ML20009B203

Response in Opposition to Intervenor Doherty 810622 Request for Leave to File Contention 57.No Good Cause Shown for Late Filing & No Specificity Provided.W/Science News Article & Certificate of Svc

ML20009B203
Person / Time
Site:	Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date:	07/07/1981
From:	Copeland J BAKER & BOTTS, HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
NUDOCS 8107150052
Download: ML20009B203 (9)

Text

. v.

7/7/81 # 4

'# DOCKriTD UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 U2"C NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Ch ,1UL'101981

• Cg BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD N

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Danch

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In the Matter of S Ng #

S HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY Docket No. 50-466 g g (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S p ^ f g

Station, Unit 1) S

, APPLICANT'S RESPONSE TO INTERVENOR DOHERTY'S JUL 141981 > To REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE CONTENTION 57 r upm i saammssm s I. 2/

'h p On June 22, 1981, Mr. Doherty requested leave t -

file a new contention. This contention deals with the alleged vulnerability of electric control systems to electro-magnetic pulses. The Board has previously admonished Mr. Doherty that it cill take a strict view toward admitting late filed contentions (TR.12253). Apparently, Mr. Doherty did not take the Board's admonition very seriously, because he has not even l

attempted to explain how his contention raises an issue cognizable under the Atomic Energy Act. As a result, the contention lacks the specificity required under 10 CFR S2.714.

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Moreover, Mr. Doherty has failed to show good cause for a late filed contention.

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While Contention No. 57 alleges that control systems are vulnerable te electro-magnetic pulses, the contention p ovides no specificity as to the source of this l vulnerability. At page 2 of his motion, Mr. Doherty asserts 8107150052 810707 $

PDR ADOCK 05000466 C PDR [M$$ f

that electro-magnetic pulses can be produced by the deto-nation of conventional explosives and nuclear weapons,  !

however, he acknowledges that " nuclear weapons exploded at high altitude have become the chief source of concern."

Apparently, Mr. Doherty would have the Board decide on the issue of what would happen to the Allens Creek plant during a nuclear attack. Applicant cannot imagine a more frivolous and speculative undertaking, and for this reason alone the 1/

contention should be denied.

Even if we were to postulate a nuclear attack, which in turn created an electro-magnetic pulse, Mr. Doherty has failed to explain how there would be any inability to e

safely shutdown operation of the plant. Absent this asser-tion, there is no issue cognizcble by the Board in this proceeding. It is particularly noteworthy that Mr. Doherty relies exclusively upon an article in Science News, dated May 16, 1981, (a copy of which is attached hereto) and that article states that:

i

-1/ As to conventional explosives the contention is even more speculative. There is no information provided as to the magnitude of explosion that would be required to create damaging electro-magnetic pulses, nor is there any assertion that there is a large enough source of explosives near the Allens Creek site to create an explosion of sufficient magnitude to create a damaging electro-magnetic pulse.

.. . the most likely result of an EMP exposure would be to trip circuit breakers across the nation. Companies with insufficient electric-load.-

shedding capabilities would be forced to shr*

generating stations down. . . "

There is nothing in the motion, or the Science News article, asserting that a nuclear plant could not be shutdown safely under the scenario. In fact, the Science News article notes that this is a functional upset of the electric grid system, not a damage situation (e.g. "the net effect is that much, if not most, of the U.S. power grid would be shut-down for hours to days"). Applicant suggests that it is not the responsibil.ity of this Board to ensure the reliability of the grid system in the entire United States in the event of a nuclear attack.

III.

Mr. Doherty has failed to establish good cause for this late-filed contention. Mr Doherty alleges that he could not have raised this contention earlier because the

" issue had been kept so.newhat quiet due to military purposes."

However, the Science News article specifically states that the study of the phenomena was "in secrecy until the mid 1960's." There is absolutely no way to conclude from this statement that the issue had been kept a secret until the Science News article was published in May 1981.

. , _ ~ . _ - . _. ___ __ - - .

l l

As to the other factors in 10 CFR S2.714, Applicant believes that there are other means whereby Mr. Doherty's interests will be protected in the event of a nucJear attack, namely the Department of Defense. Applicant cannot imagine how Mr. Doherty's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record on an issue that is so patently frivolous. Applicant agrees that no other party will represent Mr. Doherty's interest on this matter. Finally, there can be no justification for a delay in the proceedings to address a contention that has no demonstrable relevance to the safe operation of a nuclear plant.

Respectfully submitted, OF COUNSEL:

GYeg //Copdland BAKER & BOTTS cott . Rozzell 3000 One Shell Plaza 3000 One Shell Plaza Houston, Texas 77002 Houston, Texas 77002 LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS Jack R. Newman

& AXELRAD Robert H. Culp 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W. David B. Raskin Washington, D.C. 20036 1025 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY 4

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debate. "While the tailored guys all agree

• ~3M Defensive Strategies that the iFa,adax cagei app,each wii,

,s. work." King says. "not everybody agrees

,- 1 ]w f that the tailored approach will." What's e ; p L.A '

Strategies that ' harden

• electrical and more, he s sys, even advocates of the NT '

e!ectroniC Systems against electr0 magnetic tailored approach think that when build.

i' ng a new system or facility. it will cost less

- j pulS8S may Save lives during a nuclear War p 6-to shield it in a Faraday cage. So wlule and permit the restoration of Society afterward shielding with a Faraday cage "is not only BY MNET RALOFF The second of two parts the sounde,t way to go," King claims. 7t turns out-and I m doing a lot of work in if the detonation of a high yield nuclear willingness to cogfront the situation and this area-that it appears also to be the weapon in the United . states' upper at- prepare becomes a self fulfilling cheapest way to go over the life-cyc!c" of a mosphere showered the nation with an prophecy." system.

electromagnetic pulse tntr), how would Perhaps if nte protection were rela- Debate over it.e topic is so intense and American technology stand up? It's a ques- tively mexpensive, there would be less re- vital to issues of cost and hardening citc.

tuoi that can't he answered with any t er- sistance to hardening. Ilut there is "a tiveness that the !)clense Nuclear Agen. v t.unty today berause the electronics revo- pretty impressive price tag" associated will convene a big working symlmium no luta n m the computeriration of America with hardening, notes Bill Macklin of IRT the issue in a few months.

is mtroducing an increasing air vulnera- Co p. (a fit.n that has specialized in utr One issue on which there is seemingly bihty to ell segments of society. And that work for the military). Estimates vary, but no argument is that technology now eust s worries a multitude of defense planners. it could cost at least an extra 15 to 20 to ntr harden any vuinerable system.

nir is a powerfut and potentially deva- percent to build ner protection into a new But just because something uses elec-stating form of electromagnetic " fallout" facihty. And the higher cost would go not tronic parts doesn't mean that the system asso lated with nuclear weapons (Lt so much for added or more expensive is vulnerable. And an impressive survey to 5/9/81, p. 300) and other major explosive equipment, explains Ralph Sinnott, an narrow down when and why something is bursts. Unlike radioactive fallout, this rain electronics engineer with rENtA as for vulnerable has been conducted oser the is be!ieved harmless to living things but "seeing that tradesnien do the construc. past 25 years, largely with Defense Ik-antentiativ lethal to electronics and elec- tion differently." EMr hardening an exist- partment funding. Many of those stud.cs 4 tystents. It wreaks its havoc by in. ing facdity can be notably more expensive, are still c.!assified. although their resua mg staggeringly large and rapid cur- ,Perhaps the largest controvarsy Ir are pouring into the open literature.

at or soltace surges through electrically ntr hardening -one Macklin describes For instance, communicat ons equin-4 *ductmq materials. And because nu. as being almost " theological" in nature- ment using bipolar transistors with se P a weapons generate the most virulent has developed in response to the tackling contained batteries and loop antennas are e m. it's not surprismg that study of the of these potentially expensive ' retrofit not susceptible to direct utr damat

' omenon was cloaked in secrecy until cases. At issue is whether to shield all Similar equipment using stick antennas op t t- ..ud 19@ vulnerable componer,ts in a metal box. to 40 inches long is also safe. Hown. r.

'Nnng the early 1960s,"it was so classi- generically known as a Faraday cage, or electronic equipment using field-c!!, t

' hat if you said ntr out loud." jokes wheth~r to seek out and selectively shield transistors could be damaged if the ro..-

fees Kerr. "you probably had to have only the most vulnerable components. nected antenna is more than 30 inch. s u mouth washed out with secret 1o. It may not sound !ike a big deal, but long. The general imolication of thes" i.

