The inspectors identified a noncited violation of
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, after Callaway control room operators improperly entered a wrong Technical Specification action statement due to the failure to maintain the Technical Specification Bases current. On June 17, 2008, during surveillance testing, Valve EMHV8823 failed to indicate fully closed. Since EMHV8823 is an isolation valve for containment
Penetration 49, the licensee entered
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Condition C, with an action to restore the valve to an
operable status or isolate the
penetration within
72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Approximately
8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after Valve EMHV8823 had been declared
inoperable, Callaway licensing personnel contacted the control room and informed them of an approved Technical Specification Bases change that did not allow
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Condition C, to be applicable to containment
Penetration 49. The Technical Specification Bases change was effective May 1, 2008, but had not been issued to the control room. The licensee determined that the more restrictive
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Condition A, should have been entered with an action to isolate the affected
penetration within
4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. The licensee performed a containment entry following discovery of entry into
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Condition A, and found that Valve EMHV8823 failed its surveillance due to out of adjustment position indicator limit switches. The valve was verified closed and isolated allowing exit from
Technical Specification 3.6.3, Condition A. This finding, failure to ensure the Technical Specification Bases were maintained current and available to the Callaway control room staff, was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to maintain the Technical Specification Bases current could become a more significant safety concern. This finding was determined to affect the
barrier integrity cornerstone. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding is determined to be of very low safety significance since this finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment and did not involve an actual reduction in function of
hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision making component because the licensee failed to communicate, in a timely manner, decisions to personnel who have a need to know the information in order to perform work safely
H.1(c)