ML20151J731

Insp Repts 50-454/97-08 & 50-455/97-08 on 970502-0612. Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Operations, Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20151J731
Person / Time
Site:	Byron
Issue date:	07/23/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151J707	List: ML20151J700 ML20151J725 ML20151J731
References
50-454-97-08, 50-454-97-8, 50-455-97-08, 50-455-97-8, NUDOCS 9708050240
Download: ML20151J731 (14)

See also: IR 05000454/1997008

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION lli

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Docket Nos:

50-454, 50-455

License Nos:

NPF-37, NPF-66

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Report No:

50-454/97008(DRP); 50-455/97008(DRP)

Licensee:

Commonwealth Edison Company

Facility:

Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2

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Location:

4450 N. German Church Road

Byron, IL 61010

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Dates:

May 2 through June 12,1997

Inspectors:

S. D. Burgess, Senior Resident inspector

N. D. Hilton, Resident inspector

C. K. Thompson, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety

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Approved by:

Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief,

Reactor Projects, Branch 3

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9708050240 970723

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ADOCK 05000454

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2

NRC Inspection Report 50-454/97008, 50-455/97008

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This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and

plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.

Ooerations

Preparations to reduce power and shut down Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a missed

technical specification surveillance were well planned and implemented

(Section 01.2).

Operator performance during two Unit 1 shutdowns and startups for bus duct

cooling repairs and the 1 A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) repair was excellent

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(Section 01.3 and O2.1).

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The licensee's procedures and policies concerning non-licensed operator

qualifications for the radwaste panel were considered adequate (Section 05.1).

The inspectors identified that corrective actions as detailed in licensee event report

(1.ER) 454/94-014, were not performed. This was considered a corrective a : tion

violation (Section 08.1).

Maintenance

Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were well performed. The post-job

maintenance critique of the 1 A MSIV repair was considered excellent for

identification of issues and lessons learned (Section M1.1 and M1.2).

The licensee's corrective actions regarding the identification of alcohol in

emergency batteries was considered appropriate and timely (Section M1.1).

The inspectors identified that the performance of the auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump

ASME surveillance prior to the slave relay start surveillance, pre-conditioned the

engine. This was considered a violation (Section M1.3).

The inspectors determined that the licensee did not aggressively review, plan, and

document the events surrounding the overcrank of the 2B AF pump (Section M1.3).

Enaineerina

The inspectors identified that the licensee did not perform an evaluation of a

temporary modification for a strip chart recorder attached to a safety-related 125V

bus battery charger. This was considered a design control violation (Section E8.1).

Plant Succort

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The inspectors identified a weakness in the posting of contaminated areas on an

instrument piping rack (Section R1.1).

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REPORT DETAILS

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Dimmarv of Plant Status

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Unit 1 operated at or near full power until May 3,1997, when reactor power was

grid for bus duct cooling repairs. Tha main generator

May 4,1997.

Unit 1 continued to operate at full power untti May 31,1997,

when the 1 A main

testing. To complete repairs the plant was shutdown. Th

critical and the generator retumed to service on June 3,1997.

Unit 2 operated at or near full power during this inspection period.

l. Doerations

01

Conduct of Operations

01.1 General Comments (71707)

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Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of

ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional

and safety-conscious. Observations indicated that the operations staff was

knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded promptly and appropriately to al

and performed thorough turnovers. Additionally, the inspectors noted that the

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station has completed four startups and shutdowns since January 1997 and each

one was excellent. For instance, the inspectors noted good command and control

communications, and operator proficiency during these evolutions. Inspection

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Reports 97002 and 97005 also outlins specific observations of these startups a

shutdowns. Specific events and noteworthy observations during this inspection

report period are detailed in the sections below.

01.2

Unit 1 Power Reduction Pendina Enforcement Discretion Acoroval

The inspectors questioned surveillance requirements concerning the chemical an

volume control system (CV).

As a result of discussions between the NRC and the

licensee the CV system was declared inoperable for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 bec

the high points had not been vented as required by Technical Specifications (TS

The licensee requested and was granted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (

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for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Further details of the emergency core cooling system

(ECCS) venting issues are documented in NRC inspection Report 50 454/455

97009. The inspectors observed the operators' heightened level of awareness

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(HLA) briefing prior to beginning a shutdown of Unit 1. The briefing was thorough

and stressed good communications. The inspectors also observed the shift begin

reduce power on Unit 1 and noted that good cornmunications were utilized in

directing and performing activities, that the operators exercised good command a

control, and that the number of people in the control room was minimized. Power

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reduction c ntinu:d until the shift w:s r qu:stad to susp:nd the power reduction

for approximately 45 minutes pending approval of the NOED. The inspectors

concluded that the licensee conducted a good briefing and was adequately prepared

tc shutdown both Units if the NOED had not been granted.

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01.3 . Unit 1 Shutdown and Startuo to Reoair 1 A Main Steam isolation Valve

a.

Insoection Scone (71707)

The inspectors observed significant portions of the Unit 1 shutdown and startup

due to a failed main steam isolation valve (MSIV) surveUlance.

b.

Observations and Findinas

On May 29,1997, the active train of the hydraulic system for the 1 A MSIV failed

during a partial stroke surveillance. The licensee was unable to repair the system

prior to the expiration of the 48-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) and

commenced a reactor shutdown on May 31,1997. The inspectors observed

operators remove the unit from the grid and then trip the reactor. The licensee

tripped the reactor per the normal shutdown procedure to verify all rods would

insert properly. The inspectors observed all rod bottom indications as expected.

The inspectors also observed very good command and control, communications,

and procedure adherence. Peer checks were also excellent during the entire

shutdown process.

The inspectors observed significant portions of the Unit 1 startup on June 3,1997.

The inspectors observed the HLA brief, which emphasized p.ocedural compliance,

control of personnel in the control room, reactivity conteof, and lessons learned.

The inspectors considered operator performance during the approach to criticality

excellent and observed strong interaction with the qualified nuclear engineer. The

unit reactor operator verified that each expected alarm was due to the specific

input. While critical rod height data was collected, the operators also verified every

alarm and indication was as expected. Shift turnover occurred with the unit in a

safe, stable condition. The inspectors considered the operator performance

excellent.

c.

Conclusions

The inspectors concluded that the operators performance during the Unit 1

shutdown and startup was excellent.

O2

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

O 2.1 Unit 1 Bus Duct Coolina Reoairs

On May 3,1997, the inspectors observed the licensee reduce power and remove

Unit 1 from the grid. The licensee had previously identified that the main electrical

bus duct cooling system was not providing sufficient cooling to ensure performance

during the summer months. A walkdown performed by the licensee identified that

some of the bus duct cooling dampers were in the wrong position. Additionally,

the dampers had been in the incorrect position since the spring of 1996. Therefore,

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the lic:nses dtcided the t::ks the g:nerItor off the grid and inspect the bus duct for -

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potential heat generating sources, as well as re-position the dampers.

The inspectors observed portions of both the reduction of power and the restoration

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of Unit 1 to the grid on May 4,1997. Good command and control, efficient

communications, and good operator proficiency were noted by the inspectors.

The bus duct cooling inspection and damper reposition failed to correct the elevated

temperature. Additional troubleshooting by the licensee indicated a gasket had not

been installed on the service water side of the heat exchanger divider plate during

the previous refueling outage. This allowed cooling water to bypass the heat

exchanger. The licensee replaced the heat exchangers and system performance

retumed to normal. The inspac. ors also noteri some silt plugging the heat

exchangers removed from v - system.

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05

Operator Training and Qualification

05.1 Radwaste Panel Mannino

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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and policies concerning

non-licensed operator qualifications after the regenerative waste drain tank was

overfilled as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-454/455-97002. The

radwaste panel operator position was not described in a procedure: however, a

policy did describe the split in duties between non-licensed operators (equipment

attendants (EA) and equipment operators (EO)). Training procedures also did not

specifically identify a split in qualifications, although references to a job task matrix

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indicated that some training differences between EA and EO qualifications for

manning the radwaste panel existed.

Operators identified on a problem identification form (PlF) that non-qualified non-

licensed operators could have been assigned to the radwaste panel station. The

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inspectors reviewed the PlF and the licensee's investigation. The inspectors also

discussed the issue with an operator identified on the PlF. The EO requiring a relief

did not follow normal manpower control procedure (specifically, contacting the

center desk operator). The EO manning the radwaste panel was monitoring radio

communications and determined that all the other EOs were busy, without actually

requesting a relief. The EO then contacted the radwaste supervisor (not normally

responsible for manning) and stated that he wanted a relief. The radwaste

supervisor discussed the problem with the shift manager and they determined that

the radwaste rover (an EA) could take the panel for a few minutes. There were no

radwaste operations in progress at the time. The radweste rover was dispatched.

However, when another EO heard, via the radio, that the radwaste panel operator

needed a relief, he dispatched himself and provided the re?ief. The licensee

identified that: 1) it was a newly qualified EO on the radwaste panel who

attempted to get a relief for himself (rather than follow tha normal procedure), and

2) the PIF was written prior to all the facts being identified. The inspector

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concluded that the licensee's review was acceptable.

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Misc:lline:us Operzti:n3 is:ues (92700 cnd 92901)

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08.1

(Closed) LER 50-454/94014: Diesel generator (DG) inoperability in Mode 5 due to

misinterpretation of TS requirements. The licensee identified that on

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September 14,1994, while Unit I was in Mode 5 that the only operable DG

required by TS 3.8.1.2.2 was rendered inoperable and the LCO action requirement

was not met. The licensee identified the root cause as a misinterpretation of

regulatory requirements. The misinterpretation was in understanding the

fundamental difference between component operability and system operability.

The inspector reviewed the TS, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),

TS interpretations, and the licensee's procedures. One of the corrective actions of

the LER stated that a TS interpretation (TSI) was to be written to clarify the

requirements of DG inoperability when supporting equipment was inoperable.

When questioned, the licensee informed the inspectors that the corrective action to

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initiate the TSI was never implemented because the LER corrective actions had not

been entered into the licensee's tracking system; therefore, the corrective actions

were not tracked or implemented.

The inspectors considered the failure to take corrective actions to conditions

adverse tn quality a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,

" Corrective Actions," (50-454/455-97008-01(DRP)). At the end of the inspection

period, the licensee was in the process of verifying that all other corrective actions

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from 1994 LERs were in the tracking system. This LER is closed.

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11. Maintenance

M1

Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 Mpintenance Observations (62707)

a.

Insoection Scoce

The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work requests (WR). When

applicable, the inspectors also reviewed TS and the UFSAR for potential issues.

WR 97004594-1 Repair of the 1B Diesel Generator air compressor discharge

check valve,1DG01SB-B

WR 970041013 Replace back draft dampers on isophase bus cooler

W9970041010 Change out isophase louvers and retorque bus bars

W3960070266 Perform 5 year inspection on the 1 A CC pump motor

WR 970060346 1 A MSIV replace Skinner solenoid valve

• WR 970060347 1 A MSIV replace solenoid valve

WR 970049540 18 turbine feedwater pump leak repair

WR 960113481 Overterly inspection of emergency lighting

WR 970000239 lastall banana jack receptacle on DG 2B feed breaker

WR 970031968 Desilting of essential service water basins

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b.

Observations and Findinos

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The inspectors found that the maintenance activitics were conducted in accordance

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with approved procedures and were in conformance with TS. The inspectors

observed maintenance supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress.

Quality control personnel were also present when required. When applicable,

appropriate radiation control measures were in place. The inspectors determined

that the observed routine maintenance activities were well performed.

Ihoair of the 1 A MSIV

The inspectors observed portions of the troubleshooting and repair of the 1 A MSIV.

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The licensee conducted a post-job critique follo*uing the repair activities. The

inspectors discussed the results of the critique with maintenance management.

Lessons learned and identified in the critique included: sufficient evidence may

have existed to identify the problem sooner (however, even in hindsight, that is not

certain), access to the MSIV actuators could be improved (both physical

arrangement and radiological controls), the project manager could be more effective

in directing the work, and specific guidelines for isolation requirements on high

pressure / temperature systems do not exist. The inspectors considered the critique

excellent for identification of i.ssues.

The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 10.3.2 when the 1 A MSIV actuation

circuit was declared inoperable. The UFSAR indicated that the standby train would

not close the MSIV. The inspectors were concerned that, based on the UFSAR, the

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1 A MSIV was inoperable because it would not have closed given an engineered

safeguards feature (ESF) actuation signal. The LCO allowed outage time (AOT) for

an inoperable MSIV was 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> versus the 48-hour AOT for an inoperab!e manual

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actuation circuit. The inspectors reviewed electrical schematics for the MSIV

actuation circuit and discussed modes of MSIV operation with members of system

engineering. The inspectors concluded the valve was operable and would close,

given an ESF signal, based on review of the circuit. The UFSAR description was

accurate for local manual operation of the individual valve. At the end of the

inspection period, the licensee was considering clarification of the modes of

operation during the next UFSAR revision.

Emeroency Liahtino Review

The inspectors reviewed WR 960113481. The licensee had written a PIF

documenting the inadvertent addition of alcohol to the batteries. The inspectors

reviewed the WR and did not identify any issues other than the inadvertent addition

of alcohol. The licensee replaced the affected batteries and the voltage readings

documented on the WR were typical of the emergency lights. The inspectors also

verified that M&TE equipment identified on the WR was checked out and in

caiibration on the day of the surveillance. The inspectors also discussed the

addition of a small amount of alcohol with various engineers and the potential

affects were unknown. The licensee's investigation showed that alcohol was

inadvertently placed in a bottle labeled as distilled water. The inspectors considered

the corrective actions to this incident to be appropriate and timely.

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M1.2 Surveillance Observations (61726)

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a.

Insoection Scoos

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The inspectors observed the performance of all or parts of the following

surveillance procedures. The inspectors also reviewed plant equipment and

surveillance activities against the UFSAR descriptions.

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OBVS 0.5-3.SX.1-2 Test of the OB Essential Service Water Makeup Pump

OBOS 7.5.e.1-2

Essential Service Water Makeup Pump OB Monthly

Operability Surveillance

OBOS 7.6.b-1

Control Room Ventilation Train OA Staggered Monthly

Surveillance

1BO S 8.1.1.2.a-2

1B Diesel Generator Operability Monthly and Semi-Annual

Surveillance

1BVS 0.5-3AF.1-2 ASME Surveillance Requirements for the Diesel Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump

1 BVS 3.2.1-2

Bus 142 Undervoltage Protection Monthly Surveillance

1BVS 7.1.5-2

U-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves Partial Stroke Test

2BOS 3.2.1-800

ESFAS Instrument Slave Relay Surveillance

2BOS 3.2.1-853

ESFAS Instrument Slave Relay Surveillance (Train B

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Containment isolation Phase A - K612)

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2BOS 7.1.2.1.b2

28 AF Ouarterly Surveillance

2BVS 3.2.1-2

Bus 242 Undervoltage Protection Monthly Surveillance

• BOP AF-7

Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Startup on Recirc

b.

Observations and Findinos

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The inspectors routinely noted proper authorization from the control room senior

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reactor operator (SRO) prior to the start of each surveillance. Components removed

from service were identified prior to the surveillance and the proper TS LCO was

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entered. At the completion of the surveillance and after independent verification of

system restoration, the TS LCO was cleared. The inspectors verified that test

instruments used were calibrated as applicable. The inspectors reviewed completed

surveillances and verified the surveillances met the acceptance criteria and that the

procedure was acceptable and would perform the required testing.

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M1.3 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Overcrank

a.

Insoection Scoce

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's on-site review documents OSR 97-067 and

97-070. The inspectors also reviewed the TS slave start surveillance, the ASME

surveillance, and the normal manual start of the auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump

procedure. Several discussions were held with system engineers, operators, and

operations management.

b.

Qbservations and Findinas

On May 13,1997, during performance of 2BVS 0.5-3.AF.1-2, "2B AF ASME

Surveillance," the 28 diesel driven AF pump failed to start on the initial series of

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engine cranks whil2 using the B battery bank. The engine overcrank lockout

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occurred, preventing additional starting attempts after four series of engine cranks.

The licensee then used Byron Operations Procedure (BOP) AF-7, " Diesel Driven

Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Startup on Recirc," to start the engine locally for the

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ASME surveillance. Per BOP AF-7, the A battery bank was selected and the engine

started on the first attempt.

After completion of the ASME surveillance, the licensee performed TS surveillance

2BOS 7.1.2.1.b2, " Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Surveillance."

This surveillance was scheduled to be performed and was also used as

troubleshooting for the original overcrank condition. The 2B AF pump started on a

slave relay signal satisfactorily.

The TS surveillance requirement had recently changed from monthly to quarterly.

Immediately prior to the attempted start on May 13,1997, the engine had been idle

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for approximately 85 days. An earlier successful start had been completed with the

engine idle for approximately 75 days. Prior to that, the TS surveillance had been

monthly.

The licensee declared the 28 AF pump inoperable and entered the LCO action

requirement prior to the start of the ASME surveillance and remained in the LCO

after completion of the slave start surveillance due to the overcrank condition

identified during the initial start. A manual start, using the B battery bank, was

successfully performed per BOP AF-7 after the engine had cooled to near ambient

conditions (as determined by the licensee to be bearing temperatures and jacket

water temperatures similar to the 1B AF pump). Additionally, the licensee

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measured cell voltage of the B battery bank to verify battery capacity.

On May 14,1997, the inspectors discussed the engine status with the system

engineer. The system engineer identified several potential causes of the overcrank

condition, including methods of losing fuel oil prime and potential electrical circuit

issues. The inspectors also reviewed an on-site review document, OSR 97-067,

"Overcrank Alarm on the 28 AF Diesel Pump." and were concerned that little action

appeared to have been taken to identify the starting probiern prior to declaring the

28 AF pump operable. OSR 97-067 documented the near ambient start and battery

capacity check as well as noting that action requests had been prepared for the

potential root causes. The OSR also identified a history of successful starts when

started on a monthly basis. The licensee committed to performing monthly runs of

the 2B AF pump until the work window, scheduled for spring of 1998, was

complete. Based on the above information, the licensee declared the 2B AF pump

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operable.

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The inspectors questioned the adequacy of the OSR. The inspectors were

concemed that monthly runs were not adequate to ensure the 2B AF pump was

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operable. Discussions with the licensee identified that additional actions were being

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planned but had not been documented in the OSR. As a result of the inspectors

questioning, on May 16,1997, the licensee completed OSR 97-070, "2B AF Diesel

Pump Corrective Action" to better document the testing plan and bases for

operability. The licensee documented an additional start of the engine on May 14,

1997. Increased testing frequency was planned, slowly increasing the period

between engine starts until a 30-day period was reached. A multi-disciplined root

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cruss trem wts formsd with the charter of critical component identification. - A-

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work window was also planned to be implemented after the teams identification of "

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components. The inspectors found that although the corrective actions appeared ,

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adequate on May

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16,1997, OSR 97-067 was weak and did not provide sufficient

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documentation of engineering evaluation arJ corrective actions.

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The inspectors discussed the sequence of performing the surveillances with

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operators. The inspectors were concerned that performance of ASME surveillance

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(using the local manual start) pre-conditioned the engine prior to the slave relay

start surveillance. The inspectors were concemed that although the engine had

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failed to start without operator action, the engine actually passed both

surveillances. The inspectors noted that the operators declared the engine

inoperable based on ine initial overcrank and remained in the LCO action

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requirement after the slave start surveillance. The inspectors noted that this

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position is consistent with guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 97-16,

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" preconditioning of Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Before ASME Code

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Inservice Testing or Technical Specification Tests." The inspectors considered the

failure to perform the surveillances in a suitably-controlled manner a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11, " Quality Assurance Program,"

(50-454/455-97008-02(DRP)).

c.

Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not aggressively review, plan, and

document the events surrounding the overcrank of the 2B AF pump. The

inspectors concluded that OSR 97-067 declared the engine operable with marginally

acceptable justification and no additional plans for corrective actions except a

monthly run and repairs in the spring of 1998. The inspectors agreed with the

actions identified in OSR-97-070.

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Additionally, the inspectors concluded that operators had not considered possible

preconditioning issues due to scheduling prior to the conduct of the surveillances.

M8

Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92903)

M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-454/455-94002: Main steam safety valves (MSSV) setpoints

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. were outside TS tolerance due to a sciculation error. An incorrect mean seat area

was used in the Trevitest calculation; therefore, the as-left setpoints of the MSSVs

were set greater than the allowed i1 % toleranca. This calculational error affected

16 MSSVs on Unit 1 and 19 MSSVs on Unit 2. A NOED was requested on

March 10,1994, and was granted. The NOED permitted continued operation of

both units until NRC approval of a TS amendment request to revise the as-found

setpoint from * 1% to

3% The NOED allowed the MSSV *3% tolerance to be

used until May 4,1994, when the lift settings were reset to i1 % during testing.

The licensee determined through analysis that the effects of the 13% setpoint

tolerance had no significant negative impact on any system, operating mode, or

accident analysis. The proposed amendment was submitted and approved by the

NRC. This item is closed.

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lil, Enaineerina

E8

Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92700 and 92902)

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E8.1

(Closed) URI 50-454/455-97005-05(DRPH Connecting strip chart recorders to

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operable equipment without a detailed review. NRC Inspection Report

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50-545/455-

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97005 documented a strip chart recorder attached to a safety-related 125 volt dc

bus battery charger (Bus 211). The battery charger was considered operable by the

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licensee and the chart recorder was used as a troubleshooting tool. The inspector

considered the chart recorder to be a temporary alteration based on the following:

the chart recorder was installed for approximately 2 weeks.

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the battery charger was considered operable.

at least 14 leads with clips were used to connect chart modules to various

wires on the circuit card.

Additionally, since the recorder did not have an engineering review, seismic and

other related qualifications were not reviewed and the recorder had unknown and

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undocumented failure modes.

The licensee did not originally agree that the chart recorder was a temporary

alteration. The licensee position was that the recorder did not alter the circuit due

to its high impedance characteristics. Additionally, the licensee did not want to

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inhibit troubleshooting efforts on intermittent problems. However, after additional

review of the circumstances surrounding the use of the chart recorder on the

211 bus battery charger, the licensee agreed that the recorder should have been a

temporary alteration, specifically due to the length of time it was installed and to

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some extent, the complexity of the connections.

The licensee planned to modify the temporart alteration program to allow chart

recorders to be connected for up to 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />! without a temporary alteration

review. Additionally, a person knowledgeable of the recorder and connections

would be present on site during that period of time. The inspectors considered the

failure to ensure design control measures commensurate with those applied to the

original design, while a strip chart recorder was connected on the bus 211 battery

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charger, a violation of CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, " Design Control,"

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(50-454/455-97008-03(DRP)).

IV. Plant Sunoort

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)

R 1.1

Contamination Control Weakness

During a routine inspection of the auxiliary building, the inspector noted a small

contaminated area. The area was a small portion of an instrument piping rack

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adjacent to an open walkway in the auxiliary building. Although the area was

identified in accordance with the licensee's procedures, the inspector was

concerned that the contaminated area was inadequately contained. The inspector

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identifisd tha crea to members of radiological protection management. The licensee

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agreed that the posting did not clearly identify what was contaminated. The

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licensee noted, and the inspectors agreed, that the basic rule was a vertical

imaginary " wall" extended above and below the rope and sign. However, the

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inspectors noted that for some examples of small areas, the floor space under the

rope is easily accessible and likely to be inadvertently walked on or swept. The

inspectors have not identified an increase in contamination events; therefore, the

inspectors concluded the marking was a weakness due to the potential of spreading

contamination.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

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Exit Meeting Summary

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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee

management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 12,1997.

The inspectors asked tha licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was

identified.

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PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

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Licensee

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J. Bauer, Health Physics Supervisor

D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor

E. Campbell, Maintenance Superintendent

P. Donavin, Site Engineering Mod Design Supervisor

T. Gierich, Operations Manager

P. Johnson, Engineering Superintendent

K. Knfron, Byron Station Manager

K. Passmore, Station Support & Engineering Supervisor

T. Schuster, Site Quality Verification Director

M. Snow, Work Control Superintendent

D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager

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lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 37551: Onsite Engineering

IP 61726: Surveillance Observations

IP 62707: Maintenance Observations

IP 71707: Plant Operations

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IP 71750: Plant Support

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IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor

Facilities

IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations

IP 92902: Followup - Engineering

IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance

IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

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Ooened

50-454/455-97008-01

VIO

Failure to take corrective action documented in LER.

50-454/455-97008-02

VIO

Failure to test 28 AF pump under suitable conditions.

50-454/455-97008-03

VIO

Failure to ensure design control measures

commensurate with those applied to the original design.

Closed

454-94-014

LER

Inoperable DG due to TS misinterpretation.

454/455-94-002

LER MSSV setpoints outside TS tolerance.

50-454/455-97005-05

URI

Failure to ensure design control measures

commensurate with those applied to the original design

(closed to violation 50-454/455-97008-03).

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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AF

Auxiliary Feedwater System

AOT

Allowed Outage Time

BOP

Byron Operating Procedure

CV

Chemical and Volume Control System

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OG

Diesel Generator

EA

Equipment Attendants

ECCS

Emergency Core Cooling System

EO

Equipment Operator

ESF

Engineered Safeguards Feature

HLA

Heightened Level of Awareness

LCO

Limiting Condition for Operation

LER

Licensee Event Report

MSIV

Main Steam Isolation Valve

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MSSV

Main Steam Safety Valve

NOED

Notice of Enforcement Discretion

NOV

Notice of Violation

PDR

Public Document Room

PIF

Problem Identification Form

3RO

Senior Reactor Operator

TS

Technical Specification

TSI

Technical Specification Interpretation

UFSAR

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

WR

Work Request

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