ML20151J731
| ML20151J731 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1997 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151J707 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-454-97-08, 50-454-97-8, 50-455-97-08, 50-455-97-8, NUDOCS 9708050240 | |
| Download: ML20151J731 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000454/1997008
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION lli
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Docket Nos: 50-454, 50-455
Report No: 50-454/97008(DRP); 50-455/97008(DRP)
Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Facility: Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2
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Location: 4450 N. German Church Road
Byron, IL 61010
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l Dates: May 2 through June 12,1997
Inspectors: S. D. Burgess, Senior Resident inspector
N. D. Hilton, Resident inspector
C. K. Thompson, Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
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Approved by: Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief,
Reactor Projects, Branch 3
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9708050240 970723
PDR ADOCK 05000454
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
l Byron Generating Station, Units 1 & 2
NRC Inspection Report 50-454/97008, 50-455/97008
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This inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering, maintenance, and
plant support. The report covers a 6-week period of resident inspection.
Ooerations
Preparations to reduce power and shut down Unit 1 and Unit 2 due to a missed
technical specification surveillance were well planned and implemented
(Section 01.2).
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Operator performance during two Unit 1 shutdowns and startups for bus duct
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cooling repairs and the 1 A main steam isolation valve (MSIV) repair was excellent
(Section 01.3 and O2.1). '
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The licensee's procedures and policies concerning non-licensed operator
qualifications for the radwaste panel were considered adequate (Section 05.1). l
The inspectors identified that corrective actions as detailed in licensee event report l
(1.ER) 454/94-014, were not performed. This was considered a corrective a : tion
violation (Section 08.1).
Maintenance
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Routine maintenance and surveillance activities were well performed. The post-job
maintenance critique of the 1 A MSIV repair was considered excellent for
identification of issues and lessons learned (Section M1.1 and M1.2). l
The licensee's corrective actions regarding the identification of alcohol in
emergency batteries was considered appropriate and timely (Section M1.1).
The inspectors identified that the performance of the auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump
ASME surveillance prior to the slave relay start surveillance, pre-conditioned the
engine. This was considered a violation (Section M1.3).
The inspectors determined that the licensee did not aggressively review, plan, and
document the events surrounding the overcrank of the 2B AF pump (Section M1.3).
Enaineerina
The inspectors identified that the licensee did not perform an evaluation of a
temporary modification for a strip chart recorder attached to a safety-related 125V
bus battery charger. This was considered a design control violation (Section E8.1).
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Plant Succort
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The inspectors identified a weakness in the posting of contaminated areas on an
instrument piping rack (Section R1.1).
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REPORT DETAILS
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Dimmarv of Plant Status
Unit 1 operated at or near full power until May 3,1997, when reactor power was
grid for bus duct cooling repairs. Tha main generator
May 4,1997.
Unit 1 continued to operate at full power untti May 31,1997,
when the 1 A main
testing. To complete repairs the plant was shutdown. Th
critical and the generator retumed to service on June 3,1997.
Unit 2 operated at or near full power during this inspection period.
l. Doerations
01 Conduct of Operations
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01.1 General Comments (71707)
Using Inspection Procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted frequent reviews of
ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional
and safety-conscious. Observations indicated that the operations staff was
knowledgeable of plant conditions, responded promptly and appropriately to al
and performed thorough turnovers. Additionally, the inspectors noted that the ,
station has completed four startups and shutdowns since January 1997 and each
one was excellent. For instance, the inspectors noted good command and control
communications, and operator proficiency during these evolutions. Inspection
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Reports 97002 and 97005 also outlins specific observations of these startups a
shutdowns. Specific events and noteworthy observations during this inspection
report period are detailed in the sections below.
01.2
Unit 1 Power Reduction Pendina Enforcement Discretion Acoroval
The
volume inspectors questioned
control system (CV). surveillance requirements concerning the chemical an
As a result of discussions between the NRC and the
licensee the CV system was declared inoperable for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 bec
the high points had not been vented as required by Technical Specifications (TS
The licensee requested and was granted a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (
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for both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Further details of the emergency core cooling system
(ECCS) venting issues are documented in NRC inspection Report 50 454/455 -
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97009. The inspectors observed the operators' heightened level of awareness
(HLA) briefing prior to beginning a shutdown of Unit 1
. The briefing was thorough
and stressed good communications. The inspectors also observed the shift begin
reduce power on Unit 1 and noted that good cornmunications were utilized in
directing and performing activities, that the operators exercised good command a
control, and that the number of people in the control room was minimized. Power
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reduction c ntinu:d until the shift w:s r qu:stad to susp:nd the power reduction
for approximately 45 minutes pending approval of the NOED. The inspectors
concluded that the licensee conducted a good briefing and was adequately prepared
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tc shutdown both Units if the NOED had not been granted.
01.3 . Unit 1 Shutdown and Startuo to Reoair 1 A Main Steam isolation Valve
a. Insoection Scone (71707)
The inspectors observed significant portions of the Unit 1 shutdown and startup
due to a failed main steam isolation valve (MSIV) surveUlance.
b. Observations and Findinas
On May 29,1997, the active train of the hydraulic system for the 1 A MSIV failed
during a partial stroke surveillance. The licensee was unable to repair the system
prior to the expiration of the 48-hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) and
commenced a reactor shutdown on May 31,1997. The inspectors observed
operators remove the unit from the grid and then trip the reactor. The licensee
tripped the reactor per the normal shutdown procedure to verify all rods would
insert properly. The inspectors observed all rod bottom indications as expected.
The inspectors also observed very good command and control, communications,
and procedure adherence. Peer checks were also excellent during the entire
shutdown process.
The inspectors observed significant portions of the Unit 1 startup on June 3,1997.
The inspectors observed the HLA brief, which emphasized p.ocedural compliance,
control of personnel in the control room, reactivity conteof, and lessons learned.
The inspectors considered operator performance during the approach to criticality
excellent and observed strong interaction with the qualified nuclear engineer. The
unit reactor operator verified that each expected alarm was due to the specific
input. While critical rod height data was collected, the operators also verified every
alarm and indication was as expected. Shift turnover occurred with the unit in a
safe, stable condition. The inspectors considered the operator performance
excellent.
c. Conclusions
The inspectors concluded that the operators performance during the Unit 1
shutdown and startup was excellent.
O2 Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment
O 2.1 Unit 1 Bus Duct Coolina Reoairs
On May 3,1997, the inspectors observed the licensee reduce power and remove
Unit 1 from the grid. The licensee had previously identified that the main electrical
bus duct cooling system was not providing sufficient cooling to ensure performance
during the summer months. A walkdown performed by the licensee identified that
some of the bus duct cooling dampers were in the wrong position. Additionally,
the dampers had been in the incorrect position since the spring of 1996. Therefore,
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~ the lic:nses dtcided the t::ks the g:nerItor off the grid and inspect the bus duct for - \
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potential heat generating sources, as well as re-position the dampers.
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The inspectors observed portions of both the reduction of power and the restoration
of Unit 1 to the grid on May 4,1997. Good command and control, efficient
communications, and good operator proficiency were noted by the inspectors.
The bus duct cooling inspection and damper reposition failed to correct the elevated
temperature. Additional troubleshooting by the licensee indicated a gasket had not
been installed on the service water side of the heat exchanger divider plate during
the previous refueling outage. This allowed cooling water to bypass the heat
exchanger. The licensee replaced the heat exchangers and system performance
retumed to normal. The inspac. ors also noteri some silt plugging the heat
exchangers removed from v - system.
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05 Operator Training and Qualification
05.1 Radwaste Panel Mannino
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and policies concerning
non-licensed operator qualifications after the regenerative waste drain tank was
overfilled as documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-454/455-97002. The
radwaste panel operator position was not described in a procedure: however, a
policy did describe the split in duties between non-licensed operators (equipment
attendants (EA) and equipment operators (EO)). Training procedures also did not
specifically identify a split in qualifications, although references to a job task matrix
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indicated that some training differences between EA and EO qualifications for
manning the radwaste panel existed.
Operators identified on a problem identification form (PlF) that non-qualified non- l
licensed operators could have been assigned to the radwaste panel station. The !
inspectors reviewed the PlF and the licensee's investigation. The inspectors also !
discussed the issue with an operator identified on the PlF. The EO requiring a relief I
did not follow normal manpower control procedure (specifically, contacting the
center desk operator). The EO manning the radwaste panel was monitoring radio
communications and determined that all the other EOs were busy, without actually
requesting a relief. The EO then contacted the radwaste supervisor (not normally
responsible for manning) and stated that he wanted a relief. The radwaste ;
supervisor discussed the problem with the shift manager and they determined that
the radwaste rover (an EA) could take the panel for a few minutes. There were no
radwaste operations in progress at the time. The radweste rover was dispatched.
However, when another EO heard, via the radio, that the radwaste panel operator
needed a relief, he dispatched himself and provided the re?ief. The licensee
identified that: 1) it was a newly qualified EO on the radwaste panel who
attempted to get a relief for himself (rather than follow tha normal procedure), and
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2) the PIF was written prior to all the facts being identified. The inspector :
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concluded that the licensee's review was acceptable.
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08 Misc:lline:us Operzti:n3 is:ues (92700 cnd 92901)
08.1 (Closed) LER 50-454/94014: Diesel generator (DG) inoperability in Mode 5 due to
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misinterpretation of TS requirements. The licensee identified that on
September 14,1994, while Unit I was in Mode 5 that the only operable DG
required by TS 3.8.1.2.2 was rendered inoperable and the LCO action requirement
was not met. The licensee identified the root cause as a misinterpretation of
regulatory requirements. The misinterpretation was in understanding the
fundamental difference between component operability and system operability.
The inspector reviewed the TS, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),
TS interpretations, and the licensee's procedures. One of the corrective actions of
the LER stated that a TS interpretation (TSI) was to be written to clarify the
- requirements of DG inoperability when supporting equipment was inoperable.
When questioned, the licensee informed the inspectors that the corrective action to
initiate the TSI was never implemented because the LER corrective actions had not
been entered into the licensee's tracking system; therefore, the corrective actions
were not tracked or implemented.
The inspectors considered the failure to take corrective actions to conditions
adverse tn quality a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI,
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" Corrective Actions," (50-454/455-97008-01(DRP)). At the end of the inspection
period, the licensee was in the process of verifying that all other corrective actions
from 1994 LERs were in the tracking system. This LER is closed.
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11. Maintenance
M1 Conduct of Maintenance
M1.1 Mpintenance Observations (62707)
a. Insoection Scoce
The inspectors observed all or portions of the following work requests (WR). When
applicable, the inspectors also reviewed TS and the UFSAR for potential issues.
WR 97004594-1 Repair of the 1B Diesel Generator air compressor discharge
check valve,1DG01SB-B
WR 970041013 Replace back draft dampers on isophase bus cooler
W9970041010 Change out isophase louvers and retorque bus bars
W3960070266 Perform 5 year inspection on the 1 A CC pump motor
WR 970060346 1 A MSIV replace Skinner solenoid valve
- WR 970060347 1 A MSIV replace solenoid valve
WR 970049540 18 turbine feedwater pump leak repair
WR 960113481 Overterly inspection of emergency lighting
WR 970000239 lastall banana jack receptacle on DG 2B feed breaker
WR 970031968 Desilting of essential service water basins
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b. Observations and Findinos
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The inspectors found that the maintenance activitics were conducted in accordance
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with approved procedures and were in conformance with TS. The inspectors
observed maintenance supervisors and system engineers monitoring job progress. !
Quality control personnel were also present when required. When applicable,
appropriate radiation control measures were in place. The inspectors determined
that the observed routine maintenance activities were well performed. l
Ihoair of the 1 A MSIV
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The inspectors observed portions of the troubleshooting and repair of the 1 A MSIV.
The licensee conducted a post-job critique follo*uing the repair activities. The
inspectors discussed the results of the critique with maintenance management. l
Lessons learned and identified in the critique included: sufficient evidence may
have existed to identify the problem sooner (however, even in hindsight, that is not
certain), access to the MSIV actuators could be improved (both physical
arrangement and radiological controls), the project manager could be more effective
in directing the work, and specific guidelines for isolation requirements on high
pressure / temperature systems do not exist. The inspectors considered the critique
excellent for identification of i.ssues.
The inspectors reviewed UFSAR Section 10.3.2 when the 1 A MSIV actuation !
circuit was declared inoperable. The UFSAR indicated that the standby train would !
not close the MSIV. The inspectors were concerned that, based on the UFSAR, the l
1 A MSIV was inoperable because it would not have closed given an engineered
safeguards feature (ESF) actuation signal. The LCO allowed outage time (AOT) for
an inoperable MSIV was 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> versus the 48-hour AOT for an inoperab!e manual l
actuation circuit. The inspectors reviewed electrical schematics for the MSIV
actuation circuit and discussed modes of MSIV operation with members of system ;
engineering. The inspectors concluded the valve was operable and would close,
given an ESF signal, based on review of the circuit. The UFSAR description was l
accurate for local manual operation of the individual valve. At the end of the
inspection period, the licensee was considering clarification of the modes of
operation during the next UFSAR revision.
Emeroency Liahtino Review
The inspectors reviewed WR 960113481. The licensee had written a PIF
documenting the inadvertent addition of alcohol to the batteries. The inspectors
reviewed the WR and did not identify any issues other than the inadvertent addition
of alcohol. The licensee replaced the affected batteries and the voltage readings
documented on the WR were typical of the emergency lights. The inspectors also
verified that M&TE equipment identified on the WR was checked out and in
caiibration on the day of the surveillance. The inspectors also discussed the
addition of a small amount of alcohol with various engineers and the potential
affects were unknown. The licensee's investigation showed that alcohol was
inadvertently placed in a bottle labeled as distilled water. The inspectors considered
the corrective actions to this incident to be appropriate and timely.
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, M1.2 Surveillance Observations (61726)
a. Insoection Scoos
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The inspectors observed the performance of all or parts of the following
surveillance procedures. The inspectors also reviewed plant equipment and
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surveillance activities against the UFSAR descriptions.
OBVS 0.5-3.SX.1-2 Test of the OB Essential Service Water Makeup Pump
OBOS 7.5.e.1-2 Essential Service Water Makeup Pump OB Monthly
Operability Surveillance
- OBOS 7.6.b-1 Control Room Ventilation Train OA Staggered Monthly
Surveillance
1BO S 8.1.1.2.a-2 1B Diesel Generator Operability Monthly and Semi-Annual
Surveillance
1BVS 0.5-3AF.1-2 ASME Surveillance Requirements for the Diesel Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
- 1 BVS 3.2.1-2 Bus 142 Undervoltage Protection Monthly Surveillance
1BVS 7.1.5-2 U-1 Main Steam Isolation Valves Partial Stroke Test
- 2BOS 3.2.1-800 ESFAS Instrument Slave Relay Surveillance
= 2BOS 3.2.1-853 ESFAS Instrument Slave Relay Surveillance (Train B
Containment isolation Phase A - K612)
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2BOS 7.1.2.1.b2 28 AF Ouarterly Surveillance
- * 2BVS 3.2.1-2 Bus 242 Undervoltage Protection Monthly Surveillance
- BOP AF-7 Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Startup on Recirc I
b. Observations and Findinos 1
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The inspectors routinely noted proper authorization from the control room senior
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reactor operator (SRO) prior to the start of each surveillance. Components removed
from service were identified prior to the surveillance and the proper TS LCO was j
entered. At the completion of the surveillance and after independent verification of
system restoration, the TS LCO was cleared. The inspectors verified that test
instruments used were calibrated as applicable. The inspectors reviewed completed
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surveillances and verified the surveillances met the acceptance criteria and that the
procedure was acceptable and would perform the required testing.
i M1.3 2B Auxiliary Feedwater Pumo Overcrank
a. Insoection Scoce
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The inspectors reviewed the licensee's on-site review documents OSR 97-067 and
97-070. The inspectors also reviewed the TS slave start surveillance, the ASME
surveillance, and the normal manual start of the auxiliary feedwater (AF) pump
procedure. Several discussions were held with system engineers, operators, and l
operations management. l
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b. Qbservations and Findinas
On May 13,1997, during performance of 2BVS 0.5-3.AF.1-2, "2B AF ASME
Surveillance," the 28 diesel driven AF pump failed to start on the initial series of
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engine cranks whil2 using the B battery bank. The engine overcrank lockout
occurred, preventing additional starting attempts after four series of engine cranks.
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The licensee then used Byron Operations Procedure (BOP) AF-7, " Diesel Driven
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Startup on Recirc," to start the engine locally for the
ASME surveillance. Per BOP AF-7, the A battery bank was selected and the engine
started on the first attempt.
After completion of the ASME surveillance, the licensee performed TS surveillance
2BOS 7.1.2.1.b2, " Diesel Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Quarterly Surveillance."
This surveillance was scheduled to be performed and was also used as
troubleshooting for the original overcrank condition. The 2B AF pump started on a
slave relay signal satisfactorily.
The TS surveillance requirement had recently changed from monthly to quarterly.
Immediately prior to the attempted start on May 13,1997, the engine had been idle i
for approximately 85 days. An earlier successful start had been completed with the
engine idle for approximately 75 days. Prior to that, the TS surveillance had been
monthly.
