ML15153B263

Notice of 10 CFR 2.311 Appeal and Brief in Support

ML15153B263
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	06/02/2015
From:	Lodge T J Beyond Nuclear, Don't Waste Michigan, Michigan Safe Energy Future - Shoreline Chapter (MSEF), Nuclear Energy Information Service
To:	NRC/OCM
SECY RAS
References
50-255-LA, ASLBP 15-936-03-LA-BD01, RAS 27884
Download: ML15153B263 (30)

Text

UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the Com m ission I n the Matter of

Enterg y Nuclea r Ope rations, I nc.(Palisades Nuc lear Plant)Oper ating L icense Amendment Reque st) Docke t No. 50-255

)J une 2, 2015

)) *****INTERVENORS' 10 C.F.R. § 2.311( c) NOTICE OF A P P EAL OF ATOMIC SAF ETY AND LICENSING BOARD'S DENIAL OF P ETIT ION TO INTE RVENE AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST F OR AUTHORIZATION TO IMP LEMENT 10 CFR

§ 50.61a AND BRIEF IN SUP P ORT Terr y J. L odg e (O H #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 255-7552 Fa x (419) 255-7552 tjlodge50@

y ahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Authorities ii I. I ntroduction 1 I I. Fa ctual and Proc edura l Ba ckg round 3 A. The 1985 PTS Rule And Embrittlement Scre ening Program (10 C.F.R. § 50.61) 3 B. The Alternate PTS Rule And Embrittlement Sc reening Program (10 C.F.R.§ 50.61a) 7 C. Invocation Of The Alternate PTS Rule 10 D. Petitioners' Objec tions T o Entergy License Amendm entReque st (LAR) Invok ing Alternate PTS Rule 12 I I I. Arg ument 18 A. The ASLB Erroneously Found The De cision Allowi ng Entergy To Inv oke 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a To Be Nondiscretionary 18 B. 'Re asonable Assurance' Cannot Apply Alike To Two Regulati ons Addressing The Same Subjec t W hen One Is Dee med To Be W eake r Than T he Other 20 C. Variabil ities In Sister Plant Data Erroneously Allowed Inappropriate Comparisons 22 I V. Conclusion 22 Certifica te of Servic e 25-i-TABLE OF AUTHORITIE S Cases AmerGe n Energy Co., LLC (Oy ster Cree k Nuclea r Ge nera ting Station), L BP-07-17, 66 NRC 327, 340 (2007), aff'd , CL I-09-07, 69 NRC 235, 263 (2009) 21 Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclea r Station, Units 1 & 2), L BP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982) 21 Matter of Entergy Nucle ar Gene ration Co., et al. (Pilgrim Nuc lear Power Station), 50-293-L R (ASL B O ct. 16, 2006), 2006 WL 4801142 23 Power Authority of the State of New Y ork, et al. (James FitzP atrick N uclea r Power Plant; I ndian Point Nuclear Gene rating Unit 3), CL I-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 295 (2000) 23 Statu tes 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) 20 Regulati ons 10 C.F.R. § 2.309 23 10 C.F.R. § 2.311 1 10 C.F.R. § 50.57 20 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 10 C.F.R. § 50.90 10 10 C.F.R. § 50.92 2, 13

-i i-UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the Com m ission I n the Matter of

Enterg y Nuclea r Ope rations, I nc.(Palisades Nuc lear Plant)Oper ating L icense Amendment Reque st) Docke t No. 50-255

)J une 2, 2015

))P ETIT IONERS' 10 C.F.R. § 2.311( c) NOTICE OF A P P EAL OF ATOMIC SAF ETY AND LICENSING BOARD'S DENIAL OF 'P ETIT ION TO INTE RVENE AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST F OR AUTHORIZATION TO IMP LEMENT 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a' Be y ond Nuclea r, Don't Waste Michig an, Michig an Safe Energ y Future - Shoreline Chapter (Shoreline), a nd the Nucle ar Ene rg y I nformation Servic e (N EI S) (collec tively"Petitioners"), by and throug h counsel, pursua nt to 10 C.F.R. § 2.311(c), he reby g ive notice of their appe al to the U.S. Nuclea r Reg ulatory Commi ssion ("Commissi on") f or re view of the Atomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd's ("ASL B") "Me morandum and O rder (Ruling on Petition to I nterve ne and Re quest for a Hea ring", L BP-15-17 (May 8, 2015) whe rein the A SL B de nied Petitioners' "Petition to I nterve ne and f or a Public Adjudica tion Hear ing of Enterg y L icense Amendment Reque st for Authorization to I mplement 10 CFR § 50.61a, 'A lternate Fr actur e Toug hness Requireme nts for Protection Ag ainst Pressurized Therma l Shock Events.'"

Acc ording to 10 C.F.R. § 2.311( c), "

An orde r deny ing a petition to int erve ne, and/or reque st for hea ring . . . is appea lable by the re questor/petitioner on the que stion as to whether the reque st and/or petition should have bee n g rante d." Petitioners intend to urg e on appe al that their petition to int erve ne and r equest for a hea ring should have be en g rante d. /s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O H #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 255-7552 Fa x (419) 255-7552 Tjlodge 50@y ahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the Com m ission I n the Matter of

Enterg y Nuclea r Ope rations, I nc.(Palisades Nuc lear Plant)Oper ating L icense Amendment Reque st) Docke t No. 50-255

)J une 2, 2015

))BRIEF IN SUP P ORT OF P ETIT IONERS'10 C.F.R. § 2.311( c) AP P EAL OF ATOMIC SAF ETY AND LICENSING BOARD'S DENIAL OF

'P ETIT ION TO INTE RVENE AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING ON ENTERGY LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST F OR AUTHORIZATION TO IMP LEMENT 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a

'I. Introduction This proce eding conce rns Enterg y Nuclea r Ope rations, I nc.'s ("Enter g y's") reque st to amend the ope rating license f or the Palisades nuc lear plant ("Palisade s"). Palisade s is a single pressurized wa ter re actor ("PWR") fac ility located on the easte rn shore of L ake Mic higa n, five miles south of Sout h Have n, Michig an. The reque sted amendme nt would permit Enterg y to use an a lternate method to evaluate the minimum fracture toughne ss require d by the Palisades rea ctor pre ssure ve ssel (RPV) to safe ly withstand a pre ssurized thermal shock (PTS) eve nt.That alter nate method is set for th in an ag ency reg ulation, "Alterna te fra cture toughne ss require ments for prote ction ag ainst pressurized therma l shock eve nts." I n an oper ating nuclea r power plant, the re actor vessel is continuously exposed to neutrons from fission rea ctions occur ring inside the vessel. Ove r time, this neutron radia tion embrittles the RP V walls, making them less able to re sist fractur ing, i.e., "fr actur e toug hness" de cre ases. I f there is a flaw in a rea ctor ve ssel wall that is embrittled due to neutron e x posure, c erta in events ca n cause the flaw to propag ate throug h the wall, re sulting in a bre ach of the RPV and a possible ac cident. Of signific ant conc ern is a pr essurized thermal shoc k, or "PTS," eve nt, which is "cha rac terized by a rapid c ooling (i.e., thermal shock) of the interna l RP V surfa ce a nd downcomer , which may be followed by repr essurization of the RPV."

The possible trig g ers of a PTS event include "

a pipe 1 brea k or stuck-ope n valve in the pr imary pressure circ uit," or "a brea k of the main stea m line." 2 On September 30, 2014, the NRC Staff (the Staff) published notice of Enterg y's L AR, and conc luded that the L AR prese nts "no signif icant hazar ds considera tion" under 10 C.F.R. §50.92( c). I n response to the L AR notice, Petitioners filed the instant petition to intervene a nd reque st for a he aring. 3 Division of Fuel, Eng ineer ing a nd Radiologic al Resea rch, O ffice of Nuc lear Reg ulatory 1 Resear ch, Te chnica l Ba sis for Revision of the Pressurized Ther mal Shock (PTS) Scree ning L imit i n the PTS Rul e (10 CF R 50.61) Summary Report, NUREG-1806 at xi x (Aug. 2007), at http://www.nr c.g ov/rea ding-rm/doc-c ollections/nureg s/staff/sr1806/v1/ (her einaf ter "Alterna te PTS R ule Tec hnical B asis Report"). Id. at xi x; see also "Alter nate F rac ture Toug hness Requireme nts for Protection Ag ainst 2 Pressurized Therma l Shock Events, Final Rule,"

75 Fe d. Reg. 13, 14 (Jan. 4, 2010). During these sce narios, "the water level in the cor e drops a s a re sult of" depr essurization or leaks.

Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report at x ix. Emerg ency makeup wa ter is then adde d to the rea ctor c ooling loop, either manually or automatica lly , to keep the r eac tor core cover ed with water. Id. As the make up water is much colder tha n the wate r in the re actor , a ra pid cooling of the outside rea ctor wa ll results.

Id. For over-embrittled RPVs, the temperatur e shock "could be sufficie nt to init iate a r unning c rac k, which could pr opag ate a ll the way throug h the vessel wa ll."Id. As the re actor is stil l producing heat, e ven in a shutdown mode, the RPV could re-pr essurize, adding additional stress to the alre ady-propa g ating cra ck. See id. at xi x , x x iv, x x v ("A major contributor to the risk-sig nificanc e of [cer tain PTS events]

is the return to full sy stem pressure "afte r cold make up water is introduced. This could occ ur, for example, when a stuc k-open va lve rec loses)."Amende d Petition t o I nterve ne and f or a Public Adjudica tion Hear ing of Enterg y 3 L icense Amendment Reque st for Authorization to I mplement 10 CFR §50.61a, 'A lternate Fr actur e Toug hness Requireme nts for Protection Ag ainst Pressurized Therma l Shock Events'"

Petitioners' statement of the ir contention is:

The lice nsing f rame work that the N RC is apply ing to a llow Palisades to continue to opera te until August 2017 include s both non-conser vative ana ly tical cha ng es and mathematica lly dubious comparisons to alleg edly simil ar "sister" re actor vessels.Palisades' ne utron embrittlement dilemma continues to worse n as the plant a g es, and Palisades has re peate dly reque sted life extensions which have ig nored a nd defe rre d worsening embrittlement cha rac teristics of the RPV for de cade s. Presently , Enterg y plans to deviate f rom the re g ulatory require ments of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 to §50.61a (A lternate Fr actur e Toug hness Requireme nts). This new ame ndment reque st introduces fur ther non-conser vative ana ly tical assumptions into t he troubled f orty-three (43) y ear opera tional history of Palisades. Enter g y's L icense Amendment Reque st (L AR) contains a n equivalent mar g ins evaluation, which is an untr ied methodolog ical appr oach.Petitioners' hea ring reque st was re fer red to a n Atomic Safety and L icensing Boa rd for considera tion. Both Enterg y and the NRC Staff f iled answe rs opposing the Amende d Petition, t o which Petitioners filed a reply. On Marc h 25, 2015, the B oard he ard or al ar g ument on standing and conte ntion admissibi lity , and on May 8, 2015, the ASL B issued its "Me morandum and O rder (Ruling on Petition to I nterve ne and Re quest for a Hea ring"), L BP-15-17 whe rein the A SL B denied Petitioners' A mended Petition to I nterve ne and f or a Public Adjudica tion Hear ing. II. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d A. The 1985 PTS Ru le And Em brittl ement Screening Program (10 C.F.R. § 50.61)

I n 1985, the NRC implemented a manda tory prog ram to monitor PW R RP Vs for embrittlement over time, c oupled with scre ening limit s to prevent ove r-e mbrittled reac tors from opera ting. The prog ram to monitor PW R RP Vs is describe d in 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix H, 4 (De cembe r 8, 2014) (here inafter "Amende d Petition").

See "Ana ly sis of Potential P ressurized The rmal Shock Events, F inal Rule," 50 F ed. Reg.4 29,937 (Jul y 23, 1985) (c rea ting the sc ree ning c riteria); "Fr actur e Toug hness and Surve illance Prog ram Require ments, Final Rule," 38 F ed. Reg. 19,012 (Jul y 17, 1973) (c rea ting the pr og ram to monitor P WR RPVs).

and is titled "Reac tor Vesse l Material Surve illance Prog ram Require ments" (Surve illance Prog ram). T he purpose of the Surveillanc e Prog ram "is to moni tor cha ng es in the fr actur e toughne ss properties of fer ritic materia ls [iron-base d metals, such as stee l] . . . which re sult from exposure of these ma terials to neutron irr adiation and the the rmal environme nt." The 5 Surveillance Prog ram re lies on phy sical mater ial samples, also known a s specimens, c apsules, or coupons, "

which ar e withdra wn per iodically from the r eac tor vessel."

The NRC must pre-6 approve the sche dule for r emoving materia l samples from the r eac tor vessel.

7 The a ctual scr eening limit s require d by Appendix H's Surveillance Prog ram for monitoring re actor pressure vessels ("

RPVs") for f rac ture toug hness ar e esta blished in 10 C.F.R.

§ 50.61, entitled "F rac ture toug hness re quirements for protec tion ag ainst pressurized therma l shock eve nts." Section 50.61 relies on da ta g ather ed fr om the Surveillance Prog ram to ca lculate the RPV wall's fra cture toughne ss, and compar es it with a safe ty limit that cannot be exceede d.8 NRC reg ulations repre sent steel fr actur e toug hness as a tempera ture va lue, known as "re fer ence tempera ture." The NRC Staff say s, "[r]efere nce te mpera ture is the metric that the NRC uses to quantitatively assess brittleness, so these terms may be re g arde d as sy nony mous.Steel having a hig h 're fer ence tempera ture' a lso has a hig her de g ree of brittleness than stee l with 10 C.F.R. Part 50, App. H(I

).5 Id. The NRC's re g ulations further r equire that the phy sical spec imens "be loc ated ne ar 6 the inside vessel wa ll in the beltline reg ion so that the specimen irr adiation history duplicates, to the extent practica ble within the phy sical constra ints of the sy stem, the neutron spe ctrum, tempera ture history , and maximum neutron flue nce e x perie nced by the re actor vessel inner surfa ce." Id. Part 50, App. H(I I I)(B)(2).Id. Part 50, App. H(I I I)(B)(3).7 See id. § 50.61(c)

(2)(i).8 a low re fer ence tempera ture." The a bility of steel to re sist fractur e cha ng es as a function of 9 tempera ture; whe n steel is at hig h tempera tures, it can r etain its ductility and re lated ability to resist fra cturing from PTS events, eve n afte r extended per iods of neutron irr adiation. B ut at low tempera tures, stee l is naturally brittle, and eve n unirradia ted steel c an potentially suffe r brittle failure. The point at which stee l transitions from the hig h-temper ature , fra cture-re sistant-state, 1 0 to the low-temper ature , brittle state, is called the "RT N D T ," or "Transition fra cture toughne ss ref ere nce te mpera ture," or more simply "re fer ence tempera ture." As descr ibed by Staff 1 1 g uidance documents, this transition point depends primarily on two fac tors materia l composition and cumulative ir radia tion by high-ener g y neutrons.

As steel is exposed to more hig h-ene rg y 1 2 neutrons (i.e

., its fluence inc rea ses), RT N D T incre ases c oncurr ently. Thus, as fluenc e incr ease s, 1 3 1 4 J ohn B. G iessner, D ivision of Reactor Projec ts, Sum mary of the Mar ch 19, 2013, Public 9 Meeting Webinar Reg arding Palisades Nucle ar Plant, enc

l. 2 at 4 (Apr. 18, 2013) (ADA MS Acc ession No. ML 13108A336) (he reina fter "Palisades Webinar"

).See Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report at x x x viii-x x x ix (noting that with steel 1 0 at hig h tempera tures "c leava g e ca nnot occur

"). A "Cleava g e fr actur e" is the ty pe of f rac ture associate d with frac ture of br ittle materials.

See id. at xx x viii.Id. at xx x iv. "NDT" stands for Nil-D uctility Transition.

Id. at xx x i.1 1 Id. at xx ("[T]ransition temperature s increa se as a result of irr adiation damag e 1 2 throug hout the opera tional life of the ve ssel."); id. § 2.1.3 (discussing the fa ctors af fec ting fra cture toughne ss); id. § 2.4.2 (limiti ng the fluenc e to only high-ener g y "fa st" neutrons, whic h have e nerg ies above one meg a ele ctron volt).

Fluenc e is the integ ral of the neutron flux over time. The ne utron flux i s the total 1 3 distance tra verse d by neutrons within a unit volume of mater ial within one unit of time. Ty pically the unit volume is one cubic c entimeter a nd the unit time is one second. Thus the unit of ne utron flux is neutron-c entimeter/c entimeter(cubed)-sec ond, ty pically expressed as ne utrons/centimeter (squar ed)-second. See Samuel Glasstone and A lexander Sesonske, Nuc lear Reac tor Eng ineer ing§ 2.118 (Va n Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1967).

See Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report § 2.4.1 (discussing the ref ere nce 1 4 tempera ture a pproac h to char acte rizing fr actur e toug hness in fer ritic materia ls).

the steel stay s brittle at highe r and hig her te mpera tures, and it is there fore more likely to frac ture as a r esult of PTS events.

The NRC established scr eening limit s in 10 C.F.R. § 50.61, which are the cur rent scre ening criter ia, to reduc e the r isk that a PTS event will result in an RPV frac ture. The scre ening limit s are expressed as tempe rature values. When the re fer ence tempera ture of a n RPV is above this scre ening limit , the RPV is considered to have an unre asonably high r isk of fra cture from a PTS eve nt. The PTS "scre ening criter ion" is 270°F for plates, for g ings, a nd axial weld 1 5 materia ls, and 300°F f or circ umfere ntial weld mater ials."1 6 I f the RT N D T values proje cted a t specific a rea s of the RPV for the e nd of life of the plant, known as RT P T S , surpass the Curr ent Scre ening Criteria, the lice nsee must submit a safe ty 1 7 analy sis and obtain the appr oval of the O ffice of Nuc lear Reac tor Reg ulation to continue to opera te. I f that off ice doe s not approve c ontinued opera tion based on the lice nsee's safe ty 1 8 analy sis, the licensee must request an oppor tunity to modify the RPV or rela ted re actor sy stems See 10 C.F.R. § 50.61(b)(2). The c urre nt scree ning c riteria "corr espond to a limit of 5 x 1 5 10-6 events/y ear on the annua l probability of deve loping a throug h-wa ll crac k" in the RPV.

Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report at x x.10 C.F.R. § 50.61(b)(2); see also 75 Fe d. Reg. at 13 ("

The c urre nt PTS rule . . .

1 6 establishes scr eening criter ia below whic h the potential for a rea ctor ve ssel to fail due to a PTS event is dee med to be ac cepta bly low").10 C.F.R. § 50.61(a)

(7) ("RT P T S means the r efe renc e temper ature , RT N D T , evalua ted for 1 7 the [end of life] Fluenc e for eac h of the ve ssel beltline materia ls."); Alterna te PTS Rul e Tec hnical B asis Report § 11.2 ("

10 CFR 50.61 define s RT P T S as the maximum RT N D T of any reg ion in the vessel (a reg ion is an axi al weld, a circ umfere ntial weld, a plate , or a f org ing)evalua ted at the pe ak flue nce oc curr ing in that r eg ion").10 C.F.R. § 50.61(b)(3)-(5).1 8 to "re duce the potential for f ailure of the re actor vessel due to PTS events."

1 9 B. The Alt ernate PTS Rul e And Em brittl ement Screening Program (10 C.F.R. § 50.61a)

Whil e no re actor is ex pecte d to exceed the c urre nt scree ning c riteria e stablished in 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 during its 40 y ear opera ting lice nse, the Staff has noted that Palisades in pa rticular is one of the f irst plants likely to exceed them, as Palisade s' RPV is "constructed f rom some of the most irradiation-se nsitive materials in commerc ial rea ctor ser vice today

." This conce rn, as 2 0 well as sig nificant a dvance ments in failure a naly sis and materia ls knowledg e, prompted the NRC to ree x amine the § 50.61 a pproac h for pr ojecting fra cture toughne ss and the scr eening criter ia.2 1 I n Aug ust 2007, the NRC iss ued NUREG-1806, "Te chnica l Ba sis for Revision of the [PTS

]Scree ning L imit i n the PTS Rul e (10 CF R 50.61)." Tha t report summarized the r esults of a five y ear study by the NRC, the purpose of which "w as, to deve lop the technica l basis for re vision of the Pressurized Ther mal Shock (PTS) Rule."

The re port conc luded that throug h-wa ll crac ks 2 2 wer e much ha rder to cre ate in RPVs than initially thought, a nd occur red in fe wer circ um-stance s. The re port thus rec ommended a mor e deta iled approa ch to setting scre ening criter ia 2 3 that would take into ac count the var y ing c onditions along diff ere nt parts of the Id. § 50.61(b)(6).1 9 Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report at x x ii.2 0 See "Alter nate F rac ture Toug hness Requireme nts for Protection Ag ainst Pressurized 2 1 Therma l Shock Events, Proposed Rule," 72 F ed. Reg. 56,275, 56,276 (Oc

t. 3, 2007); Alternate PTS R ule Tec hnical B asis Report at iii, x x-x x iii.Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report at x ix.2 2 See id. at xx-x x iii.2 3 RPV. The re port also re commended r emoving the "mar g in term" that ha d been inc luded in the 2 4 curr ent scre ening criter ia to acc ount for unknown f actor s, beca use esse ntially all fac tors are now known and a re e ffe ctively quantified.

2 5 On Octobe r 3, 2007, the Staff published a notice of proposed r ulemaking. The 2 6 rulemaking notice stated tha t the Alterna te PTS Rul e Te chnica l Ba sis Report "conc lude[d] that the risk of throug h-wa ll crac king due to a PTS event is much lower tha n previously estimated,"

and that "[t]hi s finding indica tes that the scr eening criter ia in 10 CFR 50.61 are unnece ssarily conser vative." 2 7 On J anuar y 4, 2010, the NRC issued the final rule, c rea ting 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a. The Alterna te PTS Rul e make s two important chang es. Section 50.61a re place s the rela tively broad 2 8 curr ent scre ening criter ia (270°F for plate s, forg ings, a nd axial weld materials, and 300°F for circ umfere ntial weld mater ials) with more de tailed Alterna te Scre ening Criteria.

The Alter nate 2 9 Scree ning Criter ia consist of eig hteen diff ere nt refe renc e temper ature limit s that depend on RPV I d. at xx v ("Spec ifically , we r ecommend a ref ere nce te mpera ture for flaws oc curr ing 2 4 along axial weld fusion lines (RT A W or RT A W-M A X), anothe r for flaws oc curr ing in plate s or in forg ings (RT P L or TR P L-M A X), and a third for fla ws occ urring along circ umfere ntial weld fusion lines (RT C W or RT C W-M A X)").Id. at xx vii.2 5 72 Fe d. Reg. 56,275.2 6 Id. at 56,276.

2 7 Howeve r, like the old rule, the new r ule provides mea sures for ong oing r eporting , 10 2 8 C.F.R.§ 50.61a(d)

(1), a nd mitigation proc esses for licensee s if they projec t they will ex cee d (or they do exceed) the Alterna te PTS Rul e's sc ree ning c riteria. I

d. § 50.61a(d)

(2)-(7).75 Fe d. Reg. at 18.2 9 wall thickness and the part of the RPV under consider ation. The Alter nate PTS Rule also 3 0 chang es how lice nsees de rive proje cted r efe renc e temper ature s for the c omponents of their RPVs. Section 50.61a re lies on a proba bilist ic "e mbrittlement model" to predict f uture 3 1 ref ere nce te mpera tures ac ross the RPV, which is then verif ied by exis ting surve illance da ta in a proce ss called the "

consistency chec k." Section 50.61, by contra st, continuously integ rate s 3 2 surveillance data into future embrittlement projec tions. I n the final rule making notice, the 3 3 Commi ssion concluded that the ne w "e stimation procedure s provide a be tter (c ompare d to the exis ting r eg ulation) method for e stimating the fr actur e toug hness of re actor vessel mater ials over the lifetime of the pla nt." The fina l rulemaking notice stated tha t the Alterna te PTS Rul e 3 4"provide s rea sonable a ssuranc e that license es oper ating below the sc ree ning c riteria c ould endure a PTS event without fra cture of vesse l materials, thus assuring integ rity of the re actor pressure vessel." Fur thermore , the final rule making stated that "[t]

he fina l rule will not significa ntly 3 5 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(g) tbl. 1.3 0 See I d. § 50.61a(f

), (f)(6)(B)(ii).3 1 Id. 3 2 Compare id. § 50.61a(f

)(6)(i) (r equiring that a license e per form a "consistency chec k"3 3 of its embrittlement model ag ainst available surveillance data), and Alter nate PTS Rule Tec hnical B asis Report § 3.1.1 (The Alterna te PTS Rul e is desig ned to "e nable a ll commercia l PW R licensees to a ssess the state of the ir RPVs relative to such a new c riterion without the nee d to make new materia l property measure ments," instead using "only information that is curr ently available."), w ith 10 C.F.R. § 50.61(c)(2)(i) (requiring that "plant-spe cific sur veillance data must be integ rate d into the RT N D T estimate"), and Alter nate PTS Rule Technic al B asis Report § 2.4.2 (Unde r the Curre nt PTS Rule, material sa mples "fr om RP V surveillanc e prog rams provide the empirica l basis to establish embrittlement trend cur ves . . . .")

.75 Fe d. Reg. at 18.3 4 Id. at 22.3 5 incre ase the probability or conse quence s of ac cidents, re sult in chang es being made in the ty pes of any eff luents that may be re lease d off site, or r esult in a signif icant incr ease in occupa tional or public radia tion ex posure."3 6 C. Invocation Of The Alt ernate PTS Rul e To take a dvantag e of the Alterna te PTS Rul e, a lice nsee must re quest approva l from the NRC Office of Nuc lear Reac tor Reg ulation, in accor dance with the proce dures f or submitting a license a mendment under 10 C.F.R. § 50.90. The a pplication must contain: (i) under Sec tion 50.61a(f), the proje cted e mbrittlement refe renc e temper ature s along various portions of the RPV, from now to a future point, compare d to the Alterna te Scre ening Criteria; and (ii) under Section 50.61a(e

), an a ssessment of flaw s in the RPV.

I n calc ulating e mbrittlement refe renc e 3 7 tempera tures under Section 50.61a(f

), a lice nsee must ca lculate ne utron flux t hroug h the RPV"using a methodolog y that has bee n benchma rked to e x perimenta l measure ments and with quantified unc erta inties and possible biases."

Fr om that point, the licensee must establish 3 8 RT N D T (U) for va rious key points along the RPV. Then a licensee uses a se ries of e quations and 3 9 char ts provided in the rule to c rea te an e mbrittlement model. That model projec ts the ref ere nce tempera tures for various par ts of the RPV at the end of life of the plant, known in the ne w rule a s Id.3 6 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(c

)(1)-(2). Unde r Section 50.61a, the licensee must separa tely 3 7 examine for fla ws in the rea ctor ve ssel. Id. § 50.61a(c

)(2). The a naly sis of flaws in the Palisades RPV is not in dispute in thi s proce eding.Id. § 50.61a(f

).3 8 Id. § 50.61a(f

)(4). RT N D T (U) is the nil-ductility ref ere nce te mpera ture for the RPV 3 9 materia l in the annea led state, be fore the re actor was ope rational. I

d. I f mea sured va lues are not available , a license e ca n use a se t of g ener ic mean va lues. Id. § 50.61a(f

)(4)(i), (ii).

-1 0-RT M A X-X. The e mbrittlement model allows for ca lculations of RT M A X-X acr oss the RPV using 4 0 probabilistic analy ses, without having to rely on measure d data. The RT M A X-X values a re 4 1 compar ed to the Alter nate Scr eening Criteria to dete rmine whe ther the RPV is safe to opera te.4 2 I mportantly , as ca lculations of RT M A X-X are made a naly tically , without directly incorpora ting surveillance data, lice nsees ha ve to ver ify that their ca lculations at the time of the a pplication match up with surveillanc e data. To do so, licensee s have to pe rfor m the "consistenc y chec k"4 3 of their c alculations for specific materia ls ag ainst "hea t-specif ic surveillanc e data that are collecte d as par t of 10 CFR Part 50, App. H, surve illance pr og rams." The purpose of the c heck 4 4 is to "determine if the surveillanc e data show a sig nificantly differ ent trend tha n the embrittlement model predic ts." The c heck inc ludes three statistical analy ses that compar e the 4 5 model's inputs, fluence and mater ial proper ties, with the model's output, refe renc e temper ature.4 6 Id. § 50.61a(f

)(1)-(3). "RT M A X-X is the equivalent ter m for RT P T S in 10 CFR 50.61a."

4 0"Proposed Rulemaking

- Alterna te Fr actur e Toug hness Requireme nts for Protection Ag ainst Pressurized Therma l Shock Events" (RI N 3150-AI 01), SECY-07-0104 (June 25, 2007)

See supra note 34.4 1 See 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(c

)(3).4 2 Id. § 50.61a(f

)(6)(i).4 3 75 Fe d. Reg. at 16. The r eg ulatory history of the Alter nate PTS Rule and associa ted 4 4 draf t guida nce indica tes that unce rtainty in surveillance data mea surements may be a c oncer n, which license es' a pplications should address.

See id. at 16-17 (discussing potential conce rns with variability in surveillance data); "Reg ulatory Guidance on the Alterna te Pressure d Therma l Shock Rule," Dra ft Reg ulatory Guide DG-1299 at 12 (Mar. 2015) (he reina fter "DG-1299") ("The input variables to [the equations comprising the consistency chec k] are subjec t to variability and are often ba sed on limited data," pa rticularly fluenc e).10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(f

)(6)(i)(B).4 5 75 Fe d. Reg. at 16 ("

The NRC is modify ing the final rule to include three statistical tests 4 6 to determine the signific ance of the diff ere nces be tween he at-spec ific surve illance da ta and the

-1 1-The c onsistency chec k is require d "[i]f three or more sur veillance data points measur ed at thre e or more dif fer ent neutron f luence s exi st for a spe cific ma terial." 4 7 I n the eve nt the embrittlement model deviate s from the phy sical samples ove r the limits specifie d in the reg ulation, the licensee must submi t additional evaluations and se ek appr oval for the de viations from the Dire ctor of the Offic e of N uclea r Reac tor Reg ulation. 4 8 D. Petitioners' Objections To Ent ergy Lic ense Am endm ent Request (LAR) Invoking A lternate PTS Ru le On September 30, 2014, notice wa s published in the Fede ral Reg ister of Enter g y's 4 9 intentions of seeking amendment of the oper ating license of Palisades Nucle ar Plant to allow implementation of an a lternative me thod of ca lculation of the de g ree of embrittlement of the Palisades nuclea r re actor pressure vessel. The 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 scre ening criter ia, to which Palisades supposedly adher ed, def ine a limiting leve l of embrittlement bey ond which plant opera tion cannot continue without furthe r eva luation. The switch to the use of 10 CFR § 50.61a will chang e how f rac ture toug hness of the r eac tor vessel is deter mined, moving f rom an analy tical to a proba bilist ic risk assessment method. Ente rg y's proposed "

no signific ant hazards" deter mination, required by 10 C.F.R. § 50.91(a), conclude d that the proposed c hang e will not involve a sig nificant incr ease in the probability or conse quence s of an a ccide nt previously embrittlement trend c urve"). The c onsistency chec k compar es the mea n and slope of the embrittlement model curve ag ainst surveillance data, a s well as che cks to confir m that outliers fall within acc eptable r esidual value s provided in the re g ulation. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(f)(6)(ii)-(v).10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(f

)(6)(i)(B).4 7 Id. § 50.61a(f

)(6)(vi).4 8 79 Fe d. Re g. 58812 (Se pte m ber 30, 2014)4 9-1 2-evalua ted. Enterg y further conclude d that the proposed c hang e does not c rea te the possibility of 5 0 a new or diffe rent ty pe of a ccide nt from any acc ident previously evalua ted. The utility 5 1 maintained, also, that the pr oposed cha ng e would not involve a sig nificant re duction in a marg in of saf ety. I n light of Ente rg y's ana ly sis, the NRC S taff c oncluded that "

the three standards of 5 2 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Ther efor e, the NRC staff proposes to dete rmine that the amendment r equest involves no sig nificant ha zards considera tion."5 3 When the Palisades RPV was bra nd new, its ref ere nce te mpera ture-nil ductility transition (RT-ndt) wa s at 40 deg ree s F. B y the ea rly 1980s, NRC had wea kened Palisade s' scre ening criter ia - a nd the re st of the U.S. pressurized wa ter re actor s' - to 200 deg ree s F, whic h is closer to the oper ating tempera ture of Palisade s, which is around 550 de g ree s F. Thus if the E merg ency Core Cooling Sy stem ("ECCS") pumps too-cold wa ter into the 550 deg ree s F re actor pressure vessel and c ools it t oo quickly down to 200 deg ree s F (or , later, 270 or 300 deg ree s), there instantaneously arises a serious potential for a fr actur e of the RPV, which would be a ve ry signific ant re actor acc ident. When the PW R safety sy stem repr essurizes the RPV, the metal ca n't take it any more, a nd fra cture s. I t brea ks, either by major cr acking or ac tual fra g mentation, presumably at the point of a f law in the RPV.

As noted, 200 deg ree s F wa s merely an ea rly retre at from r eg ulation. The cr iteria we re later r elaxed to 270 deg ree s F for axial/vertical welds, and to 300 de g ree s F for welds of a Id. at 58815.

5 0 Id.5 1 Id.5 2 Id.5 3-1 3-circ umfere ntial/horiz ontal orientation. And throug h it all, Palis ades a nd/or the NRC have projec ted, ag ain and a g ain that the new PTS screening criter ia would be e x cee ded by a pre dicted future da te. These dates ha ve bee n 1995; 1999; September 2001; 2004; 2007; 2014; April 2017; and Aug ust 2017. On or nea r those date s, Palisades or the NRC has said, the a llowable boundar y bey ond which lies the risk of disa ster will be cr ossed. Eac h time, though, the da te of he ighte ned vulnera bility to this t y pe of disaste r has r outinely slipped back f urther into the f uture. I n the many y ear s since the e arly indicators of e mbrittlement in it s first opera tional deca de, Palisades ha s g ained notorie ty as one of the nation's most-embrittled re actor s. I n its May 19, 1995 NRC Gener ic L etter 1992-001, Supplement 1, the NRC Staff per mitted Palis ades to 5 4 opera te until late 1999, observing that it had "re viewed the other PWR vessels and, based upon curr ently available information, believe s that the Palisades vesse l will reac h the PTS scree ning criter ia by late 1999, before any other PW R." (Empha sis added).

Id.Petitioners' objections to the ASL B r elied in larg e par t on the expert opinion of nuclear eng ineer Arnold Gunde rsen (see "De clar ation of Arnold Gunde rsen," here inafter "Gunde rsen Dec lara tion") that the a naly sis provided to the NRC by Enterg y is inadequate and re lies upon unsupported assumptions which wa rra nt a hea ring as to whethe r Enter g y should be allowed to switch over to 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a. Petitioners urg ed the possibility exis ts that significa nt hazards associate d with implementation of the alterna tive calc ulation method under 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a may occur , cause d by materia lly-under estimated prospe cts of a se vere loss-of-c oolant acc ident (L OCA) involving the rea ctor. ADAMS No. ML 031070449.

5 4-1 4-Arnold Gunde rsen state d that "Almost half of the initial capsules [coupon samples]

installed 43 y ear s ag o still rema in inside the embrittled nuclea r re actor" and tha t if the NRC allows Enterg y to postpone the next P alisades c oupon sampling until 2019, "then no a ccur ate curr ent assessment of Palisades' seve re e mbrittlement condition ex ists." Gunderse n Dec lara tion p. 8, ¶ 21. Gunde rsen opined tha t § 50.61 is analy tical in nature , while § 50.61a a uthorizes probabilistic risk assessment, and tha t the discretionar y availability of § 50.61a unde r the circ umstances c annot be use d as a substitute for sc ientific investig ation. Id. at p. 9, ¶ 24.3.

Gunder sen obser ved (id. at p. 3, ¶ 8) tha t "Continued opera tion of the Palisades nucle ar pow er plant without analy zing the coupon de signa ted to be sampled more than seve n y ear s ag o means that Enterg y may be oper ating Palisades as a test acc ording to 10 C.F.R. § 50.59." (Emphasis in orig inal).Petitioners' expert further alleg ed that the unde rly ing da ta from other supposedly compar ative nucle ar pla nts assessing ductility of their RPVs is not legitimate: "The NRC has allowed Palisade s to compare itself to rea ctors of dispar ate de signs f rom other ve ndors, built in differ ent y ear s and oper ating at diverse power levels." G underse n Dec lara tion at ¶ 24.2. These plants, which he sa y s "thus far have not e x hibited significa nt signs of r eac tor metal embrittle-ment," ar e poor c ompara bles bec ause:. . . the dra matically differ ent nuclea r cor e desig n and oper ational power char acte ristics make a n acc urate compar ison imposs ible. The diff ere nce be tween the Westinghouse nuc lear core s and the Combustion Enginee ring nuclea r cor e impacts the neutron flux on each r eac tor vessel, thus making an ac cura te compar ison of neutron bombardment a nd embrittlement impossibl e.Id. at p. 10, ¶ 27.

The c ore obje ction raised by Petitioners' filing is that the 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a alterna tive-1 5-to § 50.61 allows Enterg y to substit ute var ious estimates of the status of the RPV for a ctual data investiga tion and analy sis. Those § 50.61a proje ctions are attained, a mong othe r mea ns, by aver ag ing da ta on re actor vessels fr om other nucle ar pow er pla nts, to arrive a t a projec tion of the curr ent status of the Palisades RPV. Enterg y's re course to the alterna te appr oach, a ccompa nied as it is by delibera te non-testing of metal c oupons from the RPV for 16 y ear s (2003-2019) c an be understood only if one a ssumes that Enterg y does not want to know wha t phy sical testing might attain by way of usef ul data about the tr ue state of aff airs within the Palisades RPV.

As Pe ti ti one rs' e xpe rt , Arn old Gunde rs en o bj ect ed t o t he s pec if ic compara ble nuc le ar re act or vessel s c it ed b y Enter gy to comply with

§ 50.61a , poi nti ng out t hat "T he NRC h as al lowe d Pa li sad es to compare it sel f t o r eac tor s of di spa ra te des igns f rom othe r vendo rs , bui lt in di ff er ent years and ope ra ti ng at di verse powe r l evels." Gu nde rs en De cl ar at ion at ¶ 24.2. T hes e pl ant s, wh ic h he sa id "t hus fa r h ave not exh ibi te d si gnifi can t s igns o f r eac tor m et al embrit tl ement," ar e po or compara ble s be cau se:. . . t he d ra m at ic al ly dif fe re nt nuc le ar cor e de si gn and o per at ion al powe r c har act er is ti cs m ake an acc ura te compari son impossi ble. T he d if fe re nce bet ween th e W est inghous e nu cl ear cor es and th e Combust ion Engine er ing nuc le ar cor e i m pac ts th e ne utr on f lux on e ach re act or vessel , th us making an ac cur at e c om par is on o f n eut ron bombard m ent and embrit tl ement impossi ble.Id. at p. 1 0, ¶ 27. A good exa m ple of a f al se compari son is fo und in Str uct ura l Integrit y Associ at es, I nc.'s Re por t No. 09 0113 2.40 1, Re visio n 0, "Evalu at ion of Sur veill anc e Dat a f or We ld Heat No. W 5214 fo r Appl ic at ion to Pal is ade s PT S Anal ysis," ADAMS No. M L110 0606 93. T his doc um ent was par t o f t he te chn ic al bas is fo r t he P T S sa fe ty ri sk regula tor y roll bac k of PT S sc re eni ng cri te ri a, f rom J anu ar y 2014 to Apri l 2 017 at Limiti ng Belt li ne W el d W 5214. " Simila r Si st er Pla nt" pr oxi es wer e us ed wh ic h invol ved the in app rop ri at e a veraging of 11 s ample s urvei ll anc e c aps ule s/cou pons fr om very dis si m il ar RPV s. S suc h f al se compari son s, Gu nde rs en s ays, "s ignif ic ant ly dil ute Pal is ade s' embrit tl ement-1 6-cal cul at ion s." Id. at p. 1 1, ¶ 28. He a dds: "T his ro gue compara ti ve dat a i s no t s ound sc ie nti fi c m et hodo logy and cl ear ly pla ces th e op er at ion s of th e Pa li sad es NPP i n t he e xpe ri m ent al te st venue, pos si bly as del ine at ed i n 10 CFR 50.59." Id. at p. 1 1, ¶ 29. T he most ser iou s a nal ytica l p rob le m in usi ng sis te r p la nts dat a "is th e e xtr aor din ar y diff ic ult y compari ng data fr om fo ur sep ar at e pl ant s whi le st il l maint ai nin g one st and ar d de viati on (1ó) o r 2 0%bet ween al l t he d at a. Ac cor din g to t he Pal is ade s Re act or P res sur e Ve sse l Fl uen ce Eval uat ion , one st and ar d de viati on i s r equ ir ed, however th er e ha s ne ver be en a di scu ssi on o f h ow t his was ac hie ved bet ween th e f our si st er uni ts." Gu nde rs en De cl ar at ion at p. 1 1, ¶ 30. Wh il e "[a] 1ó ana lysis app ear s t o be b ind ing wit hin th e Pa li sad es dat a, . . . t he NRC l ower s t he b ar when compari ng data fr om si m il ar si st er pla nts th at ar e i ncl ude d i n Ent er gy's ana lysis of th e Pa li sad es re act or vessel wit hout re qui ri ng the same 1ó vari anc e wi th Pal is ade s." Id. at p. 1 2, ¶ 32. Gunde rs en a dde d: "T her e c an b e no as sur anc e t hat th e 20% er ror ban d at Pal is ade s e nco m pas ses th e 20% er ror ban d at th e Rob ins on o r Indian Poi nt pla nts. T o compare th is di ff er ent dat a wi tho ut ass ura nce th at th e 1ó vari anc e f rom eac h pl ant overl aps th e ot her pla nts la cks sc ie nti fi c vali dit y." Id. at p. 1 2, ¶ 33. Gunde rs en f urt her fo und tha t t her e i s "ext ra ord ina ry v ar ia bil it y betwe en t he n eut ron fl ux a cr oss the nuc le ar cor e i n t his Com bus ti on En gineer ing re act or" bec aus e of a "fl ux vari at ion of as m uch as 300% bet ween th e 45-degree se gm ent and th e 75-degree se gm ent ," c al li ng it "mathemati cal ly implaus ibl e t hat a 2 0% devia ti on i s po ssi ble when th e ne utr on f lux it sel f vari es by 300%." Id. at p. 1 2, ¶34. I n su m , he not ed t hat: T he W est inghous e Ana lysis del ine at es tha t a 20% vari at ion is m and at ory, yet t he ef fe ct ive f lue nce vari abi li ty can be as high as 300%, th er ef ore , the ana ly ti cal dat a do es not sup por t r el ic ens ure wit hout des tr uct iv e t est ing and comp le te embr it tl emen t a nal ysi s of add it ion al cap sul e s ampl es.Id. at p. 1 6, ¶ 39.-1 7-III. Argum ent A. The AS LB Erron eously Foun d The Dec ision Allow ing E ntergy To Invoke 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a To Be Nondiscretion ary The Atomic Safe ty and L icensing Boa rd g ener ally denied the Petition, holding that:

Petitioners appar ently want the B oard to pre clude Ente rg y from re ly ing on Sec tion 50.61a to avoid mee ting the r equire ments of Section 50.61, but it is j ust such a "de via-tion" that Section 50.61a author izes. The ev ident pur pose of the Alternate PTS Ru le's"Alternat e Fracture Toughn ess Requirem ents" is to pr ovide an alternative to satisfying the m ore deman ding requi rem ents of Section 50.61. There fore , Petitioners are in substance a sking tha t the Boa rd prohibit what Section 50.61a a llows. Under 10 C.F.R. §2.335, we may not consider suc h a conte ntion ex cept unde r spec ific conditions not prese nt here.(Emphasis supplied). L BP-15-17 at 29.The L icensing Boa rd's re asoning is flawed; it involves two distinct considerations. Even assuming arguendo that the NRC can pr omulga te an a lternative r eg ulation that is weake r than the other, a nd aff ord a c hoice of laws to nuclea r utility opera tors, that position say s nothing a bout the discretionar y nature of the NRC Direc tor of Nuc lear Reac tor Reg ulation over whe ther to allow a particula r applica nt to invoke 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a. The A SL B r uled, in essenc e, that if the paper work is prope rly completed, the substantive issue -

whether to allow Enterg y to move to 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a - is esse ntially irrele vant, is to be automatica lly allowed, a nd that the NRC Staff's r eg ulatory hand must be stay ed. This dog matic stance is appare nt in severa l ASL B statements. For example, the ASL B a dopted Enterg y's ar g ument that "a c ontention asserting that differ ent ana ly sis or technique should be utilized is inadmiss ible beca use it indirectly attacks the Commi ssion's reg ulations." L BP-15-17 at 33. Petitioners wer e advoc ating , not for usag e of a differ ent technique to be used, but that that the Dire ctor of N RR shoul d have disc retionar ily considere d whether a super ior "re asonable assura nce" of protec tion of public health and sa fety-1 8-would be der ived from r ejec ting Ente rg y's re quest to invoke § 50.61a.

This is because 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a cle arly contemplates a discretionar y deter mination by the Dire ctor of N RR. See , for e x ample, § 50.61a( c)(1) (RT MAX-X values a ssessment "must specify the base s for the pr ojected va lue of RT M A X-X for e ach r eac tor vessel be ltline material, including the assumptions reg arding future pla nt opera tion"); § 50.61a( c

)(2) ("Ea ch license e shall perf orm an e x amination and an a ssessment of flaw s in the rea ctor ve ssel beltline as re quired by para g raph (e) of this section" - a nd (e) require s disclosure of te sts perfor med but, ag ain, detailed e x planation of the me thodology underly ing N DE unce rtainties assumptions, and 5 5 adjustments must be disclosed. This is merely a re cog nition that even objective da ta, once interpre ted, may be examined to asce rtain the objec tivity or inappropr iate bias whic h may have occur red in the me ans of a naly sis which have be en applied to it. Where the re is discre tion vested in the reg ulator, diffe renc es of opinion, interpre tation, and expert ana ly sis are le g itimate bases for challeng ing the decision bec ause the decision is potentially arr ived at in an a dversa rial manne

r. This principle is also obvious in § 50.61a(f)

(7), whic h require s that "The lice nsee sha ll repor t any information that sig nificantly influence s the RT M A X-X value to the Dir ector in acc ordanc e with the re quirements of pa rag raphs (c)(1) and (d)(1) of this section." The require ment clea rly introduces subjec tive judgme nt and selec tion among dif fer ent conditions or finding s into the decision of wha t data is to be provided to the D irec tor of NRR.

§ 50.61a sa ys in p ar t: "T he metho dol ogy to ac cou nt for NDE-re la te d un cer ta int ie s must b e 5 5 bas ed o n st at is ti cal dat a f rom the qua li fi cat ion te st s a nd a ny othe r t est s t hat m eas ure th e di ff er enc e bet ween th e a ct ual fl aw s ize an d t he NDE [no-des tr uct ive ex aminat ion] d et ect ed f la w si ze. Lic ens ees who a dj ust th ei r t est dat a t o ac cou nt for NDE-re la te d un cer ta int ie s t o veri fy conf ormance wit h t he val ues in T abl es 2 an d 3 s hal l p re par e a nd s ubmit t he metho dol ogy use d t o es ti m at e t he NDE unc er ta int y, the st at is ti cal dat a us ed t o ad j ust th e t est dat a a nd a n ex pla nat ion of how t he d at a was ana lyzed for re view and app roval by the Dir ect or in acc ord anc e wi th par agraph s (c)(2) and (d)(2) of thi s s ect ion."-1 9-Henc e for Petitioners to provide their expert's c ritique of the mea ns by which the § 50.61a investig ation was c onducted, a nd the wea knesses or bia ses in the under ly ing da ta, assumptions and manipulations of information ca nnot be construe d as a f rontal assa ult on the reg ulatory citadel, but must instead be se en, for purposes of the admissibili ty deter mination, as an exposi tion of the flaws c aused by stray ing a way from knowa ble scienc

e. Petitioners' c ritique was not answer ed by any experts on behalf of the NRC Staff or Enter g y. Petitioners articulate d challeng es to the propose d exercise of discretion by the Dire ctor of N uclea r Reac tor Reg ulation and should be a ccor ded a he aring to provide more e vidence.The Commission s hould take note that the a g ency reg ulations contain a "

pressurized thermal shock r eg ulatory relief valve" for situations wher e a nuc lear utilit y cannot mee t even the flac cid threshold of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, by means of w hich the Dire ctor of N RR may allow an embrittled rea ctor to oper ate be y ond the PTS scree ning c riteria. See slide show, "Te chnica l Brie f on Reg ulatory Guidance on the Alterna tive PTS R ule (10 C.F.R. § 50.61a

)," O fficia l Transc ript of Proce eding s, ADAMS No. ML 14321A542, at p. 242/268 of .pdf:

Use of 10 CF R 50.61a PTS screening criter ia re quires submittal for re view and approva l by Direc tor, NRR.For plants that do not satisfy PTS S cre ening Criteria, plant-spe cific PTS assessment is requir ed.Must be submitt ed for revie w and a pproval by Direc tor, NRR.Guidance is not provided for this case.

Subsequent requir ements (i.e., afte r submittal) are define d in para g raph (d) of 10 CFR 50.61a. (Empha sis suppli ed).B. 'Reasonable Assu rance' Cannot A pply Alike To Two Regulat ions A ddressing The Sam e Subject When One Is Deemed To Be Weaker Than The Other When the ASL B r efe rre d to the 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 require ments as "more demanding "than the "A lternate Fr actur e Toug hness Requireme nts," the B oard a g ree d that the "e vident-2 0-purpose" of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a is to wea ken the r eg ulatory rig or over nuclea r utiliti es with serious RPV ductility problems. Petitioners sug g est that substitut ion of a strong er standa rd which officia lly provides "r easona ble assura nce" of public protec tion with an admittedly wea ker one also "re asonably assure d" to be pr otective, is leg ally anomalous.

5 6 Section 182a of the Atomic Energ y Act states that a rea ctor ope rating license must include "te chnica l specifica tions" that include, inter alia , "the spe cific c hara cter istics of the fac ility , and such othe r informa tion as the Commis sion may , by rule or r eg ulation, deem nece ssary in order to e nable it to find that the utiliz ation . . . of spec ial nuclea r mater ial . . . will provide a dequate protec tion to the health and saf ety of the public."

42 U.S.C. § 2232(a). The g ener al re quirement for opera ting lice nses, 10 C.F.R. § 50.57(a

)(3), require s a finding of rea sonable a ssuranc e of ope ration without endang ering the hea lth and safe ty of the public.

Duke 5 7 Power Co. (Catawba Nuclea r Station, Units 1 & 2), L BP-82-116, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982). I n this procee ding, E nterg y must demonstrate that it satisfies the "r easona ble assura nce sta ndard" by a pre pondera nce of the evidenc

e. Rea sonable a ssuranc e "is not susce ptible to formalistic quantifica tion or mecha nistic application. Rather, w hether the re asonable assura nce sta ndard is met is based upon sound tec hnical judg ment applied on a c ase-by-ca se basis."

AmerGe n Energy Co., LL C (Oy ster Cree k Nuclea r Ge nera ting Station), L BP-07-17, 66 NRC 327, 340 (2007), The "rea sonable a ssuranc e" f inding of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a is found at 75 F ed. Reg. at 22.5 6"(a) Pursuant to § 50.56, an ope rating license ma y be issued by the Commiss ion, up to 5 7 the full term author ized by § 50.51, upon finding that: (1) ***; (2) ***;(3) The re is re asonable assura nce (i) that the ac tiviti es authorized by the oper ating license can be conducte d without endang ering the hea lth and safe ty of the public. . ."

.-2 1-aff'd , CL I-09-07, 69 NRC 235, 263 (2009) (reje cting an ar g ument that rea sonable a ssuranc e should be quantified with 95% c onfidenc e). To c onsider a strong er r eg ulation and a we aker one to be on the same footing when it comes to providing rea sonable a ssuranc e is log ically inconsistent, as illustrated by this very case. Palisades contains the w orst-embrittled re actor pressure vessel in the United States. Posed a c hoice be tween a toughe r, phy sical testing-base d reg ulatory reg ime, or a w eake r, projec tive method of asse ssing RPV ductility , owner s of the worst-e mbrittled reac tor have chosen the less-protec tive reg ulations. Bec ause the y are less protec tive, and g iven the enor mous discretion vested in the Dir ector of Nuc lear Reac tor Reg ulation to decide on a case-by-ca se basis wha t terms and conditions should be imposed under 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a, a he aring is nece ssary to resolve f actua l issues in li ne with re g ulatory expectations. The ASL B's candor shows that the alter native re g ulation exi sts merely to provide Enterg y with "re asonable assura nce" of being able to oper ate Palisade s in disreg ard of the destructive te sting oblig ations of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61 and in der og ation of the binding require ment of re asonable assura nce tha t the public's hea lth and safe ty will be the priority for pr otection.

C. V ariabili ties In S ister Plant Data Erron eously Allow ed Inappropriate Com parisons The ASL B tre ated Petitioners' obje ctions to the invalidity of sister plant data as attempts to sugg est reg ulatory para meters whic h exceed the r equire ments of 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a. B ut Petitioners have pr eviously arg ued that the c onsiderable discretion ac corde d the Dire ctor of N RR to allow invocation of § 50.61a should be construe d as lending rele vance to their apples/ora ng es quibbling. F urther, 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a(f)

(6)(i) requir es that "(A) The surveillance materia l must M AX-X be a he at-spec ific match f or one or more of the materia ls for which RT is being calc ulated."Petitioners' expert Gunder sen attested to the la ck of pr oof that the meta ls from the var ious RP Vs-2 2-match. This conc lusion was not rebutted by any expert evidenc e fr om either the N RC S taff nor Enterg y. The L icensing Boa rd's implicit finding that the me tals compare d in the sister plants workup we re "of the a ppropriate chemica l composition" (L BP-15-17 at 41) wa s seriously challeng ed by Petitioners' expert witness. Nor did Enter g y or the NRC Staff re fute Gunde rsen's observa tion that (noted at p. 17 infra) that there is "extraordinary varia bility betwee n the neutron flux acr oss the nuclea r cor e in this Combus tion Engine ering rea ctor" beca use of a "flux variation of as much a s 300% betwe en the 45-deg ree seg ment and the 75-deg ree seg ment," and c oncluding it was "mathe matically implausible that a 20% devia tion is poss ible when the ne utron flux i tself varie s by 300%." G underse n Dec lara tion p. 12, ¶ 34. Perhaps § 50.61a is the culmination of deca des of lea rning about embrittlement, but it stil l cannot dispense w ith huge varia tions in neutron flux in P alisades, a lone. The A SL B imprope rly reje cted this portion of Petitioners' contention.

IV. Conclusion The thre shold admissibi lity require ments of NRC's contention rule should not be turne d into a "for tress to deny intervention."

Power Authority of the State of New Y ork, et al. (James FitzPatrick Nuclea r Power Plant; I ndian Point Nuclear Gene rating Unit 3), CL I-00-22, 52 NRC 266, 295 (2000). The re is no re quirement that the pe titioners' substantive ca se be ma de at the contention stag

e. Matter of Entergy Nucle ar Gene ration Co., et al. (Pilgrim Nuc lear Power Station), 50-293-L R (ASL B O ct. 16, 2006), 2006 WL 4801142 at (NRC) 85. The Commi ssion has explained that the re quirement a t § 2.309(f)(1)(v) "does not c all upon the interve nor to make its case a t [the contention] stage of the proc eeding , but rather to indicate wha t fac ts or expert opinions, be it one fac t or opinion or many , of which it is awa re a t that point in t ime which-2 3-provide the ba sis for its contention."

Pilgrim at 84. The a dmissibi lity require ment "g ener ally is fulfilled when the sponsor of an othe rwise a cce ptable conte ntion provides a brie f re citation of the fac tors underly ing the contention or re fer ence s to documents and texts t hat provide suc h rea sons." Id.WHEREFORE , the adve rse de terminations of the Atomic Safe ty and L icensing Boa rd in L BP-15-17 should be reve rsed a nd the matter r emande d to the AL SB for an evide ntiary hear ing.Respectf ully submitt ed, /s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O H #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 255-7552 Fa x (419) 255-7552 Tjlodge 50@y ahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners

-2 4-UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA NUCLEAR REG ULATORY COMMISSION Before the Com m ission I n the Matter of Enterg y Nuclea r Ope rations, I nc.(Palisades Nuc lear Plant)Oper ating L icense Amendment Reque st)Docke t No. 50-255) J une 2, 2015

)) *****CERTIFIC ATE OF SERVICE I here by cer tify that copies of the fore g oing "PETI TI ONERS' 10 C.F.R. § 2.311( c)

NOTI CE OF APPEAL OF A TOMI C SAFETY AN D L I CENSI NG B OARD'S DENI AL OF'PETI TI ON TO I NTERVENE A ND REQUEST F OR A HEARI NG ON E NTERGY L I CENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST FOR AU THORI Z ATI ON TO I MPL EMENT 10 C.F.R. § 50.61a' "and the a ccompa ny ing "BRI EF I N SUPPOR T" we re se rved by me upon the par ties to this proce eding via the NRC's Elec tronic I nformation Exchang e sy stem this 2nd day of June, 2015.

/s/ Terry J. L odg e Terr y J. L odg e (O H #0029271) 316 N. Michig an St., Ste. 520 Toledo, OH 43604-5627 (419) 255-7552 Fa x (419) 255-7552 Tjlodge 50@y ahoo.com Counsel for Petitioners

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