05000255/FIN-2013005-08: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| (2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = Licensee | | identified by = Licensee | ||
| Inspection procedure = | | Inspection procedure = | ||
| Inspector = A Scarbeary, E Duncan, E Sanchez, | | Inspector = A Scarbeary, E Duncan, E Sanchez Santiago, J Cassidy, J Laughlin, M Holmberg, M Phalen, N Feliz Adomo, T Taylor | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = Upon review of industry operating experience regarding unfused remote direct current ammeter circuits, the licensee discovered a similar configuration existed at Palisades. The wires supplying a current signal from the output of each station battery to their respective ammeters in the adjacent room were unfused. As a result, a fire in either battery room could create multiple grounds which could cause the wire to heat up and cause a secondary fire in the adjacent space (Cable Spreading Room). This condition represented a degraded fire barrier and was contrary to the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979, specifically, Section III G.1. Because the licensee committed to adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 and revise their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), and this commitment was documented prior to December 31, 2005, the NRC is exercising enforcement and ROP discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and IMC 0305. This issue was identified and addressed during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees CAP as CR-PLP-2013-04817, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, it was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, it was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance (Red). Specifically, utilizing IMC 0609 Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance per Question 1.4.3.C based on the presence of an automatic fire suppression system. | | description = Upon review of industry operating experience regarding unfused remote direct current ammeter circuits, the licensee discovered a similar configuration existed at Palisades. The wires supplying a current signal from the output of each station battery to their respective ammeters in the adjacent room were unfused. As a result, a fire in either battery room could create multiple grounds which could cause the wire to heat up and cause a secondary fire in the adjacent space (Cable Spreading Room). This condition represented a degraded fire barrier and was contrary to the requirements in 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January 1, 1979, specifically, Section III G.1. Because the licensee committed to adopt National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 805 and revise their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), and this commitment was documented prior to December 31, 2005, the NRC is exercising enforcement and ROP discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and IMC 0305. This issue was identified and addressed during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees CAP as CR-PLP-2013-04817, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, it was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, it was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance (Red). Specifically, utilizing IMC 0609 Appendix F, Attachment 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, the issue screened as having very low safety significance per Question 1.4.3.C based on the presence of an automatic fire suppression system. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 10:48, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2013005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | Violation: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Scarbeary E Duncan E Sanchez Santiago J Cassidy J Laughlin M Holmberg M Phalen N Feliz Adomo T Taylor |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.48 10 CFR 50 Appendix R |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |