05000346/FIN-2015001-01: Difference between revisions
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Plant TS 5.4.1(d), requires, in part, the licensee to establish, implement, and maintain applicable written procedures covering fire protection program implementation. The fire protection program was implemented, in part, by Davis-Besse Procedure DBFP00009, Fire Protection Impairment and Fire Watch, Revision 20. Procedure DBFP00009, Step 6.3.4, states: Roving Fire Watches shall observe the assigned patrol area(s)/room(s)/panel(s) which is (are) to be observed as related to the impairment, for example, room associated with impaired door, damper, penetration seal, detector, etc. Contrary to this requirement, for several hours on February 16, 2015, the licensee failed to observe the interior of Room 425, the Radiation Protection (RP) Instrument Calibration Room, when an applicable fire impairment had existed. Late in the morning on February 16th, plant maintenance technicians began a planned work activity to replace 27 smoke detectors in Fire Detection Zone 412A. To compensate for this planned loss of fire detection capability, the licensee's fire protection program required an hourly fire watch patrol to be performed for each of the 17 rooms covered by Fire Detection Zone 412A. This hourly fire watch patrol was instituted by the on-watch Operations crew at 12:00 p.m., and assigned to a member of the site's Security Department, as was the standard station practice. Because the door to Room 425 was locked, however, the individual performing the hourly fire watch patrol did not enter Room 425, as required, and only checked the door to the room. This practice was repeated again at 2:00 p.m., and continued hourly by each individual who performed the fire watch patrol until 8:00 p.m. At that time, the individual performing the hourly fire watch patrol raised a question about the locked door to Room 425 to the Operations supervisors who were on watch, and it was confirmed that the room needed to be entered to adequately perform the fire watch patrol. A key for Room 425 was obtained from RP, and the fire watch patrol performed correctly from that point on. The inspectors reviewed this violation using the guidance contained in Appendix B, Issue Screening, of IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to properly implement plant procedures for performing compensatory fire watches was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. This violation was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone of reactor safety and was of more than minor significance because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors (Fire) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. Specifically, required fire watch patrols established as compensatory measures should have been properly performed for the duration of the impairment so that the sites ability to promptly detect and suppress a fire would be maintained. The inspectors evaluated the violation using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Because it involved fire protection, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significant Determination Process (SDP). The violation was characterized according to IMC 0609, SDP, Appendix F, Attachment 1, "Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet," dated September 20, 2013. The violation screened as of very low safety significance (Green), per Attachment 1, Question 1.3.1.A, because it did not affect the ability of the reactor to reach and maintain safe shutdown. The licensee had entered this issue into their CAP as CRs 201502119, 201502126, 201504246, and 201504248. A limited apparent cause evaluation was performed and corrective actions included, but were not limited to: Creation of a formal pre-job brief check list for fire watch patrols to be used and maintained at the Work Support Center desk for ready reference, and maps for multiple room fire watch patrols; and Communication of lessons learned, identification and discussion of knowledge gaps and reinforcement of the site's human performance tools with respect to fire watch patrol expectations. |
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2015001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Morris T Briley D Kimble J Cameron M Learn M Mitchell R Baker |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Davis Besse - IR 05000346/2015001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Davis Besse) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Davis Besse)
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