05000313/FIN-2013011-01: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | ||
| Inspector = A Sanchez, D Allen, D Loveless, G Miller, J Watkins, S Jonesb, | | Inspector = A Sanchez, D Allen, D Loveless, G Miller, J Watkins, S Jonesb, Lattag Werner, J Melfi, L Willoughby, N Okonkwo | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The licensee placed an additional electric motor-driven fire pump in service as a temporary modification for the Unit 1 refueling outage. The power supply for this electric fire pump was from the London 13.8 kV line, which is an additional offsite power source not included in the plant Technical Specifications. At the time of the event, the temporary electric fire pump was in service and supplying water from the intake canal to the station fire suppression system. Following the collapse of the temporary overhead crane and the drop of the generator stator, an eight-inch fire main in the train bay ruptured. As designed, the diesel-driven fire pump started when the system pressure dropped below 95 psig. The permanently installed electric fire pump was not available due to the loss of offsite power, but the temporary electric fire pump continued to operate since the London 13.8 kV line was unaffected by the event. The two operating pumps were each capable of supplying approximately 2,500 gallons per minute at rated system pressure. At 8:03 a.m., an entry in the control room log stated that all firewater pumps, including the temporary firewater pump were secured. Several subsequent log entries reflected significant water leakage from the fire suppression system in the turbine building and into the Unit 1 auxiliary building. A log entry entered 67 minutes after the event stated that fire hydrant 1 was cycled opened then shut in an attempt to lower fire header pressure and slow leakage into the train bay. An entry five minutes later stated that the temporary fire pump was secured. An unresolved item associated with the leakage of water past the seals in the turbine building hatches and into the auxiliary building is discussed in Section 4.0 of this report. The team confirmed through interviews with the operators that the diesel-driven pump was secured first, and the temporary pump was secured at a later time following the cycling of fire hydrant 1. The team reviewed video taken inside the turbine building following the event and confirmed that the diesel-driven pump was secured at a time consistent with the entry in the station log. The team also identified indications of system pressure consistent with an operating pump approximately 40 minutes after the event. The team concluded that additional inspection was needed to assess the licensees control of the temporary fire pump modification in regard to the timeliness of securing the temporary electric fire pump following the event: Unresolved Item URI 05000313/2013011-01; 05000368/2013011-01, Control of Temporary Modification Associated with the Temporary Fire Pump. | | description = The licensee placed an additional electric motor-driven fire pump in service as a temporary modification for the Unit 1 refueling outage. The power supply for this electric fire pump was from the London 13.8 kV line, which is an additional offsite power source not included in the plant Technical Specifications. At the time of the event, the temporary electric fire pump was in service and supplying water from the intake canal to the station fire suppression system. Following the collapse of the temporary overhead crane and the drop of the generator stator, an eight-inch fire main in the train bay ruptured. As designed, the diesel-driven fire pump started when the system pressure dropped below 95 psig. The permanently installed electric fire pump was not available due to the loss of offsite power, but the temporary electric fire pump continued to operate since the London 13.8 kV line was unaffected by the event. The two operating pumps were each capable of supplying approximately 2,500 gallons per minute at rated system pressure. At 8:03 a.m., an entry in the control room log stated that all firewater pumps, including the temporary firewater pump were secured. Several subsequent log entries reflected significant water leakage from the fire suppression system in the turbine building and into the Unit 1 auxiliary building. A log entry entered 67 minutes after the event stated that fire hydrant 1 was cycled opened then shut in an attempt to lower fire header pressure and slow leakage into the train bay. An entry five minutes later stated that the temporary fire pump was secured. An unresolved item associated with the leakage of water past the seals in the turbine building hatches and into the auxiliary building is discussed in Section 4.0 of this report. The team confirmed through interviews with the operators that the diesel-driven pump was secured first, and the temporary pump was secured at a later time following the cycling of fire hydrant 1. The team reviewed video taken inside the turbine building following the event and confirmed that the diesel-driven pump was secured at a time consistent with the entry in the station log. The team also identified indications of system pressure consistent with an operating pump approximately 40 minutes after the event. The team concluded that additional inspection was needed to assess the licensees control of the temporary fire pump modification in regard to the timeliness of securing the temporary electric fire pump following the event: Unresolved Item URI 05000313/2013011-01; 05000368/2013011-01, Control of Temporary Modification Associated with the Temporary Fire Pump. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:50, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2013011 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen D Loveless G Miller J Watkins S Jonesb Lattag Werner J Melfi L Willoughby N Okonkwo |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |