05000255/FIN-2011008-04: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71003 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71003 | ||
| Inspector = A Stone, G O | | Inspector = A Stone, G O'Dwyer, J Gavula, J Neurauter, M Munir, T Bilika, Stonec Brown, S Sheldon | ||
| CCA = H.2 | | CCA = H.2 | ||
| INPO aspect = LA.2 | | INPO aspect = LA.2 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for the failure to assure an engineering evaluation was initiated if pipe wall thickness measurements fall below 87.5 percent of nominal pipe wall thickness. Specifically, computer software utilized by the flow accelerated corrosion program was not modified to initiate an engineering evaluation if degraded pipe wall thickness measurements were less than 87.5 percent of nominal pipe wall thickness. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more safety significant concern. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency; there was no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the Technical Specifications allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred because the affected piping was non-safety-related. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Work Practices component because the licensee failed to provide effective supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) | | description = A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for the failure to assure an engineering evaluation was initiated if pipe wall thickness measurements fall below 87.5 percent of nominal pipe wall thickness. Specifically, computer software utilized by the flow accelerated corrosion program was not modified to initiate an engineering evaluation if degraded pipe wall thickness measurements were less than 87.5 percent of nominal pipe wall thickness. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program. The finding was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more safety significant concern. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve a design or qualification deficiency; there was no actual loss of safety function, no single train loss of safety function for greater than the Technical Specifications allowed outage time, and no risk due to external events. No violation of regulatory requirements occurred because the affected piping was non-safety-related. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Work Practices component because the licensee failed to provide effective supervisory oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. H.4(c) | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:17, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2011008 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71003 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Stone G O'Dwyer J Gavula J Neurauter M Munir T Bilika Stonec Brown S Sheldon |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
| ' | |