K-rr. who is staff director for the Macklin says that while the latter, tailored studies, notes the Defense Department m Federal Emergency Management Agency's approach could involve more design one of its attack environment manuals. is Trumological Hazards Mitigation Divi- analysis, it could also cost "almost an that mobile communications equipmem sn.n. said he was unable to study the el- order of magnitude less" than installing a -including walkie-talkies and the com-

% ts of nte on civil systems for his . gen. Faraday cage.That becomes an attractive mon transistor radio-are relatively sur-n s 'ederal predecessor in 1965 "because selling point when the economy is under- vivable in an EMr environment. But rade it was so classified." His goal had been the going a fiscal belt tightening. In addition, transmitting stations will be vulnerab:e development of a guide for the protection tailoring in smaller, selective changes to unless expressly hardened for nir.

of civdian systems and industrial facilities an existing sptem usually proves less dis- "It sort of boiled down to." says Kerr. "d agamst wartime nir. Kerr's guide eventu. ruptive to its users - for example, no there's no antenna. there's no prob'em?

ally made its debut, eight years later. workers tearing out existing walls, ceilings For example. computers are one of the

% hat has been its impact? Accordmg to or. floors -during the hardening phase. most vulnerable systems to nip. But a Mae King. an ntr shielding analyst who And that's another strong plus. computer "is not much more vulnera' ale urtil last July worked at the Defense Nu- But this tailored approach "is very,w y than a piece of marble," unle .s and un' '

clear Agency in Washington. "I think, ba. configuration-dependent," notes King. a it's attached to an antenna tne rnt s re sically. that civilian industry per se has strong advocate of total shielding. He ex. search director said. And every metal oh-totally no regard for ntr i guess their plains that the vulnerability of a particular ject represents a potential antenna to col-theory is,' Hell. if we're going to be under a system or facility is so dependent on the lect radiated nte signals and focus them nuclear attack, w hy am i worried about my exact layout of components and even the into more massive ones, c mputer file?" SCIE.NCE NEW5 confirmed process used to manufacture seemingly That's one reason why FEMA has elected in interviews with several industrialists identical parts that any changes in the to utr-harden ruio-broadcast stations that that view is one bemg used to justify origmally analyzed system could render a throughout the nat;on. Televisions, wch ignonng the hardening-or protection- specific tailored hardening scheme "for their large rooftop antennas and pem. :

of equipment agamst air within the elec- naught." And it has almost become the cords, are prime candidates for ntr d.un.

tric power industry. rule, not the exception, for firms to up- age. But transistor radios aren't, and it h_s in a paper issued last l'ecember, rnt A's grade electronic systems with minor been estimatcd th vt 80 percent of the p..m Ruasell Clanahan attempts to counter changes or additions that inexpensively ulation has access to them. So if. and such attitudes. "Much of the destructive. increaw the product.vi'y or capabdity of w hen, the Emergency Bror.Jcet System w ness of a nuclear attac k. in hves and prop- the custing system. called into use for warning the pubh.

erty lost. depends on the unpreparedness But th ro is an even mo+ interesting about a nuclear attack, an mir-bar.Irm J n' 'be one attacked. In .i ,ense. the un- asiw t i. i e f.nlored wrsus Faraday ca;e :.etwork of AM and FM radio stations con 1

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, , t 's . 15 minutes broadcast the Pres- of handling the energy; but they are rot universal military approach has been to i%t or oral leaders nationally. fast enough.* He explains,as do countless harden systems of interest. this is not a Al" ' intA has utr-hardened 150 to reports and manuals printed by rEstA over feasible civil measure.' Military at tack and ,

3 '" . ' ! 'O radio stations it has targeted the past decade, that a lightning arrestor communications systems cannot afford to mee up its voluntary emergency has to be quick enough to respond to a shut down, even momentarily, during at. -

oreadcast network Sinnott told 6CIENCE pulse. The devices-which short out cir- tack periods, whereas "[clivil prepared-

, h However. <ince the stations with the cuits leading into sensitive power-con- ness systems can afford to be out of action higgest broadcast coverage were hard- trolled equipment-are designed to han- for per ods running from minutes to days." L ened first. roughly half of the nation is die lightning pulses, which King points out So while some attempt has been made to l j dready w. shin earshot of an utr-hard- are about three orders of magnitude harden civil systems, such as the Emer-ened stata,n. Completion of the network is slower in their rise times than Estr. The gency Broadcast Network, another com-expected within three to live years. result is that an nit can flash through the mon strategy has been to analyze likely smratt says that the res-network sta- circuit, wreaking havoc, long before the damage should an tste occur and then to  ;

tions w di be equipped with bukup circuit can short. While some studies sug- develop conUngency plans to cope. These '

l power supply systems.usually diesel gen- ge4t equipment damage could occur, the plans could include storing spare parts l . rators, and fueled to last several weeks. most h*ely result of an ENtr exposure that would most likely need to be replaced

' And the anticipated need for that I,ackup would be to trip circuit breakers across or simply compiling directions for m mu

. lettrical power points to what is per- the nation. Companies with insufficient ally taking over formerly autenated ac-eetved as potentially one of the least pre- electric load-shedding capabilities would tivities until repairs can be rnade.

pared o the nation's industries. be forced to shut generating stations A number of critics worry, however, that li a high-altitude nuclear blast bathed down."And you're talking 12 to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> to the electr;c-power industry has been too ,

j the nation in nir 'my gut feeling is...our get them back on line " King says. "That's compimot about the threat of its poten-l power systems would probably not be not a damage situation, it's a functional tial Wrabili:y to take even these meas [

l available." says King, whose former em- upset. But the effect is the same " ures. And while the mditary has aggres-player, the Defense Nuc! car Agency. main- And the net effect is that me:h if not sively sought to atr-harden its most im- f f ams a more than passing interest in that most of the U.S. power grid would be shut portant facdities and weapons over the i

subject.* DN A has run "utr awareness down for hours to days, depending on the past 15 years. it is quhe dependent on sev- i l courses forelectnc utilityesecutivesand frequency with which successive ntr eral civil systems that appear potentially p l engines rs3till there appears to be a wide- pulses arnved. still quite vulnerable to atr-notably the I.

pread prev.nhng attitud" that lightning "It is neiessary to distinguish a rather nation's electric-power and telecommum.

l arrestors used tha_;;hout that industry stnking contrast between civil and mili- cations industries. As one i str analyst [t.

are more than adequate to tackle the en- tary approaches' to coping with potential points out -in the event of war these l ergy dehvered by a nuclear t ur. t ur disruptions, esplams a !<5 Defense military dependencies on non-i u r.

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~lhati true. concedes Aing Some of the Depar t mrot studv. / le. tromo. netic fuhe hardened nelworks could prove an Achil.

A hehtnmg arrestors are more than i apable und t 'n d l'rre nednen "Whit e the nearly les heel to national defense.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of S S

HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY S Docket No. 50-466 S

(Allens Creek Nuclear Generating S Station, Unit 1) S ,

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Applicant's Response to Intervenor Doherty's Request for Leave to File Contention 57 in the above-captioned pro-ceeding were served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, or by hand-delivery this 7th day of July, 1981.

Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairma's Hon. Frank Petter Atomic Safety and Licensing Mayor, City of Wallis Board Panel P. O. Box 312 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wallis, Texas 77485 Washington, D. C. 20555 Hon. Leroy H. Grebe Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum County Judge, Austin County Route 3, Box 350A P. O. Box 99 Watkinsville, Georgia 30677 Bell'1111e, Texas 77418 Mr. Gustave A. Linenberger Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Chase R. Stephens Atomic Safety and Licensing Docketing and Service Section Board Panel Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory of the Commission Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Susan Plettman Richard Black David Preister Staff Counsel Texas Attorney General's Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory P. O. Box 12548, Capitol Station Commission Austin, Texas 78711 Washington, D. C. 20555

Bryan'L. Baker Brenda McCorkle 1118 Montrose 6140 Darnell Houston, Texas 77019 Houston, Texas 77074 J. Morgan Bishop W. Matthew Perrenod 11418 Oak Spring 4070 Merrick Houston, Texas 77043 Houston, Texas 77025 Stephen A. Doggett Wayne E. Rentfro P. O. Box 592 P. O. Box 1335 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Rosenberg, Texas 77471 Jonn F. Doherty William Schuessler 4327 Alconbury 5810 Darnell Houston, Texas 77021 Houston, Texas 77074 Carro Hinderstein James M. Scott 609 Fannin, Suite 521 13935 Ivy Mount Houston, Texas 77002 Sugar Land, Texas 77478 D. Marrack V. O. " Butch" Carden, Jr.

420 Mulberry Lane City Attorney Bellaire, Texas 77401 City of Wallis P. O. Box A East Dernard, Texas 77435 Grc WCopeland

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