The licensee declared the 28 AF pump inoperable and entered the LCO action l
requirement prior to the start of the ASME surveillance and remained in the LCO
after completion of the slave start surveillance due to the overcrank condition
identified during the initial start. A manual start, using the B battery bank, was
successfully performed per BOP AF-7 after the engine had cooled to near ambient l
conditions (as determined by the licensee to be bearing temperatures and jacket
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water temperatures similar to the 1B AF pump). Additionally, the licensee I
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measured cell voltage of the B battery bank to verify battery capacity. I
On May 14,1997, the inspectors discussed the engine status with the system
engineer. The system engineer identified several potential causes of the overcrank
condition, including methods of losing fuel oil prime and potential electrical circuit
issues. The inspectors also reviewed an on-site review document, OSR 97-067,
"Overcrank Alarm on the 28 AF Diesel Pump." and were concerned that little action
appeared to have been taken to identify the starting probiern prior to declaring the
28 AF pump operable. OSR 97-067 documented the near ambient start and battery
capacity check as well as noting that action requests had been prepared for the
potential root causes. The OSR also identified a history of successful starts when
started on a monthly basis. The licensee committed to performing monthly runs of
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the 2B AF pump until the work window, scheduled for spring of 1998, was
complete. Based on the above information, the licensee declared the 2B AF pump
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The inspectors questioned the adequacy of the OSR. The inspectors were
concemed that monthly runs were not adequate to ensure the 2B AF pump was
l operable. Discussions with the licensee identified that additional actions were being
l planned but had not been documented in the OSR. As a result of the inspectors
questioning, on May 16,1997, the licensee completed OSR 97-070, "2B AF Diesel
Pump Corrective Action" to better document the testing plan and bases for
operability. The licensee documented an additional start of the engine on May 14,
1997. Increased testing frequency was planned, slowly increasing the period
between engine starts until a 30-day period was reached. A multi-disciplined root
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adequate The inspectors found that although the corrective actions appeared ,
on May
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The inspectors discussed the sequence of performing the surveillances with
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operators. The inspectors were concerned that performance of ASME surveillance
(using the local manual start) pre-conditioned the engine prior to the slave relay <
start surveillance. The inspectors were concemed that although the engine had
failed to start without operator action, the engine actually passed both
surveillances. The inspectors noted that the operators declared the engine '
inoperable based on ine initial overcrank and remained in the LCO action
requirement after the slave start surveillance. The inspectors noted that this i
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position is consistent with guidance provided in NRC Information Notice 97-16, '
" preconditioning of Plant Structures, Systems, and Components Before ASME Code
Inservice Testing or Technical Specification Tests." The inspectors considered the
failure to perform the surveillances in a suitably-controlled manner a violation of 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 11, " Quality Assurance Program,"
(50-454/455-97008-02(DRP)).
c. Conclusions .
The inspectors concluded that the licensee did not aggressively review, plan, and
document the events surrounding the overcrank of the 2B AF pump. The
inspectors concluded that OSR 97-067 declared the engine operable with marginally
acceptable justification and no additional plans for corrective actions except a
monthly run and repairs in the spring of 1998. The inspectors agreed with the
actions identified in OSR-97-070.
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Additionally, the inspectors concluded that operators had not considered possible
preconditioning issues due to scheduling prior to the conduct of the surveillances.
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Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92903)
M8.1 (Closed) LER 50-454/455-94002: Main steam safety valves (MSSV) setpoints 1
. were outside TS tolerance due to a sciculation error. An incorrect mean seat area
was used in the Trevitest calculation; therefore, the as-left setpoints of the MSSVs
were set greater than the allowed i1 % toleranca. This calculational error affected
16 MSSVs on Unit 1 and 19 MSSVs on Unit 2. A NOED was requested on
March 10,1994, and was granted. The NOED permitted continued operation of
both units until NRC approval of a TS amendment request to revise the as-found
setpoint from * 1% to
3% The NOED allowed the MSSV *3% tolerance to be
used until May 4,1994, when the lift settings were reset to i1 % during testing.
The licensee determined through analysis that the effects of the 13% setpoint
tolerance had no significant negative impact on any system, operating mode, or
accident analysis. The proposed amendment was submitted and approved by the
NRC. This item is closed.
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E8
Miscellaneous Engineering lasues (92700 and 92902)
E8.1 (Closed) URI
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50-454/455-97005-05(DRPH Connecting strip chart recorders to
l operable equipment without a detailed review. NRC Inspection Report 50-545/455-
! 97005 documented a strip chart recorder attached to a safety-related 125 volt dc
j bus battery charger (Bus 211). The battery charger was considered operable by the
l licensee and the chart recorder was used as a troubleshooting tool. The inspector
considered the chart recorder to be a temporary alteration based on the following:
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the chart recorder was installed for approximately 2 weeks.
the battery charger was considered operable.
at least 14 leads with clips were used to connect chart modules to various
wires on the circuit card.
Additionally, since the recorder did not have an engineering review, seismic and
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other related qualifications were not reviewed and the recorder had unknown and
undocumented failure modes.
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The licensee did not originally agree that the chart recorder was a temporary
alteration. The licensee position was that the recorder did not alter the circuit due
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to its high impedance characteristics. Additionally, the licensee did not want to )
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inhibit troubleshooting efforts on intermittent problems. However, after additional !
review of the circumstances surrounding the use of the chart recorder on the !
211 bus battery charger, the licensee agreed that the recorder should have been a
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temporary alteration, specifically due to the length of time it was installed and to
some extent, the complexity of the connections.
The licensee planned to modify the temporart alteration program to allow chart
recorders to be connected for up to 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />! without a temporary alteration
review. Additionally, a person knowledgeable of the recorder and connections
would be present on site during that period of time. The inspectors considered the
failure to ensure design control measures commensurate with those applied to the
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! original design, while a strip chart recorder was connected on the bus 211 battery
charger, a violation of CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion Ill, " Design Control,"
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(50-454/455-97008-03(DRP)).
IV. Plant Sunoort
R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry Controls (71750)
R 1.1 Contamination Control Weakness
During a routine inspection of the auxiliary building, the inspector noted a small
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contaminated area. The area was a small portion of an instrument piping rack
adjacent to an open walkway in the auxiliary building. Although the area was
identified in accordance with the licensee's procedures, the inspector was
concerned that the contaminated area was inadequately contained. The inspector
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identifisd tha crea to members of radiological protection management. The licensee
e agreed that the posting did not clearly identify what was contaminated. The '
licensee noted, and the inspectors agreed, that the basic rule was a vertical
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imaginary " wall" extended above and below the rope and sign. However, the
inspectors noted that for some examples of small areas, the floor space under the
rope is easily accessible and likely to be inadvertently walked on or swept. The
inspectors have not identified an increase in contamination events; therefore, the
inspectors concluded the marking was a weakness due to the potential of spreading
contamination.
V. Manaaement Meetinas
X1 Exit Meeting Summary
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The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee
management at the conclusion of the inspection on June 12,1997.
The inspectors asked tha licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was
identified. .
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, PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
l Licensee
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l J. Bauer, Health Physics Supervisor
D. Brindle, Regulatory Assurance Supervisor
E. Campbell, Maintenance Superintendent
P. Donavin, Site Engineering Mod Design Supervisor
T. Gierich, Operations Manager
P. Johnson, Engineering Superintendent
K. Knfron, Byron Station Manager
K. Passmore, Station Support & Engineering Supervisor
T. Schuster, Site Quality Verification Director
M. Snow, Work Control Superintendent
D. Wozniak, Engineering Manager
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lNSPECTION PROCEDURES USED
IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
IP 71707: Plant Operations
l IP 71750: Plant Support
l IP 92700: Onsite Follow-up of Written Reports of Nonroutine Events at Power Reactor
Facilities
IP 92901: Followup - Plant Operations
IP 92902: Followup - Engineering
IP 92903: Followup - Maintenance
IP 92904: Followup - Plant Support
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
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Ooened
50-454/455-97008-01 VIO Failure to take corrective action documented in LER.
50-454/455-97008-02 VIO Failure to test 28 AF pump under suitable conditions.
50-454/455-97008-03 VIO Failure to ensure design control measures
commensurate with those applied to the original design.
Closed
454-94-014 LER Inoperable DG due to TS misinterpretation.
454/455-94-002 LER MSSV setpoints outside TS tolerance.
50-454/455-97005-05 URI Failure to ensure design control measures
commensurate with those applied to the original design
(closed to violation 50-454/455-97008-03). j
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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
AF Auxiliary Feedwater System
AOT Allowed Outage Time
BOP Byron Operating Procedure
CV Chemical and Volume Control System
} OG Diesel Generator
EA Equipment Attendants
ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System
EO Equipment Operator
ESF Engineered Safeguards Feature
HLA Heightened Level of Awareness
LCO Limiting Condition for Operation
LER Licensee Event Report
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve
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l MSSV Main Steam Safety Valve
NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NOV Notice of Violation
PDR Public Document Room
PIF Problem Identification Form
3RO Senior Reactor Operator
TS Technical Specification
TSI Technical Specification Interpretation
UFSAR Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
WR Work Request
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