ML17228B327

Forwards Response to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-335/95-15 & 50-389/95-15.Corrective Actions:Msis Was Blocked & Reset Immediately Following Event on 950802

ML17228B327
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	11/15/1995
From:	GOLDBERG J H FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-95-306, NUDOCS 9511210113
Download: ML17228B327 (23)

See also: IR 05000335/1995015

Text

RIGRITY1ACCELERATED

RIDSPROCESSING),

REGULATORY

INFORMATION

DISTRIBUTION

SYSTEM(RIDS)r'ESSIONNBR9511210113

DOC~DATE'5/11/15

NOTARIZED

NOFACIL:50-335

St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.50-389St.LuciePlant,Unit2,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION

GOLDBERG,J.H.

FloridaPower&'ightCo.RECIP.NAME

RECIPIENT

AFFILIATION

DocumentControlBranch(Document

ControlDesk)SUBJECT:ForwardsresponsetoNRCltrreviolations

notedininsprepts50-335/95-15

&50-389/95-15.Corrective

actions:MSIS

wasblocked&resetimmediately

following

eventon950802.IDISTRIBUTION

CODE:IE01DCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR

ENCLSIZE:TITLE:General(50Dkt)-Insp

Rept/Notice

ofViolation

ResponseNOTESDOCKETN0500033505000389INTERNAL:

RECIPIENT

IDCODE/NAME

PD2-1PDACRSAEOD/SPD/RAB

DEDRONRR/DISP/PIPB

NRR/DRPM/PECB

OEDIRRGN2FILE01COPIESRECIPIENT

LTTRENCLIDCODE/NAME

11NORRIS,J2AEOD/DEIB

1A'E.1FILECENTER1/'DRC8/HFB1NUDOCS-ABSTRACT

1'GC/HDS31COPIESLTTRENCL11111111111111EXTERNAL:

LITCOBRYCE,JHNRCPDR1111NOAC11iNOTETOALLRIDS"RECIPIEYTS:

PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCE4VASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCL'!iIEYT

CO."iTROL

DESK,ROOiiIPl-37(EXT.504-2083)TOELIiIINATEYOURNA!iIEFROiIDISTRIBUTIOY.

LISTSFORDOCL'IiIEi'I'S

5'OUDOi"I'L'LD!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:

LTTR19ENCL19

40'

0FloridaPowerLLightCompany,P.O.Box14000,JunoBeach,FL334080420NOV15$995L-95-30610CFR2.201U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15FloridaPowerandLightCompany(FPL)hasreviewedthesubjectinspection

reportandpursuantto10CFR2.201theresponsetothenoticeofviolation

isattached.

Verytrulyyours,J.H.GoldbergPresident

-NuclearDivisionJHG/DAS/EJB

Attachment

cc:StewartD.Ebneter,RegionalAdministrator,

USNRCRegionIISeniorResidentInspector,

USNRC,St.LuciePlant95ii210i13

'it5iii5PDRADOCK050003359PDRanFPLGroupcompany

FPLRESPONSETOINSPECTION

REPORT95-15SUMMARYNRCInspection

Report50-335/389/95-15

considered

St.LuciePlantperformance

duringthesix(6)weekperiodfromJuly30,1995throughSeptember

16,1995.Theviolations

belowoccurredduringarelatively

shortperiodoftime,asdescribed

intheinspection

report,andseveralofthecorrective

actionswereinstituted

following

ananalysisoftheevents,collectively.

Thecorrective

stepstoavoidfurtherviolations

wereinsomecasesdetermined

tobegenericfollowing

thisanalysis,

andaretherefore

repeatedinanumberoftheresponses.

TheInspection

Reportidentified

seven(7)violations

whicharelistedbelow.Violation

A:FailuretoFollowProcedures

andBlockMSISActuation

Violation

B:FailuretoFollowProcedures

DuringRCPSealRestaging

Violation

C:FailuretoFollowProcedure

andDocumentAbnormalValvePositionintheValve,SwitchDeviation

logViolation

D:FailuretoFollowProcedures

duringAlignment

ofShutdownCoolingSystemViolation

E:FailuretoFollowProcedure

andDocumentaDeficiency

onContainment

SprayValveSurveillance

TestProcedure

Violation

F:FailuretoInitialMaintenance

Procedure

StepsasWorkwasCompleted

Violation

G:FailuretoFollowProcedures

DuringVentingofECCSSystemResultedinContainment

Spraydown

Additionally,

bothFloridaPowerandLight(FPL)andtheNRCevaluated

planteventstoidentifycommonunderlying

themes.FPLpresented

asummaryofeventstotheNRConAugust29,1995.Weaknesses

identified

inthissummaryincludedprocedure

contentanduse,aswellasmanagement

oversight

ofeguipment

performance.

FPL'sPlantoImprovetheOperational

Performance

atSt.Luciewasdeveloped

asaresultoftheAugust29,1995,meetingandsubmitted

totheNRConSeptember

15,1995.Todate,FPLhascompleted

theactivities

according

totheimprovement

planschedule.

S=.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

A:Technical

Specification

6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1.dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5.13.2,statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.OP1-0030127,

Rev68,"ReactorPlantCooldown-HotStandbytoColdShutdown,"

required,

inpart,thatoperators

blockMainSteamIsolation

System(MSIS)actuation

whenblockpermissive

annunciations

werereceived.

ONOP1-0030131,

Rev60,"PlantAnnunciator

Summary,"

requiredthat,uponvalidreceiptofannunciators

Q-18andQ-20,operators

immediately

blockchannelsAandB,respectively.

Contrarytotheabove,onAugust2,1995,duringacooldownofSt.LucieUnit1,validblock.permissive

annunciators

werereceived,

however,operators

failedtoestablish

therequiredMSISblocks,resulting

inAandBchannelMSISactuations.

RESPONSEA:REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofautilitylicensedoperatorwhofailedtoblocktheactuation

ofthemainsteamisolation

signal(MSIS)inaccordance

withtherequirements

oftheapprovedplantoperating

procedure.

2.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.Themainsteamisolation

signal(MSIS)wasblockedandresetimmediately

following

theeventonAugust2,1995.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-153.CORRECTXVE

STEPSTOAVOXDFURTHERVXOLATXONS

A.Thelicensedoperatorwhowasinvolvedintheeventwascounseled

ontheneedtofollowprocedures

andreceiveddiscipline

inaccordance

withplant'policy.

B.AllOperations

NuclearPlantSupervisors

(NPS)heldmeetingswiththeircrewssubsequent

tothiseventtoreiterate

FPL'sgoalforerrorfreeperformance.

C.Thiseventwillbeincorporated

intolicensedoperatorrequalification

trainingtoemphasize

procedural

compliance,

propercommunication

amongtheControlRoom'team,andtheimportance

ofsupervision

-inthecontrolroommaintaining

anoverallawareness,

ofactivities.

ThisactionwillbecompletebyJanuary1,1996.D.St.LuciePlantadoptedverbatimcompliance

astheonlyacceptable

meansofprocedure

compliance.

Thisrequirement

hasbeenincorporated

intoplantQualityInstruction

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures'~

"4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust2,1995withthecompletion

ofitem2above.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

B:Technical

Specification

6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1..dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5.13.2,statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.Contrarytotheabove,procedures

werenotadheredtostrictlyinthefollowing

examples:

OP1-0120020,

Rev.72,"FillingandVentingtheRCS,"precaution

4.2,requiredthatReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)venting,described

intheprocedure,

notbeattempted

ifRCStemperature

wasabove200'F.OnAugust2,1995,ReactorCoolantPump(RCP)sealventing,performed

inanattempttocorrectsealpackageleakageinthe1A2RCPinaccordance

withAppendixEofthesubjectprocedure,

wasperformed

whileRCStemperature

wasapproximately

370'F.Asaresult,designtemperatures

ofRCPsealcomponents

wereapproached

orexceeded.

2.OP1-0120020,

Rev.72,"FillingandVentingtheRCS,"AppendixE,"Restaging

ReactorCoolantPumpSeals,"requiredtheuseofRCPsealinjection

whilerestaging

wasattempted.

OnAugust2,1995,restaging

ofthe1A2RCPsealpackagewasattempted

withoutsealinjection

alignedtothesealpackage.Asaresult,designtemperatures

ofRCPsealcomponents

wereapproached

orexceeded.

RESPONSEB:REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofautilitylicensedoperatorwhofailedtofollowanapprovedplantprocedure

whileperforming

arestaging

evolution

onaReactorCoolant'Pump(RCP)sealpackage.Theoperatordidnotstrictlyadheretotheconditions

contained

intheprocedure

whichrequiredthatRCStemperature

benogreaterthan200'F,andthatsealinjection

beinservice.

0

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389Reply'oNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-152.CORRECTXVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.TheRCP'estaging

evolution

wasdiscontinued,

andOperations

cooledanddepressurized

theReactorCoolantSystem(RCS)inaccordance

withapprovedplantprocedure

tolowerRCPsealtemperatures

towithintheacceptable

range.The1A2RCPwassecured.B.Thedamaged1A2RCPsealpackagewasreplacedpriortoreturning

Unit1tooperation.

3.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVXOLATXONS

A.Thelicensedoperatorinvolvedinthiseventwasdisciplined

inaccordance

withplantpolicy.B.Theprocedure

appendixwhichwasusedforperforming

therestaging

oftheRCPswasdeletedandisnolongeravailable

foruse.C.Plantmanagement

performed

anassessment

ofthedecisionmakingprocessthatledtotherestaging

oftheRCPsealundertheexistingplantconditions.

Basedonthisassessment,

Plantpolicy105,"PlantOperation

BeyondtheEnvelopeofApprovedPlantOperating

Procedures",

wasrevisedtorequireatechnical

reviewofprocedures

whicharebeingimplemented

forthefirsttimeorforwhichplantconditions

aredifferent

fromthosedescribed

intheprocedures

D.AllOperations

NuclearPlantSupervisors

(NPS)heldmeetingswiththeircrewssubsequent

tothiseventtoreiterate

FPL'sgoalforerrorfreeperformance.

E.St.LuciePlantadoptedverbatimcompliance

astheonlyacceptable

meansofprocedure

compliance.

Thisrequirement

hasbeenincorporated

intoplantQualityInstruction

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures."

4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust2,1995withthecompletion

ofitem2A,above.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

C:Technical

Specification

6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1.dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5.13',statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.AP1-0010123,

Rev99,"Administrative

ControlsofValves,Locks,andSwitches,"

step8.1.6,required,

inpart,thatallvalvepositiondeviations

bedocumented

intheValveSwitchDeviation

Log.Contrarytotheabove,onoraboutAugust1,1995,HCV-25-1through7wererepositioned

andleftintheclosedpositionwithouttherequiredentriesbeingmadeintheValveSwitchDeviation

Log.TheValves'ositions

complicated

alossofRCSinventory.

RESPONSEC:REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofutilitylicensedoperators

whodidnotproperlydocumenttheclosedstatusofthesubjectvalvesintheValveSwitchDeviation

Log,asrequiredbytheapprovedplantprocedure.

2.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDTheSafeguards

PumpRoomSumpIsolation

valves,HCV25-1throughHCV25-7,wererealigned

totheopenpositionimmediately

following

thelossofRCSinventory

eventonAugust10,1995,whenControlRoomoperators

discovered

theclosedstatusofthevalves.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-153.CORRECTXVE

STEPSTOAVOXDFURTHERVXOLATXONS

A.AllOperations

NuclearPlantSupervisors

(NPS)heldmeetingswiththeircrewssubsequent

tothiseventtoreiterate

FPL'sgoalforerrorfreeperformance.

B.C.D.Theplanthasadoptedverbatimcompliance

astheonlyacceptable

meansofprocedure

compliance.

Thisrequirement

hasbeenincorporated

intoplantQualityInstruction

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures."

Management

isconducting

adailyreviewofControlRoomchronological

logstoreinforce

theexpectation

fordetailandcompleteness.

IPlantadministrative

procedures

havebeenrevisedtoprovideforincreased

reviewsbyplantstaffofthelogscontrolling

valverepositioning.

Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust10,1995,withthecompletion

ofitem2above.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

D:Technical

Specification

6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1.dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5'3.2,statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.OP1-0410022,

Rev22,"Shutdown

Cooling,"

step8.3.7,requiredthatV3652,theBShutdownCooling(SDC)hotlegsuctionisolation

valve,belockedopenwhileplacingtheBSDCloopinservice.Contrarytotheabove,onAugust29,acontrolroomoperatorfailedtoplaceV3652inalockedopencondition

whileplacingtheBSDCloopinservice.Asaresult,the1BLowPressureSafetyInjection

Pumpwasoperatedwithitssuctionlineisolated.

RESPONSED:REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofautilitylicensedoperatorwhofailedtoproperlyverifythealignment

oftheshutdowncooling(SDC)systemflowpathinaccordance

withtheapprovedplantprocedure,

priortostartingthe1BLowPressureSafetyInjection

(LPSI)Pump.Thisresultedinthefailuretoopenthe1BLPSIPumpsuctionisolation

valve.2.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.TheControlRoomoperators

notedtheerrorinvalvealignment

andtheLPSIpumpwassecuredapproximately

5minutesafterbeingstarted.Asubsequent

inspection

determined

thatnodamagehadoccurredduringtheshortperiodofpumpoperation.

B.Thesystemwasrealigned

inaccordance

withtheapprovedprocedure

andtheLPSIpumpwasrestarted.

Subsequent

operation

oftheLPSIpumpwassatisfactory.

C.AnASMESectionXIcoderunwasperformed

satisfactorily

onthe1BLPSIPumpandasubsequent

Engineering

assessment

concluded

thatpumpoperability

hadnotbeenadversely

affected.

St.LucieUnits.1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-153.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONS

A.Thelicensedoperatorinvolvedinthiseventwasdisciplined

inaccordance

withplantpolicy.B.Operations

implemented

procedure

changeswhichrequiretheuseofadedicated

procedure

readertoassistintheimplementation

ofSDCrelatedevolutions.

C.AllOperations

NuclearPlantSupervisors

(NPS)heldmeetingswiththeircrewssubsequent

tothiseventtoreiterate

FPL'sgoalforerrorfreeperformance.

D.Theplanthasadoptedverbatimcompliance

astheonlyacceptable

meansofprocedure

compliance.

Thisrequirement

hasbeenincorporated

intoplantQualityInstruction

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures."

E.Thiseventwillbeincludedintolicensedoperator,

requalification

training.

Thisactionwillbecompleted

byJanuary1,1996.4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust29,1995withthecompletion

ofitem2Aand2Babove.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

E:Technical

Specification

6.8.1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1.dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5.13.2,statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.QI16-PR/PSL-2,

Rev.1,"St.LucieActionReport(STAR)Program,"

requiredthatSTARsbeinitiated

forQualityAssurance

auditfindingsandindependent

technical

reviewrecommendations'ontrary

totheabove,aSTARwasnotgenerated

whenaQualityAssurance

reviewofaninadvertent

Unit1containment

spraydown,

documented

ininteroffice

correspondence

JQQ-95-143,

identified

thepracticeofprelubricating

FCV-07-1A,

Containment

SprayheaderAflowcontrolvalve,whenperforming

valvestroketimetesting.RESPONSEE:1.REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofutilityQualityAssurance

(QA)personnel.

QApersonnel

wereintheprocessofconducting

anindependent

reviewfocusingonthecontributing

factorsassociated

withaUnit1containment

spraydownevent.Thepracticeofpre-lubricating

Containment

SprayheaderflowcontrolvalveFCV-07-lApriortosurveillance

testingwasidentified

duringthis.review,butwasnotdetermined

tobeacontributing

factortothisevent.Recommendations

tocorrectthisdeficiency

weretherefore

notcontained

intheresulting

QAreport,norwasaSt.LucieActionRequest(STAR)generated

inatimelymanner.2.=CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.ASt.LucieActionRequest(STAR951048)wasgenerated

onSeptember

7,1995todocumentthedeficient

practiceofpre-lubricating

Unit1andUnit2containment

sprayflowcontrolvalvespriortosurveillance

stroketimetesting.B.Temporary

changeswereissuedtoplantsurveillance

procedures

onSeptember

2,1995toremovethepracticeof'pre-lubricating

valvespriortosurveillance

testing.10

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-153.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONS

A.B.C.AmeetingwasheldonSeptember

13,1995betweentheVicePresident

ofNuclearAssurance

andallSt.LucieQualityAssurance

andQualityControlpersonnel.

Duringthismeeting,clearexpectations

wereprovidedregarding

thethreshold

foridentification

anddocumentation

ofdeficiencies

byQualitypersonnel.

EOnOctober25,1995,asecondmeetingwasheldbetweenthesiteQualityManagerandSt.LucieQApersonnel.

Duringthismeeting,therequirements

oftheQualityInstruction

QI16-PR/PSL-2,

"St.LucieActionReport(STAR)Program"werereviewed.

Theresponsibility

ofQApersonnel

fortimelyidentification

anddocumentation

ofdeficiencies

inaccordance

withthisprocedure

wasreinforced.

Permanent

changeswillbemadetoplantsurveillance

procedures

todiscontinue

thepracticeofpre-testlubrication

ofthevalvespriortosurveillance

testing.Thisactionwillbecompleted

byDecember1,1995.4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonSeptember

7,1995withthecompletion

ofitem2Aabove.

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

F:Technical

Specification

6.8~1.arequiresthatwrittenprocedures

beestablished,

implemented,

andmaintained

coveringtheactivities

recommended

inAppendixAofRegulatory

Guide1.33,Rev.2,February1978.AppendixA,paragraph

1.dincludesadministrative

procedures

forprocedural

adherence.

Procedure

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

Rev.62,"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures,"

Section5.13.2,statesthatallprocedures

shallbestrictlyadheredto.ADM-08.02,

Rev7,"ConductofMaintenance,"

Appendix5,step5,requiredthatprocedures

bepresentduringworkandthatindividual

stepsbeinitialed

onceperformed.

Contrarytotheabove,inspection

ofworkinprogressrevealedthatindividual

stepswerenotinitialed

onceperformed

uponcompletion

forworkconducted

inaccordance

withPlantChange/Modification

11-195.RESPONSEF:1.REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wascognitive

personnel

erroronthepartofanElectrical

Department

journeyman

whofailedtoproperlydocumentthecompletion

ofstepswhileperforming

workactivities

associated

withthetripsolenoids

onthe1BEmergency

DieselGenerator

(EDG).Thestepswerenotinitialed

astheywerebeingperformed,

inaccordance

withapprovedplantprocedure.

2.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.Thestepsofthemaintenance

procedure

beingworkedweresignedoffbythejourneyman

immediately

following

thecompletion

oftheworkonAugust31,1995,andthecompleted

procedure

wasreviewedbythechiefelectrician

andElectrical

supervisor.

B.TheEDGcircuitry

wassubsequently

testedfollowing

completion

oftheworkonAugust31,1995,andperformed

satisfactorily.

12

0

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-153.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONS

A.Meetingswereheldfollowing

thiseventwithElectrical

Maintenance

employees

toreviewthisincidentandemphasize

management

expectations

regarding

thedocumentation

ofw'orkactivities.

B.Supervisors

fromeachMaintenance

discipline

haveconducted

meetingswiththeiremployees

toreinforce

theneedforstrictadherence

totheadministrative

requirements

relatedtoprocedure

use.C.Theplanthasadoptedverbatimcompliance

astheonlyacceptable

meansofprocedure

compliance.

Thisrequirement

hasbeenincorporated

intoplantQualityInstruction

QI5-PR/PSL-1,

"Preparation,

Revision,

Review/Approval

ofProcedures."

4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust31,1995withthecompletion

ofitem2Aand2Babove.13

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15VIOLATION

G:10CFR50AppendixB,Criterion

V,"Instructions,

Procedures,

andDrawings,"

requires,

inpart,thatactivities

affecting

qualityshallbeprescribed

bydocumented

procedures

ofatypeappropriate

tothecircumstances.

Contrarytotheabove,onAugust18,1995,ventingoftheLowPressureSafetyInjection

(LPSI)Systemwasconducted

inaccordance

withaprocedure

whichwasinappropriate

tothecircumstances.

Specifically,

OP1-0420060,

Rev.0,"VentingoftheEmergency

CoreCoolingandContainment

SpraySystems,"

didnotrequireaverification

thattheportionsofthesystembeingventedwerehydraulically

isolatedfromadjacentsystemsandflowpaths.

Asaresultofthisfailuretoestablish

properinitialconditions,

waterdrivenbythe1ALPSIpumpwasinadvertently

directedtotheATrainContainment

Sprayheader,resulting

inaspraydown

oftheUnit1ReactorContainment

Building.

RESPONSEG:REASONFORVIOLATION

Therootcauseofthisviolation

wasprocedural

deficiency

inthattheECCSventingprocedure,

OP1-0420060,

didnotstatetheplantconditions

requiredtosuccessfully

venttheECCSbutreliedupontheRCSheatupprocedure

tosetplantconditions.

Specifically,

theventingprocedure

didnotrequireoperators

toverifythatthepropercontainment

sprayheaderisolation

valveswereclosedpriortorecirculating

thewaterintheSDCsystem.Acontributing

factortothiseventwasthattheoperations

personnel

performing

theECCSventingprocedure

didnotrecognize

thattheexistingplantconditions

wouldresultinflowtothe'A'ontainment

sprayheaderwhenflowwasalignedthroughtheShutdownCoolingHeatExchanger.

Asecondcontributing

factorofthiseventwasthatFCV-07-1A

wasplacedintheopenpositionbecausethisvalvehadfaileditsASMEstroketimetest.Plantmanagement

madethedecisiontodeferthevalverepairandpositionthisnormallyclosedvalvetoitsengineered

safeguards

openpositioninlieuofrepairing

thevalvepriortostartup.14

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-152.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTAKENANDTHERESULTSACHIEVEDA.Operators

securedthe1ALPSIPumpandisolated,

theflowpathtothecontainment

sprayheaderfromtheLPSIPump.TheReactorCavitysumpwasdrainedtotheWasteManagement

System.B~Following

theevent,allnonessential

workatthesitewasplacedonhold,andUnit1wasmaintained

stableinMode3whileseniorplantmanagement

conducted

meetingswithallavailable

sitepersonnel

tostresstheneedforworkervigilance

andattention

todetail.Theneedtoreduceequipment

deficiencies

thatimpactoperations

wasalsodiscussed.

C.Unit1wascooleddownanddepressurized

toMode,5andaninspection

anddecontamination

ofcontainment

wasthenconducted.

Theeventwasevaluated

underanEngineering

evaluation,

whichresultedinacomprehensive

inspection

ofcomponents

insidecontainment

toensurefuturecomponent

reliability.

D.Operating

procedure,

OP1-0420060,

"VentingoftheEmergency

CoreCoolingan'dContainment

SpraySystem",wasrevisedSeptember

1,1995toincludetheplantconditions

requiredtobepresentduringventing.3.CORRECTIVE

STEPSTOAVOIDFURTHERVIOLATIONS

A.Plantpolicy105,"PlantOperation

BeyondtheEnvelopeofApprovedPlantOperating

Procedures",

wasrevisedtorequireatechnical

reviewofprocedures

whicharebeingimplemented

forthefirsttimeorforwhichplantconditions

aredifferent

fromthosedescribed

intheprocedure.

B.TheMaintenance

Department

established

ateamcomposedofplantstaffandengineering

personnel,

todetermine

therootcausefortheContainment

Sprayheaderisolation

valverepeatfailuresanddetermine

corrective

actionstoeliminate

thisoperatorworkaround.

FCV-07-1A

wasrepairedpriortoreturning

Unit1toservice.15

St.LucieUnits1and2DocketNos.50-335and50-389ReplytoNoticeofViolation

InsectionReort95-15C.Existingplantdeficiencies

werereviewedbyseniorplantmanagement.

Additional

deficiencies

whichcouldimpactoperations

wereaddedtotheworkscopeoftheUnit1shutdown.

Thesedeficiencies

werecorrected

priortoreturning

theunittoservice.D.Administrative

procedure,

AP-0010147,

"Assessment

ofAbnormalPlantConfigurations

orSignificant

MaterialDeficient

'Conditions

onPlantOperation",

wasdeveloped

toenhanceoutagescopereviewandensurethatequipment

deficiencies

arerestoredinatimelymanner.E.St.Luciemanagement

instituted

aweeklyreviewofappropriate

performance

indicators

andworkbacklogstatus,including

theageofopenitemsandoperatorworkarounds.

F.AllOperations

NuclearPlantSupervisors

(NPS)heldmeetingswiththeircrewssubsequent

tothiseventtoreiterate

FPL'sgoalforerro'rfreeperformance.

G.Thiseventwillbeincorporated

intolicensedoperatorrequalification

training.

ThisactionwillbecompletebyJanuary1,1996.4.Fullcompliance

wasachievedonAugust18,1995withthecompletion

ofitems2A,2Cand2Dabove.16