Information Notice 2001-06, Centrifugal Charging Pump Thrust Bearing Damage Not Detected Due to Inadequate Assessment of Oil Analysis Results and Selection of Pump Surveillance Points: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555-0001May11,2001NRCINFORMATIONNOTICE2001-06:CENTRIFUGALCHARGINGPUMPTHRUSTBEARINGDAMAGENOTDETECTEDDUETO INADEQUATEASSESSMENTOFOILANALYSIS RESULTSANDSELECTIONOFPUMP SURVEILLANCEPOINTS | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555-0001May11,2001NRCINFORMATIONNOTICE2001-06:CENTRIFUGALCHARGINGPUMPTHRUSTBEARINGDAMAGENOTDETECTEDDUETO INADEQUATEASSESSMENTOFOILANALYSIS RESULTSANDSELECTIONOFPUMP SURVEILLANCEPOINTS | ||
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OverallvibrationmeasurementsofeachpumpbearingaretakenasspecifiedbytheCode.The SHNPISTprogramisinaccordancewithanearlierversionoftheCode,whichrequirespump testingtobeconductedeverythreemonthsatreferencepointsofoperationreadilyduplicated duringsubsequenttests.Pumphydraulicperformanceisassessedbycomparingcurrent performancewithreferencevaluesestablishedwhenthepumpisknowntobeoperating acceptably.Pumpmechanicalperformanceisassessedlikehydraulicperformance,unlessthe specifiedmultipleofthemeasuredoverallvibrationreferencevalueexceedstheabsolute vibrationacceptancecriterion.NeithertheCodenortheregulationsrequireanyspecificpumpconditionmonitoringactivitiestobeperformedonsafety-relatedpumps.However,theNRChasobservedduringinspection activitiesthatmanyUScommercialnuclearpowerplantshavesometypeofcondition monitoringprogramfortheirrotatingmachinery.Theseprogramsusuallyincludebothsafety- relatedandnon-safety-relatedequipment.Becausenoregulationscovertheseprograms,the testingperformed,theexaminationscompleted,andtheacceptancecriteriausedforeach conditionmonitoringactivityvarywidely.TheEPRILubricationGuideincludesinformationonthetestingandanalysisoflubricants.Theguideidentifiesparticlesizeandwear-metalcontentaskeypropertiestoanalyze.Theguide alsoprovides"classic"warninglimitsforcertainmeasuredproperties.Theguidedoesnot recommendaspecificwarninglimitforparticlecount.However,theguideemphasizestrending criticalpropertiesofaspecificapplicationandestablishingappropriatewarninglimits.When theselimitsareexceededandtheresultsareverified,theguiderecommendsoilreplacement andfurtherstudyifnecessary.TheNRChasauthorizedalternativestotheCodevibrationrequirementsbasedontheperformanceofpumpconditionmonitoringactivities.Forexample,aspartofanalternativeto theCodevibrationacceptancecriterion,onefacilitycommittedtoimplementaplant-specific pumpconditionmonitoringprogramforcertainsafety-relatedpumps.TheNRChasdetermined thatthisproposedalternativedemonstratesanacceptablelevelofqualityandsafet IN2001-06Page4of5DiscussionAkeyfactorinthefailuretodiscoverthedamagedbearingbeforedisassemblywasnotactivelypursuingtherootcauseoftheabnormallyhighparticlecountintheSeptember19,1999,oil sample.TheEPRIguideimpliesthatparticleslessthan10micronsinsizearegeneratedfrom | OverallvibrationmeasurementsofeachpumpbearingaretakenasspecifiedbytheCode.The SHNPISTprogramisinaccordancewithanearlierversionoftheCode,whichrequirespump testingtobeconductedeverythreemonthsatreferencepointsofoperationreadilyduplicated duringsubsequenttests.Pumphydraulicperformanceisassessedbycomparingcurrent performancewithreferencevaluesestablishedwhenthepumpisknowntobeoperating acceptably.Pumpmechanicalperformanceisassessedlikehydraulicperformance,unlessthe specifiedmultipleofthemeasuredoverallvibrationreferencevalueexceedstheabsolute vibrationacceptancecriterion.NeithertheCodenortheregulationsrequireanyspecificpumpconditionmonitoringactivitiestobeperformedonsafety-relatedpumps.However,theNRChasobservedduringinspection activitiesthatmanyUScommercialnuclearpowerplantshavesometypeofcondition monitoringprogramfortheirrotatingmachinery.Theseprogramsusuallyincludebothsafety- relatedandnon-safety-relatedequipment.Becausenoregulationscovertheseprograms,the testingperformed,theexaminationscompleted,andtheacceptancecriteriausedforeach conditionmonitoringactivityvarywidely.TheEPRILubricationGuideincludesinformationonthetestingandanalysisoflubricants.Theguideidentifiesparticlesizeandwear-metalcontentaskeypropertiestoanalyze.Theguide alsoprovides"classic"warninglimitsforcertainmeasuredproperties.Theguidedoesnot recommendaspecificwarninglimitforparticlecount.However,theguideemphasizestrending criticalpropertiesofaspecificapplicationandestablishingappropriatewarninglimits.When theselimitsareexceededandtheresultsareverified,theguiderecommendsoilreplacement andfurtherstudyifnecessary.TheNRChasauthorizedalternativestotheCodevibrationrequirementsbasedontheperformanceofpumpconditionmonitoringactivities.Forexample,aspartofanalternativeto theCodevibrationacceptancecriterion,onefacilitycommittedtoimplementaplant-specific pumpconditionmonitoringprogramforcertainsafety-relatedpumps.TheNRChasdetermined thatthisproposedalternativedemonstratesanacceptablelevelofqualityandsafet IN2001-06Page4of5DiscussionAkeyfactorinthefailuretodiscoverthedamagedbearingbeforedisassemblywasnotactivelypursuingtherootcauseoftheabnormallyhighparticlecountintheSeptember19,1999,oil sample.TheEPRIguideimpliesthatparticleslessthan10micronsinsizearegeneratedfrom | ||
"benignwear."Theguidedoesnotdiscussthesignificanceofchangesinwearparticle concentration.However,theguidedoesdiscusstrendingofparameters.SHNPperformed spectroscopicanalysisofeachsampleandtrendedtheresultsofthesetests.Thelowweight percentofthewearparticleswasapparentlythereasonwhytheelementalanalysisdidnot detectthepresenceofbearingmaterial.Ferrographyandelectronmicroscopicscan examinationwereconductedafterthediscoveryofthebearingdegradationandthereforewere notafactorindiagnosingtheelevatedparticlecount.SHNPelectedtocontinuewitharoutine oilsamplingscheduledespitethehighparticlecountandthelackofaplausiblerootcausefor thiscondition.Amoreaggressiveoilsamplingschedule(e.g.,weekly)wouldlikelyhave revealedtheseverelydegradedoutboardthrustbearingseveralmonthsbeforethepumpwas disassembled.Inserviceandtechnicalspecificationsurveillancetestingdidnotindicatethattheoutboardthrustbearingwasseverelydamaged.Thepurposeofpumpinservicetestingistoidentify degradationbeforethepump'sperformanceofitssafety-relatedfunctionisimpaired.Forthe chargingpumpsattheSHNP,thepurposeoftechnicalspecificationtestingistoverifythatthe pumpwilldeliveraspecificflowattherequiredtotaldevelopedhead.Thefailureofbothtests toindicatebearingdegradationappearstohavebiasedthedecisiontonotinvestigatethe elevatedparticlecount.Informationprovidedbythevendorrevealedareversalinthedirectionofthepumpaxialforceasafunctionofthepumpflowrate.ThispumpdesigncharacteristicwasunknowntoSHNP personnelbeforetheydiscoveredtheseverelydegradedbearingandthentalkedwiththe vendor.TheCodedoesnotrequireSHNPtoaccountforthisdesignconditionthroughtesting. | "benignwear."Theguidedoesnotdiscussthesignificanceofchangesinwearparticle concentration.However,theguidedoesdiscusstrendingofparameters.SHNPperformed spectroscopicanalysisofeachsampleandtrendedtheresultsofthesetests.Thelowweight percentofthewearparticleswasapparentlythereasonwhytheelementalanalysisdidnot detectthepresenceofbearingmaterial.Ferrographyandelectronmicroscopicscan examinationwereconductedafterthediscoveryofthebearingdegradationandthereforewere notafactorindiagnosingtheelevatedparticlecount.SHNPelectedtocontinuewitharoutine oilsamplingscheduledespitethehighparticlecountandthelackofaplausiblerootcausefor thiscondition.Amoreaggressiveoilsamplingschedule(e.g.,weekly)wouldlikelyhave revealedtheseverelydegradedoutboardthrustbearingseveralmonthsbeforethepumpwas disassembled.Inserviceandtechnicalspecificationsurveillancetestingdidnotindicatethattheoutboardthrustbearingwasseverelydamaged.Thepurposeofpumpinservicetestingistoidentify degradationbeforethepump'sperformanceofitssafety-relatedfunctionisimpaired.Forthe chargingpumpsattheSHNP,thepurposeoftechnicalspecificationtestingistoverifythatthe pumpwilldeliveraspecificflowattherequiredtotaldevelopedhead.Thefailureofbothtests toindicatebearingdegradationappearstohavebiasedthedecisiontonotinvestigatethe elevatedparticlecount.Informationprovidedbythevendorrevealedareversalinthedirectionofthepumpaxialforceasafunctionofthepumpflowrate.ThispumpdesigncharacteristicwasunknowntoSHNP personnelbeforetheydiscoveredtheseverelydegradedbearingandthentalkedwiththe vendor.TheCodedoesnotrequireSHNPtoaccountforthisdesignconditionthroughtesting. | ||
Revision as of 16:50, 4 March 2018
ML011070643 | |
Person / Time | |
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Issue date: | 05/11/2001 |
From: | Marsh L B Operational Experience and Non-Power Reactors Branch |
To: | |
References | |
IN-01-006 | |
Download: ML011070643 (7) | |
UNITEDSTATESNUCLEARREGULATORYCOMMISSIONOFFICEOFNUCLEARREACTORREGULATIONWASHINGTON,D.C.20555-0001May11,2001NRCINFORMATIONNOTICE2001-06:CENTRIFUGALCHARGINGPUMPTHRUSTBEARINGDAMAGENOTDETECTEDDUETO INADEQUATEASSESSMENTOFOILANALYSIS RESULTSANDSELECTIONOFPUMP SURVEILLANCEPOINTS
Addressees
Allholdersofoperatinglicensesfornuclearpowerreactors,exceptthosewhohavepermanentlyceasedoperationsandhavecertifiedthatfuelhasbeenpermanentlyremoved fromthereactor.
Purpose
TheU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)isissuingthisinformationnoticetoalertaddresseesthatinadequateassessmentofpumpoilanalysisresults,combinedwith surveillancetestingwhichdoesnotmonitorallrelevantpumpoperatingconditions,mayallow severepumpdegradationtogoundetected.Itisexpectedthatrecipientswillreviewthe informationforapplicabilitytotheirfacilitiesandconsideractions,asappropriate,toavoid problems.However,thesuggestionscontainedinthisinformationnoticearenotNRC requirements;therefore,nospecificactionorwrittenresponseisrequired.DescriptionofCircumstancesOnJune19,2000,whiledisassemblingtheCcharging/safetyinjectionpump(CSIP)toreplaceamechanicalseal,ShearonHarrisNuclearPlant(SHNP)personneldiscoveredsignificant damagetotheoutboardthrustbearing.Furtherexaminationrevealedthatthebabbittmaterial onthebearingshoesofthismulti-padthrustbearinghadmeltedandre-solidifiedwithinthe thrustbearingcagearea.Onboththeshoesandthesleeveofthethrustbearing,radialwearin thedirectionofnormalpumprotationwasindicativeofmetal-to-metalcontactbetweenthetwo surfaces.Theinboardradialbearingandshaftalsohadminorwear.SHNPstatedina licenseeeventreport(Reference1)thatthemostprobablecauseofthedamagewasa momentarylossoflubricationflowtotheoutboardthrustbearing.Aninadequatefill-and-ventof thepump,whichmayhavecausedamomentaryincreaseintheaxialthrustontheoutboard thrustbearing,wasalsogivenasapotentialrootcause.ElementalanalysisofaroutinepumpbearingoilsampletakenonSeptember19,1999,usingadirectcurrentplasma(DCP)spectrometer,revealeda40-foldincreaseintheparticlecountin therangeof5to10micronsovertheprevioussampletakenonMay11,1999.(Theparticle countincreasedfrom15,800to660,000countsper100millilitersample.)AllothertestedML011070643 IN2001-06Page2of5parameterswerenormal.SHNPreviewedtheElectricPowerResearchInstitute(EPRI)LubricationGuide(Reference2)andconcludedthatthesizerangeofthesewearparticleswas consistentwithbenignwear.ThebearingoilintheCSIPwasreplacedonDecember21,1999, andSHNPcontinuedsamplingat6-monthintervals.Thenextoilsample,takenon February23,2000,alsoshowedahighparticlecountinthe5to10micronrange.Trace amountsofironandtinwerealsodetectedforthefirsttime.Theanalysisofanotheroilsample takenonJune18,2000,foundthatthelevelsofallparametersweresimilartothelevelsinthe February23,2000,sample.EachCSIPatSHNPisaPacificModel21/2RLIJ,11-stage,centrifugalpumpmanufacturedbyFlowserveCorporation,formerlyIngersoll-DresserPumpCompany.TheCCSIPisthestandby pump.Duringtheperiodinwhichhighparticlecountsinthethreeoilsamplesweredetected, theCpumpwasintermittentlyinservicetosupportplantoperations.Surveillancetesting,as requiredbytheSHNPinservicetestingprogramandtheSHNPTechnicalSpecifications,was performedontheCpumpduringthisperiod.Inservicetests,includingvibrationmeasurement, wereconductedduringplantoperationonNovember13,1999,andJanuary3,2000,withthe pumpoperatingatthenormalchargingflowrateofapproximately90gallonsperminute(gpm).
PerformancedatafrombothtestsindicatedtheCCSIPmettheestablishedpumphydraulic andmechanicalacceptancecriteriaintheAmericanSocietyofMechanicalEngineers(ASME)
CodeforOperationandMaintenanceofNuclearPowerPlants(OMCode),andnoadverse trendswerenoted.OnApril23,2000,arefuelingoutagetesttosatisfytheSHNPtechnical specificationswasperformedsuccessfully,withthepumpachievingaflowrateof609gpm.Subsequenttothediscoveryoftheseverelydegradedoutboardpumpthrustbearing,discussionswiththepumpmanufacturerrevealedthatatflowratesbetweenapproximately250 and600gpm,thenetaxialthrustofeachSHNPCSIPpumpisinthedirectionoftheoutboard thrustbearing.Therefore,SHNPconcludedthatduringnormalplantoperationandsurveillance testing,theoutboardthrustbearinghadbeeneithernotloadedoronlylightlyloaded.In addition,SHNPcouldnotassessthecapabilityoftheCCSIPtoperformitsfunctionduringa small-break,loss-of-coolantaccident,inwhichthepumpaxialthrustwouldhavefullyloadedthe outboardthrustbearing.InresponsetoanNRCnoticeofviolation(Reference3),SHNPdescribedcorrectivestepseithercompletedorinprogresstoaddressthisissue.Theseincluded(1)counselingoperators onconsequencesofimproperpumpfill-and-ventoftheCSIP,(2)establishingoilanalysis criteriaforincreasedlubricantparticlecounts,(3)reinforcingexpectationsfordispositionof abnormalindications,(4)samplingCSIPlubricatingoilquarterlyinsteadofsemi-annually, (5)revisingthemaintenanceproceduretoensurethattheCSIPlubricatingoilsystemwill functionasexpected,and(6)implementingadesignmodificationtoinstalltemperatureand vibrationproximityprobesoneachCSI IN2001-06Page3of5NRCRequirementsandIndustryGuidanceandPracticesonPumpConditionMonitoringThecurrentrequirementsforinservicetestingofsafety-relatedpumpsarespecifiedinSection50.55aofTitle10oftheCodeofFederalRegulations(10CFR50.55a),"Codesand Standards."Forplantswhicharerequiredtoupdatetheirinservicetesting(IST)programsafter September22,2000,whichisoneyearaftertherecentchangeto10CFR50.55a(Reference 4),Subsection(b)(3)requiresthatsafety-relatedpumpsbetestedtothe1995Editionandthe 1996AddendaoftheASMEOMCode.TheCoderequiresthatsafety-relatedpumpsbetested bienniallyat+/-20%oftheirdesignflowrate,andeverythreemonthsatspecificreferencepoints.
OverallvibrationmeasurementsofeachpumpbearingaretakenasspecifiedbytheCode.The SHNPISTprogramisinaccordancewithanearlierversionoftheCode,whichrequirespump testingtobeconductedeverythreemonthsatreferencepointsofoperationreadilyduplicated duringsubsequenttests.Pumphydraulicperformanceisassessedbycomparingcurrent performancewithreferencevaluesestablishedwhenthepumpisknowntobeoperating acceptably.Pumpmechanicalperformanceisassessedlikehydraulicperformance,unlessthe specifiedmultipleofthemeasuredoverallvibrationreferencevalueexceedstheabsolute vibrationacceptancecriterion.NeithertheCodenortheregulationsrequireanyspecificpumpconditionmonitoringactivitiestobeperformedonsafety-relatedpumps.However,theNRChasobservedduringinspection activitiesthatmanyUScommercialnuclearpowerplantshavesometypeofcondition monitoringprogramfortheirrotatingmachinery.Theseprogramsusuallyincludebothsafety- relatedandnon-safety-relatedequipment.Becausenoregulationscovertheseprograms,the testingperformed,theexaminationscompleted,andtheacceptancecriteriausedforeach conditionmonitoringactivityvarywidely.TheEPRILubricationGuideincludesinformationonthetestingandanalysisoflubricants.Theguideidentifiesparticlesizeandwear-metalcontentaskeypropertiestoanalyze.Theguide alsoprovides"classic"warninglimitsforcertainmeasuredproperties.Theguidedoesnot recommendaspecificwarninglimitforparticlecount.However,theguideemphasizestrending criticalpropertiesofaspecificapplicationandestablishingappropriatewarninglimits.When theselimitsareexceededandtheresultsareverified,theguiderecommendsoilreplacement andfurtherstudyifnecessary.TheNRChasauthorizedalternativestotheCodevibrationrequirementsbasedontheperformanceofpumpconditionmonitoringactivities.Forexample,aspartofanalternativeto theCodevibrationacceptancecriterion,onefacilitycommittedtoimplementaplant-specific pumpconditionmonitoringprogramforcertainsafety-relatedpumps.TheNRChasdetermined thatthisproposedalternativedemonstratesanacceptablelevelofqualityandsafet IN2001-06Page4of5DiscussionAkeyfactorinthefailuretodiscoverthedamagedbearingbeforedisassemblywasnotactivelypursuingtherootcauseoftheabnormallyhighparticlecountintheSeptember19,1999,oil sample.TheEPRIguideimpliesthatparticleslessthan10micronsinsizearegeneratedfrom
"benignwear."Theguidedoesnotdiscussthesignificanceofchangesinwearparticle concentration.However,theguidedoesdiscusstrendingofparameters.SHNPperformed spectroscopicanalysisofeachsampleandtrendedtheresultsofthesetests.Thelowweight percentofthewearparticleswasapparentlythereasonwhytheelementalanalysisdidnot detectthepresenceofbearingmaterial.Ferrographyandelectronmicroscopicscan examinationwereconductedafterthediscoveryofthebearingdegradationandthereforewere notafactorindiagnosingtheelevatedparticlecount.SHNPelectedtocontinuewitharoutine oilsamplingscheduledespitethehighparticlecountandthelackofaplausiblerootcausefor thiscondition.Amoreaggressiveoilsamplingschedule(e.g.,weekly)wouldlikelyhave revealedtheseverelydegradedoutboardthrustbearingseveralmonthsbeforethepumpwas disassembled.Inserviceandtechnicalspecificationsurveillancetestingdidnotindicatethattheoutboardthrustbearingwasseverelydamaged.Thepurposeofpumpinservicetestingistoidentify degradationbeforethepump'sperformanceofitssafety-relatedfunctionisimpaired.Forthe chargingpumpsattheSHNP,thepurposeoftechnicalspecificationtestingistoverifythatthe pumpwilldeliveraspecificflowattherequiredtotaldevelopedhead.Thefailureofbothtests toindicatebearingdegradationappearstohavebiasedthedecisiontonotinvestigatethe elevatedparticlecount.Informationprovidedbythevendorrevealedareversalinthedirectionofthepumpaxialforceasafunctionofthepumpflowrate.ThispumpdesigncharacteristicwasunknowntoSHNP personnelbeforetheydiscoveredtheseverelydegradedbearingandthentalkedwiththe vendor.TheCodedoesnotrequireSHNPtoaccountforthisdesignconditionthroughtesting.
Thetechnicalspecificationfullflowtestafterthefirstdetectionofthehighparticlecountneither detectedthisconditionnorcausedacatastrophicfailureofthepump.Thisissueillustratesthat theassessmentofsafety-relatedpumpperformanceisdependentnotonlyonverifying successfulsurveillancetesting,butalsoonunderstanding(1)pumpandsystemdesignand performancecharacteristics,(2)performancetestingresults,and(3)theresultsofcondition monitoringactivitiesandtheircorrelationwithknownpumpdesigncharacteristicsand performancetestresult IN2001-06Page5of5GenericImplicationsIftrendsofconditionmonitoringdataarenotactivelyinvestigatedwhentheydeviatefromanestablishedbaseline,alicenseemayoverlooksignificantpumpdegradationthatisnotdetected byperformancetesting.Thisinformationnoticerequiresnospecificactionorwrittenresponse.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutthisnotice,pleasecontactoneofthetechnicalcontactslistedbeloworthe appropriateOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR)projectmanager./RA/LedyardB.Marsh,Chief EventsAssessment,GenericCommunicationsandNon-PowerReactorsBranchDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontacts:J.Colaccino,NRRBobHagar,RegionII301-415-2753919-362-0601 E-mail:jxc1@nrc.govE-mail:rch2@nrc.gov:
Attachments:
1.ListofReferences 2.ListofRecentlyIssuedInformationNotices IN2001-06Page5of5GenericImplicationsIftrendsofconditionmonitoringdataarenotactivelyinvestigatedwhentheydeviatefromanestablishedbaseline,alicenseemayoverlooksignificantpumpdegradationthatisnotdetected byperformancetesting.Thisinformationnoticerequiresnospecificactionorwrittenresponse.Ifyouhaveanyquestionsaboutthisnotice,pleasecontactoneofthetechnicalcontactslistedbeloworthe appropriateOfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation(NRR)projectmanager./RA/LedyardB.Marsh,Chief EventsAssessment,GenericCommunicationsandNon-PowerReactorsBranchDivisionofRegulatoryImprovementPrograms OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulationTechnicalcontacts:J.Colaccino,NRRBobHagar,RegionII301-415-2753919-362-0601 E-mail:jxc1@nrc.govE-mail:rch2@nrc.gov
Attachments:
1.ListofReferences 2.ListofRecentlyIssuedInformationNoticesDistribution:INReadingFilePUBLICADAMSACCESSIONNUMBER:ML011070643Template#=NRR-052ÿPubliclyAvailableNon-PubliclyAvailableSensitiveÿNon-SensitiveOFFICETechEditor)REXB:DRIPEMEB:DEEMEB:DENAMEPKleene*RHagar*JColaccino*DTerao*DATE04/09/200104/09/200104/10/200104/18/2001OFFICEEMEB:DEREXB:DRIPD:DEREXB:DRIPNAMEGImbro*JTappert/txkfor*JStrosnider*LDATE04/18/200104/24/200105/03/2001OFFICIALRECORDCOPY Attachment1Page1of1References1.ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlantUnit1,DocketNumber50-400,LicenseeEventReport2000-007-01,"TechnicalSpecificationsViolationDuetoInoperableCharging SafetyInjectionPump,"datedMarch12,2001.2.NP-4916-R2,ElectricPowerResearchInstitute/NuclearMaintenanceApplicationsCenterLubricationGuide,Revision2,publishedFebruary1995.3.ShearonHarrisNuclearPowerPlantUnit1,DocketNumber05000-400,ReplytoNoticeofViolation(NRCInspectionReportNumbers50-400/00-03,50-400/00-10)dated March2,2001.4.FederalRegister,Volume64,Number183,"IndustryCodesandStandards;AmendedRequirements,"(10CFRPart50),issuedSeptember22,199 ______________________________________________________________________________________OL=OperatingLicense CP=ConstructionPermitAttachment2IN2001-06 Page1of1LISTOFRECENTLYISSUEDNRCINFORMATIONNOTICES_____________________________________________________________________________________InformationDateof NoticeNo.SubjectIssuanceIssuedto______________________________________________________________________________________2001-05Through-WallCircumferentialCrackingofReactorPressure VesselHeadControlRodDrive MechanismPenetration NozzlesatOconeeNuclear Station,Unit304/30/01Allholdersofoperatinglicensesforpressurizedwaternuclear powerreactorsexceptthosewho haveceasedoperationsandhave certifiedthatfuelhasbeen permanentlyremovedfromthe reactorvessel2001-04NeglectedFireExtinguisherMaintenanceCausesFatality04/11/01Allholdersoflicensesfornuclearpower,research,andtestreactors andfuelcyclefacilities2001-03IncidentReportingRequirementsforRadiography Licensees04/06/01Allindustrialradiographylicensees2001-02SummaryofFitness-for-DutyProgramPerformanceReports forCalendarYears1998and 199903/28/01Allholdersofoperatinglicensesfornuclearpowerreactors,and licenseesauthorizedtopossess oruseformulaquantitiesof strategicspecialnuclearmaterial (SSNM)ortotransportformula quantitiesofSSNM2001-01TheImportanceofAccurateInventoryControlstoPrevent theUnauthorizedPossession ofRadioactiveMaterial03/26/01Allmateriallicensees2000-17,Supp.2CrackinWeldAreaofReactorCoolantSystemHotLegPiping atV.C.Summer02/28/01Allholdersofoperatinglicensesfornuclearpowerreactorsexcept thosewhohasceasedoperations andhavecertifiedthatfuelhas permanentlyremovedfrom reactorvessel2000-22MedicalMisadministrationsCausedbyHumanErrors InvolvingGammaStereotactic Radiosurgery(GAMMAKNIFE)12/18/00Allmedicaluselicenseesauthorizedtoconductgamma stereotacticradiosurgery treatments