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.<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.RecognizeandLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.TerminateSI4.TerminateBreakFlowWCAP-11668TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATORTIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.ThesesimulatorexercisesdemonstratethatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668arerealisticandconservativeandthereforethiscontingencyissatisfied.ProvideasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequencesanalysis.WCAP-11668,providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiationoffsiteconsequencesanalysis,andtherefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Provideastructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filledconditions.PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowingtheJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident,amainsteamlinestructuralanalysisunderwater-filledconditionswasperformedandprovidedtotheCommission.Theacceptabilityofthisanalysisisdocumentedinthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(section6.0.Therefore,thiscontingencyismet.Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737,Supplement1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentationqualificationinformation.Acomprehensivetablelistingthecreditedequipment,itsqualification,andallotherattributeslistedinRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittalwasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"EmergencyResponseCapability,"datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore,thiscontingencyhasbeensatisfied.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698./PlantparametersforthereferenceplantusedinWCAP-10698-P-AareprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis,utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.AllGinnaspecificparametersfallwithintheboundsoftheparameterslistedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETERRCSPressure,siaPressurizerWaterVolume,ft~SGSecondaryMass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizerPressureforSI,siaPressurizerPressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure,psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698CONSERVATIVE22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aprovidesabenchmarkagainstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident,and,therefore,itsapplicabilitytoGinnaisexplicit.Therefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Basedontheabove,themethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-AcanbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668(enclosed)providestheresultsofthisapplication,anddemonstratestheacceptabilityofImprovedTechnicalSpecificationcoolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore,theproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotadverselyaffectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic. | .<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.RecognizeandLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.TerminateSI4.TerminateBreakFlowWCAP-11668TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATORTIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.ThesesimulatorexercisesdemonstratethatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668arerealisticandconservativeandthereforethiscontingencyissatisfied.ProvideasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequencesanalysis.WCAP-11668,providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiationoffsiteconsequencesanalysis,andtherefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Provideastructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filledconditions.PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowingtheJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident,amainsteamlinestructuralanalysisunderwater-filledconditionswasperformedandprovidedtotheCommission.Theacceptabilityofthisanalysisisdocumentedinthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(section6.0.Therefore,thiscontingencyismet.Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737,Supplement1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentationqualificationinformation.Acomprehensivetablelistingthecreditedequipment,itsqualification,andallotherattributeslistedinRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittalwasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"EmergencyResponseCapability,"datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore,thiscontingencyhasbeensatisfied.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698./PlantparametersforthereferenceplantusedinWCAP-10698-P-AareprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis,utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.AllGinnaspecificparametersfallwithintheboundsoftheparameterslistedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETERRCSPressure,siaPressurizerWaterVolume,ft~SGSecondaryMass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizerPressureforSI,siaPressurizerPressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure,psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698CONSERVATIVE22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aprovidesabenchmarkagainstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident,and,therefore,itsapplicabilitytoGinnaisexplicit.Therefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Basedontheabove,themethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-AcanbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668(enclosed)providestheresultsofthisapplication,anddemonstratestheacceptabilityofImprovedTechnicalSpecificationcoolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore,theproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotadverselyaffectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic. | ||
E.SignificantzardsConsiderationEvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiatorsandthereforetheprobabilityofanyaccidentisnotincreased.Consequencesofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptableintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP-11668,SectionIII.2~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodificationstotheplant;therefore,nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.3~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.F.EnvironmentalConsiderationRGGEhasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstratedintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowablelimits.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR | E.SignificantzardsConsiderationEvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiatorsandthereforetheprobabilityofanyaccidentisnotincreased.Consequencesofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptableintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP-11668,SectionIII.2~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodificationstotheplant;therefore,nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.3~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.F.EnvironmentalConsiderationRGGEhasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstratedintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowablelimits.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR | ||
.00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.References(a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"AcceptanceforReferencingofLicensingTopicalReportWCAP-10698...",March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916,"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"EmergencyResponseCapability...",October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3",February24,1993. | .00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.References(a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"AcceptanceforReferencingofLicensingTopicalReportWCAP-10698...",March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916,"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"EmergencyResponseCapability...",October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3",February24,1993.}} | ||
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Revision as of 13:31, 18 May 2018
ML17263A655 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Ginna ![]() |
Issue date: | 05/23/1994 |
From: | MECREDY R C ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML17263A656 | List: |
References | |
RTR-NUREG-1431 NUDOCS 9405310167 | |
Download: ML17263A655 (13) | |
Text
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONIntheMatterof))RochesterGasandElectricCorporation)(R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant)))DocketNo.50-244APPLICATIONFORAMENDMENTTOOPERATINGLICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulationsoftheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(the"Commission"),RochesterGasandElectricCorporation("RG&E"),holderofFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnicalSpecificationssetforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamended.ThisrequestforchangeinTechnicalSpecificationsistoincreaseallowablereactorcoolantactivitylevelstotheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationvalues(NUREG-1431).Adescriptionoftheamendmentrequest,necessarybackgroundinformation,justificationoftherequestedchange,safety'valuationandnosignificanthazardsandenvironmentalconsiderationsareprovidedinAttachmentA.Amarkedupcopyofthecurrent.GinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhichshowstherequestedchangeissetforthinAttachmentB.TheproposedrevisedTechnicalSpecificationsareprovidedinAttachmentC.ThesechangesareconsistentwithWestinghouseImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(NUREG1431)3.4.16.a,bandfigure3.4.16-1.94053iOih7940523PDRADOCK05000244.P'.,PDR
WHEREFORE,ApplicantrespectfullyrequeststhatAppendixAtoFacilityOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachmentC.RochesterGasandElectricCorporationByRobertC.MecredyVicePresidentGinnaNuclearProductionSubscribedandsworntobeforemeonthis23rddayofMay,1994.
ATTACHMENTAR.E.GINNAPOWERPLANTLICENSEAMENDMENTREQUESTTECHNICALSPECIFICATION3.1.4,MAXIMUMCOOLANTACTIVITYThisattachmentprovidesadescriptionoftheamendmentrequestandnecessaryjustificationfortheproposedchanges.Theattachmentisdividedintosevensectionsasfollows.SectionAidentifiesallchangestothecurrentGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationswhileSectionBprovidesthebackgroundandhistoryassociatedwiththechangesbeingrequested.SectionCprovidesdetailedjustificationfortheproposedchangesincludingacomparisontoImprovedTechnicalSpecificationsasapplicable.Asafetyevaluation,significanthazardsconsiderationevaluation,andenvironmentalconsiderationoftherequestedchangesareprovidedinSectionsD,E,andF,respectively.SectionGlistsallreferencesusedinthisattachment.A.DescriptionofAmendmentRequestThisLicenseAmendmentRequest(LAR)proposestoreviseGinnaStationTechnicalSpecifications3.1.4.1.a,3.1.4.1.b,figure3.1.4-1andassociatedBasesasfollows:1.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4.1.ai.Therequirementischangedto"Thetotalspecificactivityofthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed100/EpCi/gm,..."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.'6.3."2.TechnicalSpecification3.1.4.1.bi.Therequirementisrevisedto"TheI-131doseequivalentoftheiodineactivityinthereactorcoolantshallnotexceed1.0pCi/gm."ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."3.TechnicalSpecificationFigure3.1.4-1i.TheallowableoperationregionismodifiedconsistentwithImprovedTechnicalSpecifications(seeAttachmentsBandCforrevisedfigure).ii.Thebasesarerevisedtochangethereferencedanalysis(Reference3)to"UFSARSection15.6.3."B~BackgroundHistoryPriortotheJanuary25,1982,steamgeneratortuberuptureeventatGinnaStation,reactorcoolantactivitylimitswerebasedontheoriginal(1969)steamgeneratortuberuptureanalysisfortheGinnaStation.TheCommission'sreviewofthe1982tuberuptureincident resulteintherequirementforaresedsteamgeneratortuberuptureanalysis.Thestaffrequiredthatthisbecompletedwithinsixmonthsoftheplantrestart(NUREG-0916,Section9.0),andimposedreducedallowableactivitylevelsintheinterim(AmendmentNo.51toProvisionalOperatingLicenseNo.DPR-18,May22,1982).Aboundinganalysisusingthesereducedallowableactivitylevelswasperformedinordertosatisfythesixmonthrequirement,whileamoredetailedanalysissupportingthestandardtechnicalspecificationvalueswouldfollow.'hemethodologyforthisnewanalysis(WCAP-10698-P-A)wassubmittedandapprovedbytheCommissionfor'useon'estinghousePWRsprovidedfiveplantspecificinputswereverifiedtobeconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthemethodology(Referencea).RG&Ehascompletedthisverification,andthereforeintendstoupdateitsanalysisofrecordforthesteamgeneratortuberupturetoreflectuseofthisnewmethodology(UFSARSection15.6.3).ThisnewanalysissupportstheactivitylimitsproposedinthisAmendment.2.HardwareModificationsThisLARinvolvesnohardwarechangestoGinnaStation.JustificationThisproposedAmendmentimposesreactorcoolantactivitylimitsconsistentwithNUREG-1431,"WestinghouseStandardTechnicalSpecifications."TheapplicabilityoftheselimitsforGinnaStationareestablishedbyaplantspecificsteamgeneratortuberuptureandradiologicalconsequencesanalysis,WCAP-11668,whichisconsistentwiththeapprovedmethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aforanalysisofsteamgeneratortuberupturetransients.AllcontingenciesforusageofWCAP-10698-P-Amethodology(Referencea)havebeensatisfiedforGinnaStationasdescribedinsectionDbelow.SafetyEvaluationPotentialenvironmentalconsequencesofasteamgeneratortuberuptureeventattheR.E.GinnanuclearpowerplanthavebeenevaluatedtoverifythattheImprovedTechnicalSpecificationlimitonprimarycoolantactivityisadequateforGinna.'Thisanalysis,WCAP-11668(attached)isconsistentwiththemethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-A.TheCommissionrequiresthatfivecontingenciesbemetinordertousethismethodology,specifically:1~Demonstrationthatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealisticandconsistentwiththoseobservedduringsimulatorexercises.2~3~AsitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequenceanalysis.Astructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filled conitions.4~Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.5.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698.CompliancewiththosecontingenciesforGinnaStationhasbeensatisfiedandisdescribedbelow.1~Demonstrationthatcriticaloperatoractiontimesusedintheanalysisarerealisticandconsistentwiththoseobservedduringsimulatorexercises.DuringtheweekofAugust19through23,1991,simulatorexerciseswereperformedattheGinnaStationsimulatortoverifytheassumptionsusedforbothanalysescasespresentedinWCAP-11668.Theresultsaretabulatedbelow.CASE1,INTACTSGPORVFAILSCLOSEDOPERATORACTION1.RecognizeandIsolateRupturedSG2.RecognizeandlocallyopenintactSGPORVopen3.TerminateSI4.TerminatebreakflowWCAP11668TIME(SEC)600180427983428SIMULATORTIME(SEC)4231460*19162541*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyopenedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.
.<5.%e)J CASE2RUPTUREDSGPORVFAILSOPENOPERATORACTION1.RupturedSGIsolated2.RecognizeandLocallyIsolateFailedPORV3.TerminateSI4.TerminateBreakFlowWCAP-11668TIME(SEC)652155830663438SIMULATORTIME(SEC)2141116*20732424*Thesimulatorexerciseimposeda15min.delayfromwhentheoperatoridentifiedthefailedPORVtowhenthePORVwaslocallyisolatedtoaccountforoperatoractionsoutsidethecontrolroomwhichcouldnotbeverifiedonthesimulator.ThisdelayisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinWCAP-11668.Simulationoftheseactionsintheactualplanthavedemonstratedthatthesetimesareconservative.ThesesimulatorexercisesdemonstratethatthecriticaloperatoractiontimesassumedinWCAP-11668arerealisticandconservativeandthereforethiscontingencyissatisfied.ProvideasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiologicaloffsiteconsequencesanalysis.WCAP-11668,providedwiththisLARprovidesaGinnasitespecificSteamGeneratorTubeRuptureradiationoffsiteconsequencesanalysis,andtherefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Provideastructuralanalysisofthemainsteamlinesdemonstratingadequacyunderwater-filledconditions.PriortorestartofGinnaStationfollowingtheJanuary25,1982,tuberuptureincident,amainsteamlinestructuralanalysisunderwater-filledconditionswasperformedandprovidedtotheCommission.Theacceptabilityofthisanalysisisdocumentedinthere@tartSER(NUREG-0916(section6.0.Therefore,thiscontingencyismet.Alistofsystems,components,andinstrumentationcreditedforaccidentmitigationandthespecifiedsafetygradeforeach.InresponsetoNUREG-0737,Supplement1Item6.2,RG&Ehasprovidedpostaccidentinstrumentationqualificationinformation.Acomprehensivetablelistingthecreditedequipment,itsqualification,andallotherattributeslistedinRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3,wasprovidedtotheNRCbyletterR.MecredytoA.Johnson"Emergency cn ResponseCapability",datedOctober4,1992.AnSERfor~uthissubmittalwasprovidedtoRGGEbyletterA.JohnsontoR.Mecredy,"EmergencyResponseCapability,"datedFebruary24,1993.Therefore,thiscontingencyhasbeensatisfied.Acomparisonoftheplanttothe"boundingplant"usedinWCAP-10698./PlantparametersforthereferenceplantusedinWCAP-10698-P-AareprovidedinTable4.3-3oftheWCAP.WCAP-11668,theGinnaspecificanalysis,utilizesGinnaspecificparameters.AllGinnaspecificparametersfallwithintheboundsoftheparameterslistedinWCAP-10698-P-Aasdetailedbelow:PLANTPARAMETERRCSPressure,siaPressurizerWaterVolume,ft~SGSecondaryMass,ibmReactorTripDelay,secTurbineTripDelay,secPressurizerPressureforSI,siaPressurizerPressureforReactorTrip,psiaSGRelievePressure,psiaSISPumpDelay,secAFWDelay,secAFWFlowRate,gpmAFWTemerature,4FfDecayHeatWCAP-10698BASECASE22507501077592.00.31864196011001260183940100'tANS,WCAP-10698CONSERVATIVE22208681185350.00.01889198510500.00.01839120120%ANSWCAP-11668GINNA22208001032562.00.31750190210600.00.0800120120%ANSItshouldbenotedthatthemethodologyofWCAP-10698-P-Aprovidesabenchmarkagainstthe1982Ginnatuberuptureincident,and,therefore,itsapplicabilitytoGinnaisexplicit.Therefore,thiscontingencyissatisfied.Basedontheabove,themethodologydescribedinWCAP-10698-P-AcanbeappliedtoGinna.WCAP-11668(enclosed)providestheresultsofthisapplication,anddemonstratestheacceptabilityofImprovedTechnicalSpecificationcoolantactivitylimitsforGinna.Therefore,theproposedamendmentdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandwillnotadverselyaffectorendangerthehealthandsafetyofthegeneralpublic.
E.SignificantzardsConsiderationEvaluaionTheproposedchanges~totheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdiscussedbelow:OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesdonotaffectanyaccidentinitiatorsandthereforetheprobabilityofanyaccidentisnotincreased.Consequencesofthechangesareanalyzedandshownacceptableintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP-11668,SectionIII.2~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.Theproposedchangesinvolvenophysicalmodificationstotheplant;therefore,nonewaccidentcanbepostulated.3~OperationofGinnaStationinaccordancewiththeproposedchangesdoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety,asnomarginofsafetyisreducedbytheproposedchanges,asshowninWCAP-11668.Basedupontheaboveinformation,ithasbeendeterminedthattheproposedchangestotheGinnaStationTechnicalSpecificationsdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,doesnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,anddoesnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.Therefore,itisconcludedthattheproposedchangesmeettherequirementsof10CFR50.92(c)anddonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.F.EnvironmentalConsiderationRGGEhasevaluatedtheproposedchangesanddeterminedthat:1.ThechangesdonotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsiderationasdocumentedinSectionEabove;2~Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantchangeinthetypesorsignificantincreaseintheamountsofanyeffluentsthatmaybereleasedoffsiteasdemonstratedintheenclosedanalysis,WCAP11668.3.Thechangesdonotinvolveasignificantincreaseinindividualorcumulativeoccupationalradiationexposuresincethechangedoesnotaffectallowablelimits.Accordingly,theproposedchangesmeettheeligibilitycriteriaforcategoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR
.00<<4l 51.22(c)(9).Therefore,pursuantto10CFR51.22(h),anenvironmentalassessmentoftheproposedchangesisnotrequired.References(a):NRCLetter,C.RossitoA.Ladieu(WOG),"AcceptanceforReferencingofLicensingTopicalReportWCAP-10698...",March30,1987.(b):NUREG-0916,"SafetyEvaluationReportRelatedtotheRestartofR.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant",May1982.4(c):RG&ELetter,R.MecredytoA.Johnson(NRC),"EmergencyResponseCapability...",October14,1992.(d):NRCLetter,A.JohnsontoR.Mecredy(RGGE),EmergencyResponseCapability-ConformancetoRegulatoryGuide1.97,revision3",February24,1993.