10 CFR 50, Appendix B, requires that activities affecting quality shall be performed in accordance with procedures. Contrary to this required, on or before June 21, 2010, the licensee positioned the voltage check relay for the 1-2 diesel generator without use of a procedure. This rendered the 1-2 diesel
inoperable.
Technical Specification 3.8.1 requires, in part, that two qualified diesels be
operable. Because of the improper relay position, during a scheduled surveillance the output breaker did not close as required to place the diesel on the emergency bus. The licensee performed an apparent cause on the failure and determined that the cutout relay had been inadvertently repositioned due to the lack of a protective device on the relay to preclude inadvertent operation. The licensee could not determine when the relay had been repositioned. The inspectors reviewed the apparent cause evaluation and could not find firm evidence that indicated when the relay had been repositioned. Therefore, the inspectors evaluated the safety significance with a duration from the
time of discovery until the diesel was restored to
operable. Since the inoperability lasted less than the TS allowed outage time, the inspectors concluded the finding was of very low safety significance. The inspectors concluded that the finding was licensee indentified because the licensee identified the issue during surveillance testing. As corrective action, the licensee restored the relay to its correct position and successfully tested the diesel. The licensee performed a walkdown of other relay cutout switches and no others were found in an improper position. The licensee documented the condition in
CR-PLP-2010-02431.
