 3.4.3.2 and TSR 3.4.3.3

Every 18 months it is necessary to verify that each of the two vent paths

is OPERABLE. This verification consists of checking the upstream and

downstream isolation valves and ensuring that the valves are locked in

the open position. Further, the two control valves are operated from the control room, in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program through

one complete cycle of full travel. Lastly, the test includes a verification of

flow through the two vent paths.

REFERENCES 1. NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements." 2. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.

Chemistry B 3.4.4 (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-10 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.4 Chemistry

BASES BACKGROUND The Reactor Coolant System (RCS) water chemistry is selected to minimize corrosion. A periodic analysis of the coolant chemical

composition is performed to verify that the reactor coolant quality meets

the specifications (Ref. 1). This Technical Requirement places limits on

the dissolved oxygen, chloride and fluoride content of the RCS to minimize corrosion.

Limiting dissolved oxygen content of the RCS limits the amount of general

corrosion and reduces the possibility of stress corrosion. General

corrosion is a contributing factor in Reactor Coolant Activity (Ref. 2) and must be controlled for ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) considerations as well as structural integrity considerations.

Both chlorides and fluorides have been shown to cause stress corrosion if

present in the RCS in sufficiently high concentrations at high pressure

and temperature conditions. Stress corrosion can lead to either localized

leakage or catastrophic failure of the RCS. The associated effects of

exceeding the dissolved oxygen, chloride, and fluoride limits are time and

temperature dependent. Corrosion studies show that operation may be

continued with contaminant concentration levels in excess of the

Steady-State Limits, up to the Transient Limits, for the specified limited

time intervals without having a significant effect on the structural integrity

of the RCS.

APPLICABLE

SAFETY ANALYSES Minimizing corrosion of the RCS reduces the potential for RCS leakage

and for failure due to stress corrosion, thus ultimately ensuring the

structural integrity of the RCS (Ref. 3). It is not, however, a consideration

in the analyses of Design Basis Accidents.

TR TR 3.4.4 establishes the limits on concentration of dissolved oxygen, chloride and fluoride in the RCS. These limits ensure that dissolved

oxygen, chloride and fluoride concentrations are maintained at levels low

enough to prevent unacceptable degradation of the RCS pressure

boundary.

Chemistry B 3.4.4 BASES (continued)

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-11 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A APPLICABILITY Concentrations of dissolved oxygen, chloride and fluoride in the RCS must be maintained within limits at all times. Applicability is modified by a Note stating with Tavg 250 F, the dissolved oxygen limit is not applicable.

ACTIONS A.1 If one or more chemistry parameters are not within Steady State Limits in

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the parameter(s) must be restored to its Steady

State Limit within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This allows time to take corrective actions to

restore the contaminant concentrations to within the Steady State Limits.

B.1 and B.2

With one or more chemistry parameters not within Transient Limits in

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, or if the Required Action of Condition A is not met

in the associated Completion Time, the plant must be placed in a

condition where the limit is not applicable or where corrosion rates are

reduced. This is accomplished by placing the plant in MODE 3 within

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. In MODE 5, the dissolved oxygen

limit is not applicable and stress corrosion rates are reduced. The

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allotted to reach MODE 3 is a reasonable time, based on

operating experience, to shutdown the plant from full power in an orderly

manner and without challenging plant systems. The extended interval to reach MODE 5 allows 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> for restoration of the parameters and to reach MODE 5.

If high chloride or fluoride concentrations are the reason for entering

MODE 5, and the condition is not corrected before entering MODE 5, Required Actions C.1, C.2 and C.3 must be performed.

C.1 If RCS chloride or fluoride concentration are not within Steady State

Limits for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in any condition other than MODES 1, 2, 3

or 4, or if RCS chloride or fluoride concentration are not within Transient

Limits for any amount of time in any condition other than MODES 1, 2, 3

or 4, action must be immediately initiated to reduce pressurizer pressure

to 500 psig unless it is already below 500 psig. The immediate Completion Time is consistent with the required times for actions

requiring prompt attention.

Chemistry B 3.4.4 BASES Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-12 Technical Requirements ( developmental) A ACTIONS C.1 (continued)

A Note is added to Condition C stating that all Required Actions must be

completed whenever this Condition is entered.

C.2 and C.3

In addition to Required Action C.1, an engineering evaluation must be

performed to determine the effects of the out-of-limit condition on the

structural integrity of the RCS. It must also be determined that the RCS

remains acceptable for continued operation. These actions must be

taken prior to increasing pressurizer pressure above 500 psig or prior to

entry to MODE 4. These evaluations are necessary because of the

time/temperature/concentration dependency of the effects of exceeding

the limits. Corrosion evaluations for conditions outside the limits are

made on a case by case basis.

TECHNICAL

SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.4.1, 3.4.4.2 and 3.4.4.3

Demonstrating that the chemistry parameters are within their Steady

State Limits at a Frequency of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> provides adequate assurance

that concentrations in excess of the limits will be detected in sufficient

time to take corrective action. TSR 3.4.4.1 is modified by a Note stating

that it is not required with Tavg 250 F. With Tavg 250 F, the dissolved oxygen limit is not applicable.

REFERENCES

1. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 5.2, "Integrity of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary." 2. Watts Bar FSAR, Section 11.1, "Source Terms." 3. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.

Piping System Structural Integrity B 3.4.5 (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-13 Technical Requirements (developmental) A B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.5 Piping System Structural Integrity

BASES BACKGROUND Inservice inspection of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components and pressure testing of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps and valves are performed in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and

Pressure Vessel Code (Ref. 1) and applicable Addenda, as required by

10 CFR 50.55a(g) (Ref. 2). Exception to these requirements apply where

relief has been granted by the Commission pursuant to 10 CFR

50.55a(g)(6)(i) and (a)(3). In general, the surveillance intervals specified in Section XI of the ASME Code apply. However, the Inservice Inspection

Program includes a clarification of the frequencies for performing the inservice inspection and testing activities required by Section XI of the

ASME Code. This clarification is provided to ensure consistency in

surveillance intervals throughout the Technical Specifications. Each

reactor coolant pump flywheel is, in addition, inspected as recommended

in Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, August

1975 (Ref. 3).

Additionally, programmatic information on Inservice Inspection is provided

in Technical Specifications, Chapter 5.0, Administrative Controls, Section

5.7.2.11, Inservice Inspection Program.

APPLICABLE

SAFETY ANALYSES Certain components which are designed and manufactured to the

requirements of specific sections of the ASME Boiler and Pressure

Vessel Code are part of the primary success path and function to mitigate

DBAs and transients. However, the operability of these components is

addressed in the relevant specifications that cover individual components.

In addition, this particular Requirement covers only structural integrity

inspection/testing requirements for these components, which is not a

consideration in designing the accident sequences for theoretical hazard

evaluation (Ref. 4).

Piping System Structural Integrity B 3.4.5 BASES (continued)

(continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-14 Technical Requirements (developmental) B TR TR 3.4.5 requires that the structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components be maintained in accordance with TSR 3.4.5.1 and TSR 3.4.5.2. In those areas where conflict may exist between the

Technical Specifications and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code, the Technical Specifications take precedence.

APPLICABILITY The structural integrity of the ASME Code Class 1 components is required in all MODES, when the temperature is above the minimum

temperature required by NDT considerations. For ASME Code Class 2

components, the structural integrity is required when the temperature is

above 200°F. For ASME Code Class 3 components, the structural

integrity is required at all times when the particular component is in service.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2

Required Actions A.1 and A.2 apply to ASME Code Class 1 components.

Required Action A.1 stipulates that structural integrity should be restored

before the temperature of the component is increased more than 50 F above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.

Alternatively, the component could be isolated before the temperature

reaches 50 F above the minimum temperature required by NDT considerations.

B.1 and B.2

Required Actions B.1 and B.2 apply to ASME Code Class 2 components.

Required Action B.1 stipulates that structural integrity should be restored before the temperature of the component is increased more than 200 F. Alternatively, the component could be isolated before the temperature

reaches 200 F.

C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2

Required Actions C.1, C.2.1, and C.2.2 apply to ASME Code Class 3

components. Required Action C.1 requires that the applicable Conditions

and Required Actions for the affected components be entered

immediately. Additionally, the structural integrity of all components must

be satisfied or the particular component which does not satisfy the

required structural integrity must be isolated from the system within the

Completion Time specified in the affected components LCO or TR.

Piping System Structural Integrity B 3.4.5 BASES (continued)

Watts Bar - Unit 2 B 3.4-15 Technical Requirements (developmental) A TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE

REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.4.5.1

This surveillance stipulates inspection of the coolant pump flywheel in

accordance with Regulatory Position C.4.b of Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1. This inspection verifies the structural integrity of the flywheel.

TSR 3.4.5.2

TSR 3.4.5.2 requires the verification of structural integrity of ASME Code

Class 1, 2, and 3 components are in accordance with the Inservice

Inspection Program.

REFERENCES 1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI.

2. 10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards." 3. Regulatory Guide 1.14, Revision 1, 1975.

4. WCAP-11618, "MERITS Program-Phase II, Task 5, Criteria Application," including Addendum 1 dated April, 1989.