ML18079A105

LER 2018-001-00 for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Regarding Manual Reactor Scram Due to Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line

ML18079A105
Person / Time
Site:
Issue date:	03/05/2018
From:	Miner P J Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
2.18.011 LER 2018-001-00
Download: ML18079A105 (6)

Text

• ~Entergx March 5, 2018 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360

SUBJECT:

Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Docket No. 50-293 Renewed License No. DPR-35 LETTER NUMBER: 2.18.011

Dear Sir or Madam:

The enclosed Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line, is submitted in accordance with Title 1 O Code of Federal Regulations 50.73. If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (508) 830-7127.

There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter. r Manager, egulatory Assurance PJM/sc

Attachment:

Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00, Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line (3 Pages)

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station cc: Mr. David C. Lew Acting Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2100 Renaissance Blvd., Suite 100 King of Prussia, PA 19406-2713 Mr. John Lamb, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8C2A Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Letter No. 2.18.011 Page 2 of 2 Attachment Letter Number 2.18.011 Licensee Event Report 2018-001-00 Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line (3 Pages) (

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. ;.;,o.'-lll,=ll,:

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

p Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. " i .....* J (See Page 2 for required number of digits/characters for each block) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects . Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, httg://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3D the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME ~-DOCKET NUMBER . PAGE Pilarim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 1 OF3 4. TITLE Manual Reactor Scram Due To Loss of One Offsite Transmission Line 5. EVENT DATE 6. LER NUMBER 7. REPORT DATE 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED SEQUENTIAL REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NO. MONTH DAY YEAR NIA 11\.t/A 01 04 2018 2018 -001 00 03 05 2018 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER N/A N/A 9. OPERATING MODE 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITIED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that applv) N D 20.2201 (b) D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)

D 20.2201 (d) D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)

D 20.2203(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(4)

D so.73(a)(2)(iii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)

D 50.36(c)(1

)(i)(A) [8150.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(x)

10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)

D 73.71 (a)(4) D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)

D so.36(c)(2)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)

D 73.71(a)(s) 81 D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)

D so.4e(a)(3)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)

D 73.77(a)(1)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)

D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)

D 73.77(a)(2)(i)

D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)

D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 OTHER Specify in Abstract below or in NRG Form 366A 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER LICENSEE CONTACT rELEPHONE-NUMBER (Include Area Code) Mr. Peter J. Miner-Regulatory Assurance Manager ~08-830-7127 13. COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX C FK y 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR D YES (ff yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) [gj NO SUBMISSION DATE ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) On January 4, 2018 at approximately 1400 EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent core thermal power, Air Circuit Breakers 103 and 104 automatically opened due to a fault condition on 345KV Line 342. The sustained loss of one incoming 345KV line due to weather related conditions requires a plant shut down. While assessing plant conditions, the operating crew reduced reactor power to approximately 81 percent core thermal power. Following these actions, it was determined that the loss of 345KV Line 342 was due to weather and a manual scram was initiated at 1409 hours0.0163 days <br />0.391 hours <br />0.00233 weeks <br />5.361245e-4 months <br />. This event is reportable per the requirements of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System and automatic isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. rThere was no impact to public health and safety. NRG FORM 366 (04-2017)

NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

~*i'to~~ \ I ....... U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG-1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3L)

APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Wa~hington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRG may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 YEAR 2018 BACKGROUND SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -001 REV NO. -00 The station preferred (offsite)

Alternating Current (AC) power source provides AC power to all station auxiliaries required for startup and shutdown and is normally in use when the unit AC power source is unavailable.

The preferred power source is that power supply which furnishes electric energy under accident or post-accident conditions.

At Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS), this is an Offsite Power Source (either of two 345KV lines) supplied to the Startup Transformer.

EVENT DESCRIPTION On January 4, 2018 at approximately 1400 EST, with the reactor at approximately 100 percent core thermal power, Air Circuit Breakers 103 and 104 automatically opened due to a fault condition on 345KV Line 342. [rhe sustained loss of one the incoming 345KV lines due to weather related conditions defines an anticipated loss of offsite power (per PNPS procedure).

Based on meeting established requirements, reactor power was reduced to approximately 81 percent core thermal power. Following these actions, a procedurally required manual scram was initiated at 1409. The manual scram resulted in all control rods being fully inserted.

Primary Containment Isolation System Groups II, VI and Reactor Building Isolation System isolations occurred as expected.

Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)-01 was entered when ~he reactor water level reached less than 12 inches of water due to the expected post scram reactor water level reduction.

As a contingency, Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were manually started and placed on Emergency 4160V AC buses A5 and A6 per procedure.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The direct cause of the event was a static line supplied by others that failed and wrapped around all three phases of a 345KV tran~mission line (approximately 25 miles from the plant) causing the fault, during winter storm Grayson. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS rrhe Transmission Operator has removed the failed static wire which caused the line trip and has restored power to the 345KV Line 342. The Transmission Operator's Transmission Engineering Department is continuing to investigate the failure and will provide any additional details to the station. NRG FORM 366A (04-2017)

Page 2 of 3 NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 3/31/2020 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) CONTINUATION SHEET (See NUREG: 1022, R.3 for instruction and guidance for completing this form http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1022/r3l)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and led back to industry.

Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail *10 lnfocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid 0MB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.

1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. LER NUMBER YEAR Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 05000-293 2018 SAFETY CONSEQUENCES SEQUENTIAL NUMBER -00"1 REV NO. -00 The actual consequences were a loss of one offsite transmission line which resulted in a procedurally required operator-initiated manual scram. There were no other actual consequences to general safety of the public, nuclear safety, industrial safety, or radiological safety for this event. !The risk from the actual event was considered minor as described above and the scram was considered uncomplicated as defined in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02. Had the manual scram not been initiated, the plant would have continued operating with only one 345KV line providing offsite power. This additional line remained in service during the storm. rTherefore, based on the above information there was no adverse impact on the public health or safety. REPORT ABILITY !This event is reportable per the requirements of 1 O CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to a manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System and automatic isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. PREVIOUS EVENTS: LER 2015-001-00, Loss of 345KV Power Resulting in Automatic Reactor Scram During Winter Storm Juno LER 2013-009-00, Loss of Offsite Power and Reactor Scram LER 2013-003-00, Loss of Offsite Power Events Due to Winter Storm Nemo

REFERENCES:

CR-PNP-2018-00093 NRC FORM 366A (04-2017)

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