05000263/FIN-2011002-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = N Shah, A Dahbur, K Riemer, M Phalen, S Thomas, D Jones, P Voss, C Tilton, P Cardona | | Inspector = N Shah, A Dahbur, K Riemer, M Phalen, S Thomas, D Jones, P Voss, C Tilton, P Cardona-Morales | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4 states, in part, that when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE in the applicability shall only be made when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), states, in part, that each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6.1 states, in part, that the primary containment isolation instrumentation for Function 1, Main Steam Line Isolation, shall be OPERABLE for the Reactor Vessel Water Level Low Low, Main Steam Line Flow High, and Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature High functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Contrary to the requirement of TS LCO 3.0.4, on November 22, 2010, the inboard and outboard main steam line PCIVs were not operable (unable to automatically close on a primary containment isolation signal due to an electrical isolation) prior to entering Mode 2, and the associated actions to be entered did not permit continued operation in Mode 2 for an unlimited period of time. Once identified, the licensee restored electrical power to the PCIVs and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CAP 01259879. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Using the Table 4a worksheet, the inspectors answered Yes to Question 3 and applied IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Per IMC 0609, Appendix H, the finding was considered a Type B finding; that is, a finding that has potentially important implications for integrity of containment without affecting the likelihood of core damage. Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power, provided the risk significance for this finding. For BWR Mark I reactor types, the significance of Type B findings for less than three days duration is Green. | | description = Technical Specification LCO 3.0.4 states, in part, that when an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE in the applicability shall only be made when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the applicability for an unlimited period of time. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), states, in part, that each PCIV, except reactor building-to-suppression chamber vacuum breakers, shall be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when associated instrumentation is required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6.1 states, in part, that the primary containment isolation instrumentation for Function 1, Main Steam Line Isolation, shall be OPERABLE for the Reactor Vessel Water Level Low Low, Main Steam Line Flow High, and Main Steam Line Tunnel Temperature High functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3. Contrary to the requirement of TS LCO 3.0.4, on November 22, 2010, the inboard and outboard main steam line PCIVs were not operable (unable to automatically close on a primary containment isolation signal due to an electrical isolation) prior to entering Mode 2, and the associated actions to be entered did not permit continued operation in Mode 2 for an unlimited period of time. Once identified, the licensee restored electrical power to the PCIVs and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CAP 01259879. The inspectors applied IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to this finding. Using the Table 4a worksheet, the inspectors answered Yes to Question 3 and applied IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. Per IMC 0609, Appendix H, the finding was considered a Type B finding; that is, a finding that has potentially important implications for integrity of containment without affecting the likelihood of core damage. Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance Type B Findings at Full Power, provided the risk significance for this finding. For BWR Mark I reactor types, the significance of Type B findings for less than three days duration is Green. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Monticello  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000263/2011002 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | N Shah A Dahbur K Riemer M Phalen S Thomas D Jones P Voss C Tilton P Cardona-Morales |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |