ENS 40452: Difference between revisions
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| event date = 01/16/2004 00:20 CST | | event date = 01/16/2004 00:20 CST | ||
| last update date = 01/16/2004 | | last update date = 01/16/2004 | ||
| title = Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due | | title = Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Both Trains of Safety Injection Declared Inoperable | ||
| event text = The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: | | event text = The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: | ||
Inspections of the 'A' SI [Safety Injection] Pump lube oil cooler today per PMP [Plant Maintenance Procedure] 33-01 revealed silt and lake weed accumulation at tube pass inlets. Calculation C11423 Rev. 0, Addendum A was recently performed to determine service water flow and temperature requirements for the safety injection pump lube oil coolers. The calculation provides the required service water flow rate based on number of tubes blocked and SW [Service Water] temperature. At 1640 [hrs][CST], 1/15/04, it was reported that a visual inspection was performed on the 'A' SI Pump HX [Heat Exchanger] tube inlet and 17 of 20 tubes were found to be blocked. The flow for the 'A' HX was 3 - 3.8 gpm and after cleaning elevated to 5.95 - 6.05 gpm. This concern prompted an investigation into 'B' SI Pump HX and a flow test was performed at 1951 [hrs] on 1/15/04. The results from this test was no flow from 17 of the 20 tubes as seen from the outlet of the HX and a similar flow rate as seen in HX 'A'. The determination was made that this had potentially made both trains of SI Pump HX inoperable and that this needed to be reported under GNP 11.08.04 -'Reportability Determinations'. The Calculation (C11423) used data that was contradictory to current Surveillance Procedure acceptance criteria and used values that may not be indicative of post accident conditions. In a teleconference with Senior Plant Management, it was determined that future operability of the SI Pump lube oil HX cannot be verified and that both trains would be declared inoperable at time 0020 [hrs] [on] 1/16/04. This is in contradiction with the plant Technical Specification,3.3.b Emergency Core Cooling, and placed the plant in the standard shutdown sequence. | Inspections of the 'A' SI [Safety Injection] Pump lube oil cooler today per PMP [Plant Maintenance Procedure] 33-01 revealed silt and lake weed accumulation at tube pass inlets. Calculation C11423 Rev. 0, Addendum A was recently performed to determine service water flow and temperature requirements for the safety injection pump lube oil coolers. The calculation provides the required service water flow rate based on number of tubes blocked and SW [Service Water] temperature. At 1640 [hrs][CST], 1/15/04, it was reported that a visual inspection was performed on the 'A' SI Pump HX [Heat Exchanger] tube inlet and 17 of 20 tubes were found to be blocked. The flow for the 'A' HX was 3 - 3.8 gpm and after cleaning elevated to 5.95 - 6.05 gpm. This concern prompted an investigation into 'B' SI Pump HX and a flow test was performed at 1951 [hrs] on 1/15/04. The results from this test was no flow from 17 of the 20 tubes as seen from the outlet of the HX and a similar flow rate as seen in HX 'A'. The determination was made that this had potentially made both trains of SI Pump HX inoperable and that this needed to be reported under GNP 11.08.04 -'Reportability Determinations'. The Calculation (C11423) used data that was contradictory to current Surveillance Procedure acceptance criteria and used values that may not be indicative of post accident conditions. In a teleconference with Senior Plant Management, it was determined that future operability of the SI Pump lube oil HX cannot be verified and that both trains would be declared inoperable at time 0020 [hrs] [on] 1/16/04. This is in contradiction with the plant Technical Specification,3.3.b Emergency Core Cooling, and placed the plant in the standard shutdown sequence. | ||
Latest revision as of 21:24, 1 March 2018
| Where | |
|---|---|
Kewaunee  Wisconsin (NRC Region 3) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-4.32 h-0.18 days <br />-0.0257 weeks <br />-0.00592 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | James Baptist 02:01 Jan 16, 2004 |
| NRC Officer: | Howie Crouch |
| Last Updated: | Jan 16, 2004 |
| 40452 - NRC Website
| |
Kewaunee with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | |