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{{finding | {{finding | ||
| title = Number 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line | | title = Number 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line OVER-PRESSURIZATION | ||
| docket = 05000400 | | docket = 05000400 | ||
| inspection report = IR 05000400/2013002 | | inspection report = IR 05000400/2013002 | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.17 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.17 | ||
| Inspector = A Alen, A Goldau, D Mas, | | Inspector = A Alen, A Goldau, D Mas Penaranda, J Austin, J Eargle, M Meeks, P Lessard, R Musser, T Fanellia, Alena Butcavage, A Nielsen, G Hopper, J Austin, J Laughlin, J Rivera, M Catts, M Coursey, P Lessard, T Fanelli | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a URI associated with licensees capability to meet their station blackout (SBO) mitigation strategy. This item remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of the additional information to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Power. The reactor coolant pumps (RCP) No.1 seal leakoff line was designed to recover leakoff volume, at low pressure and temperature, and return it to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The leakoff lines (one per pump) join into a common header before exiting containment to the CVCS. In 1992, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, NSD-TB-91-07-R1, Over-Pressurization of RCP No.1 Seal Leakoff Line, informed specific licensees (including Harris) of the potential over-pressurization of the No.1 seal leakoff line during high seal leakoff flow conditions as a result of abnormal performance of the No.1 RCP seal. Specifically, the leakoff line pipe segment downstream of the air operated valve (which fails open on loss of instrument air) and upstream of the flow element restriction orifice was designed to 150 psig and could overpressurize and fail under high flow conditions. While Harris had implemented recommendations contained in the bulletin, the licensee did not upgrade the piping for higher pressures nor evaluate the line capability to handle expected seal leakage flow rates associated with loss of seal cooling (LOSC) events documented in Westinghouse Owner Group Report WCAP-10541 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance Following a Loss of All AC Power, Rev 2. The technical bulletin specifically stated that the validity of the information in WCAP-10541 was dependent upon the assumption that the integrity of the leakoff line was maintained. The inspectors reviewed WCAP-10541 and noted that the leakoff line could experience a pressure transient between 800-2000 psig during a LOSC event before seal leakage flow rates stabilize at approximately 21gpm and 800psig. The report also indicated that the backpressure provided by the leakoff line (upstream of the orifice) is what limits seal leagage to 21gpm and reduction of this backpressure would result in higher seal leakage flow rates. In 2003, Information Notice (IN) 2003-19, Unanalyzed Condition of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line During Postulated Fire Scenarios or Station Blackout, informed licensees of specific LOSC events (SBO and fires coincident with loss of all AC events) that could over-pressurize and fail the leakoff line. The IN reemphasized the pressures that will be experienced by the leakoff line (800-2000 psig) and that the failure of the line would result in RCP leak rates in excess of the 21gpm determined by Westinghouse and the 25 gpm assumed in SBO coping analyses. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of IN 2003-19 (AR #1069790-09) and determined the licensees actions did not adequately address the potential for over-pressurizing the seal leakoff line. The licensee entered the issue into the CAP as AR #589248 and indicated that the alternate seal injection (ASI) system, installed in December of 2010 to meet the sites new fire protection program requirements (NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants), automatically starts on a LOSC event (SBO or fire related) and will maintain seal cooling. By maintaining seal cooling, the RCP seal leakage flow rates are expected to remain at nominal operating values (2-5 gpm) and prevent seal leakage flow rates that would challenge the integrity of the No.1 seal leakoff line. The inspectors questioned the appropriateness of crediting the ASI system for SBO events and the systems capability to prevent overpressurization of the leakoff line. Specifically: The inspectors noted that the ASI system was not credited for meeting the current licensing bases for SBO. The ASI has a delayed start and the inspectors questioned whether seal cooling would be restored before seal leakage increases to the point of challenging the leakoff line. This issue remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of additional information to be provided by the licensee to address the issues described above and determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Power. This issue is being tracked as: URI 05000400/2013002-04, No. 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line Over-Pressurization. | | description = The inspectors identified a URI associated with licensees capability to meet their station blackout (SBO) mitigation strategy. This item remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of the additional information to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Power. The reactor coolant pumps (RCP) No.1 seal leakoff line was designed to recover leakoff volume, at low pressure and temperature, and return it to the chemical and volume control system (CVCS). The leakoff lines (one per pump) join into a common header before exiting containment to the CVCS. In 1992, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin, NSD-TB-91-07-R1, Over-Pressurization of RCP No.1 Seal Leakoff Line, informed specific licensees (including Harris) of the potential over-pressurization of the No.1 seal leakoff line during high seal leakoff flow conditions as a result of abnormal performance of the No.1 RCP seal. Specifically, the leakoff line pipe segment downstream of the air operated valve (which fails open on loss of instrument air) and upstream of the flow element restriction orifice was designed to 150 psig and could overpressurize and fail under high flow conditions. While Harris had implemented recommendations contained in the bulletin, the licensee did not upgrade the piping for higher pressures nor evaluate the line capability to handle expected seal leakage flow rates associated with loss of seal cooling (LOSC) events documented in Westinghouse Owner Group Report WCAP-10541 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance Following a Loss of All AC Power, Rev 2. The technical bulletin specifically stated that the validity of the information in WCAP-10541 was dependent upon the assumption that the integrity of the leakoff line was maintained. The inspectors reviewed WCAP-10541 and noted that the leakoff line could experience a pressure transient between 800-2000 psig during a LOSC event before seal leakage flow rates stabilize at approximately 21gpm and 800psig. The report also indicated that the backpressure provided by the leakoff line (upstream of the orifice) is what limits seal leagage to 21gpm and reduction of this backpressure would result in higher seal leakage flow rates. In 2003, Information Notice (IN) 2003-19, Unanalyzed Condition of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line During Postulated Fire Scenarios or Station Blackout, informed licensees of specific LOSC events (SBO and fires coincident with loss of all AC events) that could over-pressurize and fail the leakoff line. The IN reemphasized the pressures that will be experienced by the leakoff line (800-2000 psig) and that the failure of the line would result in RCP leak rates in excess of the 21gpm determined by Westinghouse and the 25 gpm assumed in SBO coping analyses. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of IN 2003-19 (AR #1069790-09) and determined the licensees actions did not adequately address the potential for over-pressurizing the seal leakoff line. The licensee entered the issue into the CAP as AR #589248 and indicated that the alternate seal injection (ASI) system, installed in December of 2010 to meet the sites new fire protection program requirements (NFPA-805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants), automatically starts on a LOSC event (SBO or fire related) and will maintain seal cooling. By maintaining seal cooling, the RCP seal leakage flow rates are expected to remain at nominal operating values (2-5 gpm) and prevent seal leakage flow rates that would challenge the integrity of the No.1 seal leakoff line. The inspectors questioned the appropriateness of crediting the ASI system for SBO events and the systems capability to prevent overpressurization of the leakoff line. Specifically: The inspectors noted that the ASI system was not credited for meeting the current licensing bases for SBO. The ASI has a delayed start and the inspectors questioned whether seal cooling would be restored before seal leakage increases to the point of challenging the leakoff line. This issue remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of additional information to be provided by the licensee to address the issues described above and determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.63, Loss of All Alternating Power. This issue is being tracked as: URI 05000400/2013002-04, No. 1 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakoff Line Over-Pressurization. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:17, 29 May 2018
| Site: | Harris  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000400/2013002 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Alen A Goldau D Mas Penaranda J Austin J Eargle M Meeks P Lessard R Musser T Fanellia Alena Butcavage A Nielsen G Hopper J Austin J Laughlin J Rivera M Catts M Coursey P Lessard T Fanelli |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |