ENS 55899: Difference between revisions
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| unit = 2 | | unit = 2 | ||
| utype = GE-4, GE-4 | | utype = GE-4, GE-4 | ||
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) | | cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) | ||
| emergency class = Non Emergency | | emergency class = Non Emergency | ||
| notification date = 05/16/2022 19:51 | | notification date = 05/16/2022 19:51 | ||
| Line 16: | Line 16: | ||
| event date = 05/16/2022 15:52 EDT | | event date = 05/16/2022 15:52 EDT | ||
| last update date = 05/16/2022 | | last update date = 05/16/2022 | ||
| title = Automatic | | title = Automatic Scram Due to Electrical Transients | ||
| event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: | | event text = The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: | ||
Unit 2 experienced multiple electrical transients resulting in a Group I Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) isolation and subsequent unit reactor scram. Low reactor water level during the automatic scram caused PCIS Group II and III isolation signals. Following the PCIS Group I isolation, all main steam lines isolated. All control rods inserted and all systems operated as designed. | Unit 2 experienced multiple electrical transients resulting in a Group I Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) isolation and subsequent unit reactor scram. Low reactor water level during the automatic scram caused PCIS Group II and III isolation signals. Following the PCIS Group I isolation, all main steam lines isolated. All control rods inserted and all systems operated as designed. | ||
| Line 22: | Line 22: | ||
Peach Bottom Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to an electrical transient and subsequent PCIS Group I isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure). Unit 2 lost main feedwater due to the PCIS Group I isolation, however, all other systems responded as expected following the scram. High Pressure Coolant Injection is maintaining pressure control while Condensate Pumps are maintaining inventory. The unit is currently stable and in Mode 3. Peach Bottom Unit 3's Adjustable Speed Drives were impacted by the electrical transients and the unit reduced power to 98 percent power. | Peach Bottom Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to an electrical transient and subsequent PCIS Group I isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure). Unit 2 lost main feedwater due to the PCIS Group I isolation, however, all other systems responded as expected following the scram. High Pressure Coolant Injection is maintaining pressure control while Condensate Pumps are maintaining inventory. The unit is currently stable and in Mode 3. Peach Bottom Unit 3's Adjustable Speed Drives were impacted by the electrical transients and the unit reduced power to 98 percent power. | ||
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | ||
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2022/ | | URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2022/20220518en.html#en55899 | ||
}}{{unit info | }}{{unit info | ||
| Unit = 2 | | Unit = 2 | ||
Latest revision as of 15:02, 4 January 2024
| Where | |
|---|---|
Peach Bottom  Pennsylvania (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-0.02 h-8.333333e-4 days <br />-1.190476e-4 weeks <br />-2.7396e-5 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Linell, Bill 19:51 May 16, 2022 |
| NRC Officer: | Brian P. Smith |
| Last Updated: | May 16, 2022 |
| 55899 - NRC Website
| |
Peach Bottom with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | |