ML17263A655: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterof))RochesterGasandElectricCorporation)(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant)))DocketNo.50-244APPLICATIONFORAMENDMENTTOOPERATINGLICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulationsoftheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(the"Commission"),RochesterGasandElectricCorporation("RG&E"),holderofFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnicalSpecificationssetforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamended.ThisrequestforchangeinTechnicalSpecificationsistoincreaseallowablereactorcoolantactivitylevelstotheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationvalues(NUREG-1431).Adescriptionoftheamendmentrequest,necessarybackgroundinformation,justificationoftherequestedchange,safety'valuationandnosignificanthazardsandenvironmentalconsiderationsareprovidedinAttachmentA.Amarkedupcopyofthecurrent.GinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhichshowstherequestedchangeissetforthinAttachmentB.TheproposedrevisedTechnicalSpecificationsareprovidedinAttachmentC.ThesechangesareconsistentwithWestinghouseImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(NUREG1431)3.4.16.a,bandfigure3.4.16-1.94053iOih7940523PDRADOCK05000244.P'.,PDR  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterof))Rochester GasandElectricCorporation
)(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant)))DocketNo.50-244APPLICATION FORAMENDMENT TOOPERATING LICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulations oftheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (the"Commission"
),Rochester GasandElectricCorporation
("RG&E"),
holderofFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnical Specifications setforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamended.ThisrequestforchangeinTechnical Specifications istoincreaseallowable reactorcoolantactivitylevelstotheImprovedTechnical Specification values(NUREG-1431).
Adescription oftheamendment request,necessary background information, justification oftherequested change,safety'valuation andnosignificant hazardsandenvironmental considerations areprovidedinAttachment A.Amarkedupcopyofthecurrent.GinnaStationTechnical Specifications whichshowstherequested changeissetforthinAttachment B.TheproposedrevisedTechnical Specifications areprovidedinAttachment C.Thesechangesareconsistent withWestinghouse ImprovedTechnical Specifications (NUREG1431)3.4.16.a,b andfigure3.4.16-1.
94053iOih7 940523PDRADOCK05000244.P'.,PDR  


WHEREFORE,ApplicantrespectfullyrequeststhatAppendixAtoFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachmentC.RochesterGasandElectricCorporationByRobertC.MecredyVicePresidentGinnaNuclearProductionSubscribedandsworntobeforemeonthis23rddayofMay,1994.
WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requeststhatAppendixAtoFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachment C.Rochester GasandElectricCorporation ByRobertC.MecredyVicePresident GinnaNuclearProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis23rddayofMay,1994.
ATTACHMENTAR.E.GINNAPOWERPLANTLICENSEAMENDMENTREQUESTTECHNICALSPECIFICATION3.1.4,MAXIMUMCOOLANTACTIVITYThisattachmentprovidesadescriptionoftheamendmentrequestandnecessaryjustificationfortheproposedchanges.Theattachmentisdividedintosevensectionsasfollows.SectionAidentifiesallchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhileSectionBprovidesthebackgroundandhistoryassociatedwiththechangesbeingrequested.SectionCprovidesdetailedjustificationfortheproposedchangesincludingacomparisontoImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsasapplicable.Asafetyevaluation,significanthazardsconsiderationevaluation,andenvironmentalconsiderationoftherequestedchangesareprovidedinSectionsD,E,andF,respectively.SectionGlistsallreferencesusedinthisattachment.A.DescriptionofAmendmentRequestThisLicenseAmendmentRequest(LAR)proposestoreviseGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications3.1.4.1.a,3.1.4.1.b,figure3.1.4-1andassociatedBasesasfollows:1.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4.1.ai.Therequirementischangedto"Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed100/EpCi/gm,..."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.'6.3."2.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4.1.bi.Therequirementisrevisedto"TheI-131doseequivalentoftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed1.0pCi/gm."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."3.TechnicalSpecificationFigure3.1.4-1i.TheallowableoperationregionismodifiedconsistentwithImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(seeAttachmentsBandCforrevisedfigure).ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."B~BackgroundHistoryPriortotheJanuary25,1982,steamgeneratortuberuptureeventatGinnaStation,reactorcoolantactivitylimitswerebasedontheoriginal(1969)steamgeneratortuberuptureanalysisfortheGinnaStation.TheCommission'sreviewofthe1982tuberuptureincident resulteintherequirementforaresedsteamgeneratortuberuptureanalysis.Thestaffrequiredthatthisbecompletedwithinsixmonthsoftheplantrestart(NUREG-0916,Section9.0),andimposedreducedallowableactivitylevelsintheinterim(AmendmentNo.51toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,May22,1982).Aboundinganalysisusingthesereducedallowableactivitylevelswasperformedinordertosatisfythesixmonthrequirement,whileamoredetailedanalysissupportingthestandardtechnicalspecificationvalueswouldfollow.'hemethodologyforthisnewanalysis(WCAP-10698-P-A)wassubmittedandapprovedbytheCommissionfor'useon'estinghousePWRsprovidedfiveplantspecificinputswereverifiedtobeconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthemethodology(Referencea).RG&Ehascompletedthisverification,andthereforeintendstoupdateitsanalysisofrecordforthesteamgeneratortuberupturetoreflectuseofthisnewmethodology(UFSARSection15.6.3).ThisnewanalysissupportstheactivitylimitsproposedinthisAmendment.2.HardwareModificationsThisLARinvolvesnohardwarechangestoGinnaStation.JustificationThisproposedAmendmentimposesreactorcoolantactivitylimitsconsistentwithNUREG-1431,"WestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecifications."TheapplicabilityoftheselimitsforGinnaStationareestablishedbyaplantspecificsteamgeneratortuberuptureandradiologicalconsequencesanalysis,WCAP-11668,whichisconsistentwiththeapprovedmethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aforanalysisofsteamgeneratortuberupturetransients.AllcontingenciesforusageofWCAP-10698-P-Amethodology(Referencea)havebeensatisfiedforGinnaStationasdescribedinsectionDbelow.SafetyEvaluationPotentialenvironmentalconsequencesofasteamgeneratortuberuptureeventattheR.E.GinnanuclearpowerplanthavebeenevaluatedtoverifythattheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationlimitonprimarycoolantactivityisadequateforGinna.'Thisanalysis,WCAP-11668(attached)isconsistentwiththemethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-A.TheCommissionrequiresthatfivecontingenciesbemetinordertousethismethodology,specifically:1~Demonstrationthatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealisticandconsistentwiththoseobservedduringsimulatorexercises.2~3~AsitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequenceanalysis.Astructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filled conitions.4~Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.5.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698.CompliancewiththosecontingenciesforGinnaStationhasbeensatisfiedandisdescribedbelow.1~Demonstrationthatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealisticandconsistentwiththoseobservedduringsimulatorexercises.DuringtheweekofAugust19through23,1991,simulatorexerciseswereperformedattheGinnaStationsimulatortoverifytheassumptionsusedforbothanalysescasespresentedinWCAP-11668.Theresultsaretabulatedbelow.CASE1,INTACTSGPORVFAILSCLOSEDOPERATORACTION1.RecognizeandIsolateRupturedSG2.RecognizeandlocallyopenintactSGPORVopen3.TerminateSI4.TerminatebreakflowWCAP11668TIME(SEC)600180427983428SIMULATORTIME(SEC)4231460*19162541*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyopenedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.  
ATTACHMENT AR.E.GINNAPOWERPLANTLICENSEAMENDMENT REQUESTTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4,MAXIMUMCOOLANTACTIVITYThisattachment providesadescription oftheamendment requestandnecessary justification fortheproposedchanges.Theattachment isdividedintosevensectionsasfollows.SectionAidentifies allchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnical Specifications whileSectionBprovidesthebackground andhistoryassociated withthechangesbeingrequested.
.<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.RecognizeandLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.TerminateSI4.TerminateBreakFlowWCAP-11668TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATORTIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.ThesesimulatorexercisesdemonstratethatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668arerealisticandconservativeandthereforethiscontingencyissatisfied.ProvideasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequencesanalysis.WCAP-11668,providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiationoffsiteconsequencesanalysis,andtherefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Provideastructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filledconditions.PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowingtheJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident,amainsteamlinestructuralanalysisunderwater-filledconditionswasperformedandprovidedtotheCommission.Theacceptabilityofthisanalysisisdocumentedinthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(section6.0.Therefore,thiscontingencyismet.Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737,Supplement1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentationqualificationinformation.Acomprehensivetablelistingthecreditedequipment,itsqualification,andallotherattributeslistedinRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittalwasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"EmergencyResponseCapability,"datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore,thiscontingencyhasbeensatisfied.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698./PlantparametersforthereferenceplantusedinWCAP-10698-P-AareprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis,utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.AllGinnaspecificparametersfallwithintheboundsoftheparameterslistedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETERRCSPressure,siaPressurizerWaterVolume,ft~SGSecondaryMass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizerPressureforSI,siaPressurizerPressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure,psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698CONSERVATIVE22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aprovidesabenchmarkagainstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident,and,therefore,itsapplicabilitytoGinnaisexplicit.Therefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Basedontheabove,themethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-AcanbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668(enclosed)providestheresultsofthisapplication,anddemonstratestheacceptabilityofImprovedTechnicalSpecificationcoolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore,theproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotadverselyaffectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.
SectionCprovidesdetailedjustification fortheproposedchangesincluding acomparison toImprovedTechnical Specifications asapplicable.
E.SignificantzardsConsiderationEvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiatorsandthereforetheprobabilityofanyaccidentisnotincreased.Consequencesofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptableintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP-11668,SectionIII.2~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodificationstotheplant;therefore,nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.3~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.F.EnvironmentalConsiderationRGGEhasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstratedintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowablelimits.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR
Asafetyevaluation, significant hazardsconsideration evaluation, andenvironmental consideration oftherequested changesareprovidedinSectionsD,E,andF,respectively.
.00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.References(a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"AcceptanceforReferencingofLicensingTopicalReportWCAP-10698...",March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916,"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"EmergencyResponseCapability...",October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3",February24,1993.}}
SectionGlistsallreferences usedinthisattachment.
A.Description ofAmendment RequestThisLicenseAmendment Request(LAR)proposestoreviseGinnaStationTechnical Specifications 3.1.4.1.a, 3.1.4.1.b, figure3.1.4-1andassociated Basesasfollows:1.Technical Specification 3.1.4.1.a i.Therequirement ischangedto"Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed100/EpCi/gm,..."
ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.'6.3."
2.Technical Specification 3.1.4.1.b i.Therequirement isrevisedto"TheI-131doseequivalent oftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed1.0pCi/gm."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."3.Technical Specification Figure3.1.4-1i.Theallowable operation regionismodifiedconsistent withImprovedTechnical Specifications (seeAttachments BandCforrevisedfigure).ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."B~Background HistoryPriortotheJanuary25,1982,steamgenerator tuberuptureeventatGinnaStation,reactorcoolantactivitylimitswerebasedontheoriginal(1969)steamgenerator tuberuptureanalysisfortheGinnaStation.TheCommission's reviewofthe1982tuberuptureincident resulteintherequirement foraresedsteamgenerator tuberuptureanalysis.
Thestaffrequiredthatthisbecompleted withinsixmonthsoftheplantrestart(NUREG-0916,Section9.0),andimposedreducedallowable activitylevelsintheinterim(Amendment No.51toProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-18,May22,1982).Aboundinganalysisusingthesereducedallowable activitylevelswasperformed inordertosatisfythesixmonthrequirement, whileamoredetailedanalysissupporting thestandardtechnical specification valueswouldfollow.'he methodology forthisnewanalysis(WCAP-10698-P-A) wassubmitted andapprovedbytheCommission for'useon'estinghouse PWRsprovidedfiveplantspecificinputswereverifiedtobeconsistent withtheassumptions inthemethodology (Reference a).RG&Ehascompleted thisverification, andtherefore intendstoupdateitsanalysisofrecordforthesteamgenerator tuberupturetoreflectuseofthisnewmethodology (UFSARSection15.6.3).ThisnewanalysissupportstheactivitylimitsproposedinthisAmendment.
2.HardwareModifications ThisLARinvolvesnohardwarechangestoGinnaStation.Justification ThisproposedAmendment imposesreactorcoolantactivitylimitsconsistent withNUREG-1431, "Westinghouse StandardTechnical Specifications."
Theapplicability oftheselimitsforGinnaStationareestablished byaplantspecificsteamgenerator tuberuptureandradiological consequences
: analysis, WCAP-11668, whichisconsistent withtheapprovedmethodology ofWCAP-10698-P-A foranalysisofsteamgenerator tuberupturetransients.
Allcontingencies forusageofWCAP-10698-P-A methodology (Reference a)havebeensatisfied forGinnaStationasdescribed insectionDbelow.SafetyEvaluation Potential environmental consequences ofasteamgenerator tuberuptureeventattheR.E.Ginnanuclearpowerplanthavebeenevaluated toverifythattheImprovedTechnical Specification limitonprimarycoolantactivityisadequateforGinna.'Thisanalysis, WCAP-11668 (attached) isconsistent withthemethodology described inWCAP-10698-P-A.
TheCommission requiresthatfivecontingencies bemetinordertousethismethodology, specifically:
1~Demonstration thatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealistic andconsistent withthoseobservedduringsimulator exercises.
2~3~AsitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiological offsiteconsequence analysis.
Astructural analysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstrating adequacyunderwater-filled conitions.4~Alistofsystems,components, andinstrumentation creditedforaccidentmitigation andthespecified safetygradeforeach.5.Acomparison oftheplanttothe"bounding plant"usedinWCAP-10698.
Compliance withthosecontingencies forGinnaStationhasbeensatisfied andisdescribed below.1~Demonstration thatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealistic andconsistent withthoseobservedduringsimulator exercises.
DuringtheweekofAugust19through23,1991,simulator exercises wereperformed attheGinnaStationsimulator toverifytheassumptions usedforbothanalysescasespresented inWCAP-11668.
Theresultsaretabulated below.CASE1,INTACTSGPORVFAILSCLOSEDOPERATORACTION1.Recognize andIsolateRupturedSG2.Recognize andlocallyopenintactSGPORVopen3.Terminate SI4.Terminate breakflowWCAP11668TIME(SEC)600180427983428SIMULATOR TIME(SEC)4231460*19162541*Thesimulator exerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentified thefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyopenedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.
Thisdelayisconsistent withtheassumptions inWCAP-11668.
Simulation oftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstrated thatthesetimesareconservative.  
.<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.Recognize andLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.Terminate SI4.Terminate BreakFlowWCAP-11668 TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATOR TIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulator exerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentified thefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.
Thisdelayisconsistent withtheassumptions inWCAP-11668.
Simulation oftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstrated thatthesetimesareconservative.
Thesesimulator exercises demonstrate thatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668 arerealistic andconservative andtherefore thiscontingency issatisfied.
ProvideasitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiological offsiteconsequences analysis.
WCAP-11668, providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiation offsiteconsequences
: analysis, andtherefore, thiscontingency issatisfied.
Provideastructural analysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstrating adequacyunderwater-filled conditions.
PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowing theJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident, amainsteamlinestructural analysisunderwater-filled conditions wasperformed andprovidedtotheCommission.
Theacceptability ofthisanalysisisdocumented inthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(
section6.0.Therefore, thiscontingency ismet.Alistofsystems,components, andinstrumentation creditedforaccidentmitigation andthespecified safetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737, Supplement 1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentation qualification information.
Acomprehensive tablelistingthecreditedequipment, itsqualification, andallotherattributes listedinRegulatory Guide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",
datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittal wasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"Emergency ResponseCapability,"
datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore, thiscontingency hasbeensatisfied.
Acomparison oftheplanttothe"bounding plant"usedinWCAP-10698.
/Plantparameters forthereference plantusedinWCAP-10698-P-A areprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis, utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.
AllGinnaspecificparameters fallwithintheboundsoftheparameters listedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETER RCSPressure, siaPressurizer WaterVolume,ft~SGSecondary Mass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizer PressureforSI,siaPressurizer PressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure, psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698 BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698 CONSERVATIVE 22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668 GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodology ofWCAP-10698-P-A providesabenchmark againstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident, and,therefore, itsapplicability toGinnaisexplicit.
Therefore, thiscontingency issatisfied.
Basedontheabove,themethodology described inWCAP-10698-P-A canbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668 (enclosed) providestheresultsofthisapplication, anddemonstrates theacceptability ofImprovedTechnical Specification coolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore, theproposedamendment doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandwillnotadversely affectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.
E.Significant zardsConsideration EvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications donotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdiscussed below:Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiators andtherefore theprobability ofanyaccidentisnotincreased.
Consequences ofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptable intheenclosedanalysis, WCAP-11668, SectionIII.2~Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodifications totheplant;therefore, nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.
3~Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.
Basedupontheaboveinformation, ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications donotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentpreviously evaluated, anddoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesmeettherequirements of10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.
F.Environmental Consideration RGGEhasevaluated theproposedchangesanddetermined that:1.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdocumented inSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstrated intheenclosedanalysis, WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowable limits.Accordingly, theproposedchangesmeettheeligibility criteriaforcategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR
.00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore, pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),
anenvironmental assessment oftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.
References (a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"Acceptance forReferencing ofLicensing TopicalReportWCAP-10698...",
March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916, "SafetyEvaluation ReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"Emergency ResponseCapability...",
October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),Emergency ResponseCapability
-Conformance toRegulatory Guide1.97,revision3",February24,1993.}}

