ML17301A108

Application for Amend to License NPF-16,revising Tech Specs to Reflect Changes Required to Commence Cycle 2 Operation. Affidavit,Reload Safety Evaluation Summary & Reload Safety Rept Encl.App I to Rept Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)

ML17301A108
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/04/1984
From:	WILLIAMS J W FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	EISENHUT D G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17215A430	List: ML17215A429 ML17215A431 ML17301A108
References
L-84-148, NUDOCS 8406110288
Download: ML17301A108 (40)

Text

REGULATOINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR)8406110288 OUTDATE'4/06/04 NOTARIZED:

YES'ACILs50389St,LuciePlant~Unit2<FloridaPower8LightCo.AUTH,NAME AUTHORAFFILIATION WILLIAMS~

J>>H,FloridaPower8LightCo,RECIP~NAME-RKCIPIKNTAFFILIATION EISENHUT~D>>G

~DivisionofLicensing DOCKET05000389

SUBJECT:

Application foramendtoLicenseNPF16grevising TechSpecstoreflectchangesrequiredtocommenceCycle-2operations~

Affidavitrreload safetyevaluation summay8"ReloadSafetyRept"encl,AppItoreptwithheld(ref10CFR2"790)~'I'STRIBUTION CODEIK26SCOPIESRECEIVEDLTR,~ENCLSIZE~"Q"Q,2~i4SO~~TITLE:Start~UpReport/Refueling Report(50Dkt)NOTBSPBO(CL<<kRECIPIKNTCOPIKSIDCODE/NAME L.TTRENCLNRRORB3BC+gy3INTERNAL!

IEFILE~)'$1NRR/DHFSOIR~g11NRR/OSI/CPB@'Q11"NIZRNAL:

ACRS+/35.NRCPOR02114Q~Ct>>SgfGai$lWaLcpoil'4L>>>>>>t byPNRECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME LPDRNSIC0305NRR/DHFSOEPYJgl7'RR/DHFS/PSRB+9 RM/DOAMI/MIB QCOPIESLTTRENCL111111Qh)o<PS.>>P0~IyTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED; LTTR18ENCL18 I~IIIII'<<fIl<<IIlhN>>'IIINX<<<<'I4<<f<<y.jK<<I,llIN1ItII<<<<N<<f9Q<<'<<<<)llrl'INf-.<<<<IIIi;r>Nr,h.NN<<N1'<<INIIJII<<IIh<<'I)ari<<I<<r)IIf<<N;<<<<<)*<<l<<III'4II<<,~h'I<<"fI<<N<<1IhlI<<NNII<<<<II<<"A<<XhJNIClh<<

.BOXI4000,JUNOBEACH,FL33408~glib'LORIDA POWER&LIGHTCOMPANYJune4,1984L-84-148OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation Attention:

Mr.DarrellG.Eisenhut, DirectorDivisionofLicensing U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555

DearMr.Eisenhut:

Re:St.LucieUnitNo.2DocketNo.50-389ProposedLicenseAmendment

~C*I2RI2lnaccordance withIOCFR50.90,FloridaPower&LightCompanysubmitsherewiththreesignedoriginals andfortycopiesofarequesttoamendAppendixAofFacilityOperating LicenseNPF-I6.Thisamendment issubmitted toreflectchangesrequiredtocommenceoperation ofCycle2,whichiscurrently scheduled forNovember25,l984.Therefore, NRCapprovalisrequested onorbeforeNovember25,l984.Theproposedchangesaresummarized intheattachedSt.LucieUnit2Cycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluation Summary,andareshownontheaccompanying marked-up Technical Specification pages.AdetailedReloadSafetyReportisattached.

.<NAOPJOOOIeoI',2IKNoOQ2rig'Cf,'O.'OARL,fLItshouldbenotedthattheproposedchangespermitoperation ofSt.LucieUnit2Cycle2atthelicensedpowerlevelof2560MWt.However,theanalysesincorporate andboundoperation forcorepowerlevelsupto2700MWt.Authorization foroperation upto2700MWt.willberequested inafuturelicenseamendment application.

Inaccordance withIOCFR50.9I(a)(l),

ithasbeendetermined thattheproposedamendment doesnotinvolveanysignificant hazardsconsiderations pursuanttoIOCFR50.92.TheNoSignificant HazardsConsiderations determination is=-attached.

fnaccordance withIOCFR50.9I(b)(l),

acopyoftheproposedamendment isbeingforwarded totheStateDesigneefortheStateofFlorida.gyesp22I2gg(8.yI(Sp~(PEOPLE...

SERVINGPEOPLE Al

-'Page2.OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation Mr.DarrellG.Eisenhut, DirectorDivisionofLicensing AppendixItotheattached'ReloadSafetyEvaluation Reportisproprietary information, andtherefore, exemptfrompublicdisclosure inaccordance withIOCFR2.790.Theproposedamendment hasbeenreviewedbytheSt.LucieFacilityReviewGroupandtheFloridaPower&LightCompanyNuclearReviewBoard.Theproposedamendment hasbeendetermined tobeaClassIVamendment.

Acheckfor$I2,300.00 is-attached inaccordance withIOCFRl70.22.Verytrulyyours,J.W.Williams, Jr.GroupVicePresident

• NuclearEnergy,JWW/RJS/dbAttachment cc:J.P.O'ReillyRegionalAdministrator, RegionIIU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission IOIMariettaStreet,N.W.,Suite2900Atlanta,GA30303LyleJerrett,Ph.D.,DirectorOfficeofRadiation ControlDept.Health8Rehabilitative ServicesI3I7WinewoodBoulevard Tallahassee, FL3230I AFFIDAYIT PURSUANTTO10CFR2.790Combustion Engineering, Inc.StateofConnecticut CountyofHartfordI,A.E.Scherer,deposeandsaythatIamtheDirector, NuclearLicensing, ofCombustion Engineering, Inc.,dulyauthorized tomakethisaffidavit, andhavereviewedorcausedtohavereviewedtheinformation whichisidentified asproprietary andreferenced intheparagraph immediately below.Iamsubmitting thisaffidavit inconformance withtheprovisions of10CFR2.790oftheCommission's regulations andinconjunction withtheapplication ofFlorida=-

PowerandLightCompanyforwithholding thisinformation.

Theinformation forwhichproprietary treatment issoughtiscontained inthefollowing document:

Statistical Combination ofUncertainties

-FPP~LUnit2,Cycle2ReloadReportAppendixI.rThisdocumenthasbeenappropriately designated asproprietary.

Ihavepersonalknowledge ofthecriteriaandprocedures utilizedbyCombustion Engineering indesignating information asatradesecret,privileged orasconfidential commercial orfinancial information.*

~Pursuanttotheprovisions ofparagraph (b)(4)ofSection2.790oftheCommission's regulations, thefollowing isfurnished forconsideration bytheCommission indetermining whethertheinformation soughttobewithheldfrompublicdisclosure, includedintheabovereferenced

document, shouldbewithheld.

1.Theinformation soughttobewithheldfrompublicdisclosure arethemethodology relatedtothedetermination oftheprobability distributions forspecificuncertainties andthecombination ofuncertainties tobeusedindetermining plantsetpoints andrelatedtechnical.

specifications, whichisownedandhasbeenheldinconfidence byCombustion Engineering.

2.Theinformation consistsoftestdataorothersimilardataconcerning aprocess,methodorcomponent, theapplication ofwhichresultsinasubstantial competitive advantage toCombustion Engineering.

3.The.information isofatypecustomarily heldinconfidence byCombustion Engineering andnotcustomarily disclosed tothepublic.Combustion Engineering hasarationalbasisfordetermining thetypesofinformation customarily heldinconfidence byitand,inthatconnection, utilizesasystemtodetermine whenandwhethertoholdcertaintypesofinformation inconfidence.

Thedetailsoftheaforementioned systemwereprovidedtotheNuclearRegulatory Commission vialetterOP-537fromF.H.SterntoFrankSchroeder datedDecember2,1974.Thissystemwasappliedindetermining thatthesubjectdocumenthereinareproprietary.

4.Theinformation isbeingtransmitted totheCommission inconfidence

,undertheprovisions of10CFR2.790withtheunderstanding thatitistobereceivedinconfidence bytheCommission.

5.Theinformation, tothebestofmyknowledge andbelief,isnotavailable

.inpublicsources,andanydisclosure tothirdpartieshasbeenmadepursuanttoregulatory provisions orproprietary agreements whichprovideformaintenance oftheinformation inconfidence.

6.Publicdisclosure oftheinformation islikelytocausesubstantial harmtothecompetitive positionofCombustion Engineering because:

a.Asimilarproductismanufactured andsoldbymajorpressurized waterreactorcompetitors ofCombustion Engineering.

b.Development ofthisinformation byC-Erequiredtensofthousands ofman-hours andhundredsofthousands ofdollars.Tothebestofmyknowledge andbeliefacompetitor wouldhavetoundergosimilarexpenseingenerating equivalentinformation.

c.Inordertoacquiresuchinformation, acompetitor wouldalsorequireconsiderable timeandinconvenience relatedtothedevelopment ofmethodstostatistically combineuncertainties anddetermine uncertainty probability distributions forspecificuncertainties.

d.Theinformation requiredsignificant effortandexpensetoobtainthelicensing approvals necessary forapplication oftheinformation.

Avoidance ofthisexpensewoulddecreaseacompetitor's costinapplyingtheinformation andnarketing theproducttowhichtheinformation isapplicable.

e.Theinformation consi'sts ofmethodsandstatistical modelsusedtocombineuncertainties andtheresultant netuncertainty tobeappliedindetermining plantsetpoints andtechnical specifications, theapplication ofwhichprovidesacompetitive economicadvantage.

Theavailability ofsuchinformation tocompetitors wouldenablethemtomodifytheirproducttobettercompetewithCombustion Engineering, takemarketing orotheractionstoimprovetheirproduct'spositionorimpairthepositionofCombustion Engineering

'sproduct,andavoiddeveloping similardataandanalysesin"supportoftheirprocesses, methodsorapparatus.

f.InpricingCombustion Engineering

'sproductsandservices, significant

research, development, engineering, analytical, manufacturing, licensing, qualityassurance andothercostsandexpensesmustbeincluded.

TheabilityofCombustion Engineering

'scompetitors toutilizesuchinformation withoutsimilarexpenditure ofresources mayenablethemtosellatpricesreflecting significantly lowercosts.g.-Useoftheinformation bycompetitors intheinternational marketplace wouldincreasetheirabilitytomarketnuclearsteamsupplysystemsbyreducingthecostsassociated withtheirtechnology development.

Inaddition, disclosure wouldhaveanadverseeconomicimpactonCombustion Engineering's potential forobtaining ormaintaining foreignlicensees.

Furtherthedeponentsayethnot.A.E.chererDirectorNuclearLicensing Sworn.tobeforemeet%this/odayofMayd'aryPublic~;DTA'i'S~il1II;YOTAB'i'.UDLIC STATF.OFCO'HiiP:T(C!3":

<>'.c.u~i42'COiMMiSilON E)li')RES i'3,'(RCh Jl,19'9 STATEOFFLORIDACOUNTYOFDADEJ.W.Willians,Jr.,beingdulysworn,deposesandsays:ThatheisaGroupVicePresident ofFloridaPower5LightCompany,theLicenseeherein;Thathehasexecutedtheforegoing document; thatthestatements madeinthisdocumentaretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information, andbelief,andthatheisauthorized toexecutethedocumentonbehalfofsaidLicensee.

AppendixtotheReoaSafetyReportisproprietary, andtherefore, exemptfrompublicdisclosure inaccordance withSection'2.790 oftheNRC"RulesofPractice",

Title10,CodeofFederalRegulations.

J.W.Willians,Jr.Subscribed andsworntobeforemethis4~~deyofc/one,19SANOTARYPUB4C,inandforthCountyofDade,StatesofFlorida.hNycommission expiresc/w/ZPAS

~'rlw St.LucieUnit2Cycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluation SummarThisreportprovidesasafetyevaluation fortheoperation ofSt.LucieUnit2Cycle2at2560MWt.Technical Specifi-cationchangesarer'equired toenableoperation with18monthcyclesandlow,leakage fuelmanagement configurations.

Thereportprovidesthenecessary analysistosupporttheseTechnical Specification changes.Theanalysisincorporates achangetotheCEA(controlelementassembly) configuration toobtaingreaterflexibility inoperational controlandareduction intheminimumrequiredreactorcoolant(RCS)flowtogainsufficient marginbetweenmeasurable flowandrequiredflow.Inaddition, theanalysisincorporates andboundsoperation withacorepowerlevelofupto2700MWt(although arequesttoincreasetheratedcorepowerto2700MWtisnotincluded).

Therequiredanalysisfor2700MWtalsoincludesarecalculation ofcontainment pressureandtemperature duringtransients.

Arequestforauthorization foroperation upto2700MWtwillbesubmitted inafuturelicenseamendment application.

Thesafetyevaluation makesuseoftheStatistical Combinat'ion ofUncertainties (SCU)methodology intheanalysistoprovideforamorerealistic assessment ofsysteminstrumentation uncertainties, systemprocessing uncertainties, manufacturing tolerances andmodelinguncertainties.

Thismethodology togetherwithseveralpropose'd Technical Specification changes,whicharemorerestrictive thanCycle1,providetheextramargintoaccommodate moreeconomical fuelmanagement designs,areducedrequiredminimumRCSflow,andacorepowerlevelofupto2700MWtwithoutasignificant increaseintheconsequences ofpotential accidents oranyreduction insafetymargin(i.e.,allrequiredsafetycriteriaaremet).Thesafetyevaluation generally followstheNRCStandardReviewPlan(SRP)guidelines intheperformance ofthesafetyanalyses, withanydeviations sufficiently justified.

Theanalysesdonotemployanyneworunreviewed methodology (theSCUmethodology waspreviously usedandNRCapprovedforSt.LucieUnit1,CalvertCliffsUnit2andArkansasNuclearOneUnit2).TheproposedTechnical Specification changesaresummarized intheattachedtable.TheseproposedTechnical Specification changesandthesupporting safetyevaluation hasbeenreviewedbytheSt.LucieFacilityReviewGroupandtheFloridaPowerEr,LightCompanyNuclearReviewBoardandfoundtobenecessary andmeetalltherequiredsafetycriteria.

"..8406110288 t<0 Page1TABLE4-1STLUCIEUlfIT2TEHPiICAL SPECIFICATIOH ANDBASESCHAHGESScification ActionRemarks2-12.1.1.2Changepeaklinearheattocenterline meltlimitfrom21.0kw/ftto22.0kw/ftPeaklinearheattocenterline meltlimitisraisedtothecalculated limitforCycle2,asdescribed inSection2.2.**2-3Figure2.1-1Replacethisfigurewithrevisedfigure.Thermallimitlinesarebeingchangedtoreflectanalysisat2700MWT,Technical Specification radialpeakingfactorsandtheimplementation ofmarginrecoveryprograms.

2-4Table2.2-1TheContainment Pressure-HighTrip:Allowable valueisbeingreducedfrom5.0psigto4.1psig.Thischangeisbeingmadesothatthetripsetpointisconsistent withtheassumptions madetothecontainment pressureHigh-HightripsetpointintheLOCAcontainment pressureandthepre-tripsteamlineinsidecontainment

analyses, Section3.3.4.2-5Table2.2-1Changedesignreactorcoolantflowfrom370,000gpmto363,000gpmonFootnote(*).Allanalysessensitive tominimumflowrequirements wereperformed assuminga363,000gpmminimumguaranteed flowrate.2"9Figure2.2-3Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.TheTM/LPLSSSisbeingchangedtoreflectanalysisat2700MWT,Technical Specification radialpeakingfactors,andtheimplementation ofmarginrecovery'rograms.

2-10Figure2.2-4Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.~Referstosectionscontained inReloadSafetyReport.TheTM/LPLSSSisbeingchangedtoreflectanalysisat2700MWT,Technical Specification radialpeakingfactors,andtheimplementation ofmarginrecoveryprograms.

Page2of7Scification ActionRemarksB2-1B2.1.1ChangeminimumDNBRlimitfrom"1.20"toread"anacceptable limit".ThevalueofDNBR,whichcorresponds tothe95/95criteria, changesslightlyfromcycletocycleduetotheapplication ofstatistical uncertainty analysis; specificvaluesoftheDNBRlimitarebeingdeletedtoavoidthenecessity ofcycle-by-cycle Tech.Spec.Revisions.

B2-1B2-4B2.1.1B2.2.1Changestatement onDNBRfrom"1.20"to"theacceptable minimumDNBRlimit".ThevalueofDNBR,whichcorresponds tothe95/95criteria, changesslightlyfromcycletocycleduetotheapplication ofstatistical uncertainty analysis; specificvaluesoftheDNBRlimitarebeingdeletedtoavoidthenecessity ofcycle-by-cycle Tech.Spec.revisions.

B2-23/41-3FigureB2.1-13/4.1.1.2.

Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.fChangeshutdownmarginforMode5from2.0%deltak/kto3.0%deltak/k.Figureisbeingchangedtoreflecthigherradialpeaking.Theshutdownmarginisbeingincreased toreflecttheassumptions usedintheborondilutionevent,Section3.2.4.4.3/41"83.1.2.23/41-103.1.2.43/41-123.1.2.6Changeshutdownmarginfrom2.0%deltak/kto3.0%deltak/k.Tobeconsistent withTechnical Specification 3/4.1.1.2.

3/41-143.1.2.8Changeshutdownmarginat200'rom2.0%deltak/kto3.0%deltak/k.Tobeconsistent withTechnical Specification 3/4.1.1.2.

Page38'cificationReaarks3/41-183.1.3.13/41-193/41-19aReducenumberofCEAregulating DuetochangeinnumberofCEAgroupsfrom6to5inItemsb;2regulating banks.andh.oftheActionStatement.

RewordItemd.toreflectuseoffigureshowingdroppedCEArecoverytimevs.measuredPr.TRemoveFootnote(N)whichshowedthetimeconstraints onasingleCEAdrop.Thisisnowcontained inItemd.whichincludesafigureshowingdroppedCEArecoverytimevs.measuredFr.Changetoreflecthigherradialpeaksusedinanalysistosupportincreased droppedCEArecoverytimeflexibility.

Resequence Itemse.throughg.toreflectadditionofnewIteme.3/41-243.1.3.4ChangeCEAdroptimefrom3.0secondsto2.7seconds.Thisreducedtimeisconsistent withplantmeasurements.

3/41-28Figure3.1-2Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.ThePDILisbeingchangedtoaccommodate thenewCEArodpattern.3/42-4Pigure3.2-2Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.LHREx-coreLCOisbeingrevisedtoreflectanalysisat2700MMt,Technical Specification radialpeakingfactors,andtheimplementation ofmarginrecoveryprograms.

3/42-5Figure3.2-3Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.Allowable combinations ofthermalpowerandPrfFxyTarebeingrevisedtoreflectanalysisat2700MWtandtheimplementation

.ofmarginrecoveryprograms.

Page3/42-73/42;93.323.2.3ActionChangetheFTxlimitfrom1.60to.75.ChangetheFrlimitfrom1.60to1.70.RemarksThevalueforFxyTlimitisraisedtoreflectthevalueusedinthesafetyanalysis.

ThevalueforFrTlimitisraisedtoreflectthevalueusedinthesafetyanalysis.

3/42-93/42-114.2.3.2Table3.2-1Deleteallreferences torodbowpenalty.Rodbowpenalties havebeenaccommodated intherevisedDNBRlimitof1.28.3/42-12Figure3.2-4Replacefigurewithrevisedfigure.TheDNB-LCOisbeingchangedtoreflectanalysisat2700MWt,ReactorCoolantFlowof363,000gpm,Technical Specification radialpeakingfactors,andtheimplementation ofmarginrecoveryprograms.

3/42-15Table3.2-2Increaseupperboundofcoldlegtemperature from548'Fto549"F.Upperboundcoldlegtemperature changereflectssafetyanalysisassumptions performed forCycle2.Decreasereactorcoolantflowratefrom370,000gpmto363,000gpm.Allanalysessensitive tominimumflowrequirements wereperformed assuminga363,000gpmminimumguaranteed flowrate.3/43-6Table3.3-2ChangeContainment Pressure-Highresponsetimefrom1.55secondsto1.15seconds.Thisreducedtimeisconsistent withplantmeasurements.

3/43-17Table3.3-4Changedcontainment sprayonContainment PressureHigh-HighTripSetpointfrom9.30psigto5.40peigandtheallowable valuefrom9.40psigto5.50psig.Thischangewasmadetobeconsistent withassumptions inthecontainment pressureanalysis.

ChangetheContainment PressureHighTripSetpointfrom5.0psigto4.7psigandtheallowable valuefrom5.10psig.to4.80psig.Thischangewasnecessary becauseofthechangemadetotheContainment PressureHigh-HighTripSetPoint.

Pageof7ScificationActionRemarks3/43-20Table3.3-5ChangeFeedwater Isolation ResponseTimefrom<5.35/5.35 to<5.15/5.15 forbothContainment Pressure-HighandSteamGenerator Pressure-Low.Thischangeisbeingmadetoincorporate thespecified valveclosingtimeandtoeliminate the0.25secondadditional conservatism thatwasassumedinCyclel.3/44-93.4.3Changeminimumandmaximumpressurizer indicated levelfrom65%to68.0%.Thischangeisbeingmadetobeconsistent withanewpressurizer levelprogramandassumptions madeintheexcesschargingevent,Section3.2.5.1.3/47-13/47-23/47-33/4.7.1Table3.7-1Table3.7-2Replacethesepageswithrevisedpages.Changesmadetoallowable powervaluesreflectanalysisat2700MWt.Formatofspecification hasbeenchangedtoimproveclarity.3/77-103.7.1.6Changefullclosuretimesof5.6'secondsand5.35secondsbothto5.15seconds.Thesechangesreflectappropriate closuretimesforthemainfeedwater isolation valve(5.15secondswasassumedinpeakcontainment pressureanalysis.)

B3/41-1B3/4.1.1.1 B3/4.1.1.2 B3/41-2B3/4.1.2ChangetherequiredshutdownmarginwithTavg<200'rom2.0%deltak/kto3.0%deltak/k.Theshutdownmarginisbeingincreased toreflecttheassumptions usedintheborondilutionevent,Section3.2.4.4.

Page7ChanHo.PacaeScification ActionRemarksB3/41-4B3/4.1.3Removewordingindicating atChangewording,sincepowerlevelsatwhatpowerlevelsaDNBRSAFDLwhichaDNBRSAFDLviolation mayoccurviolation couldoccur,andcouldvaryslightlyfromcycletocycle.clarifythewordingonhowthispotential violation iseliminated.

Increasesteady-state radialpeakfromFrT~1.60toFTr170B3/41-4B3/4.1.3Changeactualradialpeakforadditional marginfromTr1.50toFrT<1~70'hesechangesreflecttheassumptions utilizedinthesingledropCEAanalysisfoundinSection3.2.4.3.ChangeItem5froma30minutemisalignment timeforanFT<1.50Tto60minutesforanFTr<1.55.B3/42-2B3/42-3B3/42-2B3/4.2.2, B3/4.2.36B3/4.2.4TableB3/4.2-1B3/42'Deletelastparagraph whichdiscusses rodbowpenalties, anddeletetableonrodbowpenalties.

Change"minimumDNBRlimitof>1.20"to"anacceptable minimumDNBR".Rodbowpenalties havebeenaccommodated inrevisedDNBlimitof1.28.ThevalueofDNBR,whichcorresponds tothe95/95criteria, changesslightlyfromcycletocycleduetotheapplication ofstatistical uncertainty analysis; specificvaluesoftheDNBRlimitarebeingdeletedtoavoidthenecessity ofcycle-by-cycle Tech.Spec.revisions.

PageChaneHo.PacaeScificationActionRemarksB3/47-1B3/4.7.1.1 Replacepagewithrevisedpage.Changesmadetoallowable powervaluesreflectanalysisat2700MWt.Formatofspecification hasbeenchargedtoimprove-clarity.5-35.3.1Change"...236fuelrodsclad..."to"...236fuelandpoisonrodlocations.

Allfuelandpoisonrodsareclad..."Thisnewstatement isappropriate ifassemblies withpoisonrodsareloadedintothecore.Cycle2willcontainsuchassemblies.

Change"...amaximumtotalweightof1698.5gramsuranium"to"...approximately 1700gramsuranium".

Theweightof1698.5gramsisaCycle1maximumweight.Bywordingitapproximately 1700grams,variations inloadingwei.ghtscanbetolerated.

5-15.2.1Changecontainment netfreevolumefrom2.5x10ftto2.506x10ftChangeinthisvaluerepresents amoredetailedanalysisofthecontainment netfreevolume.5-35.3.2Increasethenumberoffull-lengthcontrolelementassemblies (CEAs)from83to91;EightfulllengthCEAsarebeingaddedintovacantpartlengthCEAlocations.

0 NOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATIONS ST.LUCIE2CYCLE2OPERATION AT2560MWZHDOCKET:50-389LICENSE:NPF-16MAY1984 Page1INTRODUCTION Therequested amendment totheSt.LucieUnit2operating licenseisbeingsubmitted insupportoftheupcomingCycle2corereload.Thereepested amendnent willincorporate technical specification changesasdiscussed intheevaluation.

Thereloadwillinvolvereplacing approximately one-third ofthereactorcoreandadditional newControlElement.Assemblies willbeinstalled inexisting=equipped locations.

TheRegionDfreshfuelassemblies tobeusedinthisreloadarenotsignificantly different fromthosepreviously foundacceptable totheNRCforSt.LucieUnit2Cycle1.Theanalytical methodsusedtodeaanstrate conformance withthetechnical specifications andregulations havebeenpreviously approved"by theNRCstaff.Inaddition, theproposedtechnical specification.

changesdonotchangetheapplicable acceptance criteriapreviously approvedbytheNRCStaff.Theevaluation performed insuppor'tofthisamendment hasdetermined that,whenmeasuredagainstthestandards in10CFR50.92, nosignificant hazardsconsideration exists.Itisalsoconcluded thatthisamendmntinvolvesnounreviewed safetyquestions per10CFR50.59.

T1".CHNICAL SUMKQKTheSt.,-Lucie Unit2nuclearpcwerplantispresently licensedtooperateataratedthermalpcwerof2560Mwthwithaphysicalconfiguration asdefinedanddescribed bytheFSAR.Thisreloadinvolvesrenovingdepletedfuelassemblies fromapproximately one-thirdofthenuclearcoreandreplacing themwithfreshfuelofasimilartypeaspreviously loaded.Themagnumnominalenrichment oftheRegionDfreshfuelwillbe3.65weightpercenturanium-235asconlpared toanominalmaximunenrichment inCycle1of2e73w/o.Thefreshfuelassemblies willalsoincorporate minor.dinensional changesasaresultofdesign.changesrecognized asdesirable atotherC-Eplants.-,

Thesechangescreatealargerspacebetweenthetopofeachfuelrod.andthefuelupperendfittingflowplatethusall(winggreater.spaceforfuelrodexpansion.

The,fuelassemblyguidetubeswillbechangedfrancoldworkedzircaloy,to annealedzircaloywhichwillresultina1cwergrowthrateofthe-fuelassembly.

Theincreaseinenrichment isincorporated intheRegionDfuelassemblies toprovideforanextendedfuelcyclelength.,Therehasbeennochangetothe,fueldesignbasesandassuchthenewfuel"continues tosatisfyGeneralDesignCriteria10andllandotherdesignbasesconsidered intheStaffreviewofthefuelforCycle1.

Page2BASISFORPROPOSEDNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Anevaluation ofthisrequestforamendment hasbeenperforrred todenanstrate thatnosignificant hazardsconsideration exists,baseduponacanparison withthecriteriaof10CFR50.92(c).

Therequested technical specification changeshavebeencategorized intoseveralsubheadings forthepurposesofthisevaluation.

A.MANGESTOKk'ETYLIMITSRefinemntsincalculational techniques haveledtothefollcwing twoproposedchanges.1.Theminimum'valueoftheDNBRduringsteady-state operation, normaloperational transients andanticipated transients isincreased from1.20to1.28.2.Thealliablelimitonpeaklinearheatrateofthefuel.isincreased frcm21kw/ftto22kw/ft.Therehasbeennochangetothecriteriausedtoestablish thesesafetylimits.TheproposedM3Rvaluestillprovidesatleasta95%probability ata95%confidence levelthatDeparture freeNucleateBoiling(DNB)doesnotoccuronafuelrodhavingthatminimumDNBRduringsteadystateoperation orduringanticipated operational occurrences.

Theevaluation of'thevariousfactorsassociated withDNBwillnowbebasedontheStatistical Combination ofUncertainties (SCU)methodology (Appendix IoftheReloadSafetyReport).Thisrrethodology alsoincorporates adjustments forrodbowdirectlyintheE5Blimit,whereasinthereference cycle(Cycle1)rodbowwasacccunted forexplicitly inthenanitoring oftheradialpeakingfactor.TheSCUmethodology isdescribed inC-EreportCEN-123(F)-P, andhasbeenpreviously reviewedandapprovedbytheNRC.Application ofthetechniques totheplantspecificparamtersofSt.LucieUnit2isdescribed intheaccompanying ReloadSafetyReport.Theproposednewvalueforpeaklinearheatrateisstillavaluecorresponding tocenterline fuelmeltasdetermined bythefuelevaluation model,FATED'.Thepcver-to-centerline meltlimitforCycle2takescreditfordecreased pcwerpeakingwhichischaracteristic ofhighlyburnedfuel.Also,sinceadecreaseinfuelmeltterrperature accompanies burnup,thermstlimitingpcver-to-centerline melthasbeenfoundtooccuratanintermdiateburnuprange.Usingconservative estimates oftheburnuppointatwhichthepoorerpeakingbeginstodecreaseandtherateatwhichitdecreases forCycle2,thermstlimitingpower-to-centerline melthasbeendetermined tobeinexcessof22kw/ft.

Page3Theserevisedsafetylimitshavebeenfactoredintothesafetyanalysesperformed forthisreloadapplication andallresultsarewithinprevicvsly established criteriaanddesignbasis;hence,noreduction insafetymarginhasresultedfromthesechanges.Thesetechnical specifications provideanumerical valuewithwhichtojudgeandverifytheacceptability ofsafetyanalysesthatareperformed.

Therefore, thesechangeshavenoimpactonaccidentprobability andconsequence, foreitheraccidents previously analyzedorthepotential fordifferent accidents.

Therefore, theseproposedchangesmaybeconsidered similartotheexamplein10CFR50.92 foranendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

"(vi)Achangewhicheithermayresultinsomeincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously-analyzed accidentormayreduceinscmewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteriawithrespecttothesystemor~nentspecified intheStandardReviewPlan;forexample,achangeresulting fromtheapplication ofasmallrefinarent ofapreviously usedcalculational riedelordesignmethod."TlKSNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGESTOEX%ANCEOPERATING MMGINThealliedplantoperating spaceasdefinedandcontrolled bythetechnical specifications isrevisedinthefollcwing areas.1.Theallcwable planarradialpeakingfactor(F)hasbeenincreased frcm1.60to1.75andtheallcwRleintegrated radialpeakingfactor(Fr)hasbeenincreased frcm1.60to1.70.2.TheminimumrequiredReactorCoolant,System(RCS)flewhasbeenreducedfrcm370,000gpmto363,000gpm.3.Themaximumall(wedcoldlegtemperature hasbeenincreased frcm548Fto549F.4.Increased restrictions totheLSSSandLOOsareimplemntedtooffsettheeffectsoftheincreased operating spaceproducedbyitems1,2and3.

Page4Detailedcalculations wereperforned toevaluatetheimpactofthesechangesonAnticipated Operational Occurences andPostulated Accidents.

Theextentoftheseanalysescanbecharacterized withinthefoll<wring sixcategories.

1.Increaseinheatrenavalbythesecondary system.(Section3.2.1)2.Decreaseinheatrivalbythesecondary system.(Section3.2.2)3.Decreaseinreactorcoolantfle+rate.(Section3.2.3)r4.Reactivity andpcwerdistribution ancnalies.

(Section3.2.4)5.Decreaseinreactorcoolantsysteminventory.

(Section3.2.6)6.LossofCoolantevents.(Section3.3)HOTE:SectionnumbersrefertothesectionsintheReloadSafetyReport.Thecriteriaforjudgingtheacceptability oftheseeventshasnotchangedfromthereference cycle(Cycle1).Thedetailedresultsofthesecalculations areprovidedintheaccmpanying ReloadSafetyReportalongwithcomparisons withtheappropriate limitingcriteria.

Thefollcving discussion providesasummaryofvariouseventsanalyzedwithrespecttothethreebasiccriteria; i.e.,offsitedose,reactorcoolantsystempressure, andfuelperformance.

l.OffsiteDoseAcceptance guidelines foroffsiteradiation dosecontinuetobebasedon10CFR100criteria.

Thenestlimitingpostulated accidentwithrespecttooffsitedosewasdetermined tobeasteamline breakoutsideofcontainment (Section3.2.1.5b).

Thedetailedanalysisofthispostulated accidentincludesassumptions suchasconcurrent lossofACpcverandthermstadversevaluesfortheprocessparameters (RCStemperature,

pressure, coreMID,NSSSpcwer,etc.)thataffecttheoutccmeofthisevent.Evenwiththeconservatism

assurred, theresultsarewellwithinthelimitsof10CFR100.

Theconsequences ofasteamline breakinsidecontainment are

Page5evenlessseverewithrespecttooffsitedosesincethereleasesareconfinedwithinthecontainment building.

ThelimitingAnticipated Operational Occurence whichisanalyzedforimpactonoffsitedoseistheInadvertent OpeningofaSteamGenerator SafetyValve(Section3.2.1.4).

Itisassumedthatthiseventwillresultinaccapleteblcwdcxmof.onesteamgenerator andpartialblnrdownoftheother.Conservative assumptions tomaximizethecalculated dosesincludemaxinamsteamgenerator andRCSradionuclide concentrations.

TheresultscontinuetobeasmallfractionoflOCFR100limits.2~ReactorCoolantSstemPressureAcceptance guidelines forRCSpressurearebasedonRCSdesignlimitsasdefinedbyGeneralDesignCriteria14ard15.Thermstlimitingpostulated accidentwithrespecttoKSpressurewasfoundtobeafeedwater systempipebreak (Section3.2.2.6).

Thiseventisanalyzedwithconservative assumptions, suchaslossofACparerandtherrostadversevaluesfortheprocessparaneters thataffecttheresults.Also,aparametric evaluation isperformed toidentifytheexactbreaksizethatmaximizes theRCSpressurepeak.Theseconservative calculations showthatthepressurepeakresulting fromthiseventisstillbelowtheRCSupsetpressurelimitof2750psia.ThelimitingAnticipated Operational Occurence whichaffectsKSpressureistheLossofCondenser Vacuumevent(Section3.2.2.3).

Theresulting lossofloadcausesanincreaseinsteamgenerator pressurewhichisrelievedbyopeningofthe"secondary safetyvalves.ThereisalsoanincreaseinRCSpressurewhichallcwsprotective systemstoinitiateareactortripatthehighpressuresetpointtoterminate theevent.ThepeakRCSpressureattainediswellbelowtheupsetpressurelimitof2750psia.3.FuelPerforaance Criteriainthiscategoryrecpirethataeoolablefuelgeometryismaintained suchthatcontinued rerrovalofdecayheatisensured.Thiscondition ismetbymaintaining fueltemperatures belowtheSpecified Acceptable FuelDesignLimit(SAFDL)andlimitingthedurationofDHBduringpostulated accidents.

Thenestlimitingpostulated accidentwithrespecttofuelintegrity wasdetermined tobetheSteamline BreakOutsideofContainment (Section3.2.1.5b).

Page6Notethatthiseventhasbeenpreviously discussed asthe'mstlimitingpostulated accidentwithrespecttooffsite-dose.Theresultindicates thatonlyasmallnurseroffuelpinsarepredicted tofailandaeoolablegeometryismaintained.

ThelimitingAnticipated Operational Occurrence thatisconsidered inthiscategoryistheTotalLossofForcedKS.Flew(Section3.2.3.2).

Theconditions assumdinthisanalysisincludethemaximumalliedcoldlegtemperature, maximumradialpeakingfactorsandminimaRCSflnrrateas-proposed.

Aparametric analysisisperformed todetermine theaxialshapeindexwithintheallcwable rangethatprovidesthermstsevereresults.Thiseventisusedtoestablish theminimuminitialmarginthatmustbemaintained bytheLimitingConditions forOperation (LCDs)withrespecttotheDNBRlimit.Hence,thiseventresultsinanacceptable minimumKM3Rof1.28.Anothersetofcriteriathatisestablished toevaluatefuelperformance isdescribed by10CFR50.46.

Assurance thatthesecriteriaaresatisfied isprovidedbythedetailedanalysesperformed forsmallbreakIDCA,largebreakIDCAandpost-IDCA longtermcooling.ThehighestPeakCladTemperature (PCT)calculated, resultedfromaDouble-Ended Guillotine BreakatPumpDischarge (DZQ/PD)withaPCTof2041'Fascontpared toanallowable limitof2200'F.Adetaileddescription oftheseanalysesandcorresponding resultsisprovidedintheReloadSafetyReport(Section3.3.1).Xnallcases,theanalytical resultsshoracceptability withrespecttothe10CFR50.46 criteria.

Thesedetailedcalculations shcwthatincorporation oftheincreased operating space,whenoffsetbythermrelimitingrestrictions imposedbychangestotheLSSSandLCOsresult,inlimitingeventswhicharestillbelowthecorresponding acceptance criteria.

Therefore, noreduction insafetymarginhasoccurred.

Theccabinedresultsofthesecalculations whenccmparedtothereference cycle(Cycle1)showthattheseproposedchangesdonotresultinanyincreaseintheprobability ofthoseeventspreviously analyzedandnosignificant increaseintheconsequences oftheseeventscanbeshcwn.Noneoftheseproposedchangesresultinanynadifications toplantequipment; theminorvariations inplantparaneters

'reaccounted forintheevaluations ofAOOsandpostulated Page7accidents asdescribed'bove.

Therefore, thisevaluation hasfurtherconcluded thatthesechangesdonotprovideapotential foraccidents different fromthosepreviously considered.

Sincetheseproposedchangesyieldresultswhicharewellwithinacceptance

criteria, thechangescanbeconsidered similartotheexampleprovidedin10CFR50.92 foramendmntsthatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

"(vi)Achangewhicheithermayresultinsaneincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously-ana1yzed accidentormayreduceinscxnewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteriawithrespecttothesystemorccmgenent specified intheStandardReviewPlan;forexample,achangeresulting fromtheapplication ofasmallrefinarant ofapreviously usedcalculational modelordesignmethod."Thermde5shutdcwnmarginisincreased from2%to3%deltak/kasaresultofthefuelmanagement programwhichwillpermitanincreased cyclelength.Theacccmpanying ReloadSafetyReportanalyzesanticipated operational occurrences thatareaffectedbytheproposedchangesincyclelengthandMode5shutdcwnmargin.Thelimitingeventswithrespecttoradiological releaseandlossofshutdownmarginarethefollcwing.

l.Inadvertent openingofasteamgenerator safetyvalve(Section3.2.1.4).2.PosttripanalysisofasteamlinebreakfrcmHotFullPcurer(Section3.2.1.5.c)

.3.ChemicalVolurreandControlSystem(CVCS)malfunction (Section3.2.4.4).Theseanalyseswereperforned withboundingvaluesofshutdcwnmargin,rodworth,andboronworthforthecurrentfuelloading.Theresultsfromananalysisoftheinadvertent openingofa Page8steamgenerator'afety valveshouthatreliablecontrolofreactivity ismaintained andthatradiological dosesatthesiteboundaryareasmllfractionofthe10CFR100guidelines.

The,steamlinebreakanalysisshcwsthat,withthesameHZPshutdownrequiratent asfortheprevicuscycle,therewillbenosignificant returntopcwer.AnalysisoftheQlCSmalfunction (borondilution) shearsthatunderalloperating andrefueling conditions thetimefromannunciation tocriticality willmeetorexceedtherequiredminimumcriteria.

Thus,allcriticality criteriaaremet.Increases infueltemperatures andcoolantpressures areregulated bytheconstraints imposedbytheLSSSandLO3s.Fromtheseanalysesitcanbeconcluded teatthereisnosignificant increaseintheprobability andconsequences ofaccidents previously analyzed.

Nordothesechangescreatethepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccident.

Thechangesdonotreducethesafetymargininasmuchasthesafetyanalysesshowthatacceptable resultsareobtainedwiththesamecriteriapertaining tooffsitedoserates,returntoparerandtinefranannunciation tocriticality.

Thischangecanbeconsidered asbeingsimilartotheexamplein10CFR50.92 foramendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

"(ii)Achangethatconstitutes anadditional limitation, restriction, orcontrolnotpresently includedinthetechnical specifications; forexample,ararestringent surveillance requirement."

Cycle2willincorporate severalchangesrelatedtotheControlElementAssemblies (CEAs),primarily toenhanceoperational characteristics suchascontrolofaxialshapeindex.Adescription ofthephysicalconfiguration ofthesechangesisprovidedhere,alongwithasummuyoftheaffectedtechnical specifications.

Eightadditional CEAswillbeinstalled incorelocations whicharepresently unrodded.

Theselocations arealreadyprovidedwithdrivermtors,positionindicating instrumntationandallassociated hardware.

Thischangewilltakeadvantage oftheseequippedlocations toincreasethetotalnumberofCEAsavailable forreactorcontrol.Theseadditional CEAswillalsoresultinanincreaseintheavailable shutdcwnmargin.Thesequencein Page9whichtheseeightnewCEAsandtheexisting83CEAsaremaneuvered willbechanged.The83CEAsinthereference cycle(Cycle1)aresuMivided intosixregulating andtwoshutdcambanks.The91CEAsavailable forCycle2willbesuMivided intofiveregulating andtwoshutdcwnbanks.ThisgroupingchangewillincreasethenumberofCEAsfromfourtotwelveinthefirstsequentially insertedgroupduringreactorcontrolmaneuvers.

Also,theCEAinsertion limitation (PnrerDependent Insertion Limit,PDIL)willberevised.Thechangestogroupconfiguration andPDILwillincreasetheanauntofcontrolavailable toplantoperators andwillaliceforanarcevenapplication ofCEA.worth,whichwillminunizetheeffectsoncoreradialpcwerdistribution.

Safetyanalyseshavebeenperformed toverifytheacceptability ofincreasing thea@cuntoftimealluredtorecoveradroppedCEA.Plantexperience withoperational surveillance hassheenthattheactualCEA,droptimeassociated withareactortripisconservatively fasterthanpreviously assumedforthereference cycle.Therefore, changesconcerning CEArecoverytimeandCEAdroptinewillbeincorporated intothetechnical specifications.

DetailedanalysesofAnticipated Operational Occurrences whichwereperformed toconfirmtheacceptability ofthesechangesincludethefollowing:

l.Uncontrolled CEAwithdrawal fromasubcritical orlcdpcwercondition (Section3.2.4.1).2.Uncontrolled CEAwithdrawal atpower(Section3.2.4.2)~3.CEAmisoperation (roddrop)(Section3.2.4.3).

Analysisoftheseeventshaveshcwnthatthereisnosignificant increaseintheconsequences oftheseeventsresulting fromtheproposedchanges.Thepostulated accidentwhichis~stsignificantly affectedbytheseproposedchangesistheCEAEjectionEvent.ThiseventwculdresultfromthehighlyunlikelyfailureofapressurehousingwhichretainsaCEA.Theanalysisofthiseventisperformed inaccordance withtheNRCapprovedC-Emethodology described byCENPD-190A, (Section3.2.4.6).

Theanalysisshcvsthattherrastsevereresults,whichoccuratazeropcverinitialcondition, predictthatnofuelfailureswilloccur.Therefore, acceptance criteriarelatedtofuelperformance andoffsitedosearesatisfied andnoreduction insafetymarginhasresultedfromthesechanges.

Pagel0These,changesaresimilartotheexamplein10CFR50.92 foramendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:.

~I"(vi)-Achangewhicheithermayresultinsameincrease,to theprobability orconsequences ofapreviously-analyzed accidentormayreduceinsomewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteriawithrespecttothesystemorcanponent specified intheStandardReviewPlan;forexample,achangeresulting fromtheapplication ofasmallrefinement ofapreviously usedcalculational rmdelordesignmethod."Thephysicalimplementation ofthesechangeswillbeaccmplished bymx3ifications totheexistingControlElementDriveMechanism ControlSystem(CEDMCS).Originally definedfunctional requirements andspecifications forthisequipment willberetainedand,hence,therewillbenoimpactontheprobability ofpreviously analyzedeventsandnopotential fornewevents.Toassurecontainment integrity, thefollcwing changesareproposed:

1.Containment sprayhigh-high tripsetpointisleeredfrom9.30psigto5.40psigandalliablevaluesfrem9.40psigto5.50psig.2.ThehighcontainmntpressuresetpointforEngineered SafetyFeatures(ESF)functions isleeredfran5.0psigto4.7psig.Theallowable valueisreducedfrom5.1psigto4.8psig.Thehighcontainment pressuresetpointof,4.0psigforreactortripremainsthesaneasCycle1,hcwever,thealliablevalueisreducedfran5.0psigto4.1psig.3.The-alliableresponsetineforhighcontainment pressureinstrumentation isreducedfran1.55secondsto1.15seconds.Thesechangesaresimilartotheexamplein10CFR50.92 foramendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

Pagell"(ii)Achangethatconstitutes anadditional limitation, restriction, orcontrol,not presently includedinthetechnical" specifi-cations:forexanpleanarcstringent surveillance requirement.

"Thelevercontainmntspraytripsetpointresultsinliowerpeakcontainamt pressurefollowing massandenergyreleasestothecontairurent.

Thehighcontainment pressuresetpoints havebeenreducedasaresultofthehigh-high containment pressuresetpointchanges,toassurepropersequencing ofautmaticsafetysystemactions.Thereduction inresponsetimeisjustified basedonin-plantexperience withinstrument performance.

Section3.3.4oftheReloadSafetyReportsosthatwiththeproposedchanges,ahighercorepoorer(2700Mph)canbeaccanrmdated withoutcomprcmising containment integrity.

Thereportpresentsanalysesthatshe@peakcontainmntpressures foralargebreakZQCLoramainsteamlinebreak,thetwolimitingtransients forcontainment

pressure, willbebelchthedesignpressureof44psig.Thus,theprobability andconsequences ofpreviously analyzedeventshavenotincreased norhasthesafetymargindecreased.

Theprobability foranewaccidenthasnotincreased asnonewfailuremechansim hasbeenintroduced.

Thelowerlimitoninitialcontainment pressurehasnotbeenchanged,therebyassuringthattheassurrptions usedintheHCCSanalysisremainvalid.PRESSURIZER WATERUWEEAchangetothepressurizer waterlevelcontrolsystemisincorporated toraisethenormaloperating waterlevelinthepressurizer.

Thislevelprogramimprovement willprovidegreatermarginbetweenthepressurizer heatercutofflevelsetpointandtheprojected minimumwaterlevelfollcwing areactortrip.Consequently, toaccaramdate thiscontrolsystemsetpointchange,themaximumalliableindicated pressurizer waterlevelisincreased fran65%to6ES.Thischangehasbeenaccounted forinanalysisofaCVCSmalfunction (Section3.2.5.1)whichisthelimitingeventaffectedbythischange.Theanalysisconcludes thattheoperatorhas20minutesavailable totakecorrective actionfollcving annunciation ofthehighpressurizer waterlevelalarmtopreventfillingthepressurizer.

Thisisasufficient andacceptable periodoftimefortheoperatortoterminate thecharging-letdcm fleximbalance andhencenoreduction insafetymarginhasoccurred.

Thischangealsohasnoaffectontheprobability orconsequence ofneworpreviously analyzedaccidents.

Page12Thisincreaseinallowable pressurizer waterlevelissimilartotheexamplein10CFR50.92 foramendments thatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

"(vi)Achangewhicheithermayresultinsaneincreasetotheprobability orconsequences ofapreviously-analyzed accidentormayreduceinscnewayasafetymargin,butwheretheresultsofthechangeareclearlywithinallacceptable criteriawithrespecttothesystemorcarponent specified intheStandardReviewPlan;forexanple,achangeresulting fromtheapplication ofasmallrefinement ofapreviously usedcalculational modelordesignmethod."G.SE005EARY SAPPYVALVEThemainsteamline safetyvalveoperability requirenent ischangedtoincorporate revisedmaximumalliablepowerlimitstobeineffectwhenfewerthanallsafetyvalvesareinservice.Thisspecification willnewbeofthesameformatandtechnical contentasthecorresponding St.LucieUnit1requiraaent.

Thesamecalculational methodsusedforthereference cycle(Cycle1)areappliedhereandnoincreaseordecreaseinratedvalvecapacityisassumed.Theanalyseswhichsupportthischangeareruebasedonsteamflnnateswhichwmldbepresentwiththeplantoperating at27001%th.

Therevisedspecification continues toccnplywiththeASMEBoilerandPressureVesselSectionIIIcoderequirements tolimitpeaksecondary systempressureto110%ofdesignpressure.

Therefore, noreduction insafetymarginhasoccurred, andtheprobability/consequence ofaccidents isnotaffected.Sincethischangeresultsinareduction inthealliedfractional pcwerlevel,thechangemaybeconsidered similartotheexampleinlOCFR50.92 foramendmntsthatareconsidered notlikelytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

(ii)Achangethatconstitutes anadditional limitation, restriction, orcontrolnotpresently includedinthetechnical specifications; forexamplearrorestringent surveillance requirement."

Page13H.CORRECTIONS ANDADMINISTRATIVE CHANGESThefollcwing twochangesconstitute editorial corrections intheexistingtechnical specifications:

2~Section5.3.1-change"fuelrods"to"fuelandpoisonrods"toincludefuelassemblies containing poisonrods.Section5.3.1-change"1698.3grams"to"approximately 1700grams"topermitminorvariations incoreloadingandweight.Thesechangesareofanadministrative natureandfollcwtheexamplegivenin10CFR50.92 foramendments thatareconsidered notlikleytoinvolvesignificant hazardsconsiderations:

"(i)Apurelyadministrative changetotechnical specifications:

forexample,achangetoachieveconsistency throughout thetechnical specifica-tions,correction ofanerror,orachangeinmnenclature.

"IV.CONCLUSION Fromtheconsiderations detailedaboveitcanbe.concluded thattheproposedamendments totheSt.LucieUnit2Technical Specifications donota)increasetheprobability orconsecpences ofaccidents previously analyzedb)increasethepotential foraccidents different fromanyaccidentpreviously considered c)reducethesafetymargin.Therefore itisconcluded thatinaccordance withtheprovisions of10CFR50.92 thechangesinvolvenosignificant hazardsconsiderations.