Revision as of 12:57, 29 June 2018

Application for Amend to License DPR-18,increasing Allowable Reactor Coolant Activity Levels to Improved TS (NUREG-1431)
ML17263A655
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/23/1994
From: MECREDY R C
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17263A656 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9405310167
Download: ML17263A655 (13)
v • d • e


Text

UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterof))Rochester GasandElectricCorporation

)(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant)))DocketNo.50-244APPLICATION FORAMENDMENT TOOPERATING LICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulations oftheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (the"Commission"

),Rochester GasandElectricCorporation

("RG&E"),

holderofFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnical Specifications setforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamended.ThisrequestforchangeinTechnical Specifications istoincreaseallowable reactorcoolantactivitylevelstotheImprovedTechnical Specification values(NUREG-1431).

Adescription oftheamendment request,necessary background information, justification oftherequested change,safety'valuation andnosignificant hazardsandenvironmental considerations areprovidedinAttachment A.Amarkedupcopyofthecurrent.GinnaStationTechnical Specifications whichshowstherequested changeissetforthinAttachment B.TheproposedrevisedTechnical Specifications areprovidedinAttachment C.Thesechangesareconsistent withWestinghouse ImprovedTechnical Specifications (NUREG1431)3.4.16.a,b andfigure3.4.16-1.

94053iOih7 940523PDRADOCK05000244.P'.,PDR

WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requeststhatAppendixAtoFacilityOperating LicenseNo.DPR-18beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachment C.Rochester GasandElectricCorporation ByRobertC.MecredyVicePresident GinnaNuclearProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis23rddayofMay,1994.

ATTACHMENT AR.E.GINNAPOWERPLANTLICENSEAMENDMENT REQUESTTECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.1.4,MAXIMUMCOOLANTACTIVITYThisattachment providesadescription oftheamendment requestandnecessary justification fortheproposedchanges.Theattachment isdividedintosevensectionsasfollows.SectionAidentifies allchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnical Specifications whileSectionBprovidesthebackground andhistoryassociated withthechangesbeingrequested.

SectionCprovidesdetailedjustification fortheproposedchangesincluding acomparison toImprovedTechnical Specifications asapplicable.

Asafetyevaluation, significant hazardsconsideration evaluation, andenvironmental consideration oftherequested changesareprovidedinSectionsD,E,andF,respectively.

SectionGlistsallreferences usedinthisattachment.

A.Description ofAmendment RequestThisLicenseAmendment Request(LAR)proposestoreviseGinnaStationTechnical Specifications 3.1.4.1.a, 3.1.4.1.b, figure3.1.4-1andassociated Basesasfollows:1.Technical Specification 3.1.4.1.a i.Therequirement ischangedto"Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed100/EpCi/gm,..."

ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.'6.3."

2.Technical Specification 3.1.4.1.b i.Therequirement isrevisedto"TheI-131doseequivalent oftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed1.0pCi/gm."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."3.Technical Specification Figure3.1.4-1i.Theallowable operation regionismodifiedconsistent withImprovedTechnical Specifications (seeAttachments BandCforrevisedfigure).ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferenced analysis(Reference 3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."B~Background HistoryPriortotheJanuary25,1982,steamgenerator tuberuptureeventatGinnaStation,reactorcoolantactivitylimitswerebasedontheoriginal(1969)steamgenerator tuberuptureanalysisfortheGinnaStation.TheCommission's reviewofthe1982tuberuptureincident resulteintherequirement foraresedsteamgenerator tuberuptureanalysis.

Thestaffrequiredthatthisbecompleted withinsixmonthsoftheplantrestart(NUREG-0916,Section9.0),andimposedreducedallowable activitylevelsintheinterim(Amendment No.51toProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-18,May22,1982).Aboundinganalysisusingthesereducedallowable activitylevelswasperformed inordertosatisfythesixmonthrequirement, whileamoredetailedanalysissupporting thestandardtechnical specification valueswouldfollow.'he methodology forthisnewanalysis(WCAP-10698-P-A) wassubmitted andapprovedbytheCommission for'useon'estinghouse PWRsprovidedfiveplantspecificinputswereverifiedtobeconsistent withtheassumptions inthemethodology (Reference a).RG&Ehascompleted thisverification, andtherefore intendstoupdateitsanalysisofrecordforthesteamgenerator tuberupturetoreflectuseofthisnewmethodology (UFSARSection15.6.3).ThisnewanalysissupportstheactivitylimitsproposedinthisAmendment.

2.HardwareModifications ThisLARinvolvesnohardwarechangestoGinnaStation.Justification ThisproposedAmendment imposesreactorcoolantactivitylimitsconsistent withNUREG-1431, "Westinghouse StandardTechnical Specifications."

Theapplicability oftheselimitsforGinnaStationareestablished byaplantspecificsteamgenerator tuberuptureandradiological consequences

analysis, WCAP-11668, whichisconsistent withtheapprovedmethodology ofWCAP-10698-P-A foranalysisofsteamgenerator tuberupturetransients.

Allcontingencies forusageofWCAP-10698-P-A methodology (Reference a)havebeensatisfied forGinnaStationasdescribed insectionDbelow.SafetyEvaluation Potential environmental consequences ofasteamgenerator tuberuptureeventattheR.E.Ginnanuclearpowerplanthavebeenevaluated toverifythattheImprovedTechnical Specification limitonprimarycoolantactivityisadequateforGinna.'Thisanalysis, WCAP-11668 (attached) isconsistent withthemethodology described inWCAP-10698-P-A.

TheCommission requiresthatfivecontingencies bemetinordertousethismethodology, specifically:

1~Demonstration thatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealistic andconsistent withthoseobservedduringsimulator exercises.

2~3~AsitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiological offsiteconsequence analysis.

Astructural analysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstrating adequacyunderwater-filled conitions.4~Alistofsystems,components, andinstrumentation creditedforaccidentmitigation andthespecified safetygradeforeach.5.Acomparison oftheplanttothe"bounding plant"usedinWCAP-10698.

Compliance withthosecontingencies forGinnaStationhasbeensatisfied andisdescribed below.1~Demonstration thatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealistic andconsistent withthoseobservedduringsimulator exercises.

DuringtheweekofAugust19through23,1991,simulator exercises wereperformed attheGinnaStationsimulator toverifytheassumptions usedforbothanalysescasespresented inWCAP-11668.

Theresultsaretabulated below.CASE1,INTACTSGPORVFAILSCLOSEDOPERATORACTION1.Recognize andIsolateRupturedSG2.Recognize andlocallyopenintactSGPORVopen3.Terminate SI4.Terminate breakflowWCAP11668TIME(SEC)600180427983428SIMULATOR TIME(SEC)4231460*19162541*Thesimulator exerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentified thefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyopenedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.

Thisdelayisconsistent withtheassumptions inWCAP-11668.

Simulation oftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstrated thatthesetimesareconservative.

.<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.Recognize andLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.Terminate SI4.Terminate BreakFlowWCAP-11668 TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATOR TIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulator exerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentified thefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.

Thisdelayisconsistent withtheassumptions inWCAP-11668.

Simulation oftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstrated thatthesetimesareconservative.

Thesesimulator exercises demonstrate thatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668 arerealistic andconservative andtherefore thiscontingency issatisfied.

ProvideasitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiological offsiteconsequences analysis.

WCAP-11668, providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGenerator TubeRuptureradiation offsiteconsequences

analysis, andtherefore, thiscontingency issatisfied.

Provideastructural analysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstrating adequacyunderwater-filled conditions.

PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowing theJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident, amainsteamlinestructural analysisunderwater-filled conditions wasperformed andprovidedtotheCommission.

Theacceptability ofthisanalysisisdocumented inthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(

section6.0.Therefore, thiscontingency ismet.Alistofsystems,components, andinstrumentation creditedforaccidentmitigation andthespecified safetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737, Supplement 1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentation qualification information.

Acomprehensive tablelistingthecreditedequipment, itsqualification, andallotherattributes listedinRegulatory Guide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",

datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittal wasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"Emergency ResponseCapability,"

datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore, thiscontingency hasbeensatisfied.

Acomparison oftheplanttothe"bounding plant"usedinWCAP-10698.

/Plantparameters forthereference plantusedinWCAP-10698-P-A areprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis, utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.

AllGinnaspecificparameters fallwithintheboundsoftheparameters listedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETER RCSPressure, siaPressurizer WaterVolume,ft~SGSecondary Mass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizer PressureforSI,siaPressurizer PressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure, psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698 BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698 CONSERVATIVE 22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668 GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodology ofWCAP-10698-P-A providesabenchmark againstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident, and,therefore, itsapplicability toGinnaisexplicit.

Therefore, thiscontingency issatisfied.

Basedontheabove,themethodology described inWCAP-10698-P-A canbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668 (enclosed) providestheresultsofthisapplication, anddemonstrates theacceptability ofImprovedTechnical Specification coolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore, theproposedamendment doesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestionandwillnotadversely affectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.

E.Significant zardsConsideration EvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications donotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdiscussed below:Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiators andtherefore theprobability ofanyaccidentisnotincreased.

Consequences ofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptable intheenclosedanalysis, WCAP-11668, SectionIII.2~Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodifications totheplant;therefore, nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.

3~Operation ofGinnaStationinaccordance withtheproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.

Basedupontheaboveinformation, ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnical Specifications donotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, doesnotcreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentpreviously evaluated, anddoesnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Therefore, itisconcluded thattheproposedchangesmeettherequirements of10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.

F.Environmental Consideration RGGEhasevaluated theproposedchangesanddetermined that:1.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration asdocumented inSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant changeinthetypesorsignificant increaseintheamountsofanyeffluents thatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstrated intheenclosedanalysis, WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificant increaseinindividual orcumulative occupational radiation exposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowable limits.Accordingly, theproposedchangesmeettheeligibility criteriaforcategorical exclusion setforthin10CFR

.00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore, pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),

anenvironmental assessment oftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.

References (a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"Acceptance forReferencing ofLicensing TopicalReportWCAP-10698...",

March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916, "SafetyEvaluation ReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"Emergency ResponseCapability...",

October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),Emergency ResponseCapability

-Conformance toRegulatory Guide1.97,revision3",February24,1993.

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML17263A655&oldid=